Israeli Military Plans Polygraph Jihad

Amos Harel reports for the Israeli newspaper Haaretz in an article tiled, “IDF Officers to Get Polygraphs Over War Leaks”:

Dozens of officers will be questioned with a lie detector about their contacts with journalists, as part of a probe of leaks to the media during the recent Lebanon war.

Military Advocate General Brigadier Avihai Mandelblit ordered the investigation into suspected media leaks at the request of Chief of Staff Dan Halutz.

“A number of incidents during the war raised suspicions that contacts were made with reporters contrary to military orders … in a way that could have endangered lives,” the Israel Defense Forces Spokesman’s Office said in a statement.

The investigation is expected to focus on “serial leakers,” mainly about issues that angered Halutz, such as leaks on IDF activity in Lebanon while it was still in progress. The chief of staff said that he considers instances of officers being in direct contact with reporters and leaking unauthorized information to be very grave.

The announcement of the MAG probe against officers sent shock waves through the army yesterday. As a result, many officers have been afraid to talk to journalists in recent days, while others are busy worrying about whether they said too much during the war.

If information about special forces engaging in operations deep in enemy territory did indeed leak while the troops were still in Lebanon, this is a serious security breach that must be closed to prevent danger to soldiers’ lives. However, the IDF has not had much success in closing such breaches in the past. Nine years after the naval commando disaster in Lebanon, the official military version still holds that an accidental explosion went off, rather than admitting that the disaster was caused by an intelligence hitch and Hezbollah cunning.

However, it seems unlikely that the only thing troubling Halutz is the security of his forces. If this were the case, why did the MAG wait more than two months after the end of the war before starting his probe?

Rather, it seems that an attempt is being made to keep army officers’ criticisms of the top brass from leaking outside. The IDF Spokesman’s Office hinted at this when it denounced “officers who are in direct contact with journalists without authorization.”

However, it seems doubtful that Halutz will obtain quiet for long. The officers have too much pent up anger to keep quiet, and they will find other ways to speak. If Halutz orders transcripts of officers’ conversations on mobile phones, they will get other people to speak for them. Moreover, reservists cannot be silenced, nor can GOC Northern Command Udi Adam, who leaves his post next Monday.

Indiana State Police Found Liable Over Polygraph Test

An Indiana jury found that the Indiana State Police acted negligently in its conduct of a polygraph examination of a parole officer who was fired after a panel of judges was told he had failed the polygraph. William J. Booher reports for the Indianapolis Star in an article titled, “Man Wins $600-k in Lie Detector Suit”:

A jury has awarded $600,000 to a former Shelby County probation officer who was fired based on what his attorneys argued was a negligently administered polygraph test.

The six-member Shelby Superior Court jury in Shelbyville late Wednesday awarded Daniel P. Morgan, 38, $400,000 on his claim of negligent administration of a polygraph examination and $200,0000 on his claim of reckless or intentional infliction of emotional distress.

A panel of three Shelby County judges overseeing the county probation department fired Morgan on June 13, 1997, after meeting with a State Police senior polygrapher and the intern who administered the exam, said Kevin W. Betz and Sandra L. Blevins, Morgan’s co-counsel.

Morgan filed his lawsuit in 1999, and the case reached various appeals courts before it made it to state court in Shelby County before Special Judge Karen Love of Hendricks County.

Morgan, who was a probation officer in Shelby County for five and a half years and now lives in Franklin, took the polygraph exam after a 16-year-old boy on probation accused him of making sexual advances, his attorneys said.

The attorneys for Morgan, who now works for the Indiana Tobacco Prevention and Cessation, argued during the trial that the more experienced, senior State Police polygrapher failed to tell the judges overseeing the probation department that the polygraph results were “inconclusive,” while the intern who administered the test told the judges the results showed Morgan was “slam dunk deceptive.”

Staci Schneider, a spokeswoman for the Indiana Attorney General’s office, said it would be several days before a decision is made in consultation with the State Police on whether to appeal.

