Subject: Re: Gun Control???? What is this SHIT!!
From: [email-masked] (Craig Bruce)
Date: Thu, 1 Dec 1994 23:09:33 GMT
Newsgroups: can.general,ont.general

[email-masked] (Mark Terka) writes:

>This proposal has opened my eyes to the Fascist style of our present
>government. Hell, I expect legislation of this nature from a totalitarian
>regime, not from Canada.

My eyes were opened a long time ago by banned local newsgroups.  If you read
the newspapers, etc. you will see that some new issue about cracking down on
criminals by restricting general-public personal freedoms comes up every
couple of months.  Almost always, the anti-freedom movement wins.  And,
eventually, when the measures taken don't work very well, they crack down even
harder.

Some information about guns that was posted to this newsgroup in October is
included below.

>What will they outlaw next? Cryptography with an intent to banning privacy???
>Could BE!

Quite seriously, that is very likely to be coming.  Maybe they'll introduce
the Clipper chip in Canada?  It might actually pass, here.  Or maybe an
out-right ban on cryptography.  Or maybe a registry of all encrypted
messages...?  Heh, just kidding.  But they'll come up with something.  We
can't have pedophiles exchanging contact information without the RCMP being
able to see it.

Keep on Hackin'!

-Craig Bruce
[email-masked]
"Some criminals can't handle their freedom, so we're taking away *YOURS*!"
      -- Government of Canada, 1994 (paraphrased)
--
Article 15640 of ont.general:
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~Newsgroups: can.general,can.politics,ont.general,tor.general,alt.activism,
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~Subject: Re: AW3 Guns
~Date: Wed, 26 Oct 1994 18:35:21 UNDEFINED
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Firearms Q & A

Preface:

This Q&A file is generated by Greg Booth, and graciously posted to 
various sources on the Internet

Greg asks that any corrections, additions, and criticisms be sent to him, 
and all are joyfully welcome.

You can contact Greg Booth at:

[email-masked]

Last update: 12/19/93

Somebody is lying...

Statement:

 "One child under 14 is accidently shot to death
	every day in the USA" (Center to Prevent Handgun Violence)

Truth:

 True, if the year in question is 1979, when there were
	364 such deaths. In 1990, the most recent year for which data
	are available, the number was 236, according to the National
	Center for Health Statistics. The number of fatal gun
	accidents among children has fallen by 56% since 1970, even
	as the gun supply has grown significantly.[4]

Statement:

 "In the past decade, more than 138,000 Americans
	were shot by children under the age of 6."
	(Hartford Courant)

Truth:

 	No source is ever cited for this factoid because there is none. 
	No government or academic agency even collects data to provide an 
	estimate for the true figure.[4]

Statement:

 135,000 children carry guns to school each day.
 	(U.S. Sen. Biden and Chafee)

Truth:

 The 135,000 figure, also sometimes given as 186,000, is often 
	attributed to the Department of Justice (DOJ), but no specific 
	DOJ study is identified. The number is a huge distortion from the 
	plausible 16,000 to 17,000 nationally extrapolated from criminologist 
	Gary Kleck's data.[4]

Statement:

 "Firearms are responsible for the deaths of 45,000 infants, 
	children and adolescents per year." (American Academy of Pediatrics)

Truth:

 	Even if all persons 15-95 are considered "adolescents," this one 
	can't be true. The 45,000 figure exceeds the total deaths in all 
	ages from all causes related to firearms.[4]

Statement:

 "One million U.S. inhabitants die prematurely each year
	as the result of intentional homicide or suicide." (former Surgeon 
	General C. Everett Koop)

Truth:

 	According to the National Center for Health Statistics, in 1988 there 
	were about 30,000 suicides (by all methods) and about 22,000 
	homicides (by all methods, including legal self-defense). Thus, 
	the "one million" claim is off by about 1800%.[4]

Statement:

 "Guns are the leading cause of death among older teenagers-
	white and black-in America." (Newsweek)

Truth:

 	True for black males, but not for females or for males of other 
	races.[4]

Statement:

 "People without guns injure, people with guns kill."
	(The Coalition for Gun Control)[2]

Truth:

 Most homicides (c. 60-75%) in Canada are done with something other
       than a firearm. One is more likely to be injured by a knife
       wielding attacker than a gun wielding attacker. If injured,
       (non fatal) knife wounds are more likely to be more serious
       than firearms injuries according to Statistics Canada.

	In Canada from 1961-1990, there were a total of 15,198 homicides.

	63.1% were with a non-firearm.
	14.3% were with a non-restricted rifle.
	13% were with a illegally owned restricted firearm.
	6.5% were with a non-restricted shotgun.
	2.4% were with a unidentified firearm.
	0.7% were with a legally owned and registered restricted firearm.
	[8]

	In 1992, there were 756 homicides(including self defense homicides)
	in Canada, of those, 26.19% with with firearms, that leaves
	73.81% homicides by means other that a firearm. [8]

Statement:

  "Dogs are more regulated than firearms are."
	(The Coalition for Gun Control)

Truth:

 	No permit is needed to purchase or acquire a dog.  No permit is 
	required to transport a dog or take a dog for a walk. Dogs are 
	not banned because of physical appearance. Small dogs are not 
	more strictly regulated than larger dogs. Dogs are not registered 
	everywhere, and where they are, registration is quick and easy, 
	available to everyone, and used to control dogs that tend to run 
	around on their own. Registration of dogs has not been used to 
	confiscate expensive dogs that have not been used in criminal offenses. 

Statement:

 "Motor vehicles are more regulated and taxed than guns."
	(The Coalition for Gun Control)[2].

Truth:

 	Applicable taxes on firearms and motor vehicles are the same, being
	the Goods and Services Tax and Provincial Sales Taxes.
	Motor vehicles are not banned for being paramilitary 
	in appearance (i.e Jeeps and 4WD vehicles), having automatic
	transmissions, large capacity (> 5 litres) gas tanks, or
	colour. No permit is needed to purchase a motor vehicle.
	No permit is needed to tow or ship a vehicle if the
	vehicle is not being driven.  Drivers licenses are easy to 
	get, good for 5 years and allow the motor vehicle to be taken 
	anywhere in Canada by the driver.  Concealed weapons permits 
	are not available to Canadian citizens. Motor vehicles
	are not required to be stored with empty fuel tanks and disabled
	engines in locked garages.  

Statement:

 "Guns are more lethal on a per use basis than motor vehicles."
	(The Coalition for Gun Control)[2]

Truth:

  Number of motor vehicle related accidental deaths in Canada
	in 1990, 3798. Number of firearms related accidental
	deaths in Canada in 1990, 186. Canadians fire millions of
	rounds of ammunition every year while hunting, plinking,
	target practise, and competitive shooting. Target shooting
	is one of the safest of the outdoor sports.

Statement:

 "Easy access to firearms contributes to crime".
	(The Coalition for Gun Control)[2]

Truth:

      	Areas that have instituted tougher restrictions on the legal access 
	or ownership of firearms have seen increases in the violent crime 
	rates. Canada and Britain have both increased the restrictions on 
	firearms owners in the last 15 years, and have seen dramatic 
	increases in violent crime and the use of illegal firearms. Areas 
	of the US (and several countries) that have liberal restrictions, 
	or have eased their restrictions on legal gun owners have low crime 
	rates, or have seen their crime rates drop.

	Prior to January 1978 when Bill C-51 came into effect, Canada had 
	very liberal gun laws. From 1977 to 1991, Canada's violent crime
	rate has increased 89% (583 to 1099 violent crimes per 100,000
	population) compared to a 59% for the US in the same period.
	(476 to 758 violent crimes per 100,000 population).
	[10]

Statement:

 "The majority of Canadians support tougher gun control."
	(The Coalition for Gun Control)[2]

Truth:

 	While a survey that asked "Do you favour more gun control?" had
       	80% of the respondants say yes. However when asked "What should
	the Government do to fight crime?", less than 1% responded by 
	saying "more gun control". "Do you agree that the courts are 
	presently much too lenient in punishing criminals using guns?" 
	86% said yes. "Do you agree that law abiding sportsmen, 
	recreational shooters and collectors should not lose their guns 
	because the the actions of relatively few criminals?" 82% said 
	yes. A September 1991 nationwide Gallup poll found that 88% of 
	Canadians favor sever penalties for crimes involving firearms, 
	in preference the only 8% in favour of increasing restrictions 
	over existing firearms owners, and 68% felt that passing more 
	severe laws over legitimate gun users will will have very little 
	influence on criminals.[1]

Statement:

 "The experts support tougher[sic] gun control."
	(The Coalition for Gun Control)[2]

Truth:

  The individuals that the CfGC claims are experts, are not experts on
	gun control. Some are merely more politicians, some are experts in 
 	unrelated fields, some are bureaucrats that have admitted to their 
	lack of knowledge, and are simply following the line put forward by 
	their political masters.  Experts who have actually studied the 
	effects of gun control have found that gun control does not reduce 
	violent crime.

Statement:

 "The NRA worked feverishly to block all attempts to ban plastic,
        undetectable handguns that could easily be smuggled onto airlines."
	(Handgun Control Incorporated) [3]

        "The NRA's army of slick lobbyists even fought our efforts
	to ban ... plastic pistols which can't be found by
	metal detectors, ...!
	(COALITION TO STOP GUN VIOLENCE)[9]

Truth:

 The NRA and the Federal Aeronautics Administration (FAA) showed
	how the Glock-17 pistol was 83% steel, and completely visible
	to X-ray machines. The NRA then worked with the FAA to write
	a law making undetectable firearms illegal.

Statement:

 "When the nation's police asked congress to ban the manufacture
      	and sale of "cop killer" bullets -- ammunition that penetrates the
      	vests worn by police -- the NRA lobbied furiously to defend the 
      	sale of this ammunition.[3]
       (Handgun Control Incorporated)

  	"The NRA's army of slick lobbyists even fought our efforts
	to ban ...cop-killer bullets specifically designed to
	pierce bullet-proof vests!"
	(COALITION TO STOP GUN VIOLENCE)[9]

Truth:

  The NRA helped write the law restricting the sale of armor piercing
	handgun ammunition to the police and armed services only. The
	NRA pointed how an earlier version of the law was so badly
	written that it would have banned most ammunition, including 
	regular normal ammunition used for hunting and target shooting.
	The company that was making "armor piercing" handgun ammunition
	was owned and run by senior police officers, and only sold the
	ammunition in tiny quantities to some police departments and 
	the military anyway. The ammunition was specifically designed
	to provide improved penetration against autobody panels and
	auto glass, and its design actually reduced the chance that
	it would pierce bullet-resistant vests..

Statement:

 "Handgun Control Incorporated, One million strong"
	(Handgun Control Incorporated)[3]

Truth:

	According to papers filed by HCI, their membership is actually about 
	250,000, although they only have about 146,000 names on their mailing
	list. The NRA, on the other hand, has over 3,400,000 members. 
	In Canada, the Coalition for Gun Control has only about 3,000 members, 
	while the National Firearms Association has about 100,000 members.

Statement:

 "14 children are killed by handgun abuse every day in the USA".
	(Handgun Control Incorporated)

Truth:

	14 children/day times 364 days/year means about 5100 children killed 
	by handguns every year in the USA.  This is false.  The total firearms 
	deaths for children (up to age 14) was 587 in 1988. In 1990 the number 
	children killed by firearms related accidents was 236. The total number 
	of children killed by abuse of firearms (handguns, shotguns, and rifles)
	in the USA is between 600 and 800 a year.

Statement:

 "The United States has weak gun control laws."
	(Handgun Control Incorporated)

Truth:

  Gun control varies greatly within the USA.  Unlike many countries, 
	every political unit within the USA can make their own laws. In 
	addition to federal laws such as lifetime firearm prohibition 
	orders for convicted felons, age minimums for buying firearms that 
	are higher than Canada, and restrictions on the interstate purchase 
	of firearms, every state, county, city, town and village can and 
	does set up their own gun laws. Many areas of the USA have gun control 
	laws much tougher than anywhere in the world. Example, Washington D.C.,
	handguns are banned, longarms must be stored disassembled. In Chicago, 
	Illinois, handguns must be registered, but registration forms are not 
	available.  New York City, firearms permits take up to 6 months to get,
	and concealed weapons permits are only available for the rich and 
	politically connected. California has a 15 day waiting period on the
	purchase of all firearms.

	In the USA the following persons are prohibited by law from possessing 
	firearms: convicted felons, fugitives from justice, illegal drug users,
	the mentally ill, illegal aliens, dishonorable dischargees from the 
	armed forces, and anyone who has renounced U.S. citizenship.[7]

Statement:

 "A gun in the home is 43 times more likely to kill someone
     	you know than be used against an intruder."

Truth:

 	This is a misrepresentation of a meaningless comparison from a 
	limited and poorly done study. This study was performed over a 6 
	year period in one single county in the USA. As this study is was 
	done in just one county, that makes its results useless for saying 
	what happens anywhere else. Scientists and researchers call this 
	"a sample size of one".

	The comparison is meaningless because it is an apples vs oranges 
	comparison.  37 of the 43 are suicides, 4.6 are classified as 
	criminal homicides, and 1.3 were classified as accidents.[5]

	Kellermann and Reay, the authors of the study have stated themselves 
	that "cases in which burglars or intruders are wounded or frightened 
	away by the use or display of a firearm [and] cases in which would-be 
	intruders may have purposely avoided a house known to be armed.."[5]
	should be included as a benefit. BUT, when they calculated their 
	comparison they did NOT include those cases. They therefore 
	undercounted protection uses by at least 500 times.[6] If the purpose 
	is to compare defensive uses verses misuse, all defensive uses should 
	be counted, not just the 0.2% of time when a defensive use results in 
	the death of an attacker. You measure defensive uses by lives saved, 
	not criminals killed, after all, the purpose of self defense is to 
	prevent or stop a criminal attack, not kill the attacker.	

	Homicides that were found to be self-defense in a court of law were 
	counted as criminal homicides by this study, thus over stating the 
	number of criminal homicides, and under stating the number of 
	self-defense homicides.

	"Someone you know" is often described as friends or even "loved ones", 
	but in reality this includes rival gang members, drug dealers, abusive 
	spouses and acquaintances, and so on. Those who proclaim the 43-1 
	statistics will often imply that only dear friends, loved family 
	members, and small innocent children are the ones being killed,
	an obviously misleading statement.

	The study failed to distinguish between households or environs 
	populated by people with violent, criminal, or substance-abuse 
	histories -- where the risk of death is very high -- versus 
	households inhabited by more civil folk (for example, people who 
	avoid high-risk activities like drug dealing, gang banging and wife 
	beating) -- where the risk is very low indeed.  In actuality, 
	negligent adults allow fatal but avoidable accidents; and homicides 
	are perpetrated mostly by people with histories of violence or abuse, 
	people who are identifiably and certifiably at ~high risk~ for 
	misadventure.

	The Hart Poll in 1981 found 644,000 defensive uses with handguns per 
	year. The Mauser Poll in 1990 found 691,000 defensive uses per year. 
	The Field Poll in California in 1978 found 1.2 million handgun 
	defensive uses per year.  The Time/CNN Poll in 1989 found over 
	908,000 defensive uses per year. Gary Kleck estimated the yearly 
	defensive use of firearms by civilians to be at about 1,000,000 
	per year.  A more recent study by Gary Kleck put the yearly total
	at approximately 2,400,000 defensive uses. Yet the total deaths by 
	firearm in the USA only runs about 25,000 to 30,000 per year, and 
	that includes accidents, murders, suicides and self defense homicides. 
	That means a gun is 30-40 times more likely to defend against an 
	assault or other crime than kill anybody.  As accidental firearm's
	related deaths is about 1400 per year, including hunting accidents,
	the defensive use verses accidental death ratio is about 700-800 to 1.
	A study by Simon Fraser University professor Gary Mauser
	shows Canadians use guns in self-defense against assailants more
	than 32,000 times a year.

Statement:

 "80% of deaths by guns in Canada are with legally owned firearms."
	(Coalition for Gun Control)

Truth:

	Stats Canada tells us that of the 1320 deaths by firearms in Canada,
	80% are suicides (1056), 15% are homicides (198) including self
	defence homicides, and 5% are accidents (66). CfGC uses the
	above quote to imply that law abiding citizens are the source
	of firearms related violent crime, when the CfGC's statement
	is clearly meaningless.

Statement:

	"Bankrolled largely by gun manufacturers and importers, the
	NRA spends $80 million each year to defeat each and every gun
	control proposal - no matter how reasonable and important."
	(COALITION TO STOP GUN VIOLENCE)[9]

Truth:

 The NRA's $80 million yearly budget is largely from its membership
 	dues ($25 per year) from over 3 million members. The NRA is
	forbidden by law from using these funds to lobby the government.
	The NRA obeys this law. The NRA's Institute for Legislative
	Action  is a legally separate organization that cannot receive
	any funding from the NRA proper, and their budget is much
	smaller (a few million dollars). Gun manufacturers and importers
  	lobby through the National Shooting Sports Association, and
	not the NRA, deliberatly to avoid the claim that the NRA is
	funded by gun manufacturers.

	The NRA has been pushing point of sale "instant" background
	checks of firearm purchasers, as well as laws prohibiting
	the possession of firearms by minors except for supervised
	hunting and target shooting activities. The "Three Strikes and
	You're Out" Law recently approved in Washington State is a
	NRA Initiative.  

Statement:

 "As further evidence, a 1977 law froze the number of 
handguns in
 	Washington  D.C., and independent studies (one by the U.S. 
	Conference of Mayors and the other by a Justice Department analyst) 
	showed that after the law took effect handgun deaths in the 
	District of Columbia fell 30%."
	(Handgun Control Incorporated)[11]

Truth:

	The 1977 law BANNED privately owned handguns in Washington D.C.
	In 1977 the homicide rate was approximate 22 per 100,000 population,
	it has since climbed to about 80 per 100,000 population, with
	approximately 80% of those homicides being performed with
	banned handguns. The studies HCI refers to above looked at the
	numbers of homicides, not the rates, and considering that
	several hundred thousand people moved out of Washington DC
	following the 1977 law, the total number of homicides naturally
	dropped, but the RATE of homicide, or your chance of being
	a victim of homicide, dramatically increased.

Information from:

[1]National Firearms Association fact sheet.

[2]Coalition For Gun Control fact sheet.

[3]Handgun Control Incorporated letter(s).

[4]American Rifleman, August 1993, Pg42-44, "Kids and Guns" by David Kopel.

[5]"Protection or Peril? An Analysis of Firearm-Related Deaths
   in the Home," Arthur L. Kellermann and Donald T. Reay, The New
   England Journal of Medicine 314, no. 24 (June 12, 1986): 1557-1560

[6]"Crime Control through the Private Use of Armed Force" by Professor
   Gary Kleck.

[7] US federal law, 18 USC 922(g).

[8] Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (Stats Canada)

[9] Coalition to Stop Gun Violence. Letter to Florida Residents, Nov '93

[10] U.S. Source "Uniform Crime Reports for the United States 1991",
    	Federal Bureau of Investigation, p.58   
    CDN. Source "Crime Trends in Canada 1962-1990", Cdn. Ctr.
    	for Justice Statistics, p.15.

[11] Handgun Control Incorporated Fact Card (circa 1986)

World-Wide-Web html format by
Scott Ostrander: [email-masked]

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Subject: Re: Gun Control???? What is this SHIT!!
Newsgroups: can.general,ont.general
Followup-To: can.general,ont.general
References: <[email-masked]> <[email-masked]>
 <[email-masked]> <[email-masked]>
Distribution: can
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From: [email-masked] (C U E Here Sysop)
Message-ID: <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 5 Dec 94 20:17:25 MST
Organization: CUE Here BBS
Lines: 34

In article <[email-masked]> Val Dodge ([email-masked]) wrote:
> In article <[email-masked]>,
> [email-masked] (C U E Here Sysop) wrote:

> > Because registration of firearms has ONLY been used as a prelude to 
> > illegal
> > confiscation without compensation by the government. I know of no instance

> Cite an example in this country, please.

Fred(?) is a regular contributor to these posts and to the CDN-FIREARMS
mailing list. I hope he responds. He has had his shotgun confiscated because
someone thought it LOOKED evil. He has not been compensated. The Alberta
Court of Appeals has thrown out the Orders in Council that allowed the
firearm to be confiscated in the first place. His firearm has been
destroyed. No one who is responsible for this is willing to respond to him.

> > where this has been done with any other registrations.

> You can't think of any cases where land (all private property is, of
> course, in one registry or another) has been confiscated without
> compensation by the government? Think *real* hard now....

Some, not all, of my private property is registered. (How can you register
my birthday cards?)

I know of no cases of confiscated land that has not been compensated (maybe
not equitably, though).

