BBC News Magazine on the History of the Lie Detector

On 21 May 2013, the BBC News Magazine published an article titled “The Curious Story of How the Lie Detector Came to Be.” The article briefly traces the development of polygraphy from John Larson’s construction of the first polygraph instrument for the Berkeley, California police department. AntiPolygraph.org co-founder George Maschke is among those interviewed for this article.

Also on 21 May, BBC Radio 4 aired a half-hour program titled “The Truth and Nothing but the Truth” about the history of the lie detector. Dr. Geoff Bunn, who narrates the program, speaks with Northwestern University professor of history Ken Alder, among others. The audio is available on-line and is well worth a listen.

Marisa Taylor on FBI Pre-Employment Polygraph Screening

fbi-polygraphMarisa Taylor reports for McClatchy on the high failure rate of the FBI’s pre-employment polygraph screening program using, among other sources, a 198-page document containing complaints of discrimination associated with the Bureau’s polygraph program. Excerpt:

WASHINGTON — Thousands of job applicants come to FBI offices all across the country every year, eager to work for the top law enforcement agency in the U.S.

But many of them have their hopes dashed, and it’s not because of their work experience or education or criminal records. They’re turned down because they’ve failed their polygraph tests.

The FBI’s policy of barring job candidates who fail their polygraph tests clashes with the view of many scientists that government agencies shouldn’t be relying on polygraph testing to decide whether to hire or fire someone. Experts say polygraph testing isn’t a reliable indicator of whether someone is lying – especially in employment screening.

Further, a little-known technical glitch in one of the leading polygraphs that the bureau and many other government agencies have used could give applicants who fail polygraphs even more reason to assert that they were inaccurately and unfairly labeled liars.

“I was called a lazy, lying, drug dealing junkie by a man who doesn’t know me , my stellar background or my societal contributions,” wrote one black applicant in Baltimore, who said he was told he qualified for a job except for his polygraph test failure. “Just because I am young and black does not automatically denote that I have ever used any illegal drugs.”

Government agencies use polygraph testing not only to weed out job applicants but also to question criminal suspects and to determine whether sex offenders are complying with psychological treatment or probation.

Although all polygraph testing is controversial, many scientists are highly critical of its use in job screening, saying it’s especially prone to inaccuracies because the questions are often more vague than they are in criminal investigations and therefore they’re more likely to provoke reactions from the innocent that might seem like deception.

Adding to the skepticism, polygraphers have documented problems with the measurement of sweat by the LX4000, a polygraph that the FBI and many other federal agencies and police departments across the country have used, McClatchy found. Polygraphers also interpret measurements of respiration and blood pressure for their decisions on whether someone is lying, but many see the sweat measurement as especially indicative of deception. The manufacturer of the LX4000, Lafayette Instrument Co. Inc., describes the problem as rare but it isn’t able to specify what that means. The company also points out that other polygraphs that use the same technology might have the problem as well.

For the rest of the story, see “FBI Turns Away Many Who Fail Lie-Detector Tests.” (Actually, the article might better have been titled “FBI Permanently Bars from Employment All Who Fail Lie-Detector Tests.” There is no appeal process.

Investigative Report Reveals Cozy Ties Between Polygraph Manufacturers and Government Employees Responsible for Polygraph Purchases

Marisa Taylor reports for McClatchy on the close ties between some public employees with influence over polygraph purchases and polygraph manufacturers. Excerpt:

WASHINGTON — When polygrapher Walt Goodson began moonlighting for a private company, he didn’t think the law enforcement agency he worked for would care. After all, his supervisor at the Texas Department of Public Safety had worked for his company’s competitor and had approved his outside job.

But after Texas investigators found his relationship with the polygraph manufacturer to be improper partly because of his involvement in a bid, Goodson agreed it looked bad, even describing some of the company’s arrangements as “kickbacks.”

“It’s the perception of the way everybody else sees it . . . ,” he told a Texas Department of Public Safety investigator in 2008. “It stinks.”

Public employees are supposed to avoid conflicts of interest such as Goodson’s because they could give a company an unfair advantage over competitors or create a greater expense for the public agency that’s buying a product. Even so, Goodson is one of 14 current or former law enforcement officers across the country who’ve been described by Lafayette Instrument Co. Inc. as dealers over the last six years, McClatchy has found. The officers’ listed sales territories have covered 22 states.

