Subject: Re: Airbus safety

From: [email-masked] (Robert Dorsett)
Date: 02 Dec 92 03:49:48 PST

In article <[email-masked]> [email-masked] (Peter Nelson) writes:
>>Remember that the standard definition of an airline pilot's job is 99.999%
>>pute boredom, and 0.001% pure terror (I forget where this quote came from,
>>and the ratios may be incorrect) - if this is anything like true, maybe
>>human pilots really are on the edge of extinction ?
>
>   _New Scientist_ had an article devoted to this about 3 issues ago.
>
>   Basically they said that as the % of "pilot error" crashes increases
>   we may already be at the point where more lives would be saved by 
>   pilotless airplanes.   

This is certainly a debatable contention.  Airbus certainly seems to believe
it: but it's also in the business of selling products "differentiated" by 
their style of protection.

The reality of the situation is that the safety record has remained pretty
much constant since the late 1970's--note: not the early 1980's, when the 
first automated aircraft were introduced.  It has stabilized at about 1500 
lives per year.  What IS true is that as mechanical failures are isolated
and fixed, the proportion of pilot-induced failures must, necessarily, in-
crease.  The problem facing the industry is how to get the death rate to 
zero: we don't seem to wish to recognize that, with current technology, it
may not be possible, and that we may see steadily diminishing returns in 
our efforts to do so.

The proportion of pilot-error incidents range from 60% to 95% of the total
number of crashes, with Airbus generally supporting the latter figure.  The 
problem, of course, is how one defines *pilot error*.  Is "pilot error" 
pushing the wrong switch?  Suddenly pushing, instead of pulling, on the 
yoke?  A psychotic break?  Naturally, none of these things: in all instances, 
"pilot error" has been a case of a broader *system* failure, the system being 
a combination of the pilot, his peers, the airplane, its interface, the 
airline, and the regulatory backdrop.  In precious few cases were the pilots
"asleep at the wheel," or criminally incapacitated.

What is debatable is how many of these factors can be eliminated, simply
by increasing automation, reducing oversight authority, or transferring 
responsibility for operations to ground controllers.  

It is EXTREMELY important to realize that we're struggling against an *ideal*:
no crashes.  It is also important to note that if, indeed, pilot error is
*increasing*, then it's probably a result of over-automation in the cockpit, 
since virtually no other part of the infrastructure has changed since the 
late 70's.  The simple, short-term solution is to reduce the degree of auto-
mation, or at least bring the pilot back into the loop (not necessarily 
exclusive concepts!).

You would have a hard time convincing me that the number of fundamental errors 
would not increase GREATLY with ground-based oversight, that the safety 
margins would not go DOWN, as people fundamentally distanced from the reality 
of a flight have a go/no-go say.  

>And moreover, the technology to do this either
>   already exists or is close at hand.

The technology isn't close to create safe, fully autonomous aircraft.  
And, in lack of that, we'd need ground-based control, with a high degree of 
automation in-flight.  The infrastructure needed to support this would be 
exhorbitantly expensive (and who would run it: the dispatch controller, who 
just sees a number on a status board, and wants to make his schedule?  A
government specialist?).  In addition, we'd almost certainly be replacing the 
existing social and interface problems that currently exist in the *air*, with 
a new, untried set of problems on the ground.

More than any other trend in aviation, this sort of talk, much of which seems
to originate with Airbus, and which deliberately, blithely underrates the
problems involved in reducing pilot authority, worries me that we've passed 
the point of negative returns.  The problem, again, is not automation: to 
paraphrase Don Norman, it's appropriate feedback.  Or, in mil-speak, the 
minimum capability needed to carry out the mission requirements.  There is 
abundant evidence that, in fact, this requirement can be met with *less* 
automation, *better* interfaces, and keeping the pilots in the loop.  
However, there is also evidence that flight deck design is engineering-and 
marketing-driven, and that "good" human factors does not play a primary role 
in flight deck design, except as a rubber-stamp on a pre-existing systemic 
intent.

There is also increasing evidence that hybrid designs: with high degree of
automation, and relegating the pilot to a passive, supervisory role, out of 
the loop, are *not* the way to go.  

>   They said, however, that it would be a public-relations nightmare and 
>   felt there was no hope of selling the idea to the public.  

Was Bernard Ziegler the author of this article, perchance? :-)  It's 
symptomatic of the technocratic solution: full-speed ahead with quantifiable 
solutions, damn the pilots.  Even if we don't fully understand the 
consequences of the resulting environment, when these solutions have to
ultimately interact with human beings, at least at some level.

>   People will
>   continue to cite those cases where coolness or quick thinking on
>   the part of the crew did save the airplane or at least many lives.  