The monetary judgments were handed down against the State Police. The jury also found the intern polygraph examiner at the time, Timothy Kaiser, now a State Police first sergeant, liable for punitive damages, but assessed no monetary payment against him.

Call Star reporter William Booher at (317) 444-2706.

The Associated Press provides further detail in an article titled “Jury Finds State Police Negligent for Polygraph Test” that was published in the Fort Wayne News Sentinel:

SHELBYVILLE, Ind. – A jury found that state police negligently administered a polygraph test to a probation officer after a teenager accused him of making sexual advances.

The results of that test were considered when Shelby County officials fired Daniel P. Morgan in 1998 from the job he had held for more than five years.

The six-member Shelby Superior Court jury ruled late Wednesday in favor of Morgan’s claim of reckless or intentional infliction of emotional distress and awarded him $600,000 in damages.

Special Judge Karen Love of Hendricks County cut the damage award to $300,000 because of liability limits against government agencies, said Kim Wilkins, an attorney who represented the state police.

The attorneys for Morgan, 38, of Franklin, argued during the trial that the state police official overseeing the polygraph test failed to tell the three county judges who fired Morgan that the results were inconclusive, while the intern who administered the test reported the results showed Morgan was “slam dunk deceptive.”

The jury found the intern examiner, Timothy Kaiser, who is now a state police first sergeant, liable for punitive damages, but assessed no monetary judgment against him.

“We feel that Sgt. Kaiser and the Indiana State Police did their job and did it properly, but the jury felt differently,” Wilkins said.

Morgan filed his lawsuit in 1999 and issues in the case reached the state Supreme Court before going to trial. The polygraph test was given after a 16-year-old boy on probation said Morgan had solicited him for sex.

Morgan’s attorney, Kevin Betz, said the last decade has been dreadful for his client.

“Money cannot make up for that,” Betz said. “It at least vindicates him.”

Staci Schneider, a spokeswoman for the state attorney general’s office, said it would be several days before a decision was made on whether to appeal the verdict.

No one should ever be fired based on the results of pseudoscientific lie detector “tests.” The case of Daniel P. Morgan speaks to the need for a Comprehensive Employee Polygraph Protection Act extending to all Americans the protections afforded to most by the 1988 Employee Polygraph Protection Act, which hypocritically excludes federal, state, and local governments from its scope.

Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) Rejects Polygraphs

In “Lie detectors to be left out of the spy game,” Simon Kearney reports for The Australian on the decision by that country’s intelligence service to reject polygraph screening:

Lie detectors to be left out of the spy game

Simon Kearney
October 20, 2006

AUSTRALIAN spy agencies have abandoned plans to introduce lie-detector tests after a three-year trial found them to be unreliable and likely to cause low morale among intelligence officers.

Lie-detector tests are routinely used by US agencies such as the CIA, FBI and National Security Agency to weed out traitors.

ASIO’s annual report reveals staff at the domestic spy agency submitted to polygraph tests on a voluntary basis in a trial carried out between 2000 and 2003.

ASIO found polygraphs were not compatible with the professional culture in Canberra’s intelligence community and also raised several “technical difficulties” thought to be related to the notorious unreliability of polygraphs.

A spokesman for Attorney-General Philip Ruddock said that, as a result of the trial’s findings, using polygraph machines to test the integrity of Australian spies was no longer on the agenda.

“We have no intention of adopting polygraphs,” he said.

The trial was ordered by former attorney-general Daryl Williams in 2000 after a review of internal security carried out by former inspector-general of intelligence and security Bill Blick recommnded staff be subject to psychological testing.

Mr Blick reviewed security across Australia’s six intelligence and security agencies after the arrest in Washington of Defence Intelligence Organisation officer Jean-Philippe Wispelaere, who had attempted to sell secret satellite images to Singapore in 1999.

The recommendations of the ASIO trial – that the tests not become an internal security policy – were put to federal cabinet, which agreed.

To discuss this article, see the AntiPolygraph.org message board thread, Aussies Throw Out Polygraph.

