As mentioned by Washington Post staff writer Walter Pincus in a recent article, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence‘s recently released report, The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress (9.5 mb PDF), documents three intelligence sources who provided unreliable information but nonetheless passed DIA polygraph screening examinations.

One of these intelligence sources, identified in the report as Source One, appears to be Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri (عدنان احسان سعيد الحيدري), whom author James Bamford discussed in his Rolling Stones investigative article, “The Man Who Sold the War”:

The road to war in Iraq led through many unlikely places. One of them was a chic hotel nestled among the strip bars and brothels that cater to foreigners in the town of Pattaya, on the Gulf of Thailand.

On December 17th, 2001, in a small room within the sound of the crashing tide, a CIA officer attached metal electrodes to the ring and index fingers of a man sitting pensively in a padded chair. The officer then stretched a black rubber tube, pleated like an accordion, around the man’s chest and another across his abdomen. Finally, he slipped a thick cuff over the man’s brachial artery, on the inside of his upper arm.

Strapped to the polygraph machine was Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri, a forty-three-year-old Iraqi who had fled his homeland in Kurdistan and was now determined to bring down Saddam Hussein. For hours, as thin mechanical styluses traced black lines on rolling graph paper, al-Haideri laid out an explosive tale. Answering yes and no to a series of questions, he insisted repeatedly that he was a civil engineer who had helped Saddam’s men to secretly bury tons of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. The illegal arms, according to al-Haideri, were buried in subterranean wells, hidden in private villas, even stashed beneath the Saddam Hussein Hospital, the largest medical facility in Baghdad.

It was damning stuff — just the kind of evidence the Bush administration was looking for. If the charges were true, they would offer the White House a compelling reason to invade Iraq and depose Saddam. That’s why the Pentagon had flown a CIA polygraph expert to Pattaya: to question al-Haideri and confirm, once and for all, that Saddam was secretly stockpiling weapons of mass destruction.

There was only one problem: It was all a lie. After a review of the sharp peaks and deep valleys on the polygraph chart, the intelligence officer concluded that al-Haideri had made up the entire story, apparently in the hopes of securing a visa.

But the Senate report contradicts Bamford, stating at p. 41: “DIA administered a polygraph of Source One in early 2002, which he passed.” Following three full lines of redacted text, the report continues: “There were no other Intelligence Community polygraphs of Source One prior to the DIA administered polygraph.” A footnote then adds: “Press stories alleging that Source One failed a CIA polygraph in December 2001 are inaccurate.” Thus, it appears that the case of Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri is no polygraph success story.

On Saturday, 9 September 2006, Washington Post staff writer Walter Pincus reported on the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s recently released review of pre-war intelligence on Iraq in an article titled, “Report Details Errors Before War.” Excerpt:

The long-awaited Senate Intelligence Committee report released yesterday sheds new light on why U.S. intelligence agencies provided inaccurate prewar information about Saddam Hussein and his weapons programs, including details on how Iraqi exiles who fabricated or exaggerated their stories were accepted as truthful because they passed Pentagon lie detector tests.

The two newly declassified chapters of the report fueled political accusations yesterday that the Bush administration lied to justify invading Iraq, but the documents’ nearly 400 pages contain several examples of how bad information wound up accepted as truthful in intelligence assessments at the time.

A section includes the results of an evaluation by the CIA of its performance, which concludes that, despite repeated prewar assessments that the Iraqis were practicing deceit and deception to hide their weapons, there actually were no such efforts because there were no weapons.

The CIA concludes: “There comes a point where the absence of evidence does indeed become the evidence of absence.” That statement is a play on a remark Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld made frequently in the months before the war — after U.N. inspectors in late 2002 and early 2003 could find no weapons — that “the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.”

One 208-page chapter from the Senate committee report covers the use of intelligence provided by the Iraqi National Congress and its leader, Ahmed Chalabi. The panel wrote that three Iraqi exiles gave the Pentagon inaccurate information about Hussein’s alleged training of al-Qaeda terrorists, as well as about the existence of mobile biological weapons factories and an alleged meeting between the Iraqi leader and Osama bin Laden. All three exiles passed lie detector tests given by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), adding credibility to their stories.