Lafayette, meanwhile, has become a leading manufacturer of polygraphs used by U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies for employment screening, sex offender compliance and criminal investigations.

The Indiana-based company also has fostered strong ties with U.S. and international schools that train government polygraphers and with the professional organization that in turn certifies those polygraph schools. Goodson, for instance, no longer is listed as a dealer, but he now heads the ethics committee of the American Polygraph Association. Six other Lafayette dealers or consultants are listed as holding positions with either that organization or the American Association of Police Polygraphists. Seven directors of U.S. polygraph schools are listed as Lafayette representatives.

Their polygraphs also are becoming more popular abroad. In 2010, the State Department awarded the company a noncompetitive bid worth almost $2.4 million for 318 machines to be used by Mexico for its U.S-funded anti-corruption efforts. Lafayette lists dealers who head international polygraph schools, including one in Mexico.

Such relationships raise questions about the profession’s ability to assess criticism of the polygraphs. Lafayette manufactures the LX4000, which has been described as having a technical problem that can lead to inaccurate sweat measurements that may alter the outcome of a polygraph test, McClatchy has found. The problem can occur in other machines that use the same technology, but it hasn’t been thoroughly or independently studied.

McClatchy has obtained the record of a personnel complaint filed against Goodson by the Texas Department of Public Safety. Goodson ultimately received three days off duty without pay as a disciplinary action. See “Polygraph World’s Close Ties Spark Accusations of Favoritism” for the rest of the story.

Lafayette Polygraph Instruments Suffer Technical Problem

Lafayette LX4000 Polygraph System

Lafayette LX4000 Polygraph System

Marisa Taylor reports for McClatchy on a flaw affecting the Lafayette Instrument Company’s LX4000 polygraph system, which is widely used by federal, state, and local government agencies. Excerpt:

WASHINGTON — Police departments and federal agencies across the country are using a type of polygraph despite evidence of a technical problem that could label truthful people as liars or the guilty as innocent, McClatchy has found.

As a result, innocent people might have been labeled criminal suspects, faced greater scrutiny while on probation or lost out on jobs. Or, just as alarming, spies and criminals may have escaped detection.

The technical glitch produced errors in the computerized measurements of sweat in one of the most popular polygraphs, the LX4000. Although polygraphers first noticed the problem a decade ago, many government agencies hadn’t known about the risk of inaccurate measurements until McClatchy recently raised questions about it.

The manufacturer, Lafayette Instrument Co. Inc., described the phenomenon as “occasional” and “minor,” but it couldn’t say exactly how often it occurs. Even after one federal agency became concerned and stopped using the measurement and a veteran polygrapher at another witnessed it repeatedly change test results, the extent and the source of the problem weren’t independently studied nor openly debated. In the meantime, tens of thousands of Americans were polygraphed on the LX4000.

The controversy casts new doubt on the reliability and usefulness of polygraphs, which are popularly known as lie detectors and whose tests are banned for use as evidence by most U.S. courts. Scientists have long questioned whether polygraphers can accurately identify liars by interpreting measurements of blood pressure, sweat activity and respiration. But polygraphers themselves say they rely on the measurements to be accurate for their daily, high-stakes decisions about people’s lives.

“We’re talking about using a procedure that has a very weak scientific foundation and making it worse,” said William Iacono, a University of Minnesota psychology professor who’s researched polygraph testing. “I already don’t have very much confidence in how government agencies conduct these tests. Now, they might as well be flipping a coin.”

wizard-of-oz-crystal-ballIndeed, given polygraphy’s lack of scientific underpinnings, the issues with the LX4000 may have much the same effect on the accuracy of polygraph chart readings as imperfections in crystal balls have on the accuracy of fortune-tellings. Emeritus professor of psychology John J. Furedy has likened polygraphy to the ancient divination ritual of entrails reading, and retired FBI supervisory special agent Dr. Drew Richardson has observed that polygraphers are involved in the detection of deception “to the extent that one who jumps from a tall building is involved in flying.”
Nonetheless, the fact that the federal government has evidently done nothing to address the issue, which has potentially affected thousands of polygraph examinations of applicants, employees, intelligence assets and informants, as well as criminal suspects and those subject to post-conviction polygraph screening over the past decade is testament to a polygraph community that has little interest or concern about the scientific integrity (or lack thereof) of its practices and procedures.
Read the full article, which is meticulously researched and documented, here.