-- 
Roger Walker (403) 465-4962  ****  SysOp, CUE Here BBS (403) 465-7715
               [email-masked]

    PGP Public Key from:  [email-masked]

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From: [email-masked] (Steve Deluca)
Subject: Reform MP-gun registration,RCMP ordered to lie..
Message-ID: <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 06 Dec 94 01:23:03 PST
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Transcript of CBC Newsworld interview with Reform MP
Jack Ramsay, Crowfoot.
Interviewed by Don Newman, the day of Rocks press conference
(Dec 2nd?)

Don:
"Now for reaction from the Reform Party, I'm joined by 
Reform MP Jack Ramsey, Mr Ramsey good to see you again.
You said in the House of Commons, when you were responding
to Mr. Rocks statement, that the Reform Party would support
gun Control based on common sense, the implication being you
don't think there's much common sense in Mr. Rocks proposal."

Jack:
"Well there's areas of his proposal that we will support. In
fact we led off with our own private members bill to enhance
the penalties against those who use firearms in a criminal
way. We don't think that the registration of firearms,shotguns
and rifles, is going to do what he thinks it's going to do.
There's no statistical basis for us to draw that conclusion.
If we believe that it will enhance the safety to society and
reduce the criminal use of firearms, we'd support it. But the
Kim Campbell bill was designed along similair lines and it 
hasn't reduced the criminal use of firearms and therefore,
we're from Missouri, we want to see the facts, we want to see
examples and if they can demonstrate that registration of
rifles and shotguns will reduce the criminal use of those
weapons then we will certainly take a second look at it. But
there's no basis to that right now."

Don:
"Well other than registering them and plotting, tracking what
happens, how else can you really determine whether or not it
will really work and plus Mr. Rock says, without a registry
the other things that he wants to do, like control guns 
coming over the border, control who's buying them, he can't
do that without a registry?"

Jack:
"You know we have a registration system now for handguns.
We've had it for sixty years since 1934 and it hasn't 
reduced the criminal use of handguns in society, in fact the
criminal use of handguns has gone up. In fact, the Justice
Department kept secret a review of the handgun registration
system by Terence Wade and it shows just how useless that
system is. It's in chaos. It has no objective, they don't 
really know why they're registering the handguns. Now that
document was kept secret from us until it was leaked. It was
kept away from every interest group on either side of the
question."

Don:
"But it's not increasing the use of them though is it? I mean 
you can't tell if handguns weren't registered how many 
would've been used and I'm wondering, the philosophy - I know
a lot of people don't like the idea of registering their gun
but nobody seems to mind registering their automobile or
truck and I'm wondering what's the difference between an 
automobile and a gun. Why wouldn't you register your gun and
have a permit to use it the way you do your car?"

Jack:
"Well there's an objective in registering your vehicle. What
is the objective to be met by expending huge sums of money
registering firearms? Will it enhance the goal of increasing
safety within society? If the justice minister can demonstrate
that it will, then we'll support it. There's three basic areas.
One is the criminal use of firearms, another is they're being
used in domestic disputes and the other is suicide. How is 
the registration of firearms going to deal with those areas?
How is it going to reduce the instances? No one has answered
that question and certainly the justice minister has not
answered that question. And he gives a very convoluted 
explanation to justify the registration of all firearms but 
it simply isn't washing. When he was asked today at his press
conference whether or not it would reduce the criminal use of
those weapons he could not answer."

Don:
"Well the people in the front line of the fight against crime,
the police chiefs across the country, the RCMP, and you have
a background in law enforcement, the people in law enforcement
support the ministers move. In fact he had quite a few of them
out there today standing with him to show, well are they wrong?"

Jack:
"Listen, you know we're a grass roots organization and we have
the front line people, we have contact with them, we have
some of them in our party and they're telling us an entirely
different story than what their own chiefs are telling us.
They're telling us that it's NOT going to do any good, it's
going to draw members in off the street to look after the
administration of this registration program. It means there's
going to be less protection on the street. So unless they're
prepared to inject hundreds of millions of dollars into this
program.... Our frontline police officers are telling us 
different. In fact, the RCMP, who we have quite good contact
with and we have a network of contacts, they're telling us that
THEIR SUPERIORS ARE TELLING THEM THAT IF THE NEWS MEDIA OR ANY 
OTHER INTERESTED PARTY CONTACTS THEM, THAT THEY'RE TO SUPPORT THE
REGISTRATION OF ALL FIREARMS REGARDLESS OF THEIR OWN PERSONAL
FEELINGS ABOUT IT."

Don:
"So other than tougher jail penalties for people using firearms
in the commitment of crimes, is there anything else in the bill
you like?"

Jack:
"Yes. We support more stringent enforcement of the laws that
would prevent smuggling of illegal firearms into the country
but we also acknowledge that they're going to have a very big
problem keeping the illegal firearms out of this country.
Right now the majority of firearms used in crime are illegal
firearms being smuggled into the country."

Don:
"Well let's think for a minute. Tougher penalties, in the 
United States they have the death penalty, they have a lot more
handgun crimes and shooting deaths even with the death penalty,
(Really Don? They have the death penalty for handgun crimes?
Wow! Never knew that. - Me) and you can't get a tougher penalty
than that, so how particularly do tougher penalties, usually
people commit crimes because they think they're not going to 
get caught." (Don is confused now)

Jack:
"Of course the Reform party believes in the principle of 
deterence in the Justice system, and..." (Don cuts him off)

Don:
"But my point is, in the United States they have the ultimate
deterence and more murders by people using guns."(Don is way
out of touch - not all states have the death penalty. This is
a good example of the medias propaganda techniques. Too bad
Jack never took him to task on this.)

Jack:
"Then of course the challenge is to Alan Rock, why is he
doing this? Now his support of the principle of deterence..."
(Don interrupts again).

Don:
"They have a lot more guns available in the United States. 
If they had fewer guns and less penalties in the U.S. they
might have fewer murders. (Don must have a handful of straws
by now. What the gun control media stooges will stoop to is
really quite amazing!)

Jack:(Jack wisely ignores Don's ridiculous hypothesis)
"Well if Alan Rock has a hidden agenda, or those who are
supporting the direction he's taking, if their hidden agenda
is to remove all firearms from society,  except for the police 
and the military AND the criminals, as Alan Rock suggested 
earlier this year then let's look at that. Let him put that
forward. I don't think that's acceptable to the majority of
Canadians. I think he knows that and so he's looking at the 
banning of certain firearms now. He's going to take them out of 
circulation, and many people that have talked to me and have
written me about it, fear that the registration of all 
firearms is simply the first step towards eventual confiscation
of all civilian owned firearms."

Don:
"Mr. Ramsey, our time is up. It's good to see you. Thank you
for taking the time, appreciate it."

end of transcript.

[email-masked]                                             
"I have become comfortably numb" - Pink Floyd

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From: [email-masked] (Marc Thibault)
Newsgroups: can.general,ont.general
Subject: Re: Gun Control???? What is this SHIT!!
Message-ID: <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 08 Dec 94 01:37:24 EST
References: <[email-masked]>
Distribution: world
Organization: Tanda and Associates
Lines: 51

[email-masked] (Richard Sexton) writes:

> >>I supposed you're unmoved by the fact that you're more likely to be killed
> >>by a gun you bought to defend yourself than by a criminal.
> >
> >This an urban myth. Reread your data.
> 
> An urban myth propogated by every cop in north america. Must be a conspiracy.

        - Every cop that's stupid enough to believe everything he's
        told (a lot of these guys still believe that marijuana is
        addictive). The statement has some basis in truth in that the
        commonest deadly use of legally-owned firearms is suicide -
        therefore the carefully-phrased "killed by a gun you bought
        yourself". The implication that someone else is shooting the
        gun is where lies and propaganda come in. The cops
        particularly like this one, because they are often victims of
        their own guns and don't like to feel singled out.

        If you are one of those peculiar people who treat someone
        else's suicide as a personal affront, the distinction is
        probably lost on you, but rest assured that it is a
        significant distinction.

> Consider the potential for damage to a crowd of people by say, chuck norris
> or a crazy person with an automatic weapan. Sure, martial arts can be
> dangerous, but for sheer killing efficieny, nothing beats the convenience
> of a gun.

        Actually, the bulk of the guns being targetted in this second
        wave of confiscations are singularly useless for killing. They
        are small-bore, medium power weapons designed for wounding
        without killing. As hunting arms they are most appropriate as
        small varmint guns. Few of them are allowed for deer hunting
        because they are unlikely to give a clean kill. An old .303 or
        30-30 would be much more effective. If I wanted a totable
        weapon that I could use in a variety of situations and
        guaranteed to stop a large man dead in his tracks, I'd get a
        lever-action big-bore carbine or a 16-guage pump-action
        shotgun, not an AK-47.

> >>Anybody who goes recreational shooting with an AK-47 ought to be
> >>locked up on general principle.

        Unless you are trying to make war expensive for an implacable
        enemy, recreational shooting is the only logical thing to do
        with an AK-47. It's a marginal hunting gun. On the other hand,
        it'll scare the shit out of a burglar (though the sound of a
        pump-action shotgun being cranked does a good job as well).

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From: [email-masked] (Greg Oster)
Newsgroups: can.politics
Subject: Re: More Gun Stuff
Date: 13 Dec 1994 15:54:10 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan
Lines: 40
Message-ID: <[email-masked]>
References: <1994Dec13.010301.148796@okcadm>
NNTP-Posting-Host: skribe.usask.ca
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 PL2]

[email-masked] wrote:

: In Canada, there are about 660 Homicides each year, with about half involving
: guns.

In 1993, 30.6% of homicides were shootings.  This is down from 34% in
1992 and 36% in 1991.  (Sources for stats: "gopher talon.statcan.ca",
the August 23/94 "Daily")

: Over 7500 people die each year in traffic accidents.

: Most of these deaths in both categories (with the exception of maniac drivers)
: are innocent people.

: Seems to me we should be banning people with cars, not people with guns.

The trick is they are not banning the <people> with the object, they
are banning the object.  Which leaves the <people> able to find a
different object to commit the crime...  If they banned *criminals
with guns* maybe they would begin to get somewhere... That would leave
the law-abiding and responsible gun owners free to continue using
their guns in a law-abiding and responsible fashion...

(But if you're saying that maybe cars should be banned, then we should
also ban knives as well.....  They were used in 31% of homicides in
1993...  (Source same as above).)

: My 2 cents!

: Kim Dobranski

: [email-masked]

Later...

Greg Oster

[email-masked]
Department of Computational Science
University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, CANADA

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From: [email-masked] (Dennis O'Connor -FT-~)
Newsgroups: can.general,ont.general,talk.politics.guns
Subject: Re: Gun Control????  Yeah, yeah, we know, it's SHIT!!!!
Date: 19 Dec 94 14:06:27
Organization: not much.
Lines: 149
Distribution: world
Message-ID: <[email-masked]>
References: <[email-masked]>
NNTP-Posting-Host: tinstar.ch.intel.com
In-reply-to: Nuclear Man's message of Fri, 16 Dec 1994 20:53:04 GMT

Nuclear Man writes:
] In article <[email-masked]> [email-masked] (Dennis O'Connor -FT-~) writes:
] >[email-masked] (Kelly (Kelli) Ellis) writes:
] >]      I've resently had some very heated "discussions" with both a friend
] >] and my girlfriend about this subject.
] >]
] >]    My girlfriend enjoys rec shooting, which is fine,
] >
] >If she wanted the guns for self-defense, would this be less fine ?
]
] Of course it would be less fine.  It's far more potentially dangerous 
] than being down at the shooting range.  

Really ?  According to whom ?  Statistics, please.  Let's here
your reason for believeing that.  

] >] I do not wish that our children to be exposed to these weapons until
] >] they are old enough to make dissions on weither or not they want to
] >] take the hobby up.
] >
] >is probably irrelevent. There are many ways to secure guns so that young
] >kids can't get to them.  Why are you are unwilling to consider them ?
] >Why do you _insist_ that the guns can't be in the house ?
]
] Because having _guns_ in the house is the _only_ was to make sure that
] the kids don't get guns you have secreted away. 

Any kid old enough to crack a safe is old enough to be taught proper
gun safety.  Or have you never heard of gun safes ?  There's a bunch,
ranging from small one-handgun quick-access models to 1/2-ton monsters.

And BTW, are you also going to ban bleach, ammonia, and other dangerous
household chemicals ?  Or didn't you know that many times more kids are
killed by these, and by swimming pools and skateboards and bicycles,
than are killed in gun accidents.

] There's always a chance they _might_ if you do.  

Better not let them play outside, then : they _might_ playin the street.
Face it : it's not simple risk aversion that's motivating you here :
it's an irrational fear of guns.

] Maybe you'd feel good about yourself, putting your kids' lives in
] jeopardy because of a hobby or because you're paranoid.

2.4 million times a year, guns are used in self-defense in the US.
In contrast, home fire extinguishers are used how often ?  Now,
who is paranoid : the person with the gun, or the person with the
fire extinguisher ?

] >] She interprets this as not alowing her to shoot. 
] >
] >Which it seems _is_ your thinly-veiled intent.  
]
] Why can't you have ranges or gun clubs where the guns are kept securely 
] in a vault or something? 

Such a concentration of firearms would _scream_ "steal me".
If you _want_ more illegal guns on the street, this is a good start.

] She could shoot all she wants without having to store the thing at home?
] Oh, of course, you have to have that gun handy so you can blast those guys
] who sneak in and try to steal your TV.

Any person who unlawfully enters an occupied home has a good chance of
having far more serious crimes than theft in mind.  Or have you never
even heard of "rape" ?

] >] This leads me up to my argument.  There is no need for guns in any homes
] >] where food is caught, slaughtered, and prepared by an outsider.  This is
] >] especially true in cities, like Toronto, where is someone breaks into your 
] >] home, they can use these weapons on either you, or more importantly, your
] >] children.  
]
] I agree with this completely, Kelli.
]
] >situation you fear seems to hardly ever happen.  Your fear of this
] >event is like the fear some people have of vaccinations : yes,
] >some people do get ill from some vaccines, very very rarely.  But
] >the vaccine prevents millions of people from catching the disease.
] >Well, guns in the hands of citizens are a vaccine against crime.
]
] "...guns in the hands of citizens are a vaccine against crime."
] I really wish that we could get people to vote on how they felt about
] this statement. 

Down here, they just did, on November 8th.  25% of the voters identified
the right to keep arms as there primary determinant of who to vote for,
and almost all of those people voted for pro-RKBA candidates.  Most of
whom won, BTW.

] Is this really a good analogy? 

Can't you tell ?  Well, it is.

] >] [ "I support banning people having the tools of effective self-defense"
] >    rhetoric deleted. ]
]
] If someone comes at you in an alley, do you have the right to shoot them?

Depends. What does "comes at" mean ?  Walk towards ? Attack ? Create an
immenent threat of injury or death ? If the latter, then yes, I do.

] If someone's stealing your TV, do you have the right to shoot them?

If they entered my home to do so, Arizona law says YES, I do.

] If someone carjacks you, do you have the right to shoot them?

Yes.

] If someone hits you, do you have the right to shoot them?

Depends. Did they create an immenent threat of injury or death ?

] >I personally believe that the difference between someone who believes
] >people have the right to use firearms responsibly, and people like
] >you who don't share that belief, to be rooted in extremely different
] >and incompatable world-views and philosophies.  I don't think two
] >people so fundamentally at odds can maintain a succesful marriage.
] >Do yourself, your girlfriend and any potential kids you might have 
] >had in the future a favor, and save them from the trauma of divorce.
] >
] >That sounds harsh, I know, but it's for your own good. REALLY.
]
] Boy, that's pretty good.  
]
] Does this humorous passage also imply that your wise decision should be
] imposed on a majority of people, rather than that majority's own decision?

No, people are free to follow my advice or to continue on a course
towards misery and disapointment.  I firmly believe that people
have the right to screw up and make themselves miserable.  (Not that
wether that is a "right" or not matters since they do so regardless.)

] Gun users proclaim very clearly that they're responsible, educated people,

I've got the college degree, credit rating and security clearance 
to prove it.

] Guns are just too dangerous, and we feel that it's not worth it.

Try thinking instead of just feeling, if you know how.
--
Dennis O'Connor                          [email-masked]
Intel i960(R) Microprocessor Division    Solely responsible for what I do.

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From: [email-masked] (Orion)
Newsgroups: can.general,ont.general
Subject: Re: Gun Control???? What is this SHIT!!
Message-ID: <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 19 Dec 94 15:53:24 PST
References: <[email-masked]>
Organization: The Aroga BBS - Vancouver Canada
Lines: 33

[email-masked] (Greg Franks) writes:

> >>>>> "Robert" == Robert Osborne <[email-masked]> writes:

>     Robert> the address wrong.  Of course the media never reports that the Ja
>     Robert> student was having fun trying to scare/intimidate the hapless wom
>     Robert> answered the door by going around to her carport and making a lot
>     Robert> noise. Then he made the mistake of refusing to leave the premises
>     Robert> her armed husband told him to.  Instead, he advanced on the homeo
>     Robert> and when the man yelled "FREEZE" the student started waving his h
>     Robert> the air and *rushed* at an armed man in his darkened car port.
> 
> To which he gets the death sentence.  Justice indeed.

  To which he gets 'death by misadventure'...

  (only because there is no such thing, legally, as 'death by gross 
STUPIDITY'.)

  It's over: it was ruled 'justifiable'; if you don't like that, take it 
up with the US government...but keep your juvenile 'one liners' to 
yourself.  If you have a point to make, of course, by all means do so: 
explain the reasoning (?) by which you arrived at your conclusion, and 
suggest an alternative solution to this type of problem...one which would 
*not* involve putting the homeowner himself (or his family) at risk. BUt 
be sure that you deal with the facts of the matter rather than just 
expressing your fears with something as inane as "ban all guns and no one 
will be killed by them"; people will listen to rational, reality-based 
arguments if you care to offer them...but they'll ignore emotionalism, 
ignorance and fear-mongering (and rightly so).

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Path: utcsri!newsflash.concordia.ca!canopus.cc.umanitoba.ca!alberta!ve6bc!CUEHere.Edmonton.AB.CA!Roger_Walker
Subject: Re: Gun Control???? What is this SHIT!!
Newsgroups: can.general,ont.general,talk.politics.guns
Followup-To: can.general,ont.general,talk.politics.guns
References: <[email-masked]> <[email-masked]> <[email-masked]> <[email-masked]> <[email-masked]>
Distribution: can
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 PL3]
From: [email-masked] (C U E Here Sysop)
Message-ID: <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 27 Dec 94 18:39:03 MST
Organization: CUE Here BBS
Lines: 108

In article <[email-masked]> Ed Rodda
([email-masked]) wrote:

> Most Canadians believe that guns aren't necessary for personal
> protection and all existing gun laws support this.

What does this have to do with whether or not "gun control" will reduce
crime or violence, as we are being told by the governmnet? It is irrelevant
whether "most Canadians believe" or not. If I choose to use a firearm for
personal protection, it is because I feel that it is the best tool for the
job. Having been and known many peace officers, I know that they cannot be
depended upon to do it for me.

> European countries have much less serious crime than
> Canada and they have more restrictive gun controls. Why aren't the
> criminals there more encouraged? Maybe criminals think they don't need
> guns since it is unlikely their victim is armed.

I give you Switzerland as an example of a European country that has fewer
firearms restrictions, and less crime. I give you New York City and
Washington, D.C. as examples of places where firearms restrictions are very
severe, and where crime/violence rates are high. Maybe it's not the
availability of firearms that is the problem...

> : Surprise! The rate was decreasing BEFORE tightened controls were 
> : introduced,
> : and the rate stayed pretty much the same.

> I admitted that my position was not supported by statistics, but is it
> not possible that the gun crime rate would now be climbing if the
> regulations hadn't been tightened?

Almost anything is possible, but that is no reason on which to base laws.
There is plenty of evidence to indicate that your contention is highly
improbable.

> : Your attitude is very telling...

> Why don't you re-read the above. I think Mr. O'Conner was joking and I
> certainly was.

There is very definitely a problem when light is made of a serious subject.

> What is wrong with putting all gun data in a common data base?

Makes theft easier for criminals who will find a way into the system (if the
government hasn't beaten them to it through confiscation).

> Criminals won't register, so what, they don't register their
> handguns now.

Exactly our point: Registration only affects a portion of the population
which is not the problem (responsible and law abiding citizens), whose
safety record is exemplary.

> Please tell me why you are so against registration?

THE ONLY PURPOSE IT HAS SERVED, IN THE PAST, IN CANADA, IS TO ALLOW
GOVERNMENT CONFISCATION, WITHOUT COMPENSATION, OF PROPERTY LEGALLY ACQUIRED
BY PRIVATE CITIZENS, WHEN NO LEGITIMATE REASON HAS BEEN OFFERED FOR DOING
SO.

> You've raised the
> bogeyman about confiscation and the costs of registration.

Since confiscation is a matter of record, calling it a "bogeyman" is
inaccurate.

> don't you agree
> that guns need to be better regulated.

Firearms in the hands of responsible and law abiding citizens do not need to
be regulated. However, we do need to find ways to reduce the number of
firearms in the hands of criminals. The anti-gun lobby is trying to treat
the two groups the same, and they are not.