In each case, the information proved to be questionable, if not inaccurate….

One of the three polygraph-passing fabricators, identified as Source Two in the report, The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress (9.5 mb PDF), is former Iraqi army major Mohammad Harith, who has been previously discussed on AntiPolygraph.org in the message board thread, Iraqi Fabricator Passed Polygraph.

It should be noted that former DIA employee Ana Belen Montes, a Cuban double agent who penetrated the agency and rose to become the Pentagon’s senior analyst on matters related to Cuba, passed at least one polygraph screening examination while spying for Cuba.

In its new Model Policy for Law Enforcement Pre-Employment Screening Examinations, in defiance of law enforcement agencies across the country that disqualify applicants based on nothing more than failure to “pass” a pre-employment polygraph examination, the American Polygraph Association (APA) holds, at para. 3.12.1.3, “The decision to hire, or not to hire an applicant, should never be based solely on the results of the polygraph examination” (emphasis added). For discussion of this major development, see, American Polygraph Association Model Policy on the AntiPolygraph.org message board.

Stockton Record staff writer Michael Fitzgerald comments on the U.S. Government’s denial of entry to the United States of two citizens for declining to submit to FBI interrogation and polygraph “testing.” Excerpt:

I always wondered how white Americans could have stood by during World War II and allowed authorities to drag patriotic Japanese-Americans off to relocation camps.

Now I see. In wartime, such calls are not as easy as they appear in hindsight. Americans probably assumed authorities knew something civilians did not. They trusted people with badges.

More on that later. The point is that the Lodi terror case is starting to have an eerie resemblance to that disgraceful historic mistake.

The latest wrinkle: Federal authorities won’t allow two Pakistani-Americans related to Lodi terror convict Hamid Hayat to come home from an extended stay in Pakistan until they take a lie-detector test.

Muhammad Ismail, 45, and his son, Jaber Ismail, 18, are U.S. citizens. They are charged with no crime. No U.S. official publicly has alleged any wrongdoing on their part.

But their constitutional rights seem to have done a Houdini.

Oh, the treatment they’re getting makes sense. The Ismails are, after all, implicated in the Lodi terror case.

Their cousin Hamid Hayat was convicted April 25 of supporting terrorists. A jury concluded Hayat attended terrorist training camp in Pakistan in 2003 and ’04.

Under FBI interrogation, Hayat said several of his cousins, including Jaber, attended these camps, too. That may be what landed both Ismails on the no-fly list.

Finding his way home blocked, Jaber Ismail submitted to an FBI “interview” in Islamabad. But that wasn’t enough. The feds wanted to talk to him again.

His dad, too. But Lodi relatives reportedly advised them that might not be such a good idea. So the Ismails refused.

That looks suspicious. But consider: Hamid Hayat was convicted solely on statements he made during FBI interrogation. He later recanted. Too late.

Umer Hayat, his father, cooperated with FBI agents and was charged with lying. His jury deadlocked, but he spent 11 months in jail.

Maybe the Ismails are hiding something. But then, conversations with the FBI haven’t gone so wonderfully for the Muslims of Lodi that they should be eager for more.

They may fear if they submit to interrogation, the FBI will hang something on them by hook or by crook. A lie detector? Could you answer FBI questions without making that truth graph dance at least once?

Two United States citizens have been denied re-entry to the United States for exercising their constitutional right to refuse to submit to FBI interrogation and polygraph “testing.” UPI Homeland and National Security Editor Shaun Waterman reports in part:

WASHINGTON, Aug. 28 (UPI) — A Californian father and son are in legal limbo in Pakistan after their name came up in a terrorism investigation, and federal officials told them they will not be allowed to fly home unless they submit to interviews and lie detector tests.