No Lie MRI to Begin Offering “Lie Detection” Services

In “Betrayed By Your Brain?” (9 October 2006) Philadelphia Inquirer staff writer Faye Flam reports on No Lie MRI, a Philadelphia start-up company that will soon offer “lie detection” services to the public:

Betrayed by your brain?
A Phila. company is poised to offer a lie-detecting MRI, though questions about its reliability remain.
By Faye Flam
Inquirer Staff Writer

Orwell’s 1984 thought police used the age-old tactic of intimidation to get into people’s heads, but by 2084, authorities could have more direct access. Scientists are already starting to use brain scanning, EEG and other tools to extract information directly from the brain.

“The science really has gone to the point where under very controlled circumstances you can tell whether someone is lying,” says Paul Root Wolpe, a bioethicist at the University of Pennsylvania.

This month, a Philadelphia-based company called No Lie MRI anticipates sliding its first clients into a scanning machine. Founder Joel Huizenga says they run the gamut, from women trying to prove they didn’t cheat on their husbands to convicts claiming innocence. A priest wants to clear charges of child molestation, and an Australian man wants to use this to prove he’s not gay. There’s also interest from Internet dating companies.

Huizenga says he’s charging $30 a minute and the procedure should take about an hour.

Many brain scientists say customers won’t get much for their money, since the technique will not deliver answers, only odds. But they also agree that technology is starting to break into the mind in a new way, opening up some novel ethical questions.

“Do we have a right to privacy in terms of subjective thoughts?” asks Penn’s Wolpe. “Who will have access to them?”

Soon after 9/11, a burst of government funding went into high-tech interrogation tools. Some of that went to Penn, where psychiatrist Daniel Langleben and neuropsychiatrist Ruben Gur had already spent several years exploring the potential of a brain scanning technique called functional magnetic resonance imaging, or fMRI.

The machine roughly measures changes in activity in different regions of the brain by tracking hemoglobin in the blood. When neurons become active they remove oxygen from hemoglobin, changing its magnetic properties, which the MRI’s magnet detects.

The researchers tried several experiments. One involved what’s called the guilty knowledge test, designed to determine whether you’re familiar with a particular person, object, scene or fact. Gur reasoned that he might discern whether, say, a suspect was familiar with a crime scene or someone associated with a terrorist act by how his brain reacted to a photograph.

Experiments so far show that indeed familiar objects elicit a different brain response than new ones, says Gur.

He and Langleben also did an experiment in which they gave their subjects a known playing card, then instructed them to lie about the card while under the scanner. Though they found no single lying center in the brain, when they averaged their subjects’ responses together, the distribution of brain activity looked different for the lies than the truthful statements.

But could they detect when an individual was lying? To find out, Langleben gave 26 male students envelopes with two playing cards and a $20 bill. They were told they could keep the envelopes if they could fool his colleague about the contents.

They were then led to a building with the fMRI. There, the colleague instructed them to tell the truth.

That way, Langleben says, he was prompting more spontaneous lying, as opposed to lying on cue, which he considered more like acting. He says 11 of the volunteers tried to fool the scanner by concentrating harder while they were telling the truth. For most, it didn’t help, he says. Two subjects, however, did manage to lie without their brains giving anything discernible away. “I’m sending them to the CIA,” he joked.

Overall, the scientists discriminated lies from truth between 76 and 85 percent of the time. The questioning technique is crucial, Langleben says. “We’re not talking about mind-reading… fMRI can’t just tap into someone’s brain and read free-flowing thoughts.”

In these more recent experiments, Langleben saw a significant difference in parts of the frontal cortex, which is involved with inhibition.

In 2001 the Penn experiments caught the attention of biologist-turned-entrepreneur Huizenga, who eventually bought patents from Penn and started No Lie MRI. Another company, called Cephos, is also developing fMRI, while still another is promoting the use of EEG to do “brain fingerprinting.”

Huizenga says he has more than 50 clients lined up – a mix of personal and legal cases.

