Probationer Sentenced to 8 Years in Prison for Failing Polygraph

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Caleb Beames reports for television station KTRE on the case of a probationer in Texas who has been sentenced to eight years in prison, largely on the ground that she failed three polygraph screening interrogations. Such judicial reliance on polygraph outcomes is entirely inappropriate, because polygraphy has no scientific basis:

LUFKIN, TX (KTRE) – A former Huntington teacher who was convicted in 2008 for having an improper relationship with a 17-year-old received an eight-year prison sentence Thursday morning for violating the conditions of her probation.

During Thursday’s probation revocation hearing in the 217th Judicial District Court, the only person that took the stand was a polygraph expert who testified that Melissa Williams failed three separate polygraph tests.

Friends and family of Melissa Williams on Wednesday described the former Huntington ISD teacher as a good person that was working hard to get her life back on track after being convicted in 2008 for having an improper relationship with a 17 year-old.

Williams, 46, of Conroe, was given probation but turned herself in last month after allegedly violating her probation terms.  In Wednesday’s probation hearing, Lisa Page, a supervision officer for Angelina County’s probation department, argued that there was enough evidence to revoke her probation. Those little things included accessing the Internet without supervision, possession of pornography, having direct contact with a child under 17 without supervision, possession of alcohol, and association with a known felon.  However, the biggest issue was the fact that Williams failed three separate polygraph exams while she was taking classes at a rehab center in the Houston area.

Page said “there were a lot of little things that just added up.”

Page’s statements were countered by Williams’ current probation officer in Montgomery County, Chad Alonzo.

“She has had no problems in the last year… she’s not a threat to the local community,” Alonzo said. “She’s in the top 10 percent of all the people I am assigned to.”

In her own defense, Williams argued that she had made some mistakes since being on probation, but they were minor offenses and she took the proper action and reported them to her probation officer. She also said that the counseling classes have helped and she would go back if allowed.

The final witness to take the stand was Polygraph Examiner Bobby Rachel.

Rachel said, “She was deceptive on all 3 polygraphs. The results of all the test were deceptive.”

Shortly after his questioning the judge sentenced Williams to 8 years in prison.

Supervision officer Lisa Page said she is satisfied but admits it was a tricky case.

” Her being female, sometimes violations are overlooked or their not noticed,” she said.

District Attorney Clyde Herrington was also satisfied with the sentence.

“She was on a Ten year probation, so that was pretty close to the maximum,” Herrington said.

NRO Threatens Polygraph Examiners Who Raise Concerns

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In a new article about malfeasance at the National Reconnaissance Office, McClatchy correspondent Marisa Taylor reports on the NRO’s reaction to her recent reporting based on interviews with whistleblowers from the intelligence agency’s polygraph unit. Excerpt:

After McClatchy published stories raising questions about the National Reconnaissance Office’s polygraph program in July based on whistleblower allegations, top agency officials told polygraphers in a meeting that the accusations McClatchy detailed were unfounded and based on incidents that were taken out of context, said one person familiar with the meeting. One official vowed to “take action” against polygraphers named and unnamed who’d cooperated with the reporter, said the source, who asked not to be named. The statement was taken as a threat that polygraphers who raise similar concerns about the agency’s practices – even to the inspector general – would be punished or criminally prosecuted as leakers. At the same meeting, polygraphers then were asked whether they had any problems with the way the program was being run. “You could hear crickets,” the source told McClatchy.

The inspector general recently agreed to investigate the National Reconnaissance Office’s polygraph program, but “people are going to be reluctant to talk with NRO’s inspector general now,” said the source, who was afraid to be identified for fear of being seen as cooperating with the media. Among some employees, the agency’s inspector general office is perceived as overly aligned with the CIA and out to protect the CIA’s interests rather than root out government misconduct. In an unusual relationship, the CIA shares responsibility with the Defense Department in overseeing the National Reconnaissance Office, which is staffed by CIA and Air Force employees.

In addition, McClatchy has published a letter dated August 13, 2012 from Senator Chuck Grassley to NRO Inspector General Lanie D’Allesandro asking that her investigation address allegations of polygraph violations, allegations of unreported criminal conduct, and retaliation for whistleblowing.