Muhammad Ismail, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Pakistan, and his 18-year-old U.S.-born son, Jaber Ismail, have not been charged with any crime, but the son is one of a number of young men from the small agricultural community of Lodi, Calif., named as having attended terrorist training camps.

The two, who have been in Pakistan for four years, attempted to return to the United States twice, only to be told by airline staff that they were on a “no-fly” list and would have to get “clearance” from the U.S. embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, their lawyer, Julia Mass, told United Press International.

She said the younger Ismail was eventually told by an embassy official that they would only be allowed to return if he submitted to a lie detector test. “They told him ‘You have to take the polygraph exam, or we won’t let you go home.’”

She said Ismail, who had already been questioned once by FBI agents at the embassy, had accepted advice from relatives not to undergo the polygraph.

…

And Randal C. Archibold of the New York Times in an article titled, “U.S. Blocks Men’s Return to California From Pakistan,” reports in part:

LOS ANGELES, Aug. 28 — Federal authorities have prevented two relatives of a father and son convicted recently in a terrorism-related case from returning home to California from Pakistan unless they agree to be interviewed by the F.B.I.

It is unclear whether the men, Muhammad Ismail, 45, and his son Jaber, 18, have a direct connection to the terrorism case or if they have been caught up in circumstance.

The United States attorney’s office in Sacramento declined Monday to answer questions about the Ismails beyond confirming that the men had not been permitted to fly into the United States and that the Federal Bureau of Investigation wanted to question them.

The United States attorney, McGregor W. Scott, reiterated a comment he had made to The San Francisco Chronicle, which reported Saturday about the Ismails’ troubles.

“They’ve been given the opportunity to meet with the F.B.I. over there and answer a few questions, and they’ve declined to do that,” Mr. Scott said through a spokeswoman, Mary Wenger.

The Ismails live in Lodi, Calif., a small farming town south of Sacramento, where their relatives Umer Hayat and his son, Hamid, were arrested last summer as part of what federal prosecutors said was an investigation into terrorist links.

The Hayats are the only people to have been charged. Hamid Hayat, the nephew of Muhammad Ismail and the cousin of Jaber, was convicted in April of supporting terrorists by attending a training camp in Pakistan. Umer Hayat, in a deal reached with prosecutors after jurors deadlocked on terrorism charges, pleaded guilty in May to lying to the authorities about carrying $28,000 to Pakistan from California.

The Ismails discovered they were on the federal government’s no-fly list of people not allowed to enter the United States after they were refused permission to board a connecting flight in Hong Kong on April 21; they had been trying to return to California after several years in Pakistan, said Julia Harumi Mass of the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, who is representing them.

In Hong Kong, Ms. Mass said, they were told there was a problem with their passports; other family members traveled on to California, while the Ismails returned to Pakistan. There, a consular officer suggested there had been a mix-up and advised them to book a direct flight to the United States, but at the airport, they were told they were on the no-fly list, she said.

Jaber Ismail, who was born in the United States, was questioned by the F.B.I. at the American Embassy in Islamabad, but his father, a naturalized United States citizen from Pakistan, declined to participate, Ms. Mass said. Jaber Ismail has refused further interrogation without a lawyer and has declined to take a polygraph test; Ms. Mass said the men were told these conditions had to be met before the authorities would consider letting them back into the United States.
…

The Ismails were well advised to refuse the polygraph. Polygraphy has no scientific basis whatsoever, and as used by the FBI and other law enforcement agencies, often serves as a pretext for interrogating a suspect without a lawyer present. Indeed, the conviction of the Ismails’ cousin, Hamid Hayat, on terrorism charges may well be the result of a false confession coerced after a pretext polygraph “test.” In this regard, see the discussion thread, Ex-FBI Agent Doubts Case Against Hamid Hayat.

That any American citizen should be denied re-entry to the United States for declining to submit to a criminal interrogation, let alone such pseudoscientific quackery as polygraph “testing,” is an outrage worthy of a police state, not a constitutional democracy.