He hopes to unveil the technology later this month before 24 television stations in California.

He says he thinks the technique could help people build trust. “Civilization is built on trust,” he says.

But should we trust him?

J. Peter Rosenfeld, a psychologist at Northwestern University, says he has no trouble believing fMRI can discriminate lies 80 percent of the time, but that’s still a huge error rate. Since the 1980s, Rosenfeld has been experimenting with EEG to see lies in the form of brain waves. He says his most recent round of experiments suggest it’s more reliable and accurate than fMRI.

Stephen Fienberg, a statistician at Carnegie Mellon University, is skeptical of both. He headed a recent National Academy of Sciences panel that evaluated the polygraph.

Fienberg argues that neither fMRI nor EEG have demonstrated greater reliability than the polygraph, which his panel deemed too inaccurate for the government to use to screen employees.

“We’re looking at technologies that have not been proven and have many of the same pitfalls as we articulated in our report,” he says.

Polygraphs measure sweat, pulse changes and several other signals of stress. In carefully controlled studies, it gave about 20 to 30 percent false negatives and false positives, he says. Some studies showed it could tell you which subjects were lying about 70 percent of the time, he says, but if you read the fine print, “only about half were detected as being deceptive about the right question.”

Continue reading ‘No Lie MRI to Begin Offering “Lie Detection” Services’ »

The Truth About the Lie Detector

Andrew Stephen skewers polygraphy in this feature article published in the 16 October 2006 issue of the British periodical, the New Statesman:

The truth about the lie detector
Features
Andrew Stephen
Monday 16th October 2006

Critics claim that polygraph testing is as credible as the tooth fairy or witchcraft. Yet the US government still relies on it to identify terrorists and vet FBI agents. Andrew Stephen on America’s alarming love affair with junk science

Did ex-Representative Mark Foley have sex with teenage male congressional pages? Was Wen Ho Lee, an American nuclear scientist, guilty of espionage by passing nuclear secrets to the Chinese? Did John Mark Karr kill six-year-old JonBenet Ramsey? Was the British nanny Louise Woodward guilty of the involuntary manslaughter of the baby in her care? Was Aldrich Ames, a senior CIA official in charge of analysing Soviet intelligence, actually a Soviet double agent? Was Leandro Aragoncillo, an FBI analyst with top-secret clearance who was based in the White House under Vice-Presidents Gore and Cheney, also a spy? What about Dr Ignatz Theodor Griebl, a Nazi ringleader who fled New York on the SS Bremen in 1938?

I do not care about Foley, or Karr – who was innocent of JonBenet Ramsey’s murder, as it turned out – but all the other cases have a thread in common. They illustrate a century-old American fallacy which, at long last, is beginning to crumble: that polygraph (aka lie-detector) tests actually work. Evidence is mounting that, far from being the infallible tools of world-beating American investigative procedures that Hollywood would have us believe, they have actually been responsible for countless miscarriages of justice and have ruined lives.

Ames, for example, sailed through three polygraphs before the CIA discovered that he was actually one of the worst US traitors in history. Woodward “passed” one but was then convicted on other evidence. Lee both “failed” and “passed” polygraphs, resulting in him being imprisoned and then released before being awarded $1.65m in damages by the federal government. Aragoncillo “passed” a pre-employment FBI polygraph but pleaded guilty to espionage in May. Griebl “passed” an FBI polygraph test and promptly returned to Hitler’s side.

Continue reading ‘The Truth About the Lie Detector’ »

More on New Energy Department Polygraph Policy

Roger Snodgrass of the Los Alamos, New Mexico Monitor reports on the newly revised Department of Energy polygraph policy in an 11 October 2006 article titled “DOE Curbs Polygraphs”:

The Department of Energy has published a new final rule for how it will use polygraph tests, claiming it will “significantly” reduce the numbers of people subjected to “lie detectors.”

During a press conference in Albuquerque last week, Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman said the new rule would employ the best use of polygraph technology when the evidence suggests it would be appropriate.