Chris French on Polygraph Screening of Sex Offenders

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Professor of psychology Chris French writes for the Guardian on why mandatory polygraph screening of convicted sex offenders is a bad public policy choice. Excerpt:

It is clear that offenders only have to spend five minutes on Google to realise that experts generally agree that polygraph testing is in fact not a reliable technique for detecting deception. If such testing becomes mandatory, it is inevitable that this truth about polygraphs will become widely known among offenders. From then on, any effect that unfounded belief in the effectiveness of the technique had in terms of increasing disclosures is likely to disappear.

To make matters worse, techniques exist to beat the test. Once the underlying rationale of the test is understood, steps can be taken to either augment the psychophysiological response to control questions (eg via self-induced physical or mental pain) or else reduce the response to relevant questions (eg using mental training, such as meditation).

 Indeed, polygraphs are easily beaten, and information on how to do so is freely available here on AntiPolygraph.org, among other places. Authorities in the US, UK, and elsewhere would be wise to terminate their misplaced reliance on the Emperor’s-new-clothes technology of polygraph “testing.”

DEA Contractor Sued for Violation of the Employee Polygraph Protection Act

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San Diego City Beat staff writer David Maass reports on the case of 10 translators formerly employed by Metropolitan Interpreters and Translators, a company that provides services to the Drug Enforcement Agency among other federal agencies. The translators were terminated for either failing, having inconclusive results on, or refusing to submit to, polygraph interrogations conducted by DEA polygraph operators. In a federal lawsuit, attorneys for the translators allege (convincingly, in AntiPolygraph.org’s view), that Metropolitan violated the Employee Polygraph Protection Act, which severely restricts the use of polygraphs by private companies. The DEA itself and individual DEA employees may eventually be added to the list of defendants in this case.

Sen. Grassley Calls for DoD IG Inspection of NRO Polygraph Program

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Sen. Charles E. Grassley

In a follow-up to her excellent investigative series on polygraph practices within the National Reconnaissance Office, McClatchy reporter Marisa Taylor writes that Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) thinks that the DoD inspector general should investigate whether NRO is in compliance with DoD polygraph regulations:

WASHINGTON — Pentagon officials are scrambling to look into allegations of abusive polygraph techniques by a spy agency but so far they aren’t heeding calls for a more in-depth investigation.

Pentagon officials met Thursday with the National Reconnaissance Office after a McClatchy investigation found that the spy agency was pressuring its polygraphers to obtain intimate details of the private lives of thousands of job applicants and employees, possibly in violation of the law and Pentagon regulations.

McClatchy found that the National Reconnaissance Office is so intent on extracting confessions of personal or illicit behavior that officials have admonished polygraphers who refused to go after them and rewarded those who did, sometimes with bonuses.

The agency, which oversees the nation’s spy satellites, collects the information for employee security clearances, but it isn’t supposed to be pursuing the more personal information, instead asking directly only about spying, terrorism and the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

Even though it’s aggressively collecting the private disclosures, when people confess to serious crimes such as child molestation they aren’t always arrested or prosecuted, McClatchy’s investigation revealed.

The articles prompted one prominent congressman to call this week for an investigation of the agency’s polygraph program. Sen. Charles Grassley, R-Iowa, said he thought that the Pentagon’s inspector general should look at whether the National Reconnaissance Office was in compliance with Defense Department polygraph rules. The Pentagon oversees the agency’s polygraph program even though the agency is a unique mix of CIA and Air Force employees.

“The polygraphers should have clear rules and regulations about the topics they can and should cover in their work,” Grassley said.

He added that he wanted the inspector general to review how the agency handled confessions to crimes and “make sure those rules are adequate and clearly communicated to employees.”

It should be noted, however, that the DoD inspector general was made aware of the problems with the NRO’s polygraph practices in November 2011. If the DoD IG has not yet conducted an investigation, can it be trusted to do so now? Isn’t more direct Congressional oversight called for at this point?

Taylor goes on to discuss the DoD e-mails received by AntiPolygraph.org, citing Mark Zaid, who represents former NRO polygrapher Mark Phillips. Zaid opines:

“The email traffic conveys the distinct impression that senior officials within the polygraph community do not understand the nature of the specific allegations against NRO’s practices,” he said. “To some extent that is not surprising, given no one with oversight authority in the intelligence community has yet to speak with my client.”

A message thread for discussion of the NRO polygraph matter is available on the AntiPolygraph.org message board. Registration is not required, and anonymous posts are welcome.