The Michigan State Police polygraph operator who falsely accused Lisa Hansen of Grand Rapids of deception regarding the alleged embezzlement of funds from her employer has been identified as Sergeant Ben Escalante. On 23 August 2006, Grand Rapids WZZM 13 News reported:

The Muskegon based public interest group Innocent, today called for a public apology from, reprimand and reassignment of a Michigan state police officer.

Sgt. Ben Escalante of the Michigan State Police gave a lie detector test to Lisa Hanson [sic], age 25, of Grand Rapids.

The test was administered at Hanson’s request.

Hanson had been wrongly accused of stealing a night deposit bag from her employer.

Hanson stated that Sgt. Escalante accused her of the theft and lying while giving her the test.

Hanson then failed the test.

Hanson’s attorney says that the results of the test helped the Grand Rapids Police Department to decide to arrest Hanson and charge her with misdemeanor embezzlement.

The night deposit bag was later discovered by the bank where it had been dropped off.

Doug Tjapkes, president of INNOCENT, an organization that works on behalf of people wrongly accused, sent a letter to the Michigan State Police Commander, Peter Munoz, asking that Sgt. Escalante be reprimanded, re-assigned and apologize to Hanson.

Tjapkes is concerned that Escalante’s behavior does a disservice to polygraph operators who must be completely objective.

INNOCENT often recommends that people claiming wrongful conviction take a polygraph test to support their case.

A copy of the letter was also sent to Governor Jennifer Granholm.

Sgt. Escalante’s erroneous finding that Lisa Hansen was deceptive was not necessarily the result of any misconduct on his part. That an invalid test produced erroneous results should surprise no one.

The Grand Rapids Press and the Detroit Free Press report that Lisa Hansen of Grand Rapids, Michigan, failed a polygraph “test” administered by a Michigan State Police sergeant on 22 December 2005. Hansen, a receptionist at a local Panopoulos Salon, stood accused of stealing some $425 in cash and checks, which she maintained she had placed in a deposit slot at her employer’s bank. The Free Press reports that Hansen’s lawyer, Gerald R. Stahl, “questioned the lie-detector test, saying the polygraph operator badgered her before accusing her of lying.” Hansen told 24 Hour News 8 of Grand Rapids, “I was amazed that I didn’t pass. Completely amazed.”

Following the false positive, Hansen was criminally charged and persuaded by her earlier, court-appointed attorney to plead guilty to a misdemeanor embezzlement charge. A judge rejected the plea and instead ordered her to perform 40 hours of community service.

But now, Hansen has been completely exonerated, and the Michigan State Police’s polygraph operator proven to have been completely wrong: on 9 August 2006, a bank employee found the missing money “stuck in a chute” at the night depository where Hansen maintained all along that she had placed the money.

The Transportation Safety Administration conducted a trial run of Suspect Detection Systems’ polygraph-derived passenger screening system, dubbed “Cogito,” at the Knoxville airport (presumably McGhee Tyson Airport), the Wall Street Journal reported Monday, 14 August in an article by Jonathan Karp and Laura Meckler titled, “Which Travelers Have ‘Hostile Intent’? Biometric Device May Have the Answer.” Excerpt:

At airport security checkpoints in Knoxville, Tenn. this summer, scores of departing passengers were chosen to step behind a curtain, sit in a metallic oval booth and don headphones.

With one hand inserted into a sensor that monitors physical responses, the travelers used the other hand to answer questions on a touch screen about their plans. A machine measured biometric responses — blood pressure, pulse and sweat levels — that then were analyzed by software. The idea was to ferret out U.S. officials who were carrying out carefully constructed but make-believe terrorist missions.

The trial of the Israeli-developed system represents an effort by the U.S. Transportation Security Administration to determine whether technology can spot passengers who have “hostile intent.” In effect, the screening system attempts to mechanize Israel’s vaunted airport-security process by using algorithms, artificial-intelligence software and polygraph principles.