“It would not be used in a routine fashion,” he said. “It would not be used as a sole determinant.”

In discussing comments to the proposed rule, the department related its struggle to find a balance between scientific findings and what it takes to be Congress’ direction to carry out a polygraph program.

In 2000, New Mexico’s U.S. senators requested an $870,000 study by the National Research Council to look into the department’s expansion of its polygraph program under then Energy Secretary Bill Richardson, in response to perceived security problems, like the Wen Ho Lee affair and the missing hard drives crisis at Los Alamos National Laboratory.

The study found “little basis for the expectation that a polygraph test could have extremely high accuracy.”

The senators responded this morning with prepared comments about the new version of the rule.

“The final rule is in the spirit of the National Academy of Sciences recommendation, which is good,” said Sen. Pete Domenici, R-NM. “The test will be how the rule is implemented, but I believe DOE is right to move toward the use of polygraphs as a counter-intelligence tool rather than a widespread policy tool for screening employees. I believe the new rule meets the new course Senator Bingaman and I wanted in a new polygraph policy for the labs.”

Bingaman sounded a similar note in his response.

“This is a major improvement over what the DOE initially proposed. Polygraph tests have not proven to be useful as screening tools, and I believe that if DOE insists on using them they should be applied as narrowly as possible,” Bingaman said.

Scholars have traced the invention of the “lie detector” to William Moulton Marston, the comic strip creator of Wonder Woman, while he was a graduate student at Harvard University from 1915 to 1921. Wonder Woman had a magic lasso that caused those it encircled to spill the truth.

The principles of the lie detector, which measures blood pressure, respiration and skin response under various questions, have remained the same since 1938, and became a cornerstone of the FBI’s domestic counter-intelligence operations for decades.

Even after the polygraph policy was found to be scientifically unreliable by the National Academies of Science, DOE found it hard to abandon the practice.

As former Secretary Spencer Abraham concluded in April 2003, upon release of its “then-current intent,” to ignore the NAS study and go ahead with its polygraph program, “(I)t was appropriate at the present time to ‘retain the current system’ in light of the current national security environment, the ongoing military operations in Iraq and the war on Terrorism.”

The new rule eliminates the practice of testing for “general screening of applicants for employment and incumbent employees without specific cause.”

In addition, “The new rule requires a counterintelligence evaluation for applicants for certain high-risk positions and every five years for incumbents of those positions,” the department stated in a summary of its response to public comments. The old rule called for blanket coverage for all high-risk categories with no exceptions.

The polygraph will be required under five specified situations – such as if the employee is chosen for a random counterintelligence evaluation or required to take a specific incident polygraph examination.

AntiPolygraph.org News, an Internet blog that opposes polygraphs, reported DOE’s intention to reduce the number of employees polygraphed, but questioned whether the new policy “will actually reduce the number of polygraph examinations administered.”

The news item concludes, “It is a national embarrassment – and sign of gross incompetence in DOE management – that a department responsible for such weighty scientific matters as atomic weapons design continues to rely on such pseudoscientific quackery as polygraphy.”

The rule becomes effective Oct. 30, 2006.

It is available via the Federation of American Scientists Project on Government Secrecy at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2006/09/fr092906.html.

Thanks to Roger Snodgrass for mentioning this blog. A bellwether for whether the new polygraph policy will result in a significant decrease in the total number of polygraphs conducted will be whether DOE begins laying off polygraph operators.

Energy Department to Reduce Number of Employees Polygraphed

In his Secrecy News newsletter & blog, Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Sciences publishes news and commentary regarding the Department of Energy’s decision, published in the Federal Register, to reduce the number of employees subjected to polygraph screening. See “Energy Department Will Significantly Reduce Polygraph Testing.”

However, while the new polygraph policy may reduce the number of employees (and contractors) subjected to polygraph screening, it is not at all clear that the new regulation will actually reduce the number of polygraph examinations administered. Faced with a reduced pool of polygraph candidates, it would not be surprising if the DOE Office of Counterintelligence were to significantly increase the number of putatively random polygraph screenings conducted in order to ensure full employment for the Department’s existing complement of polygraph operators.