Enduring Freedom? ISAF Deletes Criticism of U.S. Government’s Handheld Lie Detector

On Tuesday, 14 May 2013, NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan posted to its Facebook page a story about a program whereby U.S. forces in Afghanistan have been training Afghans in the use of a handheld “lie detector,” the Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System (PCASS)  developed by the National Center for Credibility Assessment at Ft. Jackson, South Carolina:

Screen shot 2013-05-15 at 7.57.06 AM

As you see above, AntiPolygraph.org co-founder George Maschke posted two comments and relevant links regarding PCASS that same day. By the following day, ISAF had deleted those comments:

Screen shot 2013-05-15 at 8.10.35 PM

The deleted comments included a link to the AntiPolygraph.org message board post, “How to Beat the Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System (PCASS)” and to the YouTube video post, Warning to U.S. Troops on Hand-held Lie Detector:

Why did ISAF delete these comments? ISAF’s Facebook page provides the following commenting guidelines:

Screen shot 2013-05-15 at 7.42.30 PM

Nothing in the deleted comments included profanity, sexual content, hate speech or commercial, overly graphic, disturbing, abusive or offensive material, or was off-topic. ISAF’s censorship of critical commentary bespeaks an authoritarian mindset inconsistent with the “freedom” that NATO purports to be bringing to Afghanistan.

CIA Director Brennan Allegedly Threatened CIA Employees With Polygraphs on Benghazi

Greta van Susteren with Sen. Lindsey Graham, 6 May 2013

Greta van Susteren with Sen. Lindsey Graham, 6 May 2013

On 6 May 2013, Greta van Susteren told U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) that Fox News has information that CIA Director John Brennan has threatened Agency employees who might provide information to Congress regarding the 11 September 2012 raid on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya with polygraphs. Sen. Graham said he had heard the same thing:

Van Susteren: We have information that people from the CIA want to come out and testify, but they’ve been told by the CIA director, Brennan, specifically they will be polygraphed if they are tied to this. Do you have any information to corroborate that?

Graham: I’ve heard that same story. I know there’s some CIA agents reaching out. They feel frustrated….

The exchange occurs about two minutes into the segment, which may be viewed on-line here. It should be noted that polygraph “testing” has no scientific basis, and polygraph operators can manipulate outcomes to satisfy the wishes of management.

Also with regard to Benghazi and polygraphs, on 3 April 2013, former CIA and State Department employee Larry C. Johnson reported on his No Quarter blog in a post titled The CIA Playing Hardball on Benghazi:

When I first heard of this from a friend who had first hand knowledge, I was still skeptical. What did I hear? The CIA is conducting weekly polygraphs of officers who work in paramilitary activities (I knew it as Special Activities Division back in my day) and were involved in supporting the operations at Benghazi, Libya last September. So, I asked another friend to run his traps. He reported the same plus that the Intelligence Officers are being pressured to sign an additional Non-Disclosure form.

AntiPolygraph.org welcomes any information readers may be able to provide regarding the use or threat of polygraphs to deter whistleblowing.

Customs and Border Protection Internal Affairs Subject of Scathing DHS Privacy Report

James F. Tomsheck

James F. Tomsheck

AntiPolygraph.org has received a previously unpublished report of investigation (934 kb PDF) by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Privacy Office into an information-sharing program operated by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office of Internal Affairs (CBP IA), headed by CBP Assistant Commissioner James F. Tomsheck.1

The report, by DHS Chief Privacy Officer Mary Ellen Callahan, is dated 18 July 2012 and documents gross violations of DHS privacy policy by Tomsheck in connection with a pilot program whereby CBP IA shared personal information on CBP employees with the FBI. The project “came to be known as the SAR Exploitation Initiative Pilot (SAREX Pilot or Pilot).”2

The ostensible purpose of this project was for CBP IA to “enhance CBP IA’s Background Investigation (BI)/Periodic Review (PR) process by leveraging the FBI’s supposed ability to conduct federated searches of law enforcement databases.” CBP IA provided personal information on over 3,000 employees to the FBI, but received, “informally,” from the FBI information on only 9 or 10 individuals.3

Callahan’s investigation “revealed a lack of oversight by CBP IA leadership to ensure that DHS policies governing the sharing of [personally identifiable information] were adhered to in conducting” the information sharing pilot program” and “found an apparent blatant disregard for concerns raised by the [Office of Inspector General] and CBP IA staff who questioned the legal authority for, and privacy implications of, the Pilot.”