I wouldn't.  Rather, I would ask how well we understand the *totality* of
in-flight incidents and actions, which are corrected by appropriate air-
manship.  An old, true saying, is that a good pilot is a pilot who doesn't
have to show he's a good pilot.  Is the capability of being able to maintain
control in a thunderstorm really that relevant, when 99% of all pilots would
simply have flown around the same thunderstorm?

We can automate easily quantifiable issues: simple tasks.  Judgement and
airmanship has thus far evaded us, on all levels.  Until we get a grip on
it, talk of fully autonomous aircraft or ground control is nothing more
than science fiction.

---
Robert Dorsett
[email-masked]
...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd

---

From: [email-masked] (Philip Peake)
Date: 02 Dec 92 13:18:59 PST

In article <[email-masked]>, [email-masked] (Robert Dorsett) writes:
|> We can automate easily quantifiable issues: simple tasks.  Judgement and
|> airmanship has thus far evaded us, on all levels.  Until we get a grip on
|> it, talk of fully autonomous aircraft or ground control is nothing more
|> than science fiction.

Robert,
	in general, you write extremely well argued and researched cases,
but occasionally you spoil the whole effect by little "throw away" comments
such as the above - history, even modern history is littered with comments from
people writing off things as "science fiction", "can't be done", "will never replace
the current ...." etc who have had to eat their words shortly after.

Anyway, getting back to the A320 ...

I suppose that I should now admit to not actually being a strong a supporter of
this machine as might have been assumed from past postings (I have flown on
them too many times :-)

My concernes are not based so much on the ergonomic design, so much as the engineering
of the computerised systems, and the numerous "cover-ups", which are apparently
inspired by the French government - if you read French, you might be interested
in a series of articles in "Science et Vie", which is a sort of "Scientific American".

There, the concerns expressed are simply that:

	- There have been many documented occurences of sudden altitiude
	  changes which were uncorrectable by the pilot.

	- Airbus Industrie REFUSES to let independent experts audit their software,
	  that say that the control system can only be examined as a "black box",
	  which either performs correctly, or it doesn't - anyone at all familiar
	  with software engineering will recognise this as being close to garbage.

	- Refusal by AI to acknowlege that there may be problems at all.

	- Attempts by members of the French government to abort independent
	  investigations (including that of Science et Vie).

This is getting away from our discussion about pilot contributions to "incidents",
but if you want to knock the A320, there are much better grounds for doing so
than ergonomics - without the more serious design problems, there would probably have
been many fewer "accidents", and hence less reason to blame the ergonomics.

Besides "cosmetic" issues like tactile feedback, and some layout issues, the 767
is pretty close to an A320 - as you have said (I think - sorry if I misquote you)
the 767 is just more conventional in cockpit design - its a pity its automatic
landing system can be as good as the best pilot on a good day, and a rough as
the worst on a bad day ... usually more towards the latter ...

Philip

---

From: [email-masked] (Derek H Cedillo)
Date: 03 Dec 92 00:40:13 PST

>Besides "cosmetic" issues like tactile feedback, and some layout issues, 
>the 767 is pretty close to an A320 - as you have said (I think - 
>sorry if I misquote you)

Im sorry, but I dont think cockpit layout and feedback are
"cosmetic".  These are pretty important issues.  Actually, these
are the main gripes about teh A320.  
If the cockpit is non-convential, its not a cosmetic issue,
but rather a problematic issue.  And think about steering your car
without knowing how much of a turn will take you until your there.
A prime example of lack of feedback is a digital stereo.
Think of how many times you over shoot the radio station your 
looking for because you get no feel of how fast the thing is 
going through stations (other than visually).  
Or perhaps if you put the radio knob where the lights knob
was and vice versa.  As these two things are not life or death
threatening, imagine if they were something for steering and braking.
Oh well, maybe some dumb analogies but i hope you get the picture.  
Feedback and layout are not "cosmetic".

Derek

-------------------------------------------------------------------
"He lived a life of going-to-do, 
   and died with nothing done"	       
		-J. Albery	     

In other words---JUST DO IT!

---

From: [email-masked] (Peter Nelson)
Date: 04 Dec 92 22:30:31 PST

>their style of protection.

  Actually they cited Airbus as a good example of the *problem*.  They
  said that most "human error" crashes have resulted from poor "situational
  awareness" and that this resuts from the way Airbus-like "glass cock-
  pits" take the pilot out of the loop.

>lives per year.

  Considering that RevenuePassengerMiles have been climbing steadily
  since that time this is not "stabilization"; it's steady improvement!

>of a flight have a go/no-go say.  

