Oregon is one of five U.S. states that have wisely enacted a total ban on polygraphy in the workplace. But some Oregon chiefs of police are seeking an exemption for law enforcement agencies, as Maxine Bernstein of the Oregonian reports in “Police Push to Polygraph Hires”:

Anyone interested in wearing a police badge in Oregon could soon be asked to sit through a lie-detector test and face questions like these:

Have you used drugs? Have you stolen from an employer? Have you committed a felony? Did you answer honestly about why you left your last job?

Oregon police chiefs are pushing to change state law this year to allow law enforcement agencies to administer polygraph tests to help screen out bad apples during hiring.

Portland Chief Rosie Sizer and Mayor Tom Potter, a former city police chief, are strong proponents of the change, and the city of Portland helped draft legislation. But the American Civil Liberties Union of Oregon pledges to fight it.
Continue reading ‘Oregon Police Chiefs Seek to Overturn Polygraph Ban’ »

Washington Times reporter Jerry Seper reports in “GOP Urges Berger Lie Test” (24 January 2007). Excerpt:

Eighteen House Republicans have urged the Justice Department to proceed with a polygraph test for Samuel R. Berger, the former national security adviser who agreed to take the test as part of a plea of guilty of stealing documents from the National Archives.

“This may be the only way for anyone to know whether Mr. Berger denied the 9/11 commission and the public the complete account of the Clinton administration’s actions or inactions during the lead-up to the terrorist attacks on the United States,” the congressmen said in their letter to Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales.

The congressmen — led by Rep. Thomas M. Davis III of Virginia — said a prompt lie-detector test is needed to determine the extent of Mr. Berger’s thievery, especially because the former Clinton administration adviser reviewed original documents for which there were no copies or inventory.

Other signers of the letter are Reps. Duncan Hunter, Darrell Issa and Brian Bilbray of California, John L. Mica of Florida, F. James Sensenbrenner Jr. of Wisconsin, Dan Burton and Mark Souder of Indiana, Christopher Shays of Connecticut, John M. McHugh of New York, Chris Cannon of Utah, John J. “Jimmy” Duncan Jr. of Tennessee, Michael R. Turner of Ohio, Kenny Marchant of Texas, Lynn Westmoreland of Georgia, Patrick T. McHenry and Virginia Foxx of North Carolina and Bill Sali of Idaho.

Mr. Davis, former chairman and now ranking Republican on the House Government Reform Committee, released a report by his staff on Jan. 9, saying a Justice Department investigation of Mr. Berger’s admitted document theft was “remarkably incurious.”

The report said the theft compromised national security “much more than originally disclosed” and resulted in “incomplete and misleading” information to the September 11 commission. It said Mr. Berger was willing to go to “extraordinary lengths to compromise national security, apparently for his own convenience.”

In October, Mr. Davis led an effort to hold hearings to determine whether any documents were “destroyed, removed or were missing” after visits by Mr. Berger to the Archives. He said the full extent of Mr. Berger’s document removal “can never be known” and the Justice Department could not assure the September 11 commission that it received all the documents to which Mr. Berger had access.

Mr. Davis said that during sentencing, Mr. Berger agreed to a polygraph examination as part of a plea deal, but Justice never administered the test, according to two Justice officials closely connected to the case — John Dion, chief of the counterespionage section, and Bruce Swartz, deputy assistant attorney general for the Criminal Division.

He said Mr. Berger assured the commission that it received all the documents it sought but that some of the papers Mr. Berger examined were originals for which there were no copies or inventory. He said there is no way to know whether Mr. Berger returned all of those documents.

Lanny Breuer, Mr. Berger’s attorney, has said the matter was thoroughly investigated by the Justice Department for more than two years and effectively closed for more than a year. He said the report’s conclusions were based on “pure conjecture.”

On 12 December 2001, CBS 60 Minutes II aired an investigative report on polygraph screening. Produced by Shawn Efran and reported by Scott Pelley, the report takes an in-depth look at the U.S. Government’s misplaced reliance on polygraph screening. The concerns raised in this report remain as valid today as they were five years ago. Indeed, despite overwhelming scientific evidence against polygraph screening, governmental reliance on it has actually grown.

For discussion of this report, including an unofficial transcript, see the AntiPolygraph.org message board thread, Poly Segment on 60 Minutes II, 12/12/01.

(The following video is 33 mb in size and may take some time to load)

Continue reading ‘Final Exam: CBS 60 Minutes II Report on Polygraph Screening’ »

Fox News Channel reports that Representative Tom Davis (R-VA) is leading a group of 18 Republican members of Congress in asking the Justice Department to exercise its right under a plea agreement to polygraph former National Security Advisor Sandy Berger regarding his theft of classified documents from the National Archive:

WASHINGTON — The Justice Department should administer a polygraph test to former National Security Adviser Sandy Berger to find out what documents he took from the National Archives in 2002 and 2003, Rep. Tom Davis wrote in a letter to Attorney General Alberto Gonzales dated Monday.