Callahan also notes, among other things:

…During my meeting with the Assistant Commissioner [James F. Tomsheck] on April 26, 2012, the Assistant Commissioner seemed to believe that CBP IA’s mission exempts it from following applicable privacy law and DHS privacy policy. I believe this attitude is likely to result in a culture of non-compliance in CBP IA. On May 10, 2012, the Assistant Commissioner told me that CBP IA is already engaging in such activities outside the Pilot. It is critical, therefore, that steps be taken now to ensure that any current or future sharing of PII by CBP IA complies with applicable law and DHS policy, and that CBP counsel and the CBP Privacy Officer are consulted prior to implementation of any such projects….

AntiPolygraph.org invites commentary.

  1. Tomsheck’s office appears to be the lead agency in Operation Lie Busters, a criminal investigation evidently targeting the teaching of polygraph countermeasures. []
  2. The acronym “SAR” is not defined in the report. []
  3. The CBP polygraph unit’s summary of significant admissions obtained during polygraph examinations, which reveals the existence of Operation Lie Busters, mentions that “ten applicants for law enforcement positions within CBP were identified as receiving sophisticated polygraph Countermeasure training in an effort to defeat the polygraph requirement.” It is not clear whether these might be the individuals on whom the FBI informally provided information. []

Mexican Security Officials Balk at Being Polygraphed by American Counterparts, Ask: “So Do We Get to Polygraph You?”

estados-unidos-mexicanosThe New York Times reports that Mexican security officials, who had previously been subjected to polygraph screening by U.S. polygraph operators, have declined to do so since the inauguration of Mexican president Enrique Peña Nieto on 1 December 2012. Excerpt:

MEXICO CITY — In their joint fight against drug traffickers, the United States and Mexico have forged an unusually close relationship in recent years, with the Americans regularly conducting polygraph tests on elite Mexican security officials to root out anyone who had been corrupted.

But shortly after Mexico’s new president, Enrique Peña Nieto, took office in December, American agents got a clear message that the dynamics, with Washington holding the clear upper hand, were about to change.

“So do we get to polygraph you?” one incoming Mexican official asked his American counterparts, alarming United States security officials who consider the vetting of the Mexicans central to tracking down drug kingpins. The Mexican government briefly stopped its vetted officials from cooperating in sensitive investigations. The Americans are waiting to see if Mexico allows polygraphs when assigning new members to units, a senior Obama administration official said.

If U.S. security officials truly believe in polygraphy (and their own honesty), why would they object to being polygraphed by their Mexican counterparts?

With respect to polygraph “testing” in Mexico, a 2009 U.S. State Department cable released by Wikileaks documents that the United States has been instrumental in promoting the practice of polygraph screening in that country. In fiscal year 2008, $5 million was appropriated to support a “bilateral working group” on polygraphy, and an additional $6 million was earmarked for fiscal year 2009.

But the notion that polygraph screening can root out corruption is dubious. For starters, polygraphy has no scientific basis. Making matters worse, polygraph techniques have an inherent bias against the most honest and conscientious of persons.1 Ironically, polygraph screening is likely to screen out the straight arrows that are needed to create a more honest workforce. And on the other hand, deceptive persons can pass the polygraph using simple countermeasures that polygraphers cannot detect.

  1. This is because the more candidly one answers the so-called “control” questions, and as a consequence exhibits less anxiety when answering them, the more likely one is to fail. []

Maryland Corrections Resorts to Mandatory Polygraphs in Wake of Corruption Investigation

gary-d-maynard

Gary D. Maynard

Carrie Wells reports for the Baltimore Sun that on Friday, 26 April 2013, Maryland Secretary of Public Safety & Correctional Services Gary D. Maynard ordered that three senior administrators at the Baltimore City Detention Center submit to polygraph interrogations, and that more polygraphs may follow. Excerpt:

Polygraph tests for three top officials at the Baltimore City Detention Center began Sunday, in an effort to determine the extent of the corruption federal investigators allege plagued the jail.