  I agree.  But the article was discussing taking humans out of the
  loop altogether, not replacing pilots with ground-based controllers.

  The problem that exists now is that the pilot is partially out of
  the loop -- he still has the authority to fly the plane into a
  mountain, but he can't maintain the situational awareness to 
  avoid it.   According to the article the period just prior to 
  landing (and to a lesser extent at t.o.) overburdens the pilot
  with vast amounts of system management tasks, so he loses a sense
  of where he (or the plane) really is.

>The technology isn't close to create safe, fully autonomous aircraft.  

  The article seemed to feel that it's closer than many people think.

>Was Bernard Ziegler the author of this article, perchance? :-)

  Julian Moxon.   October 17 issue, pg 22.

>simply have flown around the same thunderstorm?

  Except the examples I cited (DC 10 fan blade, 747 door) were not
  avoidable by pilot action.

---peter

---

From: [email-masked] (Robert Dorsett)
Date: 10 Dec 92 16:07:06 PST

In <[email-masked]> [email-masked] (Philip 
Peake) wrote:

> In article <[email-masked]>, [email-masked] (Robert Dorsett

> if you want to knock the A320, there are much better grounds for doing so
> than ergonomics - without the more serious design problems, there would probably
> have been many fewer "accidents", and hence less reason to blame the ergonomics.

I am hard pressed to think of many other things.  Structurally, the A320 is 
extremely conservative, highly conventional.  In systems layout and design, 
highly conventional.  There are a few frills, such as the cabin lighting 
system, toilets, or window heat, which have been "automated," but only in 
relatively self-contained manners (toilet going out doesn't have the slightest 
ramification on ELAC 1 being able to do its job, for instance: they aren't
on the same networks :-)).

The EFCS, in turn, has been the focus of so much attention that at least one 
pundit suggested that other aspects may have been allowed to lapse, as 
evidenced by the initial problems with the toilets or the cabin intercom/
lighting system, the latter of which, in the words of a BA maintenance 
engineer, had software so simple "a child could have done it better."  These 
aren't safety-critical items (well, maybe the lighting is: it didn't work at 
Habsheim).  

Two of the three accidents were misuses of the FMGS MCU; the other--the 
first--was so bizarre, such an outrageous case of poor airmanship, that I've 
yet to fully assess the implications. This therefore seems to call for better 
ergonomics or training, with the latter recognized as precisely what it is: a 
kludge, covering up poor design.  

It's important to note that while, on a quantifiable basis, the A320's EFCS
is most subject to criticism, it's equally clear that, thus far, the EFCS has
performed almost flawlessly.  And even if it doesn't meet the 1-in-a-billion 
failure rate, it's likely that if it produces even one EFCS-induced 
catastrophic failure every 10 years, the human and material costs can be 
easily absorbed by the industry--and when it does fail, we probably wouldn't 
be able to determine what happens, since the DFDR certainly doesn't record 
the myriad execution paths.  

The real issue, of course, is whether this is as safe as a conventional
system.  And if it isn't, there are tremendous ethical and moral issues
at play.

> Besides "cosmetic" issues like tactile feedback, and some layout issues,

This isn't cosmetic.  The choice of using sidesticks, the four major flight
control modes, the many possible permutations within those modes, are part of
a highly integrated *system* design.  If one looks at it for itself, it's a 
very "sexy" design, a startingly coherent design philosophy. How well it
adapts to the real world is another issue, entirely, of course.

I would even suggest that if one disqualifies one aspect of this model: 
sidestick, throttle control, switch design--the totality could suffer 
irreparable damage.  None of this is "cosmetic."  It's the heart of how the 
airplane is controlled.

> the 767

I would not have rated the airplanes as equivalents.  The 767 is "equivalent"
to an A310, but even then, there are significant differences in cockpit 
design.  If I've given the impression of "equivalency," it was by mistake: 
perhaps in avionics maintenance practices, or the A320 or 747-400 as 
"consumers" of the benefits of the 767/A310 learning curve; little else.  The 
airplane I'd compare with the A320 is the 747-400, at least in cockpit design, 
systems design, and AIDS/BITE integration; certainly not the mission 
requirements.

> ) writes:
> [...] history, even modern history is littered with comments from

In the software engineering community, words like "Oh, that's easy," or "I can
do that on time, on schedule, and under budget" are *always* eaten, later on.
Software is an art, not an engineering discipline.

I wonder what the aero manufacturers are doing that the rest of us poor sods 
aren't, that let them miraculously produce highly complex packages right on
schedule, in a certification environment in which even a day's delay can costs
millions of dollars.  10M of code in an A330/340, indeed.  I have a hard enough 
time keeping my little 1M Microsoft Word in line.

