Subject: THE TRUDEAU ESSAY - COMPLETE TEXT: PART 2/2

From: [email-masked] (R Ross Holder Jr)
Date: Sun, 4 Oct 1992 02:27:48 GMT

--------------------------------BEGIN PART II----------------------------------

This most recent ideological fad in Quebec, collective rights, has an
enthusiastic following.  Journalists, academics, students, businesspeople
and politicians are all ready to man the barricades to protect the
"collective rights" of Quebecers against any interference from the Canadian
Constitution or the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  In this they are following
the lead of their premier, who at the proclamation of Bill 178 banning signs
in languages other than French, bragged that in the name of collective
rights his government had trampled individual rights guaranteed by the
charter.

III. COLLECTIVE RIGHTS

The poverty of nationalistic thinking in Quebec is abundantly clear from the
dispatch with which so many of our Quebecois thinkers have embraced the
concept of "collective rights."

Under the charter, all Canadians stand as equals before the state.  But
Quebec's nationalist elites, who are fearless in the face of competition from
the United States and even the whole world, are scared stiff of English
Canada.  Only in the St-Jean Baptiste parade are we a race of giants; when
the next day dawns and we come to measure ourselves against other Canadians
as individuals, we are afraid we are not equal but inferior to them, and
we run and hide behind our "collective" rights which, if need be, we invoke
to override the fundamental rights of "others."  But what a politician or
academic or businessperson will tell us which collectivity is supposed to
have those rights?

Is it the French-Canadian collectivity living here and there across Canada?
Of course not, since the preponderant ideology in Quebec doesn't give a fig
about bilingualism in Canada, and Quebec has gone to bat in court for
Alberta and Saskatchewan when they have denied French rights acquired even
before these provinces joined Confederation in 1905.

Is it the collectivity of all Quebecers, then?  No, because that
collectivity is called a province, and the powers of the province were
explicitly recognized long ago by the Constitution Act of 1867.

So it can only be some distinct collectivity within Quebec - but which?
Certainly no the members of the anglophone collectivity, since Quebec law
denies them any collective rights in relation to signs and certain aspects
of education.  We can rule out the native peoples, too, since they have
been clearly given to understand that they cannot be a distinct society
with the right to self-determination because the term has been reserved
by Quebecers of another race.

When the nationalists talk about protecting collective rights, then, they
are thinking only of French-speaking Quebecers.  But are we sure we know
what that means?  There are plenty of anglophones who speak very good
French and plenty of francophones of various cultural backgrounds who
speak languages other than French.  Will they all get protection for thier
collective rights at least for the French-speaking part of their being?  If
so, what these rights consist of?

Can Hatian Quebecers, for instance, protect certain aspects of their own
culture by claiming protection as part of the French-speaking collectivity?
Or are they excluded from the "unique culture" which Quebec will have the
power to promote the derogations from the charter?  Can neo-Canadian Quebec-
ers of whatever origin chose to renounce their heritage and origins so as
to share with "old stock" Quebecers the protection sought for the French-
speaking collectivity?  Or are we dealing with a frankly racist notion that
makes second- or third-class citizens of everyone but "old stock" Quebecers?

There are no certainties here, but whatt does seem clear is that it will
not be for the individual to decide whether or not he or she belongs to the
collectivity of "old stock" Quebecers.  This will be decided by a Quebec
government through laws adopted by majority vote in the National Assembly.
And so from collective rights on down to the distinct society, thirst for
power in some, together with apathy and sometimes stupidity in others, will
have established that, as a basic element of Quebec society, a legislative
majority will have justification for arbitrarily overriding the fundamental
rights of any citizen who has the privelege of living in Quebec.

IV. QUEBEC'S "TRADITIONAL" DEMANDS

Max Nemni, professor of political science at Laval University, has shown in
a book published last year that between 1980 and 1992, Quebec's "traditional"
and "minimum" demands have been anything but traditional or minimum.

Looking back further still, it can be seen that there has never been a
definitive answer to the question "What does Quebec want?", which is still
being asked by the few English-speaking Canadians who are not sick and
tired of the evasiveness of Quebec nationalist thinking.

As far back as memory serves, French Canadians were essentially asking for
one thing" respect for the French fact in Canada and incorporation of this
fact into Canadian civil society, principally in the areas of language and
education, and particularly in the federal government and provinces with
French-speaking minorities.  After two centuries of struggle and a few
symbolic victories (bilingual money and stamps, for example), the Offcial
Languages Act was passed in 1969 and minority-language education rights were
entrenched in the Charter of 1982.  The gates had suddenly opened and
institutional bilingualism was recognized in Canada.

Then, equally suddenly, the Quebec nationalists no longer wanted the French
language to be made equal with English throughout Canada.  They denounced
bilingualism as utopic at the very moment it was becoming a reality.  With
Bills 22 and 101, Quebec declared itself unilingually French and abandoned
the cause of French-speaking minorities in other provinces, the better to
marginalize the English-speaking minority in Quebec; the Quiet Revolution
had suddenly empowered us to become indifferent to the first minority and
intolerant to the second.  It is as if we had practised virtue only out of
weakness or hypocrisy.