 

DoD Reaction to McClatchy Reporting on NRO Polygraph Practices

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AntiPolygraph.org has received a copy of a Department of Defense (DoD) e-mail and attachments (4.4 MB PDF) documenting senior officials’ reaction to McClatchy reporter Marisa Taylor’s investigative series on the National Reconnaissance Organization’s (NRO’s) polygraph practices. Taylor reported that NRO is “pressuring its polygraphers to obtain intimate details of the private lives of thousands of job applicants and employees, pushing the ethical and legal boundaries of a program that’s designed instead to catch spies and terrorists.”

On Wednesday, 11 July 2012, Frank Maietta, who holds the title of Deputy Branch Chief, Credibility Assessment at the Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center (DCHC) forwarded an e-mail from Troy “Toby” Sullivan, the director of counterintelligence in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) to a group of addressees. Titled “NRO Press Article,” Sullivan’s e-mail suggests that a team of individuals be formed to visit NRO and talk about the McClatchy articles.

Sullivan’s e-mail includes (at pp. 4-6 of the PDF) a 3-page document prepared by Michael Porco, Deputy Director, Counterintelligence Functional Services, OUSD(I) summarizing the McClatchy articles. Importantly, Porco’s memo flatly contradicts the NRO’s statement to the McClatchy that a November 2011 on-site inspection of the NRO polygraph program found it to be “in full compliance with [federal] policies and procedures.” Instead, Porco reveals:

During the period November 15-17, 2011, National Center for Credibility Assessment (NCCA) Quality Assurance Program personnel reviewed the program’s activities for the previous two years pursuant to DoD policy. The only discrepancy noted was the improper use of comparison questions.

  •  Have you engaged in any consistent personal behavior unsuitable for access?
  • Have you engaged in any personal behavior unsuitable for access?
  • Have you hidden any personal behavior unsuitable for access?
  • Outside the classified environment, have you ever done anything for which you could be fired?
  • Regarding your personal life, are there any reasons why you should not be considered for a security clearance?
  • In matters not related to security, have you ever done anything for which you could lose your job?

Comparison questions are a necessary component of polygraph testing. They are a technical aspect of the test and are utilized only for diagnostic purposes; they are not evaluated to determine truth or deception nor are they included in formal agency reports

The asking of these questions and their discussion with the examinee could elicit responses from an examinee that would not be consistent with established DoD protocols, therefore their use was directed to be discontinued. These questions were used during the time period of October 2010 – December 2011.  NRO subsequently concurred and terminated the use of these questions.  There was no indication that this practice continued outside the time frame stated above.

Indeed, the aforesaid “comparison” questions (also called “control” questions) seem designed to elicit precisely the kind of personal information that McClatchy reported was being improperly collected at NRO. This raises the question, who ordered the use of these home-brewed control questions and why? This is a question that NRO Polygraph Program Manager Michael McMahon should be required to answer.

The DoD e-mail also also includes (at pp. 7-10 of the PDF) the “final draft” of a memorandum titled “Deterring and Detecting Unauthorized Disclosures, Including Leaks to the Media, Through Strengthened Polygraph Programs” that was to be sent to Director of National Intelligence James Clapper for signature.

AntiPolygraph.org welcomes commentary regarding these documents.

Senate Intelligence Committee Invites Increased Polygraph Screening

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As noted by Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists’ Project on Government Secrecy, “the Senate Intelligence Committee’s markup of the 2013 intelligence authorization bill includes 12 provisions that are intended to combat unauthorized disclosures of classified information.” Among these provisions is a requirement that within 120 days of enactment, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) provide to the Senate and House intelligence committees an assessment of:

“…the practical feasibility of extending the use of the polygraph to additional Executive branch personnel and standardizing the questions used during polygraph examinations regarding disclosure of classified information and contact with the media;”

This is a virtual invitation to the executive branch to expand polygraph screening. It seems likely that in the current political climate, any proposed expansion of polygraph screening that DNI James Clapper might recommend would be approved by Congress. Clapper has already directed that a question about disclosure of classified information to members of the media be incorporated in polygraph screening examinations conducted by US intelligence agencies.

Instead of increasing its reliance on the pseudoscience of polygraphy, Congress should be instructing the DNI to terminate it. As the National Research Council concluded in 2002,“[polygraph testing's] accuracy in distinguishing actual or potential security violators from innocent test takers is insufficient to justify reliance on its use in employee security screening in federal agencies.”