Usually, when I write "stupid" things, I regret it an hour later.  It's
been over 72 hours, now, and I stand by my words.  At this point in time, 
it is not feasible to create fully autonomous transport aircraft, as implied 
in the original article.  By the time it is, I expect my bones to be dust.

Incidentally, a few people seem to have interpreted my comments about software
engineering as coming from an AE perspective: they weren't.  I'm not sanguine
about CS types writing this stuff: I simply don't think development 
technology's at a point where we can write reliable software with the level 
of confidence I feel is necessary.  This is a whole other discussion, though.

I actually have little experience with the capabilities of AE-types to write 
code.  Although I suppose if they had done it, the EFCS would have been 
written in FORTRAN, not C/Pascal/assembly. :-)  

I will concede that the CS approach is likely the lesser of two evils.

---
Robert Dorsett
[email-masked]

---

From: [email-masked] (Karl Swartz)
Date: 10 Dec 92 18:07:49 PST

>aren't safety-critical items (well, maybe the lighting is: it didn't work at 

I believe both intercom and lighting are considered safety-critical
items.  Not long ago, I sat for half an hour at O'Hare with a United
747 while they fixed the intercom.  They considered this critial --
justifiably so, IMO -- because it would be necessary for instructing
passengers in the event of an emergency.

Lighting in general may not be deemed critical, though certainly the
directional lighting in the floor is.

>airplane I'd compare with the A320 is the 747-400, at least in cockpit design, 

Is the MD-11 comparable to the 747-400 in this regard?  I would assume
so since they are of comparable vintage.

Where do the new generation 737s (-300/-400/-500) fit into this?  With
the first flight of the 737-300 coming several years after the 767 came
on the scene I would expect it to be comparable, yet some of what I've
seen suggests it is less sophisticated.  I've been in the cockpits of
each (well, 757s, not 767s that I recall) but really don't know enough
about what I'm looking at to tell the difference.

And, for completeness, where do the glass-cockpit version of the MD-80
family fit into the picture?

-- 
Karl Swartz	|INet	[email-masked]		
1-415/854-3409	|UUCP	uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls
		|Snail	2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA
 Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to [email-masked]

---

From: Robert Dorsett <[email-masked]>
Date: 11 Dec 92 17:42:28 PST

In article  <[email-masked]> [email-masked] (Karl Swartz) writes:

>> These aren't safety-critical items (well, maybe the lighting is: it didn't 
>> work at Habsheim).
>  
> items.  

Sorry: that was poorly phrased.  It is a must-have, and, yes, it did
fail.  However, I understand the problem was mechanical in nature (CCF?); the
software problems were eventually fixed.  

I don't know about the intercom, but the PA system is, as well.

>directional lighting in the floor is.

Floor directional lighting is relatively new.  It complements, but does not 
replace, the regular emergency floods: both are now considered critical.

For the semantics fans: we should probably be careful in our use of the term 
"safety-critical" with respect to these systems: it is not, for instance, in 
the same league as the EFCS, and the software likely doesn't require the 
same confidence.  Anyone known for sure?  I would suspect emergency lighting 
is listed as an "essential function," not critical.

> so since they are of comparable vintage.

I would suggest not: the former is more of a derivative, the latter more of
a new type, with its new wing (which was designed to support the all-upper-
deck concept, plus maybe one more derivative after that), electrical system, 
extensive use of composites, new APU, etc.  Each has a high degree of direct 
commonality with its predecessor, but from a technology basis, I don't think 
they're in the same league.

One commenter to the paper Pete and I are brewing up took exception to my
comparison, though: he feels the 767 was more of an equivalent to the A320.
I disagree, from both design and avionics perspectives.

Perhaps some of the Boeing people posting here can comment on the 
commonality of the various versions of the 747.

> Where do the new generation 737s (-300/-400/-500) fit into this?

FMS, new engines, composites, just about everything else is derivative.  The
"glass" in the cockpits is hackwork, IMHO, nowhere NEAR as integrated as
the "all-new" glass airplanes such as the 747-400.  I don't believe systems
control has changed much at all.

> family fit into the picture?