> Most citizens of Canada,
> including most gun owners favour gun registration.

Your information is based on the same poll often used by Rock, which was
taken in a select group of people. The "gun owners" you mention are some of
those who don't care about the legislation, because it does not affect them
directly.

> Registration will
> do nothing to restrict hunters or target shooters.

Registration does not restrict, but bans and prohibitions do. His other
legislation will remove Canada from international competition, because his
bans include those firearms that are used for such competitions. They
discriminate against women who cannot properly grasp a large handled
handgun. There is simply no logical reason (that can be stated publicly) for
firearms bans that he is suggesting.

> I personally know a few hunters, my brother-in-law, a 15 year veteran
> RCMP constable and a couple of acquaintances. They all think
> registration is a good idea and support all the other proposed
> restrictions.

I am a former member of the R.C.M.P. and I disagree, as do many others who
have been told that they cannot comment publicly unless they come out in
favor of the bans.

-- 
Roger Walker (403) 465-4962  ****  SysOp, CUE Here BBS (403) 465-7715
               [email-masked]

    PGP Public Key from:  [email-masked]

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Subject: Re: Anti-gunners: shoot first, think later (maybe)
Newsgroups: can.talk.guns,can.politics,can.general,can.legal
Followup-To: can.talk.guns,can.politics,can.general,can.legal
References: <[email-masked]> <[email-masked]>
Distribution: can
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From: [email-masked] (Rosco)
Message-ID: <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 8 Jan 95 15:27:56 MST
Organization: CUE Here BBS
Lines: 130

In article <[email-masked]> Scott Shepherd ([email-masked])
wrote:

> In article <[email-masked]>, [email-masked] (C U E Here Sysop) writes:

> |> See New York City and Washington, D.C. for examples of attempts to limit
> |> firearms where violence is on the increase.
> |> 
> |> See Vermont and Arizona for examples of fewer restrictions, and less
> |> violence.

> This is a fallacious argument. There are numerous other reasons for the high
> incidents of violence in places like NYC, like higher population density, 
> high
> poverty and urban decay; to say that violence in NYC is attributable to more
> gun control is absurd.

Your logic is correct. What you missed is that my statement was a COUNTER
argument to the the statement that restricting responsible people prevents
crime and violence. My examples simply pointed out that the problem is not
responsible firearms owners and their property.

You have correctly pointed out that responsible firearms owners are not the
root problem. Causes of crime and violence include the higher population
density, poverty and urban decay. Those are some of many root problems that
need to be addressed. That is what firearms owners advocate.

> Maybe, and maybe not, but it certainly seems reasonable to assume that 
> unlimited proliferation of guns is going to put more guns in the hands of
> criminals as well as your 'law abiding citizens'.

Since we will not be able to prevent criminals from obtaining significant
numbers of firearms by restricting responsible citizens, from the "firearm
as defence" angle, it would be better to allow the good guys to become
better armed. It should still be a matter of choice. (Most illegally used
firearms are illegal to begin with, ie. smuggled into the country, not
stolen from responsible citizens).

> Surely you would put *some* limits on car ownership?

Not on ownership. On use, yes, because it is possible to use a vehicle to
the detriment of other people. We need regulations to formalize appropriate
use so that such use poses as little risk to others as possible. If someone
uses a vehicle to intentionally kill someone, there are
murder/homicide/manslaughter laws which handle this. Those same laws can be
used for intentional use of a firearm to kill someone. Both are criminal
acts. However, safety, courtesy and respect for vehicles and firearms is
something that is taught/learned, not something that is legislated.
Restrictions on firearms and their legitimate owners are far more harsh than
for vehicles and their owners (including punishments: Criminal for firearms,
not for vehicles).

> |>  G> Besides, cars are a useful think in society.
> |> 
> |> That is a matter of opinion. 

> That guns are a useful thing in society is also a matter of opinion. 

Certainly. It is the person who finds utility in a particular item that will
declare it useful. It is a relative thing. That does not mean that we can
not nor should not recognize an item's usefulness for other people.

> Really? There are guns that are actually *designed* for collecting? I have a > hard time with that one.

As with many other items that people collect, there have been firearms
issued/sold with the collector in mind. I recall seeing a number of R.C.M.P.
commemorative lever action rifles for private sale, over the years, which
included a special display box, etc. Actually firing the gun or rendering it
inoperative in any way would lessen its value as a collectable.

> I also have trouble with the statement that killing people is a legitimate 
> use for a gun (or a legal one). 

Perhaps that is also a matter of opinion, then. Our police are issued
firearms for the express purpose of being able to enhance their ability to
defend themselves or others when the situation calls for it; that has
included the requirement to kill. Since civilians can also find themselves
in such a situation, even when they aren't looking for it, they would be
able to afford themselves the same tools for the job. Also, a civilian is
also much less likely to shoot the wrong person, as he will be in the first
hand situation, as opposed to the cop who responds to such a situation.

> |> I am not involved in crimes. Take the firearms
> |> away from criminals, not responsible, law abiding people.

> Ok... how do you do that?

Your question acknowledges that "gun control" has been directed at
responsible people rather than criminals. In answer to your question, the
first thing to do is NOT to do it to responsible people. When all else has
failed to prevent a criminal from making a bad choice, you can only react.
That is done by increasing minimum and maximum sentences as punishment, by
not allowing plea bargaining, by not allowing parole, and by putting those
restrictions on the criminal that you would have put on responsible people.

[BENEFIT TO NON OWNERS OF FIREARMS, IN THAT BURGLARIES ARE COMMITTED MORE
OFTEN WHILE PEOPLE ARE NOT PRESENT]

> So? Does this reduce crime?

Being as there are no confrontations when homes are broken into while people
are away, then there are fewer incidents of violence as a result: YES.

> The "everyone else has them, so I should" argument doesn't seem to me to
> be a particularly good one.

That is not an argument that I made. I addressed the notion that "the world
would be so nice if no one, including criminals, had firearms." It is a
utopian dream and will never happen. My point was that restricting
responsible people will not do the same for the irresponsible.

>  Just don't try to tell me that the owning guns prevents crime. It just 
> ain't so. 

While firearms in the hands of private citizens isn't a cure-all for crime,
it certainly changes its makeup. Places like Arizona, that have fewer such
restrictions, has a lot less violent crime, including that involving
firearms, than places like California, New York City, and Washington, D.C.

By the same token, it cannot be expected that restricting responsible, law
abiding people will positively affect crime stats, of any type. At best, it
may affect the accident stats, but those are already very good, a testiment
to the education responsible people afford themselves on firearms, and which
are already a requirement in Canada.
 
-- 
Roger Walker (403) 465-4962  ****  SysOp, CUE Here BBS (403) 465-7715
               [email-masked]

    PGP Public Key from:  [email-masked]

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Path: utcsri!newsflash.concordia.ca!canopus.cc.umanitoba.ca!alberta!ve6bc!CUEHere.Edmonton.AB.CA!Roger_Walker
Subject: This is Gary Mauser's Firearms Poll
Newsgroups: can.general,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.politics
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 PL3]
From: [email-masked] (Rosco)
Message-ID: <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 19 Feb 95 17:58:08 MST
Organization: CUE Here BBS
Lines: 974

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Posted by permission of Gary Mauser

Is there a need for armed self defense in Canada?

This is the original except_as_follows_:
1. Reformatting has been done.
2. Some tables have been moved into the text where the original suggested
   they should appear.
3. Some tables had headings changed (from "firearm" to "gun" and from
   "percentage" to "%-age") to preserve alignment of columns.

Thanks for the formatting, Skeeter, but I had to redo it. Sorry if some of
the tables are misformated.

Is there a need for armed self defense in Canada?

by 

Gary A. Mauser
Institute of Canadian Urban Research Studies
Simon Fraser University
Burnaby,  B.C. CANADA
V5A 1S6

Abstract

The use of firearms for self defense is strongly discouraged in
Canada.  This discouragement takes the form of restrictive firearms
laws as well as limited legal grounds for self defense in any form.
Nevertheless,  lethal force may still be used legally in Canada to
defend oneself,  and occasionally private citizens resort to its use.
In this paper,  I present the results of a nationwide survey on the
Canadian public's attitudes towards the use of firearms in self defense
and estimate the frequency that firearms are used for defending oneself
in Canada.  Canadians report using a firearm to defend themselves or
their families over 60,000 times per year between 1985 and 1990.
Approximately half of these incidents involve threats by dangerous
animals and half involve people.  It is unknown how many lives are
saved annually by firearms owners in Canada.

Presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Law and Society
Association in Calgary, Alberta,  12-14 April 1994.

file: CSD.Calgary 30-4-94 

Self defense is a troublesome right.  On the one hand,  it would seem
obvious that all people have -- or should have -- the inherent right to
use physical force to defend themselves from assault.  Not
surprisingly,  the criminal codes of many countries includes self
defense as a legitimate justification for the use of deadly force.  On
the other hand,  the right of self defense threatens our faith in the
rule of law.  It is too easy for revenge or even aggression to be
confused with legitimate self defense.  The intensity of this debate
increases when the use of firearms in self defense is considered.

The right to defend oneself strikes at the heart of the rule of law.  A
legal system is only possible if the state enjoys a monopoly of force.
If individuals can appeal to force to decide on their own who shall
live and who shall die,  there can be no pretense to the rule of law.
However,  the state's monopoly on force entails the obligation to keep
its citizens secure from violence.  Whenever individuals are threatened
with immediate aggression,  and when the police are unable to protect
them,  the state's monopoly on the use of force must give way.  The
individual's right of survival reasserts itself.  No right could be
more basic and more important than that of the individual's right to
use force,  even deadly force,  to repel an aggressor.  But precisely
when does the state's monopoly on force give way?  When can individuals
use weapons to defend themselves?  There are complex legal and moral
problems involved in drawing these distinctions,  and different
political jurisdictions may deal with these issues quite differently.

In the US,  there is a lively debate over armed self defense.  Both the
Gun Owners of America and the National Rifle Association have
campaigned vigourously in support of an armed public,  while Handgun
Control Inc. and the National Coalition to Ban Handguns have enveighed
against public ownership of firearms.  Police organizations are divided
over the advisability of citizens arming themselves for self defense.
While the National Association of Chiefs of Police strongly opposes
civilian gun ownership,  both the National Police Officers Association
of America and the American Federation of Police support civilians
arming themselves for self defense.

Canadians typically view this debate as one that is restricted to the
United States.  The prevailing attitude is that there is no need for
self defense in Canada;  our superiour social system and/or legal
system have obviated these problems.  Many Canadians prefer to believe
that problems of violent crime are limited to the rather tumultuous
republic to the South of them.  Thus,  it should come as no surprize
that exceptionally few Canadian organizations argue that citizens have
the right to defend themselves with weapons1.  Any organizations that
make such an argument are soon marginalized and excluded from the
national consensus.  Not only do the police actively discourage self
defense in general,  but armed self defense is widely considered
illegal.2  Moreover,  there are surprisingly few organized groups that
officially support self defense,  even in principle,  or that teach
self defense in any form.3   Talk show hosts discuss "violence against
women" for hours without once mentioning the possibility that women
might use physical force to defend themselves against those who seek to
assault or rape them.

The question of the defensive use of firearms has been relatively
ignored by academics.  In the US,  only a few studies have examined
the frequency with which citizens use firearms to defend themselves or
their families [Cook 1991;  Kleck 1988,  1991].  In Canada,  the topic
has been almost completely ignored.  No studies have been published to
my knowledge that have attempted to estimate the frequency with which
firearms are used in self defense in Canada,  however a few studies
have investigated attitudes towards the use of firearms in self defense
[Mauser 1990;  Mauser and Margolis 1992],  and one unpublished study
has been circulated [Mauser 1993].

But how different are Canada and the United States with respect to the
defensive use of firearms?  If there are little differences,  then the
assumption of Canadian moral superiority would be unjustified.  The
first section of the paper,  the examination of public attitudes
towards firearms and self defense,  draws upon and expands previous
work [Mauser 1990; Mauser and Margolis 1992;  Mauser 1993].  The second
part of this paper estimates the frequency with which Canadians use
firearms in self defense and compares these rates with those in the
United States.  The approach taken is based upon that used by Professor
Kleck so that the results are comparable with similar studies of self
defensive uses of firearms in the United States [Kleck,  1988;  Kleck
1991].

The legislation

Self defense must be distinguished from all other reasons for using
force against criminals,  such as vigilantism or revenge.  Self defense
entails those acts intended to protect one's physical safety or
property,  or to protect the safety or property of others,  while
vigilantism and revenge involve retribution,  or an attempt to punish
an offender.  The use of force to defend oneself is legal under some
conditions,  but neither vigilantism nor revenge are ever legal.
Certainly,  elements of vengeance might be mixed with a concern with
self defense in a given incident,  but logically,  retribution is not
necessarily involved in self defense.

Despite disavowals by police officials,  the Canadian criminal code
does include the right of citizens to use deadly force to protect
themselves [sections 34, 35, and 37].  It is a right however that is
severely circumscribed by more conditions than are typically found in
the United States.  In Canada,  the key provision in the criminal code
[ 34] is that, no one may use "more force than is necessary" and then
only when "he believes on reasonable grounds that he can not otherwise
preserve himself from death or grievous bodily harm."  In section 35,
the code goes on to require that one must show that "he declined
further conflict and quitted or retreated from it [the assault] as far
as it was feasible to do so before the necessity of preserving himself
.. arose."  Moreover,  the right to use physical force to defend
non-family members is more limited than it is in many US states,  as
are the Canadians' rights to repulse trespassers on his or her own
property,  or to use force to stop the commission of serious or violent
crimes  [Viz.  sections 24, 40, and 41].

Recent firearms legislation now requires firearms to not only be
unloaded when stored in one's residence,  but all firearms must also be
under lock and key [CCC,  Section 86 [3].4  Moreover,  many
municipalities have regulations that make it an offense to discharge a
firearm within city limits [Municipal Code].  Presumably,  if someone
were to use a firearm in defending him or herself, charges could be
laid on a number of possible violations -- from unsafe storage to
homicide -- and he or she would have to prove in court that the firearm
had been used in self defense.

Methods

This paper is based primarily upon two surveys of the general publics
in the United States and in Canada undertaken simultaneously in the
early spring of 1990 [Mauser & Margolis 1992].  These surveys were
conducted under my direction by the Center for Social and Urban
Research at the University of Pittsburgh and funded by a grant from the
International Council for Canadian Studies (ICCS).  Representative
samples of adult residents,  18 years of age or older,  were drawn
using stratified random sampling methods to ensure adequate
representation from both countries.  Random digit dialing methods were
used to generate unlisted telephone numbers.5  Professional
interviewers completed 393 telephone interviews in all Canadian
provinces (including 93 interviews of residents in Quebec conducted in
French) and 344 in the United States during the period of March 20
through April 10,  1990.   The target population in Canada included all
10 provinces,  but not the Yukon nor the Northwest Territories;  in the
United States,  the target population included the District of Columbia
and all states except Hawaii and Alaska.  Interviews averaged
approximately 12 minutes,  and the response rate was 60 percent for
Canada and 56% for the United States.

This joint Canadian-American study replicated questions included in
relevant American and Canadian surveys to facilitate comparison.
However, strict replication  was not always possible due to occasional
legal differences between the two countries.  In such cases,  I
attempted to make the fewest possible changes in the wording that would
preserve equivalence.  Where differences in wordings exist,  they are
noted.

The key questions in this study about defensive gun use were based upon
those used in the 1991 Hart Poll.  Respondents in both Canada and the
US were first asked:  "Aside from military service or police work,  in
the past five years,  have you yourself,  or a member of your
household,  used a gun for self-protection, or for protection of
property at home,  at work, or elsewhere,  even if it wasn't fired?"
If the respondent answered, "yes,"  he or she was then asked,  "Was
this to protect against an animal or a person [or both]."  The
identical question was used in the 1981 Hart Poll except that Hart
asked about the defensive use of handguns only rather than all
firearms.  As with the Hart Poll,  all Rs were asked these questions
without screening for gun ownership or for privious victimization.
This point is important because some Rs may not have firearms now,  but
have used firearms defensively before they sold their firearms.
Similarly with screening  for victimhood:  Rs may not report being a
victim because they do not consider themselves a victim,  having
successfully frightened off the attacker with a firearm.6

A variety of basically similar questions have been asked of probability
samples of the general adult population in the United States.7   The
formulation adoped in this paper is superior in several ways.  First,
it asks about defensive use of all types of guns,  not just handguns.
Second, it is more precise because it asks about a specific time period
rather than the vague "have you ever used a gun."  Third,  it asks
about firearms use by anyone in the family,  not just the respondent.
Fourth,  it asks about the self defense of people as well as the
protection of property.  Fifth,  it excludes the defensive uses of
firearms as part of military and police duties.  Finally,  it
distinguishes between defensive uses against animal threats and human
threats.

As with victim surveys,  this question does not permit an assessment of
the legal or moral nature of the reported 'defensive' gun use.  One
must rely upon the honesty of the Rs as to the defensive character of
the reported act.  This moral ambiguity is important to note.  Even if
some violent encounters are morally unambiguous,  many assaults and
homicides are more accurately characterized as mutual combat than as a
guiltless victim defending himself against an immoral aggressor.  In
both victim surveys and self defense surveys, whoever is viewed as the
'victim' may depend only upon who one is interviewing.

Firearms ownership and attitudes in Canada and in the United States

Before examining firearms use in Canada and the US,  it is important to
compare the ownership and use of firearms in the two countries.  Table
1 shows that fewer Canadians have firearms than Americans.  Estimates
range between 23% and 34% of Canadian households have one or more
firearms, while 46% of households in the US are estimated to do so.
Canadians have almost as many rifles and shotguns but have much fewer
handguns.  Estimates range between 16% and 23% of Canadian households
have one or more rifles, while  between 24% and 32% of households in
the US have one or more rifles.
 Concerning shotguns,  estimates range between 15% and 19% of Canadian
households have one or more shotguns,  while  between 24% and 33% of
households in the US do so.  The differences are most striking with
respect to handguns.  Estimates range between 3% and 7% of Canadian
households have one or more handguns,  while between 25% and 27% of
households in the US do so.

For the most part,  Canadians own firearms for the same reasons that
Americans do.  Large majorities of respondents in both countries cited
"hunting" as the main reason for owning firearms.  As well,  Canadians
and Americans are equally likely to cite "target shooting" and "part of
a gun collection." as their primary reason for firearms ownership.  The
principal difference has to do with handguns.  Canadians are much less
likely [5%] than Americans [22%] to volunteer "self defense" as their
main reason for owning a firearm.

- ------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 1.  Households with firearms in Canada and the United States. 

 Gallup ICCS ICCS Angus Reid
 USA USA Canada Canada
        (1991) (1990) (1990) (1991) 
Rifle   24%    32%    29%    16%
Shotgun 24%    33%    19%    15%
Handgun 25%    27%     7%     3%
Firearm 46%    46%    34%    23%
N       1,010  343    393    2,341

NB:  These estimates are based upon telephone surveys and refer to the
percentage of households in the country that own each type of firearm.

Table  2.  Main reason reported for owning a firearm (ICCS 1990)

                      Canada  USA 
Hunting                  71%  51% 
Target Shooting           5    9 
Part of Collection        7   10
Self-Defense at Home      4   15 
Other                    13   15  
                        100% 100% 

NB.  The question:  "Please indicate, from the following list, the most
important reason you have a gun in your household. " 

- ------------------------------------------------------------------

In my survey of the Canadian and American publics,  I included several
questions that had not been asked in nationwide surveys of Canadians
before.  The first of these questions concerned Canadians beliefs about
their "right to bear arms."  Table 3 shows that more than half of
Canadians assert that,  as Canadians,  they "have a right to own a
gun." Interestingly,  the belief in this "right" is widespread among
Canadians:  majorities of most educational, income, regional,  and age
categories assert that, as Canadians, they have this right.  As might
be expected, firearms owners feel particularly strongly about their
asserted right.  Differences between the two countries are larger among
people who do not own a firearm:  in Canada a majority of non-owners do
not believe that they have a right to own a firearm,  while in the
USA,  strong majorities of all citizens, including non-gun owners,
believe  Americans have the right to bear arms.

Interestingly,  this belief in "the right to own a gun"  conflicts with
the opinions of most Canadian jurists,  who assert that firearms
ownership in Canada is a privilege,  not a right (Friedland 1984).
There is however a school of thought that,  because of the Magna
Carta,  Canadians have the same rights as English subjects to firearms
ownership [Kopel, 1992; Blackstone, 1979].  Whatever the legal opinions
are,  a majority of Canadians believe that they have a right to bear
arms.  This belief is particularly strong outside of Central Canada:
Westerners, as well as people living in the Maritimes, are more likely
to have grown up with firearms than people in Central Canada (Mauser
1990;  Stenning and Moyer 1981).