In its new policy, DOE persists in the peculiar notion that because polygraph screening is unreliable, it should somehow be used to screen only those with access to the most sensitive information and material. In addition, in its justification of its new polygraph policy, DOE tellingly avoids any mention of the National Academy of Sciences‘ key conclusion that “[polygraph screening's] accuracy in distinguishing actual or potential violators from innocent test takers is insufficient to justify reliance on its use in employee security screening in federal agencies.” It is a national embarrassment — and sign of gross incompetence in DOE management — that a department responsible for such weighty scientific matters as atomic weapons design continues to rely on such pseudoscientific quackery as polygraphy.

Federal Polygraph Lawsuit Dismissed

On 29 September 2006, United States District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan granted summary judgment (90 kb PDF) to the defendants in Croddy, et al. v. FBI et al. (Civil Action No. 00-651 [EGS]), dismissing the lawsuit which challenged the FBI’s and U.S. Secret Services’ pre-employment polygraph policies whereby applicants are denied employment based solely on the results of polygraph screening — a procedure that the National Academy of Sciences found to be completely invalid. In a footnote (no. 2 at p. 2), Judge Sullivan with a wave of the hand dismisses all concerns over the reliability of polygraphy:

Though Plaintiffs have introduced significant evidence on the question of whether polygraph examinations are reliable, the Court need not answer that question to resolve Plaintiffs’ cliams. Therefore, the Court will not delve into the details of the polygraph examination process.

This is strange justice. Past filings documenting the plaintiffs’ claims are available here.

The Associated Press has published the following report on the court’s decision:

FBI Can Use Polygraphs On Applicants

WASHINGTON, Oct. 2, 2006
(AP) The FBI and Secret Service may continue to use lie-detector tests to screen potential employees, a federal judge ruled Monday.U.S. District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan’s ruling ends a six-year lawsuit brought by six applicants who failed polygraph tests and were denied jobs. They said the policy violated their rights to privacy and due process.The Secret Service has required polygraph tests for potential agents since 1985. All FBI employees have been tested since 1994.Applicants are asked questions about their medical histories, finances, sex lives, drug use and mental health. Secret Service applicants are asked whether they have committed adultery or other sex crimes.

While those questions are personal, Sullivan said, they’re not an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. Because the applicants sought positions of public trust, the agencies have the right to inquire about the backgrounds of their agents, he said.

“With regard to the Secret Service’s specific questions, the agency has made a reasonable determination that there is a danger if its employees in sensitive positions could be blackmailed for some reason,” Sullivan wrote. “The court will not second-guess that conclusion.”

Four of the six applicants who brought the case probably were turned down based on their answers to drug-related questions, according to court documents. All denied using drugs.

“Three people know you’re lying: me, you and God,” a Secret Service polygraph agent said to one applicant, according to court documents.

“No, God and I know I’m telling the truth,” the applicant, Eileen Moynahan replied.

A fifth applicant was denied because she had lied about marijuana use on a Baltimore police application, prosecutors said. The sixth applicant was accused of holding his breath to try to beat the polygraph.

The lawsuit claimed the tests are unreliable, yet there is no way for applicants to clear their name. They said the stigma attached to failing the test would prevent them from getting other law enforcement jobs.

Sullivan denied that claim, noting that some of the applicants who brought the lawsuit now work in federal law enforcement jobs.

“Ultimately this will be an issue for the Supreme Court or Congress to take care of,” attorney Mark Zaid said.

Justice Report: Standards Lacking on ‘Lie Detector’ Tests

Jeff Stein, Congressional Quarterly’s national security editor, reports on the U.S. Department of Justice’s recently released report, “Use of Polygraph Examinations in the Department of Justice” (1 mb PDF). Excerpt:

The FBI and three other Justice Department components are conducting over 16,000 polygraph tests a year, even though they have no uniform standards for administering them, the department’s inspector general reported Monday.