My PERSONAL mental "ranking" of the sophistication of these airplanes is 
about:

                   High-high automation/integration    
One philosophy        
   |
  777                                                     Another philosophy
   |                         
747-400<--------------------------------------------------->A320/A330/A340
                                |
                     HIgh automation/integration
                                |
                              MD-11
                                |
             757/767<--------------------->A310, A300-600
                                |
              FMS only, varying or no glass, no standards
                                |
                747-300,737-300,-400,-500, MD-8X, F.100
                                |
                    INS/PMS, conventional otherwise
                                |
                           747-200/SP
                                |
              INS only, very smart autopilot, fair integration
                                |
                              L1011
                                |
                              A300
                                |
        INS only, simple, coupled autopilots, fair integration
                                |
                        747-100/200, DC-10
                                |
          First/second-generation design, little integration
                                |
             two-man            |                    three-man
      DC-9,737-100,737-200<-----|
                                |
                              KC-135
                                |
                                 --------------->727, DC-9, 707, DC-8

Two-man airplanes have always used more automation than three-man crews;
hence, I give them a slight edge among the "first-generation" airplanes.

Others may have differing impressions; there's no hard and fast rule to
apply.

Of all these airplanes, the original 747 family has the best internal
cockpit consistency, by far.  Otherwise, the new Airbusses have the best 
design consistency.  But I count some 19 fundamental cockpit designs in 
operation, countless permutations existing in most of them, depending on 
customer preferences in avionics and cockpit layout.  

The FMS's used on these airplanes are generally done by Honeywell, except
that Boeing's using Smiths Industries for the 737, for some reason.

Note that INS's on older-generation airplanes were often not purchased by 
customers who intended to use them for domestic service: EAL's A300-B4's, for 
instance, didn't even have them for service to South America.  All of the 
first-generation airplanes currently have INS retrofits available; there are 
also on-again, off-again plans to offer a relatively sophisticated glass 
cockpit for the 727, with new engines.  

But it's important to note that INS interfaces were pretty much localized, 
with maybe a coupled mode for the autopilot.  The devices were nowhere near 
as integrated in the cockpit design as 1980's/1990's crop, even if they were 
explicitly sold with airplanes (such as the early 747).  They were "packages,"
not the "essence."

LASTLY, note that the manufacturers are MUCH more assertive about preventing
customers customizing their cockpits.  This really got out of hand: for 
instance, I have a picture of a KLM 747-200 with some seven HSI's and CDI's 
and four full-sized ADI's, blanketing every spare square inch of the pilots' 
panels--that's what THEIR chief pilot apparently felt comfortable with. :-)  
Options are much more limited on modern airplanes; all customer variations 
are much "closer" to the manufacturer standard cockpit (the one that gets 
in all the publicity photos) than they used to be.  Then again, nearly all 
the major airlines don't have anything resembling the engineering and design 
departments  that they used to have, so they've forfeited the right to 
comment, to a large degree.  Performance is now ensured by legal contract, 
rather than design, with the dollar being the bottom line.

Caveat: I generally don't know that much about Douglas products 
(except for the DC-10 :-)); Boeing and Airbus have always caught my 
interests.

---
Robert Dorsett
[email-masked]

---

From: [email-masked] (Karl Swartz)
Date: 15 Dec 92 00:13:29 PST

>deck concept, plus maybe one more derivative after that) ...

My understanding was that the 747-400 does *not* have a new wing but
rather a tweaked version of the original.  I recall some statement
from Boeing regarding the lack of winglets on the 777, which noted
that the 777 had a new wing and starting from a clean slate it was
more efficient to not have them, whereas working from an existing
design as with the 747-400 it was helpful to have them.

>... electrical system, extensive use of composites, new APU, etc.

Hmmm ... sounds a lot like the MD-11 as well the 747-400.

>My PERSONAL mental "ranking" of the sophistication of these airplanes is 

...

>                747-300,737-300,-400,-500, MD-8X, F.100

What I've seen suggests the F.100 is quite advanced, probably not far
behind the A320 and perhaps closer to the Airbus philosophy than to
Boeing's.

>                    INS/PMS, conventional otherwise

Ok, I'll risk it ... what's PMS?  (We're talking about airplanes!)

>      DC-9,737-100,737-200<-----|

Every first-generation 737 I've seen has a third seat for the flight
engineer.  I believe this was one of the selling points of the DC-9
over the 737.

>that Boeing's using Smiths Industries for the 737, for some reason.

Boeing recently made a substantial change to the FMS on new 737s, and
offers a retrofit kit for older new-generation 737s.  I believe this
was a replacement ... perhaps away from Smiths?  Having observed the
trials and tribulations of friends with MGs and their Smiths electrics
I'm not enthusiastic about a Smiths FMS!  :-)

>customers customizing their cockpits.  This really got out of hand ...

I've always wondered just what the flight engineer really does on a
767 equipped for three flight crew.  I believe QANTAS does this.
Also, some A310s lack the FFCS (Forward Facing Crew Cockpit) having
instead what I assume is a cockpit more like an older A300.  All of
these are due primarily to union/labor pressures.

>Performance is now ensured by legal contract, rather than design,
>with the dollar being the bottom line.