Are Canadians simply confused by too much American television,  or do
Canadians resemble Americans more than Canadian nationalists suppose?
According to this brief look at the available surveys,  Canadians and
American would seem to express the same basic attitudes towards
firearms, with the exception of handguns.  It appears that the two
countries do not differ as much as implied by the "cultural heritage"
argument.  Nonetheless, the data suggest that the publics in both
countries have complex feelings about firearms.  Large majorities in
both countries simultaneously support "moderate" firearms legislation
while supporting the use of firearms in self defense.  Reports of
previous surveys have tended to focus upon only part of the story,
namely attitudes in support of firearms restrictions.  These reports
have exaggerated the differences between the Canadian and American
publics, fostering the false impression that the Canadian public
strongly opposes the private ownership of firearms.

Another question that elicits strong agreement from both Canadians and
Americans concerns public evaluations of the effectiveness of
gun-control legislation.  Large majorities in both countries--79
percent (Canada) and 86 percent (USA) -- agree that "gun-control laws
affect only law-abiding citizens,  criminals will always be able to
find firearms."  See table 4.  While this question is somewhat loaded,
the high level of agreement,  and the low percentage of respondents who
express "no opinion,"  suggest that the public perceives a clear
distinction between the use of firearms by "criminals" and by
"law-abiding citizens."

- ------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 3.  "Do you believe that you,  as a citizen,  have a right to own
a gun?" (ICCS 1990)

                   Canada (1990)            USA (1990)
         Total   Firearm  Non-gun  Total   Firearm  Non
         Sample  Owners   Owners   Sample  Owners   Owners
Yes      56%     80%      45%      86%     96%      75%
No       44      20       55       14       4       25
        100%    100%     100%     100%    100%     100%
N       (386)   (121)    (260)    (339)   (160)    (170) 

Note.  The question in the Canadian survey was,  "Do you believe that you, 
as a Canadian resident,  have a right to own a gun,  or not?"

Table 4. "Gun control laws affect only law-abiding citizens,  criminals
will always be able to find firearms.  Do you agree or disagree?"  

           ICCS             Caddell       ICCS 
           Canada (1990)    USA (1978)    USA (1990) 
Agree      79%              78%           86% 
Disagree   20               13            13 
No opinion  1               10             1 
          100%             100%          100% 
          N=393            N=1500        N=344 

The Caddell survey refers to a nationwide survey conducted by Pat Caddell
for the Center for the Study and Prevention of Handgun Violence [viz,
Wright et al,  1983, chap 7].

- ------------------------------------------------------------------

But what about self defense?  Americans,  it is claimed,  believe that
people have the right to defend themselves with firearms if necessary,
while Canadians,  in contrast,  prefer to trust the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police to protect them from violence (Friedland 1984:
132-134).  Unfortunately,  questions about the use of firearms in self
defense are rarely found in surveys, for pollsters prefer to ask about
the criminal use of firearms.  This is particularly true in Canada
where almost all surveys have been conducted by the proponents of
stricter firearms legislation.  Nevertheless,  a few questions can be
found.  For example,  a series of highly publicized shootouts between
retail store owners and holdup men in both countries a few years ago
motivated Gallup to investigate public reaction to the use of firearms
by store owners and to include a small number of identical questions in
nationwide surveys of both the USA and Canada on this topic.

- ------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 5. "In the past year there have been a number of incidents
involving firearms used by retail store owners.  Do you feel that
incidents like these -- taking the law into one's own hands,  often
called 'vigilantism' -- are often justified,  sometimes justified,
rarely justified because of the circumstances or are never justified?"

               Gallup          Gallup 
             USA (1985)    Canada (1987)
Always          8                8 
Sometimes      72               68 
Never          17               21 
No opinion      3                3 
              100%             100% 

Table 6. "In the past year there have been a number of incidents
involving firearms used by retail store owners.  Do you feel that
incidents like these -- taking the law into one's own hands,  often
called 'vigilantism' -- are often justified,  sometimes justified,
rarely justified because of the circumstances or are never justified?"

                         ICCS             ICCS 
                       USA (1990)     Canada (1990)
Always                   11%                7%
Usually justified        26                16
Sometimes justified      44                45
Rarely justified         13                20
Never justified           5                11
No opinion                3                 3
                        100%              100% 
N = 393

- ------------------------------------------------------------------

The similarities between the Canadian and American publics are
eye-catching.  (See table 5.)  Over three-quarters of the public in
both countries reported that they thought the use of firearms by retail
store owners was at least "sometimes justified."  On this subject also,
Canadians do not seem to differ very much from their American
neighbors.  To probe the attitudes of the respondents further on the
issue of retail store owners using firearms,  I included a variation of
a question that Gallup had asked about the propriety "of taking the law
into one's own hands, often called 'vigilantism'."   Although this
wording had been used by Gallup,  I thought that his phrasing,  which
emphasized 'vigilantism,' an illegal act of retribution which excluded
the possibility of legitimate self defense, was unnecessarily biased.

To examine the impact of Gallup's wording,  I rephrased the question to
read "defending oneself with a firearm,"  and randomly split the
sample, asking one-half of the respondents the question with the
"vigilantism" wording,  and the other half with the "self defense"
wording.  An inspection of Tables 5,6 and 7 show that Americans are
more likely than Canadians to approve of either self defense or
vigilantism, but the change of wording had a greater effect in the USA
than in Canada.  Clearly,  more Americans than Canadians distinguish
between "vigilantism"  and "self defense," finding the latter a far
more attractive alternative.  Perhaps because Americans are more likely
to have occasion to use firearms to defend themselves,  they realize
that not all defensive use of firearms is vigilantism, while Canadians
are unclear about the differences between the two alternatives.8   In
any case, however, in both countries the most frequent response was
that retail store owners were "sometimes" justified in using firearms
for these purposes.

Following up on Gallup's questions about firearms used by retail store
owners,  I included several questions about the public's views of using
handguns for self defense.   One of the issues involved in these
incidents was the possible illegality of the store owners' firearms.
In Canada it is often impossible to get permission from the police to
keep a handgun for self protection.  Nevertheless, Mauser and Kennedy
had found that a majority of British Columbians and Albertans supported
of the use of firearms on the part of store owners,  so I decided to
ask the national samples about making such use into public policy.
Table 8 shows that Americans are much more supportive than Canadians of
storeowners having firearms to protect themselves.  While a huge
majority of Americans support storeowners arming themselves (80%),
Canadians as a whole come out slightly against such uses, 51 to 44
percent.  However, support for the use of firearms for self defense is
more common among residents of the western provinces than among the
Canadian population in general.  Canadians are not so supportive of
allowing homeowners to have handguns.  See Table 9.

- ------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 7. "In the past year there have been a number of incidents
involving firearms used by retain store owners.  Do you feel that
incidents like these -- defending oneself with a firearm* -- are often
justified, sometimes justified,  rarely justified because of the
circumstances or are never justified?"  (ICCS 1990)

                USA (1990)       Canada (1990) 
              self     vigil-   self      vigil-
             defense   antism   defense   antism 
Always         16%       8%        8%       5%
Usually        30       23        18       15
Sometimes      41       46        47       43
Rarely         11       15        19       23
Never           2        8         8       15
              100%     100%      100%     100% 

*An alternative formulation was randomly substituted for "defending
oneself with a firearm" in one-half of the interviews,  "taking the law
into one's own hands,  often called 'vigilantism.'"

Table 8.  "Do you favor or oppose store owners,  or owners of small
businesses,  being licensed to have a small handgun to use if necessary
in the event of an armed robbery?"

                Mauser   Kennedy   ICCS      ICCS
                 B.C.    Alberta   USA       Canada
               (1988)    (1987)    (1990)    (1990)
oppose            36        36%       17%       51%
favor             58        57        80%       44%
no opinion         2         7         3         5
                 100%      100%      100%      100%
               N=405    N=1045     N=344     N=393

Note:  The Alberta data were originally collected through the Alberta
Survey,  directed by Professor Kennedy of the Department of Sociology,
University of Alberta,  and made available through through the
Inter-University Consortium.

Table 9  "Do you favor or oppose home owners being licensed to have a
small handgun to use if necessary in the event of an armed robbery?"

        Mauser   DMI     ICCS    ICCS
         B.C.    USA     USA    Canada
        (1988)  (1978)  (1990)  (1990)
oppose    59%     69%     24%     56%
favor     40      29      73      41%
no opinion 2       3       3       3
         100%    100%    100%    100%
        N=405  N=1500   N=344   N=393

Note:  the wording used in the DMI survey differed from the other
questions,  "Would you favor or oppose a law giving the police the
power to decide who may or may not own a firearm?"

- ------------------------------------------------------------------ 

Our analysis thus far indicates that respectable majorities in both
countries express support for the legitimate use of firearms.  Many
Americans and Canadians share some of the beliefs of the pro-firearms
position in the United States:  for example,  a majority of Canadians as
well as Americans believe that as citizens, they "have the right to own a
gun."  Moreover,  majorities in both countries believe that,  under certain
circumstances,  the use of firearms in self defense is justifiable.  In
short,  citizens appear simultaneously to want to enjoy their freedom to
bear arms and to want government protection from harm that such arms--in
the wrong hands-- could cause.  An important question then arises about
whether these attitudes are held generally, or if the public is divided
into distinct camps.

To summarize,  this review of public opinion in the US and Canada
reveals striking similarities and a few important differences.  The
general public in both countries share much the same [if complex]
attitudes towards firearms and the use of firearms in self defense.
Majorities in both countries support 'moderate' firearms legislation
and simultaneously support the use of firearms in self defense.  In
Canada,  the public is more supportive of stricter legislation,
particularly concerning handguns, and is less supportive of the 'right
to bear arms.'  Despite these differences,  the Canadian public is more
supportive of responsible firearms ownership than has been portrayed by
Canadian nationalists.

The use of firearms in self defense

This section compares how often Canadians and Americans use firearms to
defend themselves or their family.  Unfortunately,  it is exceptionally
difficult to answer this question directly,  as there are few relevant
official records that are readily available.9   Public opinion surveys
are the best data available to estimate the use of firearms in self
defense.

In order to facilitate comparison,  the identical question was asked in
both Canada and the US.  In the ICCS study,  respondents were asked a
series of questions to investigate their use of firearms in self
defense.  First,  respondents were asked,  "Aside from military service
or police work,  in the past five years,  have you yourself,  or a
member of your household,  ever used a gun for self-protection of
property at home,  at work,  or elsewhere,  even if it wasn't fired?"
If the respondent answered, "yes," a follow up question was asked, "Was
this to protect against an animal or a person [or both]."

- ------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 10.  Comparison of firearms use in Canada and the US.

                     USA                   Canada             BC 
         Hart [1981]     ICCS [1990]     ICCS [1990]     Mauser [1988]
Animal       2%            0.3%            1.5%                2%
Person       3%            3.5%            1.3%                1.5%
Both         1%            0.3%            0.3%                0.5%
Total        6%            4.4%            3.1%                4% 
Source:  Kleck [1988];  Mauser [1990];  Mauser and Margolis [1992]

Note:  SFU Excel file,  "CDN firearms 23/10" 

Table 11.  Use of a firearm in self protection in the past 5 years in
Canada. 

        %-age     Per household     Per household     Per 100,000 persons
                  per year          per year
Animal   1.5%     151,192           30,238            140
Person   1.3%     131,033           26,207            121
Both     0.3%      30,238            6,048             28
Total    3.1%     312,463           62,493            289

Source:  Survey of Canadian general public conducted in 1990.  [Mauser
and Margolis 1992].

NB #1:  The wording of the question asked was,  "Aside from military
service or police work, in the past 5 years, have you yourself, or a
member of your household, ever used a gun for self-protection of
property at home, at work, or elsewhere, even if it wasn't fired?"

NB #2:  There were 10,079,442 households in Canada in 1990.
[Statistics Canada].

NB#3:  The Canadian population age 15 or over was 21,604,305 in 1991.
[Statistics Canada].

- ------------------------------------------------------------------ 

As shown in Table 10  approximately 3.1% of the Canadian adult
population report that someone in their household used a firearm,  at
least once,  in self defense in the past 5 years.  Over half of these
incidents [1.8%] involved protection against animals -- most likely
bears;  but almost as many [1.6%] involved the use of firearms to
defend against other people.  These estimates are consistent with the
results of an earlier study I conducted of British Columbia,  where I
estimated that firearms were somewhat more likely to be used in self
defense against animals,  and about as likely to be used against human
threats.

Thankfully,  these are small percentages.  However,  when it is
realized that there were over 10 million households in Canada in 1990,
these percentages imply that there were approximately 312,463 Canadian
households where at least one person reports having used a firearm to
protect themselves or their family between 1985 and 1990.  Calculating
the typical 5% confidence limits for a sample of this size gives an
estimate ranging from 296,840 to 328,086.  Dividing these figures by 5,
one finds that firearms were used 62,493 times each year during this
time period [between 59,368 and 65,617].  Half of these incidents
involved a defense against human threats.  Thus,  there were
approximately 32,255 incidents each year between 1985 and 1990 where a
Canadian reported using a firearm to defend him or herself against a
human threat.  [See Table 11].

- ------------------------------------------------------------------

Table 12.  Use of a firearm in self protection in the past 5 years in the
US. 

         %-age     Per household     Per household     Per 100,000 persons
                   per year          per year
Animal    0.3%     268,068           53,614            29
Person    3.5%   3,216,819          643,364           348
Both      0.3%     268,068           53,614            29
Total     4.4%   4,021,024          804,205           434

Source:  Survey of general public in the US conducted in 1990.  [Mauser
and Margolis 1992].
NB #1:  The wording of the question asked was,  "Aside from military
service or police work, in the past 5 years, have you yourself, or a
member of your household, ever used a gun for self-protection of
property at home, at work, or elsewhere, even if it wasn't fired?"
NB #2:  There were 91,947,410 households in the US in 1990.  US Bureau
of the Census
NB#3:  The US population age 18 or over was 186,532,400 in 1990.

Table 13.  Firearms misuse in 1987.

                      U S                Canada
                 %-age frequency      %-age frequency     woundings
Homicide   
  with firearms    59%    11,857        36%   187-231     1,050
Suicide
  with firearms    59%    18,525        33% 1,129-1,186     213
Accidents    
  with firearms     1%     1,400        <1%   99-99       1,436

Total firearms deaths     31,782        1,415-1,516       2,699

Armed Robbery     
  with firearms    33%    96,249        26%   5,960
Assault
  with firearms    21%   179,568        28%  13,036
Rape             unknown unknown         6  % 1,342

Total firearms crimes 275,817              20,338 

Source:  Actual crimes as reported in the Uniform Crime Reports for the
United States.  FBI.  1987;  Canadian Crime Statistics,  Statistics
Canada, 1987.  Vital Statistics, Vol. III.  Statistics Canada.  1987.

Note #1.  1987 is the most recent year that all of the accidental death
and suicide statistics are available for both countries.

Note #2:  It is very difficult to compare Canadian and American crime
statistics.  With a few notable exceptions,  the definitions of violent
crimes are not identical.  Murder and non-negligent manslaughter are
equivalent to 'homicide.'  However,  'violent crime' in the United
States includes murder, non-negligent manslaughter,  forcible rape,
robbery,  and aggravated assault but does not include 'abduction,'  or
'other sexual offenses,'  as does the Canadian category of 'violent
crime.'  To approximate,  'aggravated assault,'  I aggregated all
categories of 'assaults' with 'attempted murder,'  but excluding
'assault level 1' and the 'sexual assaults.'  To approximate the
'forcible rape' category in the US,  I aggregated all Canadian sexual
assaults.

Note #3.  The percentages allocated to firearms are estimated from
totals smaller than the total frequencies because of missing
information.  It is impossible to get these frequencies by multiplying
these percentages with the raw total frequencies

Table 14.  Comparison of actual violent crimes in Canada and the United
States [1987]

                       United States                Canada
                   per 100,000 frequency     per 100,000 frequency
Murder                 9          20,096         3             642
Armed robbery        120         291,664        46          11,732
Robbery              213         517,704        88          22,523
Forcible rape         37          91,111        87          22,369
Aggravated assault   351         855,088       182          46,557
Violent crime total  610       1,484,000       856         219,381
Burglary [B&E]     1,330       3,236,184     1,421         364,144
Suicide               13          31,398        14           3,594

population  US 243,400,000 Canada 25,617,300 

Sources:  Uniform Crime Reports for the United States.  FBI.  1987;
Canadian Crime Statistics,  Statistics Canada,  1987.  Vital
Statistics, Vol. III.  Statistics Canada.  1987.

Note #1.  At the time I began this analysis,  1987 was the most recent
year that all of the accidental death and suicide statistics were
available for both countries in the SFU Library.

Note #2:  It is very difficult to compare Canadian and American crime
statistics.  With a few notable exceptions,  the definitions of violent
crimes are not identical.  Murder and non-negligent manslaughter are
equivalent to 'homicide.'  However,  'violent crime' in the United
States includes murder, non-negligent manslaughter,  forcible rape,
robbery,  and aggravated assault but does not include 'abduction,'  or
'other sexual offenses,'  as does the Canadian category of 'violent
crime.'  To approximate,  'aggravated assault,'  I aggregated all
categories of 'assaults' with 'attempted murder,'  but excluding
'assault level 1' and the 'sexual assaults.'  To approximate the
'forcible rape' category in the US,  I aggregated all Canadian sexual
assaults.

- ------------------------------------------------------------------

If it assumed conservatively that only one person in a household used a
firearm only once between 1985 and 1990,  then there were 289 defensive
uses of a firearm per 100,000 population on average during this time
period,  and 149 of these involved a human threat.  Another way to pose
this,  is to compare it with the number of firearms owners in Canada.
Since there are approximately half as many households with firearms in
Canada as in the US,  and firearms are reported used defensively about
half as frequently,  this means that Canadian firearms owners report
using a firearm in self defense almost as often as do American firearms
owners.

Firearms are reported used to protect against animal attack over
180,000 times between 1985 and 1990 and over 160,000 times against
dangerous people.  Although the survey wasn't designed to assess
regional differences,  the threat of animals is probably more important
in western Canada [British Columbia and the prairie provinces] than in
central Canada [Ontario and Quebec].  Limited confirmation for this
hypothesis can be found by examining the results of an earlier study
conducted in British Columbia,  a large western Canadian province,  in
1990 [Mauser 1990].  This earlier study found slightly more defensive
uses of firearms over all and a much higher incidence of uses against
animals -- 2.5% for BC compared with 1.8% for all of Canada. [See Table
11].

Table 12 shows the frequency with which firearms are used in self
defense in the United States.  The results of my survey of the United
States are consistent with earlier estimates.  Kleck estimated that
between 600,000 and 960,000 Americans used firearms defensively against
human threats each year during this time period.  [Kleck 1991,  pp
104-111].  Compared with Americans,  Canadians use firearms more
frequently against dangerous animals [1.8% to 0.6%],  but less
frequently against dangerous people [1.6% to 3.8%].  In other words,
Canadians report using firearms to defend against human threats 32,255
times annually,  while Americans report using firearms 696,978 times
annually against human threats.

Another way to put this in perspective is to compare the frequency of
defensive use of firearms with the frequency that firearms are
misused.  As may be seen in Table 13,  there were a total of 1,516
firearms deaths in Canada [1,186 of these being suicides] and an
estimated total of 20,338 firearms crimes that did not involve death in
1987.10   Since Canadians report using firearms defensively more that
62,000 times annually,  if only one life was saved out of every 40
reported uses of a firearm,  more lives would be saved annually than
were lost through criminal violence.

Conclusions

The survey results reported here show that firearms are used in Canada
more often than many may believe in the defense of people and
property.  Canadians use firearms defensively almost as frequently than
in the United States,  but these uses tend to be disporportionately
against animal threats and not against human threats as in the U.S.  Of
necessity,  these estimates are only approximate,  given the small
sample size and the small incidence rates.  Moreover,  these are
retrospective estimates,  and Rs are notoriously unable to recall
exactly past events,  even important or traumatic events.  However, the
available evidence suggests that Rs are more likely to forget incidents
than to telescope time,  claiming that long-ago incidents occurred more
recently [Kleck 1991, p 109-110].

These conclusions should be considered quite tentative.  Despite the
use of two independent samples to estimate the frequency of that
firearms are used in self defense,  more research is needed before it
will be possible to reach a firm conclusion.  Further research must be
conducted into what Rs meant when they reported they had "used" a
firearm in defense.  It is unknown how often the firearm was fired,  or
how often the firearm was 'displayed' in order to discourage a
potential attack but not fired.  Presumably,  animals would be less
likely than humans to be intimidated by the simple display of a
firearm,  but animals might back down for many reasons when faced with
an armed person.  It is even possible that some Rs may have included
the carrying or having the firearm available in case of an attack as an
example of "use."  The only way to answer these questions would be to
ask this question in a larger sample survey study.