Davis, ranking Republican on the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, is leading a group of 18 lawmakers who say the Justice Department has been “remarkably incurious” about Berger’s decision to remove documents relating to the Sept. 11 commission’s inquiry into his role in helping prevent terror attacks during the Clinton administration.

“It is extraordinarily important that the Justice Department avail itself of its rights under the plea agreement and administer a polygraph examination to Mr. Berger to question him about the extent of his thievery. This may be the only way for anyone to know whether Mr. Berger denied the 9/11 commission and the public the complete account of the Clinton administration’s actions or inactions during the lead up to the terrorist attacks on the United States,” Davis wrote.

The letter was signed by all Republican members of Congress.

Berger admitted to taking documents on two of the four occasions he went to the National Archives to bone up on his responses for the Sept. 11 commission on his inquiry into how intelligence and law enforcement communities failed to prevent the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks on the United States. He said he hid some of them at a construction site near the archives building in Washington.

Berger agreed to take a polygraph test as part of a plea deal reached in September 2005. As part of the guilty plea, he was also sentenced to 100 hours of community service, two years probation, three years of lost security clearance and a $50,000 fine plus court costs.

A report issued two weeks ago by Davis said commission members expressed grave concerns about whether they had received all the relevant information on the Clinton administration’s anti-terror activities. Archivists said they will never know what Berger took because none of the pages Berger said he took were inventoried.

At the time of the report, Justice Department spokesman Bryan Sierra said the department “has no evidence that Sandy Berger’s actions deprived the 9/11 commission of documents, and we stand by our investigation of this matter.”

Added Matt Bennett, a spokesman for Berger attorney Lanny Breuer: “I can state unequivocally that no documents were withheld, and that all documents that Mr. Berger took were disclosed to the Justice Department and the inspector general of the archives.”

But Davis and the other lawmakers said the Justice Department’s investigation is incomplete and two Justice Department officials confirmed that a polygraph was never administered despite the department being given the authority to do so.

FOX News’ Molly Hooper and The Associated Press contributed to this report.

Unfortunately, the answers to Rep. Davis’s questions are not to be found in polygraph charts. While the polygraph is sometimes useful as an interrogational prop, it has no scientific basis as a lie detector. Politically savvy individuals like Berger, represented by by top-flight Washington defense lawyers, are not going to be fooled into making admissions against interest based on the outcome of a bogus lie detector “test.” Moreover, the polygraph can be readily passed using simple countermeasures that polygraphers have no demonstrated ability to detect.

Nonetheless, Rep. Davis’s polygraph proposal is seconded by conservative columnist Michelle Malkin while receiving mixed reviews on FreeRepublic.com.

In 2003, AntiPolygraph.org’s George Maschke was interviewed by Nick Frost for the tongue-in-cheek 2003 British television series, Danger: Incoming Attack. This segment, which aired as part of episode 5, may now be viewed here:

Continue reading ‘George Maschke on How to Beat a Polygraph Test’ »

In its January 2007 issue, the Association for Psychological Science periodical Observer has published a tribute to David Lykken, the late eminent psychologist and polygraph critic.

The FBI obfuscates and evades in a written response to questions posed by Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) regarding the Bureau’s polygraph screening program. Senator Grassley’s questions, and the FBI’s responses, appear at pp. 47-50 of a document submitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee on 30 November 2006 and made available by the Federation of American Scientists here (7 mb PDF):

http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_hr/fbi-qfr.pdf

Senator Grassley’s questions (in bold text), the FBI’s responses, and AntiPolygraph.org’s observations appear below:

48. According to a May 1, 2006, Washington Post article:

["]Many researchers and defense attorneys say [polygraph] technology is prone to a high number of false results that have stalled or derailed hundreds of careers and have prevented many qualified applicants from joining the fight against terrorism. At the FBI, for example, about 25 percent of applicants fail a polygraph exam each year, according to the bureau’s security director.”

The article also cites “a comprehensive 2002 review by a federal panel of distinguished scientists” which found that “if polygraphs were administered to a group of 10,000 people that included 10 spies, nearly 1,600 innocent people would fail the test[.]“

a. Has the FBI conducted, commissioned, or reviewed scientific studies of the accuracy and effectiveness of polygraph examinations? If so, please describe them in detail. If not, why not?

Response:

For clarification, the FBI’s Assistant Director for Security’s comments to the reporter indicated that about 25% of applicants are disqualified as a result of the polygraph test. These results usually include admissions of information or activities that lead to a disqualification decision.