Well, mandated, at least, if not ensured.

---

From: Robert Dorsett <[email-masked]>
Date: 16 Dec 92 14:00:40 PST

In article <[email-masked]> [email-masked] (Karl Sw
artz) writes:
>rather a tweaked version of the original.

There were significant changes in structure and composition, plus the 
addition of the wingtip extensions and the winglets. As I understand it, 
the new wing is intended to support both the 747-400 and a full-upper-
deck 747-500.

>I recall some statement

One doesn't really relate to the other: the 777 has a high-aspect-ratio
wing, reducing drag in its long-range profile.  The drag reduction is
what the winglets were purportedly for; the 777 will achieve a better 
effect, naturally.

>Ok, I'll risk it ... what's PMS?  (We're talking about airplanes!)

Performance Management System.  It's the precursor of FMS's; it was
originally deployed on the 747-SP.  It was used to provide a lot of "nice
to know" and performance-related flight guidance, to obtain optimal 
fuel burn.

>engineer.

Hmm.  I have some vague recollection of a three-man 737, but I think I'm
thinking of that 767.  The 737 was designed for a two-man crew.  If three-
man ships were produced, there are precious few of them.  I wasn't able 
to find any explicit references to three-man variants in my notes.

Be careful to distinguish between a "flight engineer" and someone occupying
the jump seat.  Quite a few airlines will run a "third man" due to either 
union pressures, or to provide training experience for new-hires; one often
sees "transients" (instructors, check pilots, deadheading pilots) in
the jump seat.

Lufthansa, I believe, ran a third man on the 747-400 for a long time; Air 
Inter's unions had a major fight over the A320.  The 737 itself is certifi-
cated for two-man operation, and that's what is legally needed in order to 
fly it.

It's an interesting question whether the union desire to safeguard its
members' economic interests might actually *decrease* safety, in this case.
I question the wisdom of inserting a third man "for the ride," who has
no real operational significance in the cockpit.  It would seem that such
a person could serve as a destabilizing influence.  If they're going to 
go three-man, they should go whole-hog, and give him something to do, in
the fundamental cockpit design.  But I digress.

>I believe this was one of the selling points of the DC-9
>over the 737.

Yet ANOTHER excerpt from _Legend & Legacy_, pp. 255-257:

"The DC-9 head start was a killer for Boeing's sales force, yet it
wasn't the only handicap Boeing's new baby faced in its adolescence.
A deep hole was dug by the men who would fly the plane, and unwittingly
it was Delta's pilots who handed their brethren the shovel that almost
buried the 737.  When Delta bought the DC-9, it won an agreement from its 
pilots that the cockpit be designed for a two-man crew, eliminating the 
flight engineer.  This was permissible under an FAA regulation that 
allowed any jet transport weighing less than 80,000 lbs to be flown by two 
pilots.  Both the original DC-9 and BAC-111 met the so-called '80,000-pound 
rule,' heresy and anathema to the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA).  
It could do nothing about the precedent Delta's pilots had set for the 
DC-9, but the union began pressuring the FAA to change it regulation for 
the 737, and at the same time warned US airlines planning to buy the 
Boeing jet that future pilot contracts would specify a three-man crew for 
the 737.

"ALPA argued that with no flight engineer to help them, the pilots'
increased workload made it difficult to watch out for other traffic, thus
enhancing the chances for mid-air collisions, and also created more 
danger during bad-weather landings.  The union's case might have sounded
logical until one began wondering why a two-man crew was safe for the DC-9
and BAC-111, and not for the 737.  Nevertheless, the FAA changed its 
regulations to the extent of requiring Boeing to prove that the 737
could be operated safely with two pilots.  The irony was that once having
been certificated for a two-man crew, three subsequent larger DC-9
models weighing far more than 80,000 pounds also were automatically 
certificated for two pilots, but not the 737.

"Thus the baby Boeing's late start was saddled with a further sales han-
dicap--many airlines considering the 737 bought the DC-9 instead, 
unwilling to add the expense of a third cockpit crew member who literally 
was nothing except an extra set of eyeballs.  United and Western, 
after arbitration, agreed to a three-man crew, although that third
man was a classic case of feather-bedding--or 'feather birding,' as
then-FAA administrator Najeeb Halaby expressed it.

"Western's pilots referred to the extra crew member as GIBs, for 'Guy
in Back,' but abandoned this nomenclature hastily when a pilot ran
across the word 'gib' in a dictionary and discovered it meant castrated
tomcat.

"Lew Wallick once asked a Piedmont captain what the third crew member did,
riding in a jump seat just behind the pilots, unable to reach any controls.