This study should be replicated with a larger sample size.  It would be
particularly valuable to study what victims [and those who have avoided
being victims] do to defend themselves in repelling aggression in
assaults, either sexual assaults or armed robberies,  and how effective
these efforts are.  Despite the small numbers,  it would be helpful for
policy makers to know the frequency that firearms,  knives, clubs,  or
noxious sprays are used in personal self defense in Canada.  Moreover,
court data would be valuable as well.  Before one could say with any
certainty that firearms are useful [or are not useful] against human
threats,  court data would need to be collected and analyzed to examine
the frequency that firearms are used in cases of justifiable homicide.

Despite the limitations of this study,  these data are the best data
currently available and they suggest that firearms are used in Canada
to save lives.  The results suggest that if only one life were saved
out of every 40 reported uses of a firearm,  more lives would be saved
annually than were lost through criminal violence.  Canadian policy
makers would be well advised to realize that firearms are used in self
defense in Canada almost as often as they are in the United States.  If
these results are confirmed in further research,  then restrictive
legislation that had been designed to save lives may actually cost
Canadian lives by rendering it difficult to obtain a firearm when one
is needed.

References

Blackstone,  William.  1979.  Commentaries Upon the Laws of England.
Vol I.  [Originally published 1765 - 1769].  Chicago, University of
Chicago Press.  p. 139

Bureau of the Census.  1991.  U.S. Population by Age, Sex, and
Households,  1990.  U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, DC.

Cook,  Philip J.  1991.  "The technology of personal violence."  In
Crime and Justice,  A Review of Research.  Vol 14:  1-71.    [ed]
Michael Tonry.
 Chicago,  University of Chicago Press.

Federal Bureau of Investigation.  1988.  Uniform Crime Reports for the
United States.  1987.  U.S. Department of Justice,  Washington,  DC.

Friedland,  Martin L.  1984.  A Century of Criminal Justice.
(Toronto:  Carswell).

Kleck, Gary.  1988. "Crime control through the private use of armed
force."
 Social Problems 35: 1-21.

Kleck, Gary.  1991.  Point Blank:  Guns and Violence in America.  New
York,
 New York,  Aldine de Gruyter.

Kopel,  David B.  1992. The Samurai, the Mountie, and the Cowboy.
Buffalo, New York, Prometheus Books.

Mauser, Gary.  1990.  "A comparison of Canadian and American attitudes
towards firearms."  Canadian Journal of Criminology 32[4]:  573-589.

Mauser, Gary.  1993.  Firearms and Self Defense:  the Canadian Case.
Presented to the annual meeting of the American Society of
Criminology.  Phoenix AZ 27 - 30 October 1993.

Mauser, Gary and Michael Margolis.  1992.  "The politics of gun
~control:  comparing Canadian and American patterns."  Government and
Policy  10:  189-209.

Statistics Canada.  1988.  Canadian Crime Statistics.  1987.  85-205.
Queen's Printer.  Ottawa,  Ontario.

Statistics Canada.  1993.  Vital Statistics, Vol. III,  1987.  84-206.
Queen's Printer.  Ottawa,  Ontario,

Stenning, P.C. and S. Moyer.  1981.  Firearms Ownership and Use in
Canada:  A Report of Survey Findings.  (Toronto:  Centre of
Criminology,  Univ. of Toronto).

Endnotes

1. There is only one national group in Canada,  the National Firearms
Association,  that supports the use of firearms in self defense,  and
only an occasional feminist group.

2. The Canadian Criminal Code prohibits the ownership of a wide variety
of weapons,  eg,  Mace,  pepper sprays,  knives,  nunchakus,  as well
as tightly restricting carrying firearms.  As well,  it is illegal to
carry anything that is intended to be be used as a weapon [Sections 87,
88, 89, 90(c) and Orders-in-Council SOR/74/297 74-05-07, SOR/78-277
78-03-28, inter alia].

3. Almost all martial arts groups deemphasize the use of their training
for self defense,  but a few feminist groups in Canada teach martial
arts explicitly as a means of self defense.  Other feminist groups
encourage the carrying of "non-violent" alternatives such as spray
dyes,  whistles,  or sirens to frighten off attackers.  One group even
advocates carrying a noxious spray in order to spray upon oneself -- to
make oneself unattractive to a potential rapist!

4. Handguns require two locks:  not only must a handgun be locked in a
"container" that "cannot readily be broken open,"  but it  must also
"be rendered inoperable by a secure locking device" [Regulations
Respecting the Storage, Display, Handling and Transportation of Certain
Firearms,   6, JUS-92-193-02].

5. The specific RDD method used involved a modified Mitofsky-Waksberg
cluster sampling approach and was conducted by Survey Sampling Inc.

6. These points are contentious.  See Cook for an opposing view [Cook
1991, pp 54-56].

7. See Kleck for an expanded discussion of the differences among these
questions [Kleck 1988 and 1991.

8.  This result is consistent with Mauser's [1990] earlier findings
that similar changes in wording had little effect upon the opinions
expressed by residents of British Columbia.

9. The most relevent official records are those kept by courts
concerning the use of firearms in incidents where people are charged
with illegal use of a firearm.  If the court eventually finds that the
firearm was legitimately used in self defense,  the court drops or
stays the charges.  The most important of these charges involves
homicide.  To my knowledge,  there are no published studies of
justifiable homicide by Canadian residents or citizens.

10. This year was selected as it was the most recent year that the SFU
Library had all of these statistics are available for both countries.
Since conducting this analysis, I have been able to look at more recent
statistics but I have not had the time to update this analysis.
However, an 'eyeball' analysis suggests that no fundamental changes
have taken place since 1987.

- -- 
Roger Walker (403) 465-4962  ****  SysOp, CUE Here BBS (403) 465-7715
               [email-masked]

    PGP Public Key from:  [email-masked]

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From: [email-masked] (Skeeter Abell-Smith)
Newsgroups: can.talk.guns,can.politics,talk.politics.guns
Subject: Questions Which Shouldn't Be Asked
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Date: 8 Mar 1995 16:51:26 GMT
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QUESTIONS WHICH SHOULDN'T BE ASKED 

George Jonas, Toronto SUN

I'm worried about guns, but I'm more worried about gun control.  At the
risk of repeating myself, I will outline some of my reasons once
again.

I'm neither a hunter nor a gun collector, but I still have a personal
stake in the matter as a free citizen.  A call for banning weapons, or
certain kinds of weapons is always based on a query which shouldn't be
posed to anyone in a free society, namely: "What do you need it for?"

Whether or not such a question can be answered - and in the case of
guns it can be answered rather easily - it should never be asked. In
free societies people shouldn't be called upon to justify their need
for anything they wished to own.  (Unless they wished to own it for an
illegitimate purpose - in which case no "need" would serve as a
justification.)

There's nothing abstract about this: it ties in with everyone's daily
life.  If society demands to know people's "needs" for their personal
choices, and then judges such needs by the tastes or standards of
others, it opens the door to tyranny.  (How could I judge, for
instance, how much you feel a need for protecting yourself?)

If we must establish need as a justification we may not be entitled to
much beyond food and shelter.  Others who feel differently about our
habits or tastes may pass laws to ban just about anything we own, from
cars to furs.  Or anything we enjoy, from alcohol to cigarettes.  Not
to mention music or books.  This is not a hypothesis.  This is
precisely what happens in societies that ban books or music or beverage
or activities on the basis that they're morally or physically
detrimental to some users or to some social ideals.

Of course, you can't buy ground-to-air missiles in a corner store in
any society - nor should you be able to.  But in free countries the
onus is always on those who want to restrict something to show why it
must be restricted.  By asking citizens: "Why do you need it?" we
reverse this onus.

The minute the question "Why do we need it?" is legitimized, any
response only invites further questions.  For instance, the reply "I
need a gun to hunt," invites the question "But why do you need to
hunt?"  Never mind whether these questions are valid or not.  The point
is that by allowing them to be asked we permit others to be the judges
of our choices.

Validating the need to own a gun - any gun - is not very hard. It's
certainly easier than, say, validating the need to own a vehicle that
can travel faster than the legal limit.  Or the need to fly to Rome for
a holiday.  Nor is it possible to argue that fast cars or recreational
air travel threaten no lives or entail no social costs.  They do.
Travel or adventurous forms of recreation always raise medical and
security risks.  They pollute and cause non-renewable resources to go
up in smoke.  Far more people are hurt as a result of wanton use of
vehicles than wanton use of firearms.

The utility of a vehicle that can travel at a faster rate than a
prudent person needs to travel isn't greater than the utility of
weapons that can shoot at a faster rate than a prudent person nees to
shoot.  No, I'm not about to suggest that if we ban rapid-fire guns we
should also ban rapid acceleration cars.  I leave such suggestions to
others.  All I suggest is that "need" is not a valid test for guns any
more than it is for vehicles or hobbies.

Someone might say vehicles or hobbies are different from guns. Power
boats or parachutes, even if they entail social costs, even if they're
tragically misused at times, have an intrinsic value, whereas guns have
none.  Guns can only be used to kill.  This is a tempting argument,
except is happens to be false.  Many people keep guns, including
handguns or rapid fire guns, for protection.  The need for protection
may not arise often or, with luck, ever.  But those who conclude from
this that protection has no value confuse frequency with importance.
Protection has quite a bit of value for those who value their lives.

To subscribe to the cdn-firearms information/discussion list, send 
an e-mail message to "[email-masked]" with the following 
command in the body:

subscribe cdn-firearms your_name_here
 
--
E-mail: [email-masked]                     University of Saskatchewan
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From: [email-masked] (Orion)
Newsgroups: can.politics,can.talk.guns,soc.culture.canada,can.general,ont.general,tor.general
Subject: Re: Who said anything about taking things away?
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Stephen Perelgut ([email-masked]) wrote:
: : IF TAKING MY TARGET PISTOLS WILL STOP  * [email-masked]
: : ARMED ROBBERIES THEN TAKE MY ASPIRIN   * c/o P.O. Box 51,Portugal Cove, 
: : TOO;THAT SHOULD STOP THE FLOW	       * Newfoundland,Canada,A0A 3K0
: : OF ILLEGAL DRUGS.                      * (709) 579-7191(w) 895-1223(Fax) 

: I'm curious.  What part of the new legislation being proposed says they'll
: take anything away from anyone?  OK, I believe that they'll take assault
: weapons away but I doubt you go hunting or target practicing with AK-47's.

  It's already happened.  Kim Campbell, in a calculated move to take 
political advantage of the tragedy that some of the anti-gun groups have 
dubbed (with the kind help of our largely left-leaning news media) the 
Montreal Massacre, restricted many firearms that 'looked' military 
(although amusingly enough she did NOT restrict the actual gun used by 
Marc Lepine...since it's popular with farmers/ranchers for predator 
control, firing a small, light bullet and being capable of quick second 
or third shits if necessary).  Allan Rock's first move was to make almost 
all of these firearms PROHIBITED instead (something that would have been 
impossible without having had them *registered* first)...and some were 
confiscated outright WITHOUT COMPENSATION.

  We aren't talking about 'Saturday Night Specials' here: we are talking 
about guns that *start* at about 1500 dollars and go as high as 3000.
Collectors guns.  Sporting guns.

: They want to register your guns.  This will reduce, somewhat, the number
: of illegal guns over the next few years.  It will also make it easier to
: track down the *registered* owner of any firearm used illegally.  

  How will it reduce the number of illegal guns?  And what difference 
does it make that you can track down a gun that has been *stolen* from 
it's legal owner when the theft has already been reported BY LAW?  Do you 
think that all the guns used in crimes are recovered...or that people 
would be dumb enough to use a gun *registered* to them in commission of a 
crime, when they could do what 85% or so of criminals already do 
(according to your own government): buy SMUGGLED guns?

: As far as I have heard/read, nobody is taking things away from you.

  That's because you haven't been paying attention to what has been 
posted here.  If you had, you would have known that shortly after Allan 
Rock was elected he madethe statement in a media interview that "I came 
to Ottawa with the firm belief that only the police and the military 
should have firearms in Canada".

  Those are his words (as much as he's tried to 'back-pedal' away from 
them ever since).  You figure it out.  

  

From elastic!exorcist!lethe!geac!reptiles.org!io.org!van-bc!news.mindlink.net!mindlink.bc.ca!a10548 Fri Nov 24 00:59:46 1995
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From: [email-masked] (Larry Soo)
Newsgroups: can.general
Subject: Re: Thankyou, Senators, for passing Bill C-68....
Date: Thu, 23 Nov 95 17:46:00 -0800
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#35174381    Karen Gordon writes:

>
> Thank you to the caring Senators who voted to pass Bill C-68 and take
> Canada on a very different path than that of our neighbours to the south.

Yes, thanks for throwing common sense out the window and setting the
stage for the government to spend half a billion dollars on a
registration system which has never been shown to work _anywhere in the
world._

>
> The police will soon be able to collect guns from those who now own them
> but are a danger to their families and to ec-partners.

Right...if the guns are registered.  Reality doesn't change now that
your fantasy law is about to be passed, Karen.  After all, murder has
been illegal for a long time now, but it still occurs (and in the
majority of it doesn't involve firearms...fancy that, eh Karen?).

>
> The newly-created registries of those who have restraining orders
> against them, or a history of partner abuse will be targeted for the
> 'discontinuance' of their gun ownership. Also to be targeted are those
> with a history of stalking, intimidation, haras- sment and having
> 'circuits that don't connect'.

You are so naive, Karen.  C68 isn't going to prevent women being
murdered by their stalkers.  Have you heard nothing of the BC women who
were recently killed by their ex-partners??  As far as "circuits that
don't connect," mental agility is one of the requirements in obtaining
an FAC which you need to obtain a firearm.  This is ALREADY THE LAW.
Again, you have revealed your breathtaking ignorance of existing gun
control laws.

>
> There isn't a segment of society that won't benefit from the removal of
> THEIR firearms.

Uh huh.  Less than 1% of legally-owned firearms are used in crimes so
you deem it necessary to register all of them, at a cost of millions and
millions of dollars.  Great thinking, Karen.  It's odd that you advocate
this ineffectivel, expensive placebo when many more lives could be spent
simply educating women on the early detection of breast cancer and
cancer research. Your choice makes it obvious that you're anti-gun
rather than pro-life.

>
> The removal of rapid-fire, military-style firearms, such as used by Marc
> Lepine to slaughter so many women with very little effort.

For starters, "rapid-fire" firearms are still widely available and very
LEGAL. For some reason, you and Rock et al believe that the appearance
of a firearm is directly related to its danger.  Again, a typical
hoplophobic symptom. As far as Marc Lepine is concerned, is there
something you know about him that the case's coroner doesn't?

    In their document the CGC quotes an Angus Reid poll (33) as the
    source for the "fact" that 80% of Canadians do not consider the
    current legislation adequate.  A more careful examination of the
    results of this poll indicates that a very large percentage (almost
    40%) of the respondents felt that tougher penalties for the misuse
    of firearms was preferable to further restrictions on the ability to
    purchase a firearm. The report also indicated that support for
    further gun control increased after the Montreal murders but it must
    be realized that gun control became a knee jerk "Mom and apple pie"
    issue for a while after that tragedy. The reality of that incident
    with regard to some aspects of further gun control legislation is
    that the coroner's report concluded that the particular type of
    firearm and its magazine capacity was irrelevant to the number of
    deaths and that the poor response of the police was the primary
    factor here. (34)

        34.  Report of Coroner Teresa Sourour, May 15, 1990.

    A report by coroner Teresa Sourer stated that Lepine's use of the
    Mini-14 was not an important factor in the shootings, since a
    standard  hunting rifle "probably would have had similar results."

Of course, since the Ruger Mini 14 is _styled_ after a 1950's/1960's
military rifle, you, Karen Gordon, automatically assume that it must
be more dangerous.  Very logical and typical of all your arguments.

>
> Anyone who decides 'the law is not for him' is about to recognize how
> easy it is to cross the line from 'law-abiding citizen' to 'criminal'.

Turning a larger percentage of the population into criminals doesn't
exactly reduce violent crime, does it Karen?

>
> The laws are being brought in to give Canada a reprieve from the trends
> of gun violence - particularly in the hands of younger males - and to
> give us a chance at more security in our everyday lives.

What a joke.  Do you seriously think that the young males involved in
your so-called "trend of gun violence" are going down to the local gun
shop, presenting their FAC (which requires a police check and
exam/course), and buying a gun to use in a crime?  That's what pre-C68
laws require.  C68 will do absolutely nothing to change your trend.

>
> Anyone who decides to buck these laws is no less a criminal than one who
> decides not to abide by the laws of driving, border crossing, or any
> other law that is meant to create security - not diminish it.

And we all know that everyone drives at or below the speed limit, don't
we Karen?

Also, thanks to C68's draconian measures, bucking its laws results in a
much more severe punishment than any of your examples.  See, this is
where the stupidity of your "registered-cars = registered-guns" argument
comes in: the penalties are in no way similar.  Last I heard, you don't
run the risk of a criminal record and a four year sentence if you don't
register your gun.

>
> Those who are determined not to register their firearms will find out
> just how easy it is to cross the line from 'law-abiding' to 'criminal'.
> And those of us who have noted the hate and anger of the majority of gun
> proponents are not going to shed a tear for those who cared more for
> their 'recreational fun' and contrived 'right to guns' than they did the
> losses of the people who know all too well the effects of unrestricted
> gun ownership.

What country are you talking about, Karen???  We've had restricted gun
ownership for DECADES!!!  You know, if you didn't post so many obviously
untruthful posts, perhaps the respondents to your drive-by postings
wouldn't be so hard on you.  The fact is, you rely on exaggeration and
outright lies rather than anything even remotely resembling the truth.

As for caring about the losses of the people affected by gun-related
crime, do you also suggest that people who own automobiles are promoting
hatred because they continue to insist on driving their vehicles?  Why
should the vast majority of law-abiding gun owners be made responsible
for the less than 1% which are involved in crimes.  Do you also
advocating strict censorship of the internet because some people are
distributing kiddie porn?  Your kind of perverted values are the type
which insist that we should design laws and rules for our society based
on the lowest common denominator; the logical extension of this thinking
is that we as a people are judged by the basest, worst examples of the
group.

As for "hate and anger," here's some of your own posts:

        And what 'drives' the gun-huggers?  You'd think that by
        asking people to declare what guns they own to the
        police, they were being asked to give up their first born.
        Why is it that so many 'law-abiding citizens' don't want
        the police toknow what guns they have?  I think you've been
        watching too many American TV shows.....likely you've got a
        camoufalge  outfit for 'boys' weekends in the woods', too.

        Can't learn anything from our good neighbours to the south?
        Then you're amongthe 'not-too-bright' gun huggers who would
        gladly take us down the same road.  Smarten up.

So get off your high-horse because you're one of the most bigotted posters
in
this gun control thread.  Well, you and the people whose articles you
plagiarized.  It is your distrust of the common man/woman that is truly
insulting.

...lars

From elastic!exorcist!lethe!geac!reptiles.org!io.org!chi-news.cic.net!newsfeed.internetmci.com!howland.reston.ans.net!torn!nott!bcarh189.bnr.ca!bcarh8ac.bnr.ca!bcarh8ab.bnr.ca!glasgow Sat Nov 25 10:57:12 1995
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From: [email-masked] (Barry Glasgow)
Newsgroups: can.talk.guns,can.politics,can.legal,can.gov.general,can.general,soc.culture.canada,talk.politics.guns
Subject: We register dogs - was: Comparing Canadian and U.S. gun laws
Date: 24 Nov 1995 22:30:45 GMT
Organization: Bell-Northern Research Ltd.
Lines: 216
Distribution: world
Message-ID: <[email-masked]>
References: <[email-masked]> <[email-masked]> <[email-masked]> <[email-masked]> <[email-masked]>
NNTP-Posting-Host: bcarh6c1.bnr.ca
Originator: glasgow@bcarh6c1

In article <[email-masked]>, raterman <[email-masked]> writes:
 
|>      But wouldn't you at least agree that the dangers of alcohol and automobiles do 
|> justify a degree of government regulation.  Thus, cars have to be registered (and no 
|> it is not an unworkable or excessively expensive burden on the nation), and the sale 
|> and public consumption of alcohol are also controlled.

Where on earth did you get the idea that cars and alcohol are
regulated because they're dangerous ?
The government regulates these things for tax purposes. 

Just how does registering your car make you any safer ?

I used to get upset when people used this car/dogs/guns analogy,
especially those who proudly proclaimed "we register our dogs !".

What kind of mentality takes comfort in giving the government money 
to own a dog ?!

It's really quite funny when you think about it.

|>      Well, from what I've seen there is a certain amount of intolerance and 
|> stubbornness on the side of gun owners. 

Yeah, right. We put up with successive governments heaping more and more
regulations on us (while boasting some imagined public health victory)
while people who aren't affected by the laws shit all over us for daring
to complain and WE'RE the ones who are intolerant !

|>And to contradict one of the most common 
|> (and unreasonable) insinutaions favoured by gun owners, gun control is NOT the 
|> beginning of dictatorship.  The gov't is not going to come rapping on your door at 3 
|> am just because there's a gun registry. 