Neither the TSA nor Suspect Detection Systems Ltd., the Israeli company, will discuss the Knoxville trial, whose primary goal was to uncover the designated bad guys, not to identify threats among real travelers. They won’t even say what questions were asked of travelers, though the system is generally designed to measure physical responses to hot-button questions like “Are you planning to immigrate illegally?” or “Are you smuggling drugs.”

The test alone signals a push for new ways to combat terrorists using technology. Authorities are convinced that beyond hunting for weapons and dangerous liquids brought on board airliners, the battle for security lies in identifying dangerous passengers.

The method isn’t intended to catch specific lies, says Shabtai Shoval, chief executive of Suspect Detection Systems, the start-up business behind the technology dubbed Cogito. “What we are looking for are patterns of behavior that indicate something all terrorists have: the fear of being caught,” he says.

…

Mr. Shoval, the Israeli entrepreneur, believes technology-based screening is the key to rolling out behavior-recognition techniques in the U.S. With experience in counter-terrorism service and the high-technology industry, Mr. Shoval developed his Cogito device with leading former Israeli intelligence officials, polygraph experts and computer-science academics.

Here is the Cogito concept: A passenger enters the booth, swipes his passport and responds in his choice of language to 15 to 20 questions generated by factors such as the location, and personal attributes like nationality, gender and age. The process takes as much as five minutes, after which the passenger is either cleared or interviewed further by a security officer.

At the heart of the system is proprietary software that draws on Israel’s extensive field experience with suicide bombers and security-related interrogations. The system aims to test the responses to words, in many languages, that trigger psycho-physiological responses among people with terrorist intent.

The technology isn’t geared toward detecting general nervousness: Mr. Shoval says terrorists often are trained to be cool and to conceal stress. Unlike a standard lie detector, the technology analyzes a person’s answers not only in relation to his other responses but also those of a broader peer group determined by a range of security considerations. “We can recognize patterns for people with hostile agendas based on research with Palestinians, Israelis, Americans and other nationalities in Israel,” Mr. Shoval says. “We haven’t tried it with Chinese or Iraqis yet.” In theory, the Cogito machine could be customized for specific cultures, and questions could be tailored to intelligence about a specific threat.

The biggest challenge in commercializing Cogito is reducing false results that either implicate innocent travelers or let bad guys slip through. Mr. Shoval’s company has conducted about 10 trials in Israel, including tests in which control groups were given terrorist missions and tried to beat the system. In the latest Israeli trial, the system caught 85% of the role-acting terrorists, meaning that 15% got through, and incorrectly identified 8% of innocent travelers as potential threats, according to corporate marketing materials.

The company’s goal is to prove it can catch at least 90% of potential saboteurs — a 10% false-negative rate — while inconveniencing just 4% of innocent travelers.

Mr. Shoval won a contract for the Knoxville trial in a competitive process. Next year, Israeli authorities plan to test Cogito at the country’s main international airport and at checkpoints between Israel and the West Bank, where the goal will be to catch genuine security threats while testing the logistics of using the system more broadly. The latest prototype costs about $200,000 a machine.

As discussed earlier on the AntiPolygraph.org message board (see TSA to Screen for Terrorists by Reading Palms), a similar trial of Suspect Detection Systems’ touted terrorist detection technology was to be tested at Atlantic City, New Jersey. The result of that trial — or whether it in fact took place — is unknown.

This passenger screening technology is based on the same flawed assumptions as polygraphy. Anxiety is no clear indication of deception, much less terrorist intent. Because of the extremely low percentage of air travelers who intend to commit an act of terrorism, very nearly all who “fail” will be completely innocent. On the other hand, nothing prevents terrorists from taking a diazepam tablet and breezing through.

On 2 August 2006, the popular collaborative website wikiHow gave featured billing on its homepage to an earlier-written article titled “How to Cheat a Polygraph Test (Lie Detector).” The article appears to have reached a wide audience, having been accessed more than 95,000 times at the time of this writing. Public comments on the article, which also includes a link to AntiPolygraph.org, are available here.