The FBI does not independently conduct or specifically commission polygraph research but it works with other federal agencies to improve polygraph techniques and has participated in research studies with the DoD Polygraph Insitute (DoDPI) which is charged with conducting research for the federal polygraph community. All DoDPI research is available directly from DoDPI.

Although 25% of FBI applicants may be disqualified as a result of the polygraph, this does not necessarily mean that only 25% of those polygraphed fail, as many applicants are disqualified before the polygraph stage. Past statements by senior FBI officials indicate that the FBI pre-employment polygraph failure rate is on the order of 50%.And while the FBI would have the Senate Judiciary Committee believe that most FBI applicants who fail the polygraph also make disqualifying admissions, the Bureau has never documented this assertion. It should be noted that in the past (and likely still) FBI polygraphers’ performance was evaluated based upon the rate of confessions obtained from those who “fail.” This gives polygraphers a strong incentive to inflate or embellish any admissions made to boost their performance ratings. Worse still, the FBI’s deliberate practice of not recording polygraph examinations puts FBI polygraphers at liberty even to fabricate admissions with impunity.

Senator Grassley asked not only whether the FBI had conducted or commissioned any scientific studies of the accuracy and effectiveness of polygraph examinations, but also whether it had reviewed any such studies. Conspicuously absent from the FBI’s response is any mention of any review of the findings of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), which in its report, The Polygraph and Lie Detection, concluded that “[polygraph testing's] accuracy in distinguishing actual or potential security violators from innocent test takers is insufficient to justify reliance on its use in employee security screening in federal agencies.” (original emphasis)

It should be noted that when the NAS stated, as mentioned in the Washington Post article, that if polygraphs were administered to a group of 10,000 people that included 10 spies, nearly 1,600 innocent people would fail the test, it was assuming, for the sake of argument, an overall accuracy rate of 90%. The NAS did not conclude that polygraph screening is anywhere near this accurate, but rather used the 90% figure in order to better illustrate the shortcomings of polygraph screening “even when an accuracy is assumed that is greater than can be expected of polygraph testing on the basis of available research.”

b. What is the FBI’s estimated rate of false results on polygraphs used for employment screening?

Response:

Because scientists are unable to conduct field studies under ideal (laboratory) conditions, and the absolute truth is not always available to validate the results of polygraph examinations in actual cases, known error rates remain elusive. Although error rates can be estimated, the estimates depend upon the testing situation, the issues being tested, and the persons being tested. Empirical studies cannot be used to generalize rates of error because different polygraph examiners and examination situations will produce different error rates. A major reason why scientific debate over polygraph validity yields conflicting conclusions is that the validity of such a complex procedure is very difficult to assess and may vary widely from one application to another. The accuracy obtained in one situation or research study may not generalize to different situations or to different types of persons being tested. Scientifically accepted research on polygraph testing is hard to design and conduct as evidenced by the depth of studies conducted by academic laboratories. The FBI would welcome and encourage broader research in this area.

We would offer a noteworthy data point concerning FBI internal testing of employees. Since the inception of the PSP Program in 2001, approximately 7500 counterintelligence-focused examinations have been conducted with a Deception Indicated rate of less than 1%. This result is significantly lower than the Washington Post‘s predicted 16% failure rate.

Note that the FBI studiously avoided answering Senator Grassley’s question: What is the FBI’s estimated rate of false results on polygraphs used for employment screening? Former Attorney General John Ashcroft himself acknowledged a 15% false positive rate in a 2001 press conference.

The <1% failure rate for the FBI’s internal polygraph screening program for employees can only be achieved by arbitrarily shifting downward the threshold for a reading of “deception indicated.” It would be bureaucratically untenable for the FBI to have a significant percentage of its employees failing the polygraph, and thus outcomes are manipulated to ensure that almost everyone passes. In July 2001, journalist Lenny Savino reported that some 25 of 500 FBI employees thus far polygraphed, that is, five percent, had failed to pass, a rate that a senior FBI official at the time described as “surprisingly low.” Apparently, it wasn’t surprisingly low enough, however, and “less than 1%” seems to be the prevailing officially acceptable polygraph failure rate for FBI employees. This has no bearing on the failure rate associated with applicant screening, where a fifty percent failure rate is evidently deemed acceptable.

c. Given the high rate of false results, should a “failed” polygraph alone be the basis for a negative employment decision or personnel action? How many times per year is a polygraph result the primary reason for a negative employment decision or personnel action?