"'He doesn't do much,' the captain admitted.  'He sits back there and 
spills coffee in my brainback [nickname for the briefcase holding air-
way maps and aircraft manuals].  But come next summer, he's gonna mow my
lawn.'

"Brien Wygle was in charge of the 737's flight test program, and worked 
with engineering to design a cockpit whose workload would put the least 
possible stress on two pilots.

"'We went to a lot of trouble proving this out,' Wygle said.  'We didn't
have much computer input--they weren't as sophisticated then--but we
designed a simple cockpit management system because the FAA told us that
when we came up for certification, they were going to be very tough.  They
were under great pressure from ALPA, which wanted the FAA to say that 
the 737 needed a flight engineer or any third crew member.'

"Tough they were.

"'The FAA made us jump through a lot of hoops,' Wygle recalled.  'There
was an unprecedented amount of testing, all kinds of simulated engine and
systems failures, low-visibility approaches and landings, and even test 
flights through high-density traffic on the eastern seaboard.  And to the
FAA's credit, they ruled that the 737 was completely safe to fly with a 
two-man crew.

"The ruling, however, couldn't recoup the sales Boeing had already lost
because of the ALPA campaign; the union itself eventually came around to
admitting that a sophisticated, well-designed cockpit didn't need a flight
engineer [MUCH later! --rdd]  And in one sense, ALPA did the 737 a
favor.  It forced Boeing to improve the plane to the point where it would
be so good it didn't matter how many men were in the cockpit."

>767 equipped for three flight crew.  I believe QANTAS does this.

There was only one 3-man 767 built, and that was for UAL.

Ansett uses a three-man crew, but there's no major change to the structure--
probably just a CDU interface on the rear on the control pedestal, so the
third man can play navigator, to keep busy.  Again, be sure to distinguish
between a "GIB" (:-)) and someone who plays an intended operational role 
in the cockpit.

>these are due primarily to union/labor pressures.

This is the first I've heard of it.  Got any references?  It'd be REAL
difficult to do, and I'd question whether the returns would be enough
to entice the manufacturer to do it.

>Well, mandated, at least, if not ensured.

I suspect that when dollar figures reach low earth orbit, performance is
whatever you say it is. :-)

Two good references:

Incidentally, there are good design summaries of the 757/767 and 
A310/A300-600 cockpits in _Aerospace Crew Station Design_, G. P. Carr, 
editor, Elsevier Science Publishers, 1984.  

There's also a superb design overview of the 737 in the February 3, 1966 
issue of FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL.

---
Robert Dorsett
[email-masked]

---

From: [email-masked] (Ken Jongsma)
Date: 16 Dec 92 14:00:43 PST

>>that Boeing's using Smiths Industries for the 737, for some reason.

Perhaps because Smiths offered a better product at the time? Perhaps because
Boeing does not want to depend on one supplier for all it's FMS design?

>I'm not enthusiastic about a Smiths FMS!  :-)

Ohh... It helps to know a bit about the corporate history before one
makes comments like "Smiths electrics."

OK. The division of Smiths that makes the 737 FMS is located in Grand
Rapids, Michigan. Prior to being purchased by Smiths a few years back,
it used to be known as Lear Siegler, Inc. (LSI) and was originally
formed by Bill Lear, the designer of the Lear Jet.

All of the FMS work that this division does was initiated well before
SI bought the division, so references to UK product lines aren't really
valid.

Some history on the 737 FMS. The original 737-300 FMS was based on work
done for the 727 and early 737s (Performance Data Computer) and a system
that was not fielded called the PNCS.

A few years ago, along with Update 4 of the software, the "Eagle" FMS
hardware was fielded. It had a faster processor and more memory. More
recently, Update 6 came with additional memory. I assume this is the 
update you were refering to.

Next month, the "Dual" FMS will be shipped. This system is a 4 MCU,
two computer system. 

In addition to commercial FMSs, SI also makes the Nav System for all
600+ USAF C-130s. This same system has been installed on some international
C-130s.

(Although I work on the military side of the house, I checked with our
commercial people to verify the above. Obligatory Disclaimer: I speak
for myself...)

Ken

-- 
Ken Jongsma                                          
Smiths Industries                               [email-masked]
Grand Rapids, Michigan                      [email-masked]

---

From: [email-masked] (Ken Hoyme)
Date: 16 Dec 92 14:00:44 PST

> design as with the 747-400 it was helpful to have them.

I believe the winglets issue on the 777 was also complicated by the
folding wing option.  Which no one has ordered -- even those airlines
who originally expressed interest in the option.  Has development on the
folding wing stopped??  I had heard that Boeing was getting tired of the
investment required to keep the option open while not receiving any
orders for it.