Rick Binetti, a spokesman for the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, declined to comment Sunday on the outcome of the polygraph tests for interim jail administrator Ricky Foxwell and two deputy administrators. The corrections department’s internal affairs unit and Maryland State Police investigators administered the polygraphs, and the information gleaned from them could factor into potential disciplinary actions or the decision to prosecute.

On Friday, state corrections secretary Gary D. Maynard ordered the polygraphs for the three administrators, as well as “integrity reviews” for all employees of the city jail. Corrections officials say more employees could be administered polygraphs.

Maynard said he could also use the polygraphs to investigate possible corruption in other state corrections facilities, saying the tests could clear the names of good employees while identifying the bad.

The notion that polygraphs can be relied on to “clear good employees while identifying the bad” is a dangerous delusion. Polygraphic lie detection has no scientific basis. Honest persons frequently fail, while liars can pass the polygraph using simple countermeasures that polygraph operators have no ability to detect.

Adam May reports for CBS Baltimore about concern that the mandatory polygraphs will become a “witch hunt.” Excerpt:

BALTIMORE (WJZ) — Sex, drugs and money. The corruption probe at the Baltimore City Detention Center expands.

Adam May explains–starting Sunday night, some officers still on the job are being forced to take lie detector tests.

For the last few years, inmate Tavon White claimed he ran the Baltimore Detention Center–dealing drugs, impregnating guards and making thousands of dollars a month.

Federal investigators say he had help from at least 25 people, including 13 female corrections officers. They face charges of racketeering, money laundering and drug possession and distribution.

Now–the net widens–and additional officers at the jail will be forced to take polygraph tests.

“I hope they don’t use this thing as a witch hunt,” said Archer Blackwell, AFSCME.

Union reps say many officers are ashamed of the allegations.

“There are a lot of good officers there–and obviously this group, they fell into this situation–don’t represent officers in the system at all,” said Blackwell.

Archer Blackwell’s concerns about the polygraph being used as a witch hunt are well-founded. Indeed, the late U.S. Senator Sam Ervin characterized polygraphy as “20th century witchcraft.” If Gary Maynard truly believes that polygraph chart readings can be relied on to clear or implicate employees, then he should be sacked and replaced by someone more competent.

Accused Cuban Agent Marta Rita Velázquez Allegedly Sought Polygraph Training from Cuban Intelligence Service

The Princeton Alumni Weekly identifies the woman on the right as Marta Rita Velázquez as a student on 18 March 1977.

The Princeton Alumni Weekly identifies the woman on the right as Marta Rita Velázquez (class of 1979) at an anti-apartheid demonstration in 1977.

On 25 April 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice revealed the existence of a previously sealed indictment (455 kb PDF) against former U.S. Agency for International Development employee Marta Rita Velázquez, who is charged with a single count of conspiracy to commit espionage. The indictment alleges that it was Velázquez who recruited Ana Belen Montes, the Defense Intelligence Agency’s senior Cuba analyst who in 2002 pled guilty to spying for Cuba. The indictment was secretly issued on 5 February 2004, and an arrest warrant was issued the following day. According to Jim Popkin of the Washington Post, Velázquez lives in Sweden, whose extradition treaty with the United States “does not allow extradition for spying.”

The indictment recounts details of an alleged trip to Cuba that Velázquez and Montes made together in 1985 to received training from the Cuban Intelligence Service, including the following item:

(19) In or about early April 1985, while clandestinely in Cuba, defendant VELÁZQUEZ, with Montes, asked the Cuban Intelligence Service to give them “practice” polygraphs so that they would be able to pass polygraphs they might have to take in connection with future United States government employment.

The indictment provides no further details regarding any polygraph instruction received, but a recent Washington Post magazine feature article (also by Jim Popkin) about Ana Belen Montes indicates that such training was indeed provided:

Her tradecraft was classic. In Havana, agents with the Cuban intelligence service taught Montes how to slip packages to agents innocuously, how to communicate safely in code and how to disappear if needed. They even taught Montes how to fake her way through a polygraph test. She later told investigators it involves the strategic tensing of the sphincter muscles. It’s unknown if the ploy worked, but Montes did pass a DIA-administered polygraph in 1994, after a decade of spying.

For discussion of the Montes case, see Source: Cuban Spy Ana Belen Montes Passed DIA Polygraph on the AntiPolygraph.org message board.