Contradiction, yes.  True ?   No.   Read the story at the end of this.
Combined with all the statements Rock made wanting to get rid of all
guns, I would say you're merely pissing into the wind. 

|> Relax.

We are.

|>  
|> 
|> >ps,Raterman, do you have a real name or do your gonads become 
|> >significantly larger when you communicate under a pseudonym??
|> 
|>      Of course I have a real name, but you'll excuse me if I don't wish to be on a 
|> first name basis with someone as uncivil as yourself.

Who the hell really cares ?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

          A Quiet Friday Evening in the Country!

    I am feeling a bit down today and not very kindly toward Kim
Campbell, Alan Rock, Jean Chretien and all other well-meaning but naive
souls who are in support of the useless, senselessly severe gun laws
and police state tactics that are being rammed down the throats of
responsible citizens who have never committed a crime in their lives
and never will unless pushed a little too far by the prejudicial,
discriminatory democratic? process in this great free?? land of ours.
(How's that for an opening mouthful?)

    Last Friday afternoon (February 10/95) about two minutes after my
daughter, Audra (age 17) arrived home from school (around 4:50 PM) an
RCMP officer showed up at our place with a search warrant, displayed
his badge and told Audra he was there to search (if necessary) and
seize my Franchi shotgun (which they claim became a prohibited weapon
effective Jan 1/95 by Order In Council #11 enacted on Nov 29, 1994).

    We had been half expecting them to come for over a month, but of
course didn't know when or if it would really happen.  Audra
immediately phoned me at work and I told her to open the vault and give
the officer the receiver (frame) of the gun which is all I am required
by law to surrender. The officer was not happy with just the receiver
and was even less pleased when Audra on my instructions over the phone
told him that was the only part of the gun he was entitled to have by
law and to please take it and leave. He told Audra that he was entitled
to search for and seize all parts belonging to that gun (even though no
part except the receiver is either marked with any identification
number, or restricted or registered in any police record.)  (The legal
definition of a firearm is the lower receiver which has the serial
number stamped on it.)

     The officer then proceeded to tell Audra that his search warrant
gave him complete control of all our property, house, barn, vehicles
and everything else; that he had the power and authority to put Audra
out of the house and off the property (in about -10 deg.C
temperatures), bring in a search team and tear the house and anything
else that they pleased, to pieces until they found the other parts to
the gun which they suspected were still there on the property.  At that
point, the officer took the phone from Audra, and asked me if I was
going to give him the other parts to the gun; I told him that he
already had all he was entitled to by law, and to please get off my
property. He then said he was proceeding to call in his backup team to
take the house apart and he hung up the phone.

     I phoned my lawyer, explained what was happening and specifically
asked him if I was required by law to give up any part of the gun
except the receiver, his answer, "No, you are not, but it sounds like
the police officers honestly believe they have the right to search and
find the other parts".

     I said "Then you had better come and mediate this because I'm not
budging a hair beyond what the law requires except on your advice and I
have no intention of letting them tear my house apart either."  To make
a long story short, when my wife, Louise and I arrived home, there were
three RCMP vehicles there but they hadn't done any serious searching
except to order Audra to open up anything that looked like a gun
cabinet.

    My lawyer arrived, talked to the police, talked to their lawyer on
the phone for ten minutes, advised me that even though by law, I was
not required to give up the rest of the gun parts, that the police and
their lawyer believed it was their right to search for them and seize
them and tear down our house as required to accomplish that. So he
recommended that I give them the parts to avoid further immediate
damages on either side.

    Since I had previously decided to follow the lawyer's advice if he
came to mediate, I stalled a bit longer; then went outside and came
back in a few minutes with the parts.  The officers were relieved.
(With a large unfinished house full of all kinds of construction
"junk", a barn full of hay and 300 acres of land under 2' of snow to
search through, plus the fact they didn't really know what they were
looking for and had no way of positively identifying it if they did
find it, they could have torn the house to the ground with very little
chance of ever finding what they were looking for, and they knew it.)

    The real important questions in my mind are:  How much of our stuff
would they have rooted around through believing that it was their job?
And, in a so-called free country why should any group of people,
majority or otherwise, have the right to enact laws that allow the
police to go to the home of someone who never has, and never will
commit any crime (unless provoked beyond all reason), lean heavily on a
17 year old daughter who is an extremely responsible kid and a top
notch student, and threaten to tear the house apart to steal legally
acquired and responsibly owned and used private property.

   Why didn't I just hand over the complete gun up front and avoid the
hastle ?  Because I'm fed up, I'm stubborn, I'm not a criminal and I
refuse to be treated like one, I don't appreciate being robbed of a
valuable top quality collector's item which I enjoy, and more people
have to stand up and point out that what is currently happening with
gun laws here in Canada is wrong and will not make one bit of
difference in the crime rate except to cause it to increase.

   Taking away every last legally owned gun in Canada will make no
significant difference in the level of public safety.  Current laws
require all handguns in Canada to be registered.  Chretien says he will
greatly improve public safety by banning all handguns. However, there
is one slight unmentionned hitch in his safety plan - for every person
in Canada killed by a legally registered handgun, over 770 are killed
by motor vehicles.  Why then are we so intent on persecuting the honest
people who enjoy owning and target shooting with their handguns ? The
main reasons are ignorance, prejudice and discrimination against a
minority group of law abiding citizens.

   Anyway, my next step is either to forget the whole affair and accept
the fact that Canada has already become a police state and can seize
any piece of property it wants from any individual at any time; or, to
resist.  I have decided to resist along with a lot of others. We need
vocal support from all those who might be starting to think that maybe
the police should not have the right to force their way into an honest
person's house and traumatize a 17 year old girl for no other reason
than to steal private property.

   I am trying to see a positive side in all of this. The only one I
can think of so far is that Audra has personally experienced a small
sample of what invariably happens to innocent, responsible people when
any law, (enacted by majority approval or otherwise) is allowed to
override individual human rights for the sake of the intangible and
legally undefinable goal of "public safety".

   Audra is not a faint-hearted kid but she was extremely uncomfortable
with the "legal?" and intimidating police tactics she was subjected to
before Louise and I arrived home. After the police had left (they were
there for about two hours) Audra said that she has always felt many
times safer home alone with or without a gun than she did with the
police there telling her they had the right to put her outside in the
cold and tear the house down unless she gave them the rest of my gun
parts, when she had absolutely no idea where I had put them.

   I suppose another positive aspect is that it did create a little
unusual excitement for us on a February Friday evening in the country;
and Audra says that when we do go to court to challenge the legality of
OIC #11, and try to get our gun back, she definitely wants a chance to
testify!

PS - On Sunday one of our neighbours phoned Louise and said that she
     didn't want to be nosy but there was talk around the neighborhood
     that there had been three police vehicles at our place for quite a
     while last Friday evening. She wanted to know if we had had a
     burglarly and if everything was okay. Louise said "No it was not a
     burglarly, it was armed robbery and no everything is not okay! We
     lost a gun worth over $1000. It's the first robbery we have ever
     had at our place; but, by far the most alarming and serious thing
     that's wrong is that this time it's the police that are the
     robbers".

  Darrell McKnight
  RR#4 Carlisle Road,
  Fredericton, NB
  Canada, E3B4X5

  EMAIL: [email-masked]

|> 

From elastic!jaywon.pci.on.ca!noc.tor.hookup.net!nic.wat.hookup.net!wire!van-bc!unixg.ubc.ca!rover.ucs.ualberta.ca!tribune.usask.ca!usenet Wed Sep 27 00:27:50 1995
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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [1/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 14:57:41 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan
Lines: 319
Sender: [email-masked]
Distribution: na
Message-ID: <[email-masked]>
Reply-To: [email-masked]
NNTP-Posting-Host: skatter.usask.ca

THE NFA PRESENTATION ON BILL C-68

Bill C-68 is, in our view, the last egg of a political dinosaur. 
It is an example of early 20th century hamfisted legislation--a
legally, socially, and politically inept document that will have
far more evil effects than good effects if passed.

In one hour, we can barely scratch the surface regarding all the
constitutional, legal, technical, and defective use of language
problems that lurk within Bill C-68.  We have therefore chosen to
present a series of brief points, each amplified and explained in
the well-researched papers that form the main part of our brief.

1. The worst flaw lies in C-68's Firearms Act.  It is regulatory
law, not criminal law.  It is, according to our lawyers, ultra
vires of the federal Parliament.  If you pass it, we will
challenge it in the courts, and we will probably win--just as we
have already won the Simmermon test case.  In that decision,
11 of Kim Campbell's and Allan Rock's Orders in Council were
struck down as invalid for improper enactment.  The effects of
that win will be haunting governments for years.  

The courts are independent.  If they disagree with Mr. Rock's
legal opinion--as they have over the Order in Council issue--any
federal or provincial  government enforcing the Firearms Act
will be left with huge liabilities.  Those liabilities will have
to be paid off out of our tax dollars, and we would prefer not to
pay for Mr. Rock's latest legal and constitutional blundering.

Even if we do not win on the Constitutional argument, C-68 is so
badly drafted that it is pathetically vulnerable.  In the past,
bad firearms control laws survived because our people could not
afford lawyers to fight.  That is no longer true; the NFA now
supplies kits containing legal expertise to those abused by the
system, and they are winning a high percentage of their
cases--without lawyers.  When they lose, their loss is minimal,
because we explain how to minimize losses.  Win or lose, the cost
to government is high--but the cost to our people is peanuts. 

These problems are addressed in our papers IA, IB, IC, IIA and
IIB.

2.  It is our position that the federal Parliament cannot enact
legislation in which it purports to give permission or refuse to
give permission to do things through the charging of license fees
in an area where the Constitution clearly allots the power to
charge licensing fees exclusively to provincial Legislatures.

This problem is addressed in our papers IIA and IIB.

3.  We strongly object to the Minister's office use of public
funds to spread false information about the security of the
RCMP's computerized registration system around the nation.

This problem is addressed in our paper III.

4.  We strongly object to the vagueness and poor linguistic
skills exhibited by the authors of C-68.  For example, C-68 still
uses the word being defined as part of the definition.  It still
defines a "firearm" as a "weapon" and a "weapon" as a "firearm,"
creating an unbreakable loop of confusion.  It still defines
"firearm" in two different ways for differing parts of C-68.

The defective structure and language of C-68 still merits the
comments of Mr. Justice Gibbs of the Supreme Court of British
Columbia (1985):

This is a difficult case.  Not the least of the
difficulties is due to the tortuous language of the gun control
provisions of the Criminal Code.  In Regina versus Neil, Judge
Gordon was moved, with some justification, to refer to those
provisions as "one of the most horrifying examples of bad
draftsmanship that I have had the misfortune to consider", as "so
convoluted that even those responsible for enforcing the
provisions are apparently unable to understand them", and as "a
challenge to one"s sense of logic."

The drafters of C-68 have made that situation even worse.

This problem is addressed in our paper IV.

5.  We strongly object to the blurring of the dividing line
between crimes and public welfare offences.  In our view, a
public welfare offence belongs in regulatory law, and a crime
belongs in criminal law.  The House of Commons seems unable to
grasp the difference between the two, so we have done some
research into the proper location of that dividing line.

We strongly believe that Parliament cannot ignore fundamental
justice and legal principles without bringing the law into
disrepute.  A further increase in public disrespect for the law
would be bad for our society, so we ask you not to pass C-68.

These problems are addressed in our papers VA and VB.

6.  We strongly object to the unconstitutional introduction of
C-68, in violation of the terms of section 24.4.36 of the
Constitution Act of 1982.  Section 24.4.36 clearly requires
consultation with the aboriginal peoples before introduction of
such a bill, and that was not done.  The issue was looked at, but
then swept under the rug by the Liberal majority in the House
Justice and Legal Affairs Committee.

The motion of Mr. Jack Ramsay, Member of Parliament, to suspend
hearings of that Committee until the apparently clear violation
of the Constitution could be dealt with was rejected by Chairman
Allemand on grounds not related to the merits of the motion.

That problem has still not been resolved, to the best of our
knowledge.  We would like an answer as to whether C-68 is
legitimately before the Senate, or whether the Constitutional
violation that is married to its introduction voids everything
that has happened since.  If we cannot get a satisfactory answer
here, we will try for one in the courts.

This problem is addressed in our paper VI.

7.  We strongly object to the wide-open powers to abuse the
aboriginal peoples authorized by C-68's Firearms Act.  There is
no reason to discriminate against them, and doing so may well be
a violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

This problem is addressed in our paper VII.

8.  We strongly object to giving this and any future Minister of
Justice carte blanche to "prohibit" any firearm, bow, arrow,
cartridge, baseball bat, knife, or sport accessory that he
chooses to, by Order in Council.

We strongly object to the C-68 provisions that prevent any such
Order in Council from being scrutinized by Parliament.

We strongly object to the C-68 provisions that prevent any such
Order in Council from being overturned by any court of law.

These problems are addressed in our papers VIIIA, VIIIB and
VIIIC.

9.  We point out that even the crime provisions of C-68 are badly
flawed.  Giving mandatory extra penalties for possession of a
firearm during a crime has been proved useless by many years of
experience with section 85 of the Criminal Code.  The criminal
justice system refuses to use section 85, and will refuse to use
the new sections for the same reasons.

An extra penalty for using a harmless unloaded firearm without
violence in a robbery makes no sense when no mating penalty is
imposed on an armed robber who actually uses a different and
genuinely deadly weapon to inflict injuries or death.  The clear
injustice of such a situation will prevent use of the sections.

Scientific research indicates that the number of injuries and
deaths will rise 500 per cent where this legislation is
successful in turning robbers away from guns and to other
weapons.  Fortunately, it is highly unlikely to be successful.

Genuine scientific research also indicates that the research data
offered to you by the Minister and his supporters is invalid.

These problems are addressed in our papers IXA and IXB, with Dr.
E A Suter's paper and Dr. Centerwall's paper.

10.  We strongly object to C-68's "grandfathering" provisions,
which are confused, confusing, and apparently violate the
discrimination provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.  Firearms are to be divided into unrestricted,
"restricted," and 5 different and exclusive kinds of "prohibited
firearms."  "Prohibited devices" are parts of firearms, or not. 
The classifications overlap, and it is frequently impossible to
tell which firearm or part of a firearm falls into which
classification--even if you are a world-class expert.

C-68's "grandfathering" provisions are being widely taken as
proof of Parliament's lack of good faith.  It is impossible to
understand how a particular kind of firearm can simultaneously be
so dangerous to the public good that it must be "prohibited" and
so little danger that it may be retained by its owner until he or
she dies, and then willed to the heirs. 

These problems are addressed in our paper X.

11.  We strongly object to the characterization of nearly every
form of firearm transfer as criminal "Trafficking Offences" in
C-68's Criminal Code sections 99, 100, and 101.  The terms are so
broad that simply saying to one's daughter, "Barbara, I'm going
to buy you that .22 biathlon rifle you want on your birthday" is
enough to make one guilty of a criminal offence and liable to
imprisonment for up to 5 or 10 years. [CC s. 99(1)(b)]

This problem is addressed in our paper XI.

12.  We strongly object to giving the Minister of Justice
authority to issue more Orders in Council.  He and his officials
have already been castigated by the Auditor General for shoddy
research, for false claims for the effectiveness of their earlier
laws and Orders in Council, and for acting without any basis
beyond personal whim.

We strongly object to the issuance of Orders in Council on the
basis of information like that detailed in our paper XVI.

When the Kim Campbell batch of Orders in Council was issued, we
could not understand the rationale behind the choices of firearms
to be "prohibited."  One person said, "It looks like they went
through the pictures in the Gun Digest and ticked off everything
that looks nasty."  When we applied for their research data
through the Access to Information Act, we got nothing of
substance--but they did send us photocopies of Gun Digest pages
with certain firearms marked with X's.

In our view, creating criminal offences by Order in Council
brings the law into disrepute.  That practice makes it impossible
for any Canadian to know what the law is, as it changes law
unpredictably, without notice, and with remarkable speed.  The
authors of such Orders in Council have already demonstrated a
fine disregard for law, technicalities, and clarity of language. 

This problem is addressed in our papers XVI and XII with AG
excerpt.

13.  We approve the May, 1995 decision of the Australian Police
Ministers to abandon registration and concentrate on setting
standards for a uniform system of licensing.

Under both the Canadian and Australian constitutions, such a
licensing system should be similar to an automobile driver's
license: Issued provincially, but meeting uniform national
standards so it can be valid nationally, by agreement.

This area is addressed in our papers XIIIA and XIIIB.

14.  We draw your attention to the fact that firearms
registration is intended to uniquely identify every firearm in
Canada, in a manner adequate for use as evidence in a court of
law.  The current registration system is riddled with errors, and
cannot identify firearms adequately--because it is based on
defective principles.  

One of the oldest rules of computer operation is, "Garbage in,
garbage out."  If the identifying information put into the
computer does not uniquely identify each firearm, it is then
impossible to get unique identifications out of the computer.

There is no known method of uniquely identifying firearms. 
Firearm identification is a subject that firearm collectors spend
their entire lives trying to unravel.  The systems that have been
tried have usually failed.  This is not a simple problem.  We
expect to have evidence from the existing system ruled
inadmissible in the courts for high error levels in 1995.

The Minister has frequently indicated that all of the problems of
registration can be solved by purchasing new, expensive computer
equipment and programs.  That is not true, and no one who
understands firearms identification problems can honestly make
such a claim.  If anyone does, we suggest you ask him to explain
the fact that there are 350,000 duplicated firearm serial numbers
in the FRAS database of 1,200,000 records.

It is not possible that those 350,000 firearms actually exist. 
Most of them are "masked errors" in the FRAS database.  

These problems are addressed in our papers XIVA, XIVB and XIVC.

15.  We strongly object to the inadequate legal and scientific
research carried on by the Minister of Justice's office.  We
present examples of their errors, omissions, and failures to
understand the Constitution, the law, and the Canadian people.

This problem is addressed in virtually all of our papers.

16.  We strongly object to the inadequate technical knowledge of
the authors of C-68 and the existing Orders in Council.  Their
inadequate knowledge results in vague and confusing legislation
which brings the law into disrepute, clogs the courts, and faces
innocent Canadians with a bitter choice: Lose your property
or pay a lawyer more than the property is worth to keep it.

This problem is addressed in our paper XVI.

17.  We strongly object to criminal law that makes Canadians
liable to imprisonment simply because they are unable to
understand the garbled "definitions" issued by the office of the
Minister of Justice.  The problem of vagueness--apparently due to
incompetence--is also well illustrated in the 11 Orders in
Council that we have had struck down by the courts.   

This problem is addressed in our papers XVIIA and XVIIB.

18.  We strongly object to all of C-68's inclusions of retroactive
provisions, including all of those dating back to 14 Feb 95.  It
is wrong in principle to backdate a criminal law.

This problem is addressed in our paper XVIII.

19.  We strongly object to the use of public funds to publish and
distribute false information to the public.

This problem is addressed in our paper XIX.

20.  You probably believe that firearms control will continue to
be operated by the police.  We believe that police involvement in
firearms control will soon be ruled illegal by the courts. 

This problem is addressed in our paper XX.

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [2/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 15:10:41 GMT
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						NFA PAPER IA

LEGAL PROBLEMS IN BILL C-68

The legal flaws in C-68 are probably less important than the
constitutional flaws.  The constitutional flaws can, and probably
will, result in the entire Firearms Act being struck down as ultra
vires (outside the jurisdiction) of the federal Parliament, if
C-68 is actually passed and proclaimed.

However, even if that does not happen, the flaws in the
legislation are so numerous and varied that it is impractical to
attempt to improve it significantly through amendments.  It is
impossible to render it either practical or cost-effective by any
means short of radical change its basic concepts.

The scope and degree of required change would be beyond the
power to alter by amendment, which cannot be used to make
fundamental changes in the original concept.

Licensing is practically useless unless applicants are carefully
screened, an expensive and often futile exercise.  Adequate
screening is costly, but cannot be made cost-effective;
inadequate screening is a waste of time, manpower and money.

Registration of firearms is practically useless unless the
firearm can be uniquely identified.  Unique identification of a
firearm is impossible by any known method, and anything less
opens a door to easy refutation of any "solid" identification.

Registration of firearms is pointless unless the data put into
the system is accurate and can be kept up to date.  It has
been proven that it is impossible to meet those standards.  Some
degradation arises from poor data put into the system.  Some
arises from failure to notice when a person with registered
firearms moves, emigrates or dies.  Some arises from alterations
to firearms which at a later date result in misidentifications
and registration record errors when they are next transferred.

An error in reading, identifying, or transcribing a firearm
serial number, for example, fouls the principles of registration.
The firearm is "lost in the system" and unidentifiable. 

It is not possible, within a criminal law statute, to require
annual renewal of registrations.  A firearm which has not been
seen by the system for several years may well be quite different
when seen again, or be the same but be identified differently. 
In sum, it is impossible to track firearms accurately through
provisions established within a criminal law statute.

