Subject: Re: SAM taking out a jumbo jet, how hard?

From: [email-masked] (Andrew Jaremkow)
Date: Thu, 25 Jul 1996 16:34:40 GMT

From [email-masked] (Andrew Jaremkow)

Morgoth <[email-masked]> wrote:

>From Morgoth <[email-masked]>

>I know it has been the fear of many anti-terr groups, that a terr group
>will acquire a SAM (shoulder or otherwise) and sit of a busy airport and
>take potshots at jumbo jets.

>How difficult would this be, and why?

	There are two parts to this. 

	The first, and by far the most difficult, is the acquisition of the
weapon in question. You have two options: a) obtain it from a
legitimate government with their blessing, or b) steal it, or pay
someone to steal it for you. The former leads to deniability problems
for the government in question. Man portable SAMs aren't made
everywhere, and tracing them is a lot easier than tracing a bit of
plastique or dynamite. Furthermore they're expensive, and so dramatic
that any use of the weapon will bring quite a bit more condemnation
than a simple bombing. I suspect terrorist sponsoring nations would be
reluctant to give this sort of support unless they could hide their
involvment very deeply.
	Stealing the weapon (ie.obtaining it illicitly) has gotten much easier
in the last five to ten years. SAMs are in the hands of several
guerilla groups (notably the Afghans) who have reportedly sold some
for hard currency. It is very difficult to track the numbers of
weapons and their whereabouts in an irregular organization. The chaos
in Europe with the collapse of the Soviet Union, pullout of troops
(both NATO and Warpac), reunification of Germany, re-equipping of
Warpac nations, and flaring civil wars have all provided ample
opportunity for one or two of the weapons to take a walk for cash.
When we hear of Soviet nuclear material being stored in padlocked
sheds can their other security measures be viewed with confidence?
Furthermore, as weapons are upgraded from generation to generation
(SA-7 to SA-14, etc) the opportunity exists to set aside an obsolete
weapon or two and claim they have been destroyed.
	What sort of weapon is the terrorist likely to get? The tremendous
cost and technical sophistication of the larger systems coupled with
their size almost certainly rules them out. (But not entirely... Who
would have thought a terrorist cult would have attempted to develop
chemical, biological, and radiological weaponry, and then mounted a
complex nerve gas attack on a major subway system?) I would suspect
the terrorist would pass on anything radar guided, with the
requirements for search radars, guidance radars, control centres, and
power sources. This means weapons like the SA-8, Roland, Crotale,
Rapier, and anything larger are out. The man portable SAMs would be
the weapon of choice. Small, light, easy to use and conceal, and
without any support requirements these weapons are almost purpose
built for the terrorist. The various SA-7s, both Soviet models and
various clones, would be the most readily available. Later models
(SA-14, 16, and 18) would be progressively harder to come by. Redeyes
are almost certainly extinct by now, but there may still be some early
Stingers floating around in Afghanistan, and an unscrupulous
serviceman could provide a few new ones direct from Uncle Sam. The
various optically quided weapons from Britain (Blowpipe, Javelin,
Starburst) would be rather unlikely, having higher operator training
requirements, and being far less widely deployed.
	The problem with the small IR SAMs is their lack of killing power.
They have tiny warheads, and will usually track on an engine, meaning
a large multi engined jetliner is likely to escape destruction,
allbeit with serious wounds. A larger weapon, such as the Mistral, or
a SA-9/13, or perhaps even Chaparral would be more likely to do
sufficient damage to the airliner, but, again, obtaining and employing
the larger weapons is problematic. Also remember, that with any of the
weapons the terrorist must somehow obtain training if he is to use the
weapon with any degree of success. This may be as difficult as
obtaining the weapon itself, especially if it is a foreign make.

	Once the terrorist has the weapon, he is faced with the second part of
his "mission": successfully using it.

	The terrorist must first smuggle the weapon into the target country,
and then to the launch site. Attacking Israel might be a little tough.
It is a small, heavily guarded target. Getting something into America,
on the other hand,  is not too difficult. It has enormous relatively
unguarded coastlines, and a vast undefended border with Canada.
Bringing the weapon across somewhere in the Prarie provinvces would
probably be the easiest. Getting the device into Canada would be so
laughably simple it's not funny. A boat could land almost anywhere on
our completely unguarded coastline without any difficulty. Once the
weapon has evaded border inspection it can be toted about in the trunk
of any car you please.
	Assuming the terrorist has safely reached the airport, where should he
set up? The jets would be most vulnerable at takeoff, when they are
low, slow, and fully loaded. With the marginal performance of the
weapon attacking the plane on takeoff is almost a necessity. Simply
parking your car at the end of the runway and leting loose is almost
certain to get you caught though. I'd back off a kilometer or so, and
try to find a rooftop position, preferably in an industrial area where
there are fewer observers. If the airport is out in the country
concealmant and escape is a lot easier.  I would also try to attack
shortly after dawn on a grey cloudy morning. The low contrast sky
would hide the smoke trail much better than a blue sky, the missile
flare would be much less obvious than at night, and there would be
fewer observers around. Furthermore, the weapon operator would be able
to clearly see the target. 
	In order to kill the target it would probably be necessary to fire
several rounds. This makes it more likely that someone will see or
hear the terrorist, so I think it's unlikely that the shooter would
stick around and down several jets. Also, performing multiple
engagements requires multiple ammunition loads, which is a significant
logistics problem. Acquiring one or two missiles is difficult enough,
but getting five or six or more and hiding them is a much more
difficult proposition. I would be far more worried about a group
salvoing off two or three missiles at a single airliner and fading
into the city than about a sustained operation against a succession of
planes.

>I have some ideas. but..

		...but you don't want to give them away???

			Andrew Jaremkow
			[email-masked]