Response:

We do not believe that the FBI is experiencing a high rate of false positive results. Throughout the Federal polygraph community, the polygraph is considered to be an effective and acceptable screening tool and is a strong contributor in conjunction with the entire applicant process which examines the prospective employee from several standpoints. These include field investigations, records checks and polygraph examinations. As noted earlier, polygraph results, including statements and admissions, account for about 25% of applicant disapprovals. With regard to on-board employees, a “failed” polygraph is never used as the sole basis for an adverse personnel decision. Anomalies are addressed through additional interviews and investigative work. The polygraph program does not make determinations on negative employment issues or personnel actions.

When Senator Grassley earlier directly asked the FBI for its estimated false positive rate, it dodged the question and declined to provide any estimate. But in the next breath, the FBI claims that it does “not believe that the FBI is experiencing a high rate of false positive results.” What rate then does the FBI believe it is experiencing? On what basis?

Why should a failed polygraph alone reason be enough not to hire an applicant, but not reason enough to take personnel action against an employee? For applicants who wrongly fail the polygraph, there are no field examinations or record checks. They are summarily barred from FBI employment. For life.

Note that the FBI failed to answer Senator Grassley’s question: “How many times per year is a polygraph result the primary reason for a negative employment decision or personnel action?” How many times a year is a polygraph result the primary reason an applicant is not hired? How many times a year is a polygraph result the primary reason for adverse personnel action against a current employee? The FBI’s not saying.

d. What steps has the FBI taken to identify more reliable alternatives to polygraph tests for ensuring the trustworthiness of current and prospective employees?

Response:

The FBI supports DoDPI research through a cooperative agreement and currently has two SAs assigned to DoDPI. Later this year, DoDPI will host a summit sponsored by the interagency Technical Support Working Group and DoD’s Counterintelligence Field Activity. The purpose of assembling these experts is to develop a research plan for the next 5-10 years for means to assist in determining truth of statement [sic].

Given the National Academy of Sciences’ finding that polygraph screening is completely invalid, we need not wait until a working lie detector is invented before scrapping one (the polygraph) that does not work.

49. In response to a previous question for the record regarding the New York Police Department (NYPD), you indicated that during a meeting to explore cooperation with the NYPD’s translation and analysis program, the NYPD indicated that it did not want its officers and translation staff to undergo FBI polygraph testing as a condition of being granted access to “FBI information.” The response further stated, “we understand that the CIA and Pentagon have found a means of ensuring trustworthiness without the use of polygraph examinations.”

a. Please describe the alternative method of ensuring trustworthiness to which that response refers.

b. The previous response also stated, “We will work with both organizations to learn more about this process and will evaluate our ability to do the same.” Please explain what progress has been made toward implementing this polygraph alternative.

Response to subparts a and b:

We have established a program where NYPD translators work on unclassified IC materials through the National Virtual Translation Center (NVTC). The FBI is also providing the NYPD with romanization training, teaching the IC’s standard for transliterating foreign scripts into the Roman alphabet. Although we contacted our sister agencies to discuss their internal policies in this regard, we were pleased to find the NVTC to be a suitable vehicle through which we could fully us the NYPD’s available translator resources.

Note that the FBI fails to provide the requested description of the “means of ensuring trustworthiness without the use of polygraph examinations” of which FBI Director Mueller had spoken. What are these means? Why won’t the FBI say? If means of ensuring trustworthiness without the polygraph exist, why use the polygraph at all?

In an e-mail message posted to LANL: The Corporate Story, an anonymous physics undergrad has written about a recent (October, 2006) CIA polygraph screening examination administered in connection with his application for a summer 2007 internship.

Brad Lee Holian, a Laboratory Associate at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and fellow of the American Physical Society, is organizing employee resistance against planned random polygraph and drug screening at the lab. Holian, who has worked as a theoretical physicist at LANL for more than thirty years, has publicized his proposal via the blog LANL: The Corporate Story. Holian writes, among other things:

Polygraphy is an insulting affront to scientists, since a committee of the National Academy of Sciences has declared that, beyond being inadmissible in court, there is no scientific basis for polygraphs. In my opinion, by agreeing to be polygraphed, one thereby seriously jeopardizes his or her claim to being a scientist, which is presumably the principal reason for employment for many scientists at Los Alamos….

He proposes that laboratory employees sign a letter to the LANL’s director along the lines of the following:

Director Anastasio:

I refuse to be subjected to polygraph testing for any reason whatsoever. Polygraphs are inadmissible in a court of law and have no scientific basis.

Signed,
-Brad Lee Holian (blhksh@comcast.net)

In an earlier post on this blog, AntiPolygraph.org expressed the concern that while an announced Department of Energy plan to curtail its polygraph screening program might reduce the number of persons subject to polygraph screening, it might not reduce the number of polygraph examinations administered if random polygraph screening were stepped up to ensure full employment for DOE’s polygraph operators.