Yet Premier Jean Lesage, the father of the Quiet Revolution, had spelled out
Quebec's traditional demands at the federal-provincial conference held in
July, 1960, a few weeks after the election that had brought him to power.
In substance, they were as follows:
*  Immediate resumption of talks on the repatriation of the Constitution and
the constitutional amending formula;
*  Insertion in the Constitution of a charter of rights, to include both
language rights and education rights for French-speaking minorities outside
Quebec;
*  Creation of a constitutional court;
*  Creation of a permanent federal-provincial affairs secretariat;
*  Annual meetings of provincial premiers;
*  An end to conditional grants and shared-cost programs.

But whenever these objectives were about to be reached, Quebec's "traditional"
demands would begin to evolve.  Then, in 1964, Premier Lesage gave in to the
nationalists and repudiated the Fulton-Favreau agreement on repatriation,
which his government had negotiated and signed, and came up with an entirely
new "traditional" demand, which came to be known as "special status."  The
content of theis notion remained deliberately vague, for it was to become
essentially an instrument of blackmail: Quebec would never allow the Canadian
Constitution to be brought home unless the country paid a ransom to Quebec.

That ransom would vary from year to year, the only constant being that as
soon as the ransom was paid, the Quebec government would come up with a new
one.  Thus, under Lesage, there was a lot of "opting out," by which
various federal programs that were applicable throughout the country would
be administered in Quebec by the Quebec government, but at the Canadian
government's expense.  There was also much hoopla over the new
[1mpolitique de grandeur[0m, through which it was hoped that Quebec
would gain recognition as an international power.

In 1966, Daniel Johnson's government took power, and Quebec's new demand
became "equality or independence."

In 1971, the profitable federalism premier scuttled his own agreement on
repatriation and, as ransom, demanded the right to opt out of family
allowances.  This had barely been paid when he demanded another: cultural
sovereignty.

In 1976, the sovereignty-association premier demanded sovereignty-association
as ransom, failing which Quebec would become totally independent.  After the
defeat in the referendum; this premier demanded merely a massive transfer of
federal powers to the provinces (the Chateau Consensus of September 1980)
and refused to discuss even the possibility of repatriation until the
transfer was assured.  Then, in April, 1981, this premier allied himself
with seven English-speaking provinces to demand a "notwithstanding" clause
that provided for opting out with compensation.

On Nov. 5, 1981, the same premier spealled out his three conditions for
agreeing to the constitutional deal that had just been made: an amending
formula with a guarantee of full compensation to a province opting out of a
transfer of powers; restrictions on the right to work anywhere in the
country; and restrictions on minority-language education rights.

The federal government indicated that it was ready to talk, but less than
two weeks later, on Nov. 13, 1981, these three conditions had disappeared and
been replaced by three others: recognition of Quebec's distinct society, a
constitutional veto and limitations to the charter.

After the federal elction of 1984, the self-same premier recommended that
Quebec give "the fine risk of federalism" a try.

The profitable federalism premier, when he had returned to power in 1985,
demanded that Quebec's "distinct society" be mentioned in a preamble to the
Constitution, failing which he would break off negotiations.  A year or two
laterthe "distinct society" was to be incorporated in the body of the
Constitution as an interpretive clause (the Meech Lake accord), failing which
Quebec would "resort to self-determination."

In February, 1990, while the Meech Lake accord was still being negotiated,
this premier created the Allaire committee, whose mandate was to define
the "traditional demands" to be made [1mafter[0m the conclusion of the
Meech Lake accord.  The Allaire report, published less than a year later,
demanded a massive transfer of federal powers just to Quebec.  If this
ransom were not paid, there would be a referendum on Quebec independence.
As we know, this report was set aside by the premier at the policy
convention of the Liberal Party of Quebec on Aug. 29, 1992.

Many in Quebec have the cheek to call this incredible grab bag "traditional
demands"!  And every time a new demand is announced, the self-appointed
elites snap to attention, ready to feel humiliated if the ransom is not
paid at once.  Most incredible of all, there are still good souls in
English Canada who are ready to take these temper tantrums seriously and urge
their compatriots to pay each new ransom for fear of losing each "last
chance" to save Canada.  Poor things, they ahve not yet realized that the
nationalists' thrist will never be satisfied, and that each new ransom paid
to stave off the threat of schism will simply encourage the master
blackmailers to renew the threat and double the ransom.

It has become clear that ll the demands made of Canada by the Quebec
nationalists can be summed up in just one: keep giving us new powers and
money to exercise them, or we'll leave.  If Quebecers are offered the chance
to have their cake and eat it too, naturally they will accept.  But as
Canadians they also know that a country must chose to be or not to be; that
dismantling Canada will not save it and the nationalists cannot be allowed
to play the game of heads-I-win-tails-you-lose, or to hold referedums on
independence every 10 years.  And anyway, you cannot [1mreally[0m
believe in Canada and at the same time claim the right of self-determination
for Canadian provinces.

"French Canadians have no opinions, they only have felings," Sir Wilfrid
Laurier said.  For unscrupulous politicians, there is no surer way of
rousing feelings than to trumpet a call to pride of race.  French Canadians
will be rid of this kind of politician if the blackmail ceases, and the
blackmail will cease only if Canada refuses to dance to that tune.
Impartial history has shown that it was exactly this attitude that pushed
separatism to the brink of the grave between 1980 and 1984.

Separatism has regained a lot of ground since 1984, of course, but as the
Portuguese proverb goes, "The worst is not always certain."  However,
to ward it off, our leaders will need a bit of courage.

EOF
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R. Ross Holder, Jr.  INTERNET: [email-masked]  (Winnipeg, Manitoba)
       Department of Philosophy                The University of Manitoba
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