FIREARMS ACT FLAWS (Using Firearms Act section numbers):

2(1) "business": is defined as "a person who carries on a
business."  Much confusion is caused by using the word being
defined as part of the definition.  The word "business" is often
used to (apparently!) mean a business (in the ordinary sense of
that word; a corporation) in other parts of C-68.  Oddly, it
includes a "business" that purchases crossbows, but not
one that sells them.

2(1) "chief firearms officer:" and "firearms officer:" are
defined in such a way that their status in law is unclear. Each
is either an independent quasi-judicial statutory decision-maker
or a simple administrator.  Throughout the Act, each is sometimes
one, and sometimes the other--a very confusing business.  This
lack of clarity was characteristic of earlier firearms control
legislation, and was partly responsible for the comments of Mr.
Justice Gibbs of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, in Hurley 
v. Dawson (1986):

This is a difficult case.  Not the least of the
difficulties is due to the tortuous language of the gun control
provisions of the Criminal Code.  In Regina versus Neil, Judge
Gordon was moved, with some justification, to refer to those
provisions as "one of the most horrifying examples of bad
draftsmanship that I have had the misfortune to consider", as "so
convoluted that even those responsible for enforcing the
provisions are apparently unable to understand them", and as "a
challenge to one"s sense of logic."

It is very disappointing that no effort has been made to improve
the existing legislation, and that C-68 only attempts to replace
the existing control system with a worse one.

2(1) "provincial minister": is defined as a member of the
executive council of the provincial Legislature.  In the Act, he
is frequently treated as if he were a federal employee.  In
existing law, that sort of treatment has caused severe problems
in that he is not compellable by the courts, as a federal employee
would be.  The tasks delegated to him by the Act may not be
done, or may be done in some fashion not foreseen or intended by
the federal Parliament, and can bring the law into disrepute.

2(1) "regulations": are defined in such a fashion that the
proclamation of the Firearms Act automatically voids all
existing firearms control regulations and Orders in Council.

Because most of the C-68 firearms control system lies in
regulations and not in this Act, it would seem appropriate that
the new regulations (which obviously must be in place immediately
upon proclamation of C-68), an integral part of the Firearms Act,
should be examined by the Senate before its passage.

2(2): This defines terms used in the Firearms Act as having
"the meanings assigned to them by section 2 or 84 of the
Criminal Code."  In several areas, that has unfortunate
results.

For example, the word "firearm" is defined in Criminal Code
section [CC s.] 2, by Bill C-68 section 138, in one rather broad
way.  Then it is re-defined by the provisions of CC s. 84(3),
more narrowly, and quite differently--but only for the purposes
of certain sections of the Criminal Code plus the Firearms Act. 
The result of such a defective dual definition is litigation.

C-68's CC s. 2 definition of "firearm" uses the words
"weapon" and "firearm."  Conversely, s. 2's definition of
"weapon" uses the word "firearm."  The use of the word
being defined as part of the definition has ludicrous effects.

It is not possible to learn what either "firearm" or "weapon"
mean, in law,  without first going to the s. 2 definitions
of "firearm" and "weapon."   Because they define the two
terms by referring either to themselves or to each other, one
becomes trapped in an infinite loop with no possible exit.  

5(1): A person is not eligible to hold a license if it is
desirable, in the interests of the safety of that or any other
person, that the person not possess [a variety of items].  The
person or body entitled to determine whether or not "it is
desirable" is unspecified in s. 1, leading to confusion in the
following subsections.

The following subsections mention "a chief firearms officer"
and "a provincial court judge," but there is nothing to vest
them with exclusive jurisdiction to render opinion judgements on
the eligibility of applicants.  Litigation dealing with
situations where others infer that they have that authority are
certain.  Such litigation will waste time and money that could be
saved by the clarification that should be present already.

5. (2)(a) This authorizes the denial of eligibility where the
person "has been convicted or discharged."  It seems odd
that the subsection authorizes a firearms control official to
impose a punishment on a person who has been "discharged."

7(1) and (2): These impose a requirement that the applicant
successfully complete a training course given by a private
instructor, and pass a test administered by that private
instructor.  It is doubtful that such a requirement is lawful
under criminal law.  That should be determined before passage
to prevent waste of time and money in litigation.

7(4): This voids the requirements set by s. (1) and (2), at
the whim of a Chief Firearms Officer.  Is that discriminatory?

9: This uses the word "business" in a way that implies that a
corporation is meant, contrary to the definition of that word in
s. 2(1).  The section is meaningless without the regulations
which, under s. 2(2), cannot exist until C-68 is proclaimed.

11(2): This appears meaningful, until one tries to run down
the ramifications--at which point, it dissolves into fog.  The
section cannot be understood without the regulations, which,
under s. 2(2), cannot exist until C-68 is proclaimed.

11(3): A carrier is eligible to hold a license...  Going back
to the FA s. 2 definitions, we find that "carrier" means a
person who carries on a transportation business."  Because
a "business" is also defined in s. 2 as a person, this
also dissolves into fog.

Throughout C-68, it is unclear whether the word "carrier" means a
person who owns or operates a transportation corporation, a
transportation corporation, or a person who works for a
transportation corporation.  From context, all those meanings
appear to be intended at various points.

*****************************************************************

12: and related subjects are covered in "C-68'S BOTCHED
LICENSE AND REGISTRATION SYSTEM" which analyzes that system.  

*****************************************************************

16.  This raises the question of discrimination.  As in many
other areas, the legislation provides one law for one group of
people, and another for another group.  There seems to be no
rhyme or reason to the discrimination; it is not based on any
characteristic of the people involved, but on irrelevant
variables outside the control of any intelligence.

Where a particular "licensing" document is offered in the law,
the Morgentaler decision says it must be available.  It
cannot be "illusory, or so difficult to obtain as to be
practically illusory"--or the Supreme Court of Canada will strike
that law down.

Bill C-68 contains many provisions which are vulnerable to
Morgentaler attacks.  This is one of them.  Wasteful and
costly litigation is guaranteed.

17.1 [now renumbered as 18]: This sets up a differing
standard for "prohibited firearms" in the FA s. 12(6) kind,
making them approximately equivalent to "restricted firearms"
in the way they and their owners are treated.  The other four
kinds of "prohibited firearms" are segregated into kinds
handled more stringently, just as they were segregated into
kinds handled less stringently by the procedures described
in FA s. 12 and related provisions.

21 [22] and 32 [33]: These each establish criteria for
lending a firearm.  The two are quite different.  Having two sets
of contradictory criteria causes confusion and litigation.

23 [24]: This subdivides prohibited firearms into kinds which
are treated differently by the legislation, establishing further
confusion by making wasteful and costly litigation inevitable.

27 [28]: This vests the cfo with the power to authorize a
transfer of a restricted firearm or a FA s. 12(6) firearm
"only if [he] is satisfied" that the transferee needs the
firearm for the specified purpose.

There are no limits on the cfo (here, a statutory decision-maker)
to limit his discretion in any way.  His conception of "need" may
be quite different from that of the applicant, or from that of
the federal Parliament, but he is vested with unlimited
opinion-judgement authority to refuse authorization, up to and
including all transfers.   The courts have repeatedly struck down
this type of unlimited discretion legislation.  This type of
legislation guarantees extensive and expensive litigation.

28 [29]: This vests "the provincial minister" with powers
as if he were a federal employee.  The federal Parliament has no
authority to compel him to act, and, if he refuses to act, no
court can compel him to act as if he were an agent of the federal
Parliament.  In those circumstances, no appeal to the courts
against a refusal to issue, revocation, or refusal to renew is
possible.  His powers are absolute.  That will cause problems.

30 [31]: A major failing at this point is that the Registrar
is not required to notify the transferor that his registration
certificate has been revoked.  One of the commonest registration
errors in Ottawa is failing to delete the old registration.  If
the transferor is not notified, there is no chance that this
error will be caught.  It is probable that 10 to 20 per cent of
the registration certificates in the Ottawa files are merely
meaningless trash from this cause alone.

It is not possible to correct this problem by buying more
advanced computers.  The problem is inherent in the nature of
firearms, and in the difficulties that arise from trying to
uniquely identify a firearm.  No solution to the "unique
identification" problem is in sight, and C-68 is guaranteed to
make the registration records even less useful.

At present, the records are a shambles.  Approximately 30 per
cent of all registration certificate records on file in Ottawa
are meaningless trash.  No one knows which records are trash, and
which have some degree of agreement with reality.  As New
Zealand's experience has proved, there is no cost-effective way
to find out which records are trash.

If there is any new method to prevent registration records from
rapidly becoming trash, it is not described in Bill C-68.   

31 [32]: A person may transfer a firearm by mail only if

(a) the verifications, notifications, issuances and
authorizations referred to in sections 20 to 27, 29,30, 39 to 42
and 45 to 51 take place within a resonable period before the
transfer in the prescribed manner;

(b) the firearm is delivered by a person designated by a chief
firearms officer and the person ensures that the transferee
holds a license authorizing the transferee to acquire that kind
of firearm; and

(c) the prescribed conditions are complied with.

It is quite impossible to say what all that means, but it is an
excellent example of bureaucracy running amok.  It is a good
example of an old and well-known bureaucrat ploy: Offer vague
legislation for passage, primarily to gull MPs and Senators into
extending the power, funding and staff of the bureaucracy.

33 [34]: See 21 [22].

34 [35], 35 [36], and 37 [38]: An American may import a
firearm if he 

35. (a)(ii)declares the firearm to a customs
officer in the prescribed manner and, in the case of a
declaration in writing, completes the prescribed form
containing the prescribed information, and...

(b) a customs officer confirms in the prescribed manner the
declaration referred to in subparagraph (a)(ii) and the
authorization to transport referred to in subparagraph (a)(iii)
[emphasis added--NFA]."

Those conditions are so disliked by Americans that they have
already caused a major slump in Canada's outfitting and tourist
industries.  They are so much easier than those imposed on
Canadians that they are turning affected Canadians (25 to 40 per
cent of all Canadian households) against the political parties
responsible for imposing them.  As the underlining indicates,
much of this is unknown, and must wait until Bill C-68 is
passed for exposure of the Orders in Council.  

The word "prescribed" is used 8 times in the 3 sections.

43 [44]: This section imposes a requirement for the business
to register firearms that it has made for export.  The
registration is cancelled almost as soon as it is created, so the
apparent purpose is to hire more registration staff.

46 [47]: This section, at 46(1) and (2) [47(1) and (2)]
apparently vests a customs officer with unlimited power to block
importations, but sets no criteria as to why he should or should
not do that.  His discretion is apparently unlimited.

The general impression arising from sections 20 [21] through 51
[53] is that the author is merely trying to increase the number
of civil servants in the firearms control offices.  It is highly
unlikely that anything in those sections will have any desirable
effect, and it is guaranteed that they cannot be cost-effective.

52. (1) [54. (1)]  A license, registration certificate or
authorization may be issued only on application made in the
prescribed form containing the prescribed information
and accompanied by payment of the prescribed fees.

In the case of an authorization to transfer, as set forth in FA
s. 22 [23], the information, form and fees are all unspecified. 
That makes it rather difficult to comply with FA s. 52(1)
[54(1)] until the Minister gets around to issuing Orders in
Council specifying all these requirements.

After reading this paper and our companion paper, "C-68'S BOTCHED
LICENSE AND REGISTRATION SYSTEM," one might well question whether
the quality, clarity and cost-effectiveness of all the required
Orders in Council will be adequate.  The state of Bill C-68
certainly does not inspire confidence in their abilities.

53. (2) [55. (2)]  Without restricting the scope of the
inquiries that may be made with respect to an application for a
license, a chief firearms officer may conduct an investigation of
the applicant, which may consist of interviews with neighbors,
community workers, social workers, individuals who work or live
with the applicant, spouse, former spouse, dependents, or
whomever in the opinion of the chief firearms officer may provide
information pertaining to whether the applicant is eligible under
section 5 to hold a license.

It is rather difficult to see how all that is going to be
financed by the license fees collected from the applicants plus
the minimal funding allotted by the federal Minister of Justice.

As was noted in the foreword to this paper, issuance without
screening is practically useless.  FA s. 53(2) [55(2)] describes
adequate screening.  It is obvious that screening of that nature
will cost hundreds of dollars per application.

At that cost level, cost-effectiveness is impossible.
 
At lower cost, the screening itself is impossible.  Catch 22!

The only way that FA s. 53(2) [55(2)] makes any sense is to
speculate that the price an applicant must pay for his licensing
application will move rapidly upward to several hundred dollars.

That speculation is supported by the fact that unlimited upward
movement of licensing fees is authorized by FA s. 110(v)
[117(w)], and that such upward movements are subject to neither
court challenges nor Parliamentary scrutiny.  In fact, FA s.
112(5) [112(9)] specifically exempts such upward movements of
licensing fees from Parliamentary scrutiny. 

Consideration of those facts seems to validate fears that the
government's intent is to authorize the ending of private
ownership of firearms in Canada.  If that is not the intent, then
why does C-68 say what it does, and not say what it does not?  

54(3) [56(3)]: A business other than a carrier requires a
separate license for each place where the business is carried
on.  That looks straightforward, until you realize that
"business" is defined (in FA s. 2) as "a person who carries on
a business."  How is a person "carried on"?  

In studying Bill C-68, it becomes clear that the authors had
neither the skills required to construct a well-designed
administrative system nor an adequate command of English.

55 [57]: This section says a cfo "may issue" authorizations,
but it is unclear.  Does the word "may" vest him with the power
to refuse to issue, or not?  Under what circumstances, if any,
may he refuse to issue?  Under what circumstances, if any, must
he issue?  This is not a procedure.  It is a mess, and it is
guaranteed to lead to wasteful and costly litigation.

57 [59]: This says that "an individual who holds an
authorization to carry or...transport need not be the person to
whom the registration certificate...was issued."  The procedures
whereby this odd state of affairs might arise is unclear, and
varies among the 7 kinds of firearm established by C-68.   Unless
the matter is made much clearer, wasteful litigation is guaranteed.

58 [60]: This says that the Registrar "is responsible for
issuing...firearms identification numbers."  That is
interesting, but what does it mean?  The concept of "firearms
identification numbers" was apparently present in draft
legislation up to Nov 94, but was then apparently scrapped.  It
is not possible to assign a firearms identification number that
can be attached to a firearm, due to the nature of firearms.

Retaining legibility for up to a century while coping with normal
wear and tear, temperature shifts, solvents, and the necessity of
permanently mating it to a variety of "frame or receiver" coated
or uncoated materials including teflon, plastic, aluminum, steel,
chromium, etc., rendered the original concept impossible.  Is
this a missed leftover, a different proposal, or what?

59 [61] and 60 [62]: These tell us a good deal about the form
of licenses, authorizations, etc., but nothing about the
administrative procedures regarding them.  Who issues?  Under
what limitations?  Where do "may" and "shall" apply?  What
criteria must a statutory decision-maker consider while forming
his quasi-judicial opinion judgement, and which must he ignore?

This entire area is vulnerable to legal attack on the grounds
that it is "void for vagueness."

The existing legislation is so vague that we find this in the
Department of Justice publication, "FIREARMS REGISTRATION REVIEW
TR 1994-9e":

"Practices with regard to restricted weapons transactions
apparently vary so widely across Canada that it is impossible to
describe a typical registration process... Even within a single
province, wide differences were reported; according to the study,
Halton (Ontario) officers spent only one minute per application,
awhile officers in the neighboring force in Guelph spent 30
minutes."

It is a pity that no effort was made to correct that situation in
the drafting of Bill C-68.  It is still hopelessly vague. 

63(2) and (3) [65(2) and (3)]: These subsections are a good
example of administrative idiocy.  Subsection (2) says that the
authorization to transport "takes the form of a condition on a
license" which is valid for 5 years.

Subsection (3) then forces the authorization to expire 2 to 4
years before the license does.

Did the authors ever read what they wrote? 

64 [66]:  This is another example of administrative idiocy. 
It provides that the registration of a firearm expires at the
moment "the holder of the registration certificate ceases to
be the owner."  "Own" and "possess" are different.

The transfer procedure, at FA s. 30(1)(b) [31(1)(b)], directs the
Registrar to revoke the transferor's registration
certificate--which is redundant if it has automatically expired.

Whether the certificate has "expired" or has been "revoked," the
certificate apparently remains in the hands of the transferor, in
pristine condition and with no indication that it is not valid.

The "transfer" is authorized by the authorization issued by the
cfo, (FA s. 27 [28]).  It is not specified whether this is
authorization for a transfer of registration, of possession, or
both.  It is not specified whether the "authorization" is
written, oral, recorded or unrecorded.

The transfer of registration is done by the Registrar (FA s. 30
[31]).  The transfer of ownership may take place either at
"authorization" time, or at some other time.  The paperwork and
transfer of possession may well be delayed.

Under the terms of FA s. 64 [66], the moment of sale is the
moment of expiry of the registration certificate.  If the firearm
is not physically transferred at that same moment, then, under CC
s. 91 or 92, the seller becomes liable to prosecution at that
moment.

If the firearm is physically transferred at that moment, then,
because his application to register is still being processed,
the buyer becomes liable prosecution at that moment.

Is this a Machiavellian trap, or only evidence of incompetence?

65 [67]: This section is a booby trap.  "A chief firearms
officer may renew..."  Does that mean that he is vested
with the power to refuse to renew, or does it designate him as
the person who issues the paper?  Paragraph (2) tells us that,
while renewing a license, the cfo "shall decide."  That
apparently means that he is vested with the power to refuse to
renew.  He is also vested with a masked power to revoke.

He is, at FA s. 65(3) [67(3)], vested with the power to "inform
the Registrar" when, in his unlimited opinion, the applicant is
not using his firearms "for the purpose" originally intended. 
How he should make that decision, what limits of discretion
apply, and what investigation should be carried out before coming
to that conclusion are entirely missing.

That notification to the Registrar is apparently intended to
trigger FA s. 69(1)(b) [71(1)(b)] , which says, in part:

69 [71]. (1) The Registrar...

(b) shall revoke a registration certificate for a
firearm held by an individual where the Registrar is
informed by a chief firearms officer under section 65
that the firearm is not being used for [the originally intended
purpose] [emphasis added--NFA].

The effect of that, of course, is to vest the cfo with an
indirect but absolute power to revoke any registration for any FA
s. 12(6) firearm--some 58 per cent of all currently registered
firearms.  There are no criteria to limit his discretion.

The FA s. 72 [74] appeal procedures make no provision for any
appeal against a refusal to renew.  They provide a weak and
probably useless route of appeal, featuring reverse onus, against
a refusal to issue or a revocation.  There is no appeal procedure
whatever against a refusal to renew.

The reverse onus is a good example of the laziness of the
bureaucracy that wrote Bill C-68.  The bureaucrat who has just
refused a citizen's application need not justify himself in any
way.  It is up to the citizen to prove that the bureaucrat's
decision was unjustified.

Because there are no criteria that the bureaucrat was required,
by law, to consider, the burden on the citizen is very heavy. 

That lack of an appeal procedure for refused renewals is
particularly significant when FA s. 121(2)(b) [127(2)(b)] is
considered--there, we find the flat statement that wall current
registration certificates expire on "the earlier of...December
31, 2002, or such other date as is prescribed."

No renewal procedure for those certificates is specified anywhere
in Bill C-68, nor is there any appeal procedure that an applicant
could use where his application for renewal is refused.

Apparently, on "31 December, 2002, or such other date as is
prescribed," every currently-registered firearm becomes
unregistered.  According to CC s. 91 and 92, that loss of
registration automatically criminalizes the owner, making him
liable to up to 5 years imprisonment, or more if he knows what
has happened.  All such firearms become illegal and subject to
confiscation when the registrations expire.

If that is not the intent, why does Bill C-68 say what it
does--and not say what it does not?  

The above sequences are particularly interesting in the light of
FA s. 65(5) [67(5)], in which the cfo is required to send, to the
person who has had his renewal refused, data on an appeal
procedure that he cannot use.  While FA s. 72 [73] appears to
give the provincial judge jurisdiction to review the decision of
the cfo, the remedies he may apply under FA s. 74 [76] only allow
him to confirm the cfo's decision.  He cannot reverse it,
because only FA s. 74(a) [76(a)] applies, not (b) or (c).

The appeal then may be continued by the applicant after the
forced ruling under FA s. 74(a) [76(a)] is made.  FA s. 75(1)
[77(1)] allows the applicant to appeal upward, but it does him no
good.  FA s. 77(1) [79(1)] exhibits the same defect as FA s. 74
(a) [76(a)]; no power to order renewal is vested in the judge.

That reading is confirmed by FA s. 69(1)(b) [71(1)(b)], below,
which vests indirect but absolute power to revoke in the cfo.

66 [68]: This says that a cfo "may refuse to issue...for
any good and sufficient reason."  That is hopelessly vague, and
will lead to much costly and wasteful litigation.

67 [69]: This says that the Registrar "may refuse to
issue...for any good and sufficient reason."  That is hopelessly
vague, and will lead to much costly and wasteful litigation.