The FBI requires job applicants and employees in sensitive positions to pass polygraphs as a condition of employment, even though their scientific basis and reliability have been sharply challenged in the past decade.

The FBI’s polygraph program failed to meet federal standards during 2003-2005, the inspector general (IG) said.

More than 49,000 polygraph examinations were conducted by the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) and the office of the Inspector General (OIG) itself during that period, the report said.

The lion’s share of those — 77 percent, or 38,017 tests — were conducted by the FBI during 2003-2005.

Thousands more polygraph examinations —by the CIA, the military services, Pentagon agencies or other Justice Department components that do not have their own programs, such as the Bureau of Prisons and the U.S. Marshals Service—are conducted annually on subjects as varied as job applicants, employees, contractors, confidential sources and even participants in the Witness Protection Program.

“However, our review found no [Justice] Department-wide policy concerning the conduct and use of polygraph examinations,” the OIG said. “Rather, each Department component has developed its own policies, procedures, and practices to govern polygraph examinations.”

In 2004, the Justice Department’s Management Division concluded that without a uniform standard, agencies under its jurisdiction should not be able to “compel Department employees to take a polygraph in a misconduct investigation.”

Two years later, only the FBI among its components has codified its policies and procedures for making an employee submit to a polygraph, the report said.

Critics were quick to point out that the polygraph examinations can give the FBI a false sense of security.

Such infamous turncoats as the CIA’s Aldrich Ames and the FBI’s Robert Hanssen, both of whom spied for the Russians for years, passed routine polygraph examinations, where they were asked about their loyalty to the United States.

More recently, in May, an FBI intelligence analyst with a top secret clearance pled guilty in May to spying for Philippines officials.

Leandro Aragoncillo, who joined the FBI in 2004 after 21 years in the Marines, which included a stint in the office of the vice president, would have been asked about any unauthorized use of classified documents in a standard polygraph test.

The Senate Intelligence Committee’s review of pre-Iraq war intelligence also reported that three key Iraqi exiles who supplied false or misleading intelligence to the Pentagon all passed polygraphs.

None of these cases was part of the OIG’s study, which focused on the administration of polygraph programs, not the validity of the tests themselves.

For discussion of the DOJ report, see DOJ Report on Use of Polygraph Examinations on the AntiPolygraph.org message board.

U.S. Appeals Court Allows Testimony Regarding Polygraph Examination in U.S. v. Allard

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in its decision (43 kb PDF) in U.S. v. Linda Gay Allard (Case No. 05-20087) filed on 11 September 2006, upheld the admission of testimony regarding a polygraph examination administered by Special Agent William Wind of the United States Secret Service. After failing the polygraph, Allard confessed to placing straight pins in a Hillshire Farms summer sausage purchased at Walmart, in hopes of getting money from Hillshire Farms. Allard alleges that Wind coerced her confession:

Allard testified on direct examination that her confession was involuntary because it was coerced by Agent Wind. She stated that Agent Wind told her she could not leave until she wrote what he told her to write in her statement; that Agent Wind threatened her by stating that he could take her farm and arrest her at work; that Agent Wind refused to honor her request for an attorney; that Agent Wind pushed her, shoved her, and told her to sit down and shut up; and that Agent Wind said he could make her children disappear.

The appeals court upheld the decision of the trial court to allow Special Agent Wind to testify regarding his polygraph examination and interrogation of Linda Allard, including mention that she had “failed,” for the limited purpose of rebutting Allard’s allegations.

The court’s decision makes no mention of any recording of the polygraph examination, and it would appear that none was made. However, it seems to be standard practice for the Secret Service to audio record the polygraph examinations of applicants for employment. There is no excuse for not recording the interrogations of criminal suspects (whether or not a polygraph is used). By routinely recording interrogations, abuse of the kind alleged by Allard, as well as false allegations of the same, can be minimized, and any doubts resolved.

(Hat tip to Robert Loblaw.)