> I'm not enthusiastic about a Smiths FMS!  :-)

Me too!  But then, I *am* biased on this issue.  :-)  However, I do not
believe that the part of Smiths that supports cars and the part that
designs avionics has a whole lot to do with each other.  I suspect (but
do not know for certain) that Boeing's choice of Smiths might be related
to trying to get some competition in this area.

Ken Hoyme                    Honeywell Systems and Research Center
(612)951-7354                3660 Technology Dr., Minneapolis, MN 55418
Internet: [email-masked]

---

From: [email-masked] (Robert Dorsett)
Date: 17 Dec 92 03:35:15 PST

>to trying to get some competition in this area.

And if we're going to pick on Smiths for that, we should note that Delco
Electronics, which produced the INS used on just about every airliner produced
in the late 60's and 70's, was a subsidiary of General Motors. :-)  Same 
logo as the car-stereo systems, too. :-)

But boy, is Smiths' 737 engine display tacky. :-)

---
Robert Dorsett
[email-masked]

---

From: [email-masked] (Michael T. Palmer)
Date: 17 Dec 92 13:27:35 PST

>to find any explicit references to three-man variants in my notes.

Well, NASA Langley operates Boeing B-737-100 Hull Number 1.  That's right,
Number 1.  I can tell you for a fact that it was designed for two pilots.

>sees "transients" (instructors, check pilots, deadheading pilots) in

Correct.  However, putting a third pilot on that tiny, flip/fold-down seat
would require hazardous duty pay.  I have ridden in that seat for quite a
few hours, and it is NOT repeat NOT like riding in a 767 cockpit!!  Still,
there is no rear "engineer's station" for a third crewmember anyway.  And
the seat blocks access to the cabin door!  It was never designed for constant
use.

-- 
Michael T. Palmer, M/S 152, NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA 23681
Voice: 804-864-2044,   FAX: 804-864-7793,   Email: [email-masked]
RIPEM Public Key available soon --- Consider it an envelope for your e-mail

---

From: [email-masked] (Terrell D. Drinkard)
Date: 29 Dec 92 22:53:49 PST

>>deck concept, plus maybe one more derivative after that) ...

Both airplanes are derivatives, actually.  The MD-11 was certified under
the DC-10's certification basis.

>design as with the 747-400 it was helpful to have them.

I can't speak to exactly how much of the 747-400's wing design could be
considered 'new', but I do know that it was modified extensively to
change the pressure distribution across the wing - particularly the
inboard wing where we were seeing double shocks on the older models.

>behind the A320 and perhaps closer to the Airbus philosophy than to

The Fokker 100's flight deck is much more Boeing-esk than Airbus-ish.
There are control columns, and the FMS is very similar to the Boeing
models.  The F 100 does have envelope protection, as do the Airbus
airplanes, but I don't think you would find it much different from
what is already flying.  It is a very advanced flight deck, very
clean.

>Ok, I'll risk it ... what's PMS?  (We're talking about airplanes!)

Could it be the Performance Management System, a la Douglas MD-80? :-)

>these are due primarily to union/labor pressures.

You are quite right, three-crew cockpits are union requirements on some
airlines.  The flight engineer on a 767 would do the same job done
on other three-crew airplanes - deal with onboard systems.  All those
nifty controller boxes are left behind in Seattle.  :-)

-- 
Terry
[email-masked]
"Anyone who thinks they can hold the company responsible for what I say has
more lawyers than sense."

---

From: [email-masked] (Terrell D. Drinkard)
Date: 29 Dec 92 22:53:51 PST

>> design as with the 747-400 it was helpful to have them.

One further comment.  The 747 is constrained on span, therefore the
winglets were the optimal choice for improving the efficiency of the wing.
The 777 has chosen to offer two options:  folding wingtips, and 'ignore the
existing infrastructure'.  Both options allow an unconstrained span, which
gives better induced drag performance.

>investment required to keep the option open while not receiving any

I don't think I'm giving anything away by saying that the folding wingtip
option is still being studied, primarily by the New Large Airplane
Division.  They apparently don't think they can get away with a 'damn the
infrastructure' attitude.  :-)

---

From: [email-masked] (Karl Swartz)
Date: 29 Dec 92 23:02:31 PST

>infrastructure' attitude.  :-)

It's also still being offered on the 777, as far as I know.  My
understanding was the part of United's reason for not ordering the
option was the weight penalty -- 3,900 lbs., or 2,000 for just the
hinges and stuff without the actuation mechanism, which allows easy
addition later on.  United preferred the weight savings and even at
that went with a higher MGTOW version in order to operate the 777
on Chicago to Hawaii routes, which are right at the range limits of
the A-market 777.