68 [70]: Paragraph (1) says that a cfo "may revoke...for
any good and sufficient reason."  That is hopelessly vague, and
will lead to much costly and wasteful litigation.  

This provision was apparently the basis of the provincial Liberal
proposals to create "gun-free zones" in Ontario that were made
during the provincial election.  That has raised the question as
to whether or not FA s. 68 [70] can be used to eliminate the
private ownership of firearms in a province for the "good and
sufficient" reason that the provincial government wants it
eliminated.  Wasteful and costly litigation is likely.

Paragraph (2) again says that the Registrar "may revoke...for
any good and sufficient reason."  That is hopelessly vague, and
will lead to much costly and wasteful litigation.

69(a) [71(a)]: says that the Registrar "may revoke...for
any good and sufficient reason."  That is hopelessly vague, and
will lead to much wasteful litigation.

69(1)(b) [71(1)(b)]: says that the Registrar "shall revoke
a registration certificate" if instructed to do so by a cfo. 
The omission here of any reference to an appeal procedure is
confirmation that the absence of an appeal procedure, as shown in
FA s. 65 [67] above.  That will lead to much wasteful litigation.

69(2) [71(2)]: This muddled wording has already caused a
number of court cases resulting from the Department of Justice
apparently being unable to understand its own murky provisions. 

This wording cannot apply to a firearm registered before the
requirement to describe the "alteration" on the application to
register; yet the Department has issued instructions to the
police indicating that all registered firearms of this kind
had their registrations revoked in 1992 by the existing and
similar CC s. 109(4.2), which is patently false.

Litigation is already raging in this area, and the government is
apparently liable for costs, damages and compensation.

It would be desirable if such provisions could be worded clearly
enough so that the police could understand them. 

It would be desirable if the provisions were complete enough to
understand the law without having to gain access to every Order
in Council issued after the legislation came into force.

70(3) [72](3)]: This exemption is far too broad and too
easily open to abuse.

71 [73]: This section will create a powerful and expensive
new bureaucracy just to handle this one provision.  It is
guaranteed not to be cost-effective.

72 [73]: See FA s. 65 [67] above. 

73(3) [75(3)]: If there were clear criteria imposed upon the
firearms control official to limit his opinion judgement
decisions, it might be barely acceptable.  Where there are no
such criteria, as here, a firearms control official can stand
mute and win the case because his reasons are unknown.  The
reverse onus condition is unacceptable. 

74 [76]: The power of a provincial court judge to "direct
the provincial minister to" do anything because he is
required to do it under a federal statute is questionable.  This
appeal procedure may well be unworkable.  It is attempting to
compel an elected provincial Legislature cabinet member to serve
as a statutory decision-maker--a creature of statute--created by
a federal law. 

*****************************************************************

At this point, we abandoned the effort to deal with every problem
in the Bill.  From this point forward, the number and severity of
the problems does not diminish, but we leave it to the reader to
detect the minor problems and deal with only the major problems.
What follows is a more general commentary on specific issues.

*****************************************************************

FA s. 81 [83] and 83 [85] create requirements for a system of
compilation and maintenance of many millions of records.  As a
device to increase the size, budget and power of Ottawa's
bureaucracies, it is superb.  As a cost-effective method of doing
something worthwhile, it is useless.

It is noteworthy that while FA s. 81(1)(f) [83(1)(f)] opens the
door for unlimited expansion of this expensive new
bureaucracy, FA s. 82 [84] then orders the bureaucrats to keep
and maintain all records not specifically ordered to be
destroyed.  The cfo and Registrar maintain duplicated records.

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [3/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 15:18:14 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan
Lines: 408
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						NFA PAPER IB

C-68'S BOTCHED LICENSE AND REGISTRATION SYSTEM

Creating a licensing and registration administrative system is a
complex and difficult task.  The system should be so well
designed that every step of every procedure is clear, every
document is designed to display the required information, the
authority vested in each statutory decision-maker is clear, and
limits imposed on opinion judgement decision-making are clear.  

The following analysis of the administrative structure,
procedures and documentation offered in Bill C-68 indicates that
the authors failed to create a practical and workable system
within the proposed legislation.  

There is no reason to believe that the same people will be able
to do any better when writing the "regulation" set that C-68
requires before it can become operational.  Certainly, the
"regulations" issued so far, under the current Act and written by
the same people, are very seriously beset with vagueness,
contradictions, and major legal problems.  Eleven of their Orders
in Council have now been found invalid in the Alberta Court of
Queen's Bench, based on a 1983 Court of Appeal precedent. 

In what follows, C-68 Firearms Act section numbers are used.

THE BOTCHED TRANSFER PROCEDURE:

C-68's Firearms Act section [FA s.] 12 identifies certain
"grandfathered" people and firearms.  FA s. 113 [now renumbered
as 120] "grandfathers" the "grandfathered" people's Firearms
Acquisition Certificates (FACs) as licenses "to acquire and
possess" more "grandfathered" firearms, of kinds that they
already possess.  C-68 establishes 7 kinds of firearm that
can be legally bought, sold and traded by all Canadians who hold
the relevant "license":

KIND OF FIREARM		NUMBER IN CANADA  VALUE
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Unrestricted long arms	5 to 30 million	   $500 to 3000 million
Restricted handguns	600,000 plus *	   Over $120 million
FA s. 12(2) prohibited	A few thousand	   About $2 million      
FA s. 12(3) prohibited	A few thousand	   About $10 million
FA s. 12(4) prohibited	A few thousand	   About $1 million
FA s. 12(5) prohibited	A few thousand	   About $1 million
FA s. 12(6) prohibited	About 700,000	   Over $140 million

* There are large numbers of unregistered restricted handguns
in Canada, some illegal, and some valuable, legal antiques.  This
600,000 restricted handguns figure covers only registered ones. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------

The automatic deeming of an existing FAC to be one of many
types of "license" creates an administrative nightmare.  The
deemed FAC "license" carries no annotation on it as to the
kinds of firearms owned or possessed by its holder, and
therefore it cannot tell anyone which type of license it is. 

Let us track one simple transfer of one firearm through the
procedure outlined in C-68, and examine the problems that arise: 

1.  Buyer, who owns a prohibited firearm of the common
kind described by FA s. 12(6), wishes to buy another
of the same kind from Seller.

The FA s. 12(6) class is quite large, comprising 58 per cent of
all registered firearms in Canada, or nearly 700,000 firearms
worth at least $140 million.

2.  FA s. 22(a) [23(a)] says that Seller may only sell to Buyer
after seeing Buyer's license and determining, from it, that it is
"a license authorizing the transferee to acquire and possess that
kind of firearm."

FA s. 113 [120] deems today's "firearms acquisition certificate"
(FAC) to be a "license."  It then goes much further; it
reclassifies today's FAC as "a license to acquire and
possess" firearms of C-68's 7 different kinds (new).

An FAC may therefore become a type of license covering only
unrestricted plus  restricted firearms, or only FA s. 12(2), (3),
(4), (5) or (6) firearms--or any possible combination of the
7 kinds of firearm established by C-68.  C-68 creates many
different types of license.

The problem that arises is that the FAC does not display the
information about which type it is, i.e., which kinds
of licenses it is relevant to.  

Neither the legal requirement nor the designation of firearms
into the C-68 pattern of 7 kinds existed when those FACs
were issued.  Therefore, when Seller examines Buyer's FAC
"license," the FA s. 22(a) [23(a)] information he is required to
gain is not on the license (FAC). That is a serious flaw, because
it wrecks the basic procedure and confuses everyone.

It should be noted that this "deemed" problem will only go away
when the last of today's very common FACs expires--five years
after the proclamation of the Firearms Act.

Seller must therefore get the missing information elsewhere. 
The only visible solution is the Seller must go to the home of
Buyer, and physically compare a firearm of the relevant kind
owned by Buyer to Buyer's registration certificate for that
firearm.

There appears to be no other way for Seller to learn that Buyer
"is authorized to acquire and possess that kind of
firearm," as Seller is required to do by FA s. 22(a) [23(a)]. 

3.  FA s. 22(b)(ii) [23(b)(ii)] then says says Seller
cannot transfer the firearm until he "obtains the
authorization of the chief firearms officer [cfo] for the
transfer."  There is no specified procedure for him to
obtain it, or for the cfo to issue it to him.

The form of that authorization is unspecified.  Is it
written or verbal?  A matter of record or not?  The procedure to
"obtain" it is not specified.  Is the request for it written or
verbal?  A matter of record or not?  These matters need
clarifying, or wasteful and costly litigation will result.

7.  FA s. 26 [27] says that "on being informed of a proposed
transfer" the cfo "shall (a) verify":

(i) that the transferee has a license,

To determine that, the cfo must examine the file of FACs issued
over the past 5 years.  If he finds that no FAC has been issued
to Buyer, according to provincial records, he must seek access to
the records of all other provinces and the territories covering
the past 5 years before concluding that Buyer has no "license."

(ii) that the transferee is still eligible to hold that license,

For that data, the cfo must examine Buyer's medical history
regarding mental illness, use CPIC to examine his criminal
record, and examine any other record of violent behavior
available, to get the information required by FA s. 5(2).

(iii) that the license is valid for that kind of firearm,
and

The cfo cannot get that information from the FAC files, because
they do not include records of what kinds of firearms Buyer
owns, and therefore cannot specify what type of "license"
his FAC has become.  Therefore, the cfo will have to request a
printout of all firearms registered to Buyer from Ottawa, then
attempt to determine which kind of firearm each is.

Unfortunately, those firearms registration records do not record
what kind each firearm is.  C-68's reclassification into 7 kinds
has made the current registration records obsolete. 

Making such a determination may well be beyond the capabilities
of the cfo: The registration records do not include data on the
multiple barrels supplied with or added to some firearms.  A
second barrel will often put the firearm into 2 different
kind categories.

Many of the registrations contain errors which have long been
ignored as inconsequential, but become important as C-68's new
7-kinds separation becomes important. 

For example, Dan Wesson revolvers have easily interchangeable
barrels, and many of them were sold with several barrels as part
of the same firearm.  If a revolver came with a 2" (50mm) and a
6" (152mm) barrel, it is apparently classified as a "restricted
weapon" when the 6" (150mm) barrel is in place, and as a
"prohibited firearm" when the 2" (50mm) barrel is in place.

To further confuse that issue, the 2" (50mm) barrel is apparently
intended to be lawful when fitted on the revolver, but C-68's
Criminal Code section (CC s.) 84(1) "prohibited device"
definition outlaws it as a prohibited device.  The language of
that definition also apparently outlaws the barrel--and any other
short barrel which forms part of any handgun--when it is
installed on a handgun, as there is no exception clause for that
situation.  Wasteful and costly litigation is guaranteed.

In other words, the "prohibited device" definition is in conflict
with all other provisions regarding lawful ownership, possession,
and transfer of handguns with barrels under 4.14" (105mm) long.

Similarly, many handguns come with both a .32 and a .380 barrel,
and that throws them also into the dual-kind dilemma, as
far as transfer procedures are concerned.  Examples include the
very common 1910 and Model 115 Browning (FN) pistols, and the
fairly common HK-4, which was sold with 4 barrels in 4 different
calibers.  Such handguns are usually registered with only one of
their calibers on the record, because spare barrels are not
firearms and do not require registration.

The .32 barrel, unlike the short Dan Wesson barrel, does not
come under the CC s. 84(1) "prohibited device" definition.

(b) verify the buyer's purpose and whether the firearm is
appropriate for that purpose

That will require, at the least, interviewing Buyer and a
physical inspection of the firearm.  Since the transfer has not
yet been authorized, it requires Seller to bring the firearm to
the cfo, but C-68 provides the cfo with no authority to order
Seller to do that.  Therefore, it may be necessary for the cfo to
go to Seller's home to inspect the firearm.  The cfo is not
vested with any authority to compel Seller to permit that.

The cfo may or may not have sufficient knowledge of the shooting
discipline that Buyer is involved with to make a sensible
determination.  There are no guidelines or criteria; the decision
is entierly subjective, and wholly entrusted to the cfo--who may
be entirely unqualified to make such a determination.

(c) decide whether to approve the transfer and inform the
Registrar; and 

The criteria which the cfo must apply in making that opinion-
judgement decision are not specified, and are therefore both
subjective and unlimited.  The courts have frequently held that
such unlimited discretion is unlawful, and voided laws which
purport to vest unlimited discretion.

(d) take the prescribed measures.  

Once again, vital parts of the procedure are missing and unknown. 
It would be advisable to see the "prescribed" regulations while
considering the legislation, as FA s. 110 (a) to (v) [107 (a) to
(w)] are so broad that they even permit effective reversal of the
intent of anything in C-68 as passed by Parliament.

While examination of the "prescribed" materials intended to be
brought into force immediately would be interesting, it should
also be noted that no such material is set in stone.  Indeed,
bringing a provision into force has the added effect of making it
much easier to change that provision than it was to bring it
into force initially, because FA s. 112(1) [119(1)] eliminates
the FA s. 111 [118] requirement that the new provision be laid
before each House of Parliament for 30 sitting days.

That has the effect of enabling the bringing into force of new
provisions by Order in Council without Parliamentary scrutiny. 
The scope of what can be done in that way, under FA s. 110 [107],
is staggering.  The lack of Parliamentary control is worrying.

Back to the main thread, following the example transfer: Note
that the cfo never gives Seller the required authorization,
unless by stepping outside the procedure detailed in C-68.  

The form of that authorization is unspecified.  Is it written or
verbal?  A matter of record or not?  These matters need
clarifying, or wasteful and costly litigation will result.

FA s. 30 [31] says that when the Registrar is informed of a
proposed transfer by the cfo, the Registrar "(a) may issue a
new registration certificate... and (b) revoke any registration
certificate for the firearm held by the transferor." 

The Registrar apparently does not inform the transferor that his
registration certificate has been revoked.  That is a major
source of error in the existing registration system, and it leads
to duplicated registrations floating in the system, with the same
firearm registered to two or more individuals or businesses.

The reason for that type of error is quite simple.  The entries
for "Make" and "Model" are the key identifiers on any
registration certificate, but there are no standards set for what
data shall be used in those two entries.  In the National
Firearms Manual's Appendix 4-5 examples of "correct"
registration, we see the same firearm registered as "Make:"
Browning, Browning (FN), or Fabrique Nationale d'Armes de Guerre. 
We see it registered as "Model:" GP 35, 1935, and 1935 Hi Power.

Where the entries can vary that much, it is easy for a transfer
to go awry.  The registrations clerk is supposed to delete
Seller's record from the file, and add one to Buyer's list.
 
However, a handgun registered as a "Browning GP 35," on transfer,
may be described as a "Fabrique Nationale d'Armes de Guerre 1935
Hi Power."  The clerk is unwilling to delete the former from
Seller's list, because the clerk does not know that the latter is
the same handgun.  The result is a dual registry--and there is no
way for either Seller or Buyer to know that has happened.

It is a great pity that the opportunity to correct that problem
has been ignored.  Currently, there are about 1.2 million
registration certificates on file in Ottawa.  On about 350,000 of
them, the data in the "Serial Number" data field is the same as
the data in that field on at least one--and up to 16--other
registration certificates.  That raises a question: Does a
registration certificate whose "Serial Number" field duplicates
another signify the presence of an error in the system, or the
fact that two firearms actually have the same "Serial Number"?

No answer to that question is possible without a physical check. 
Someone must go to the address of each firearm's registered
possessor, and look at the firearm.  Some will turn out to be
errors, and some will turn out to be guns with the same "Serial
Number," a not uncommon happenstance.

The registration system has not been subjected to a major check
for this type of error since 1934. We have a 61-year accumulation
of errors in the system, and neither C-68 nor the proposed
implementation of C-68 offer any way to locate or remove them. 

The procedure we are considering does not include any
specification as to when or how the firearm itself is
physically transferred.  That is a very serious flaw, apparently
the result of too much concentration on the paperwork and too
little on the firearm.  It is especially serious because C-68's
CC s. 101 provides for imprisonment for up to 5 years if either
Buyer or Seller interpret the transfer provisions wrongly. 

The above-cited sections of C-68's Firearms Act specify a
(partial!) procedure for the transfer of a specimen of the FA s.
12(6) class of prohibited firearm.  The procedure is somewhat
more stringent than the procedure for transferring an
unrestricted firearm.  

It is not known if this was intentional: The (partial!) procedure
specified for transferring a specimen of the FA s. 12(2) [full
automatic machine gun] class of prohibited firearm is
identical to that used for transferring an unrestricted
firearm.  

There is little difference between the "restricted handguns plus
FA s. 12(6) firearms" transfer procedure described above and the
"unrestricted firearms plus FA s. 12(2), (3), (4) and (5)
prohibited firearms" transfer procedure.  Most of the problems
outlined above are common to both procedures.

Overall, the design of the firearms control system proposed in
C-68 is badly flawed.  Known failings of the current system
have not been corrected, and new failings have been added.

For as long as the firearms control system was embedded in the
Criminal Code, its constitutionality was difficult to attack. 
Any attacks had to be piecemeal, and they were usually
unsuccessful.  By moving all the regulatory sections into the new
Firearms Act, C-68 has at least opened the Act to examination by
the courts.  The entire Act can now be attacked as one target.  

There is a very good case to be made that the Firearms Act is,
"in pith and substance," regulatory law, and therefore ultra
vires of the federal Parliament.  That position is strongly
supported by the comments of Minister of Justice Allan Rock
before the House's Justice and Legal Affairs Committee, and by
the amendments made by the Justice and Legal Affairs Committee.

The Firearms Act will have to face that challenge in the courts.
perhaps in an action brought by one or more provincial
Legislatures, perhaps in an action brought by one or more
firearms organizations, and certainly by defence lawyers in
criminal cases.  The issue will not be settled for many years.

Even if the Act survives, the question of whether or not the
federal Parliament can impose licensing fees--particularly
regarding legislation enacted under the criminal law power, and
particularly regarding licensing of businesses--will be tested.

It is highly questionable that the combination of C-68's
Firearms Act and Criminal Code amendments have the effect of
defining certain behaviors as crimes: so heinous that a penalty
of years of imprisonment will be imposed, and simultaneously
offering to sell licenses to commit those crimes. 

If certain behavior is so heinous as to be defined as a crime,
with a penalty of years of imprisonment waiting for anyone who
engages in that behavior, how does the federal Parliament offer
to sell permission to commit that crime by licensing the heinous
behavior?  Indeed, is the federal Parliament even authorized by
the Constitution to sell permission to commit crimes?

In the event that the entire Firearms Act or the licensing fee
system is finally determined to be, "in pith and substance,"
ultra vires of the federal Parliament, the resulting chaotic
situation, along with the heavy legal and financial liabilities
incurred by operating under an invalid law, merit attention.

Experience teaches us, if we are at all willing to learn, that
the decision of a court is quite unpredictable--no matter how
certain one is about what the "correct" decision should be.

If there is a possibility of a constitutional challenge--and
there obviously is--great caution should be exercised by any
legislator who does not wish to accept blame for a blunder.

This is a particularly dangerous area of law.  Even if a
reference to the Supreme Court of Canada were to be made
regarding the constitutionality of Bill C-68, the result would be
subject to revision at a later date.  C-68 is so complex, and
covers so many differing firearms, procedures, licenses, crimes,
etc., that any such reference determination might well lose out
to detail decisions over particular subsections at a later date.

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [4/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 15:28:39 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan
Lines: 244
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Distribution: na
Message-ID: <[email-masked]>
Reply-To: [email-masked]
NNTP-Posting-Host: skatter.usask.ca

						NFA PAPER IC

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF C-68

C-68 is in two parts, the new Firearms Act section and the
Criminal Code amendment section.  They should be examined
separately. 

THE FIREARMS ACT: This Act is an attempt to impose a
regulatory licensing scheme on law-abiding Canadians under the
criminal powers of the federal Parliament.

When firearms control was first put into the Criminal Code, it
was clearly recognized that the federal Parliament had no power
to make regulatory law (law dealing with public welfare offences
and including a licensing system) to deal with firearms.

Instead, Parliament defined a series of crimes regarding firearms
matters, and instituted penalties which included imprisonment. 
That, at a later date, made the legislation look toward Charter
section 7, the right to liberty.

Parliament also instituted a system of regulatory law, embedded
within the Criminal Code.  It could only do that by disguising it
as a system of criminal law, defining crimes and establishing
penalties for those crimes.

The format chosen was the same as that chosen for the now-failed
abortion law: "It is an indictable offence to [do this] unless
you have [this document]."  That is a dangerous format, as the
striking down of the abortion law proves.

According to the Supreme Court of Canada in the Morgentaler
case, that format works this way:

1.  The criminal behavior is defined.

2.  The document (therapeutic abortion certificate, carry permit,
registration certificate, etc.) is "a specifically-tailored
defence to a particular [criminal] charge."

3.  If the accused has engaged in the behavior, the accused is
guilty of the offence.  

4.  If the accused has the "specifically-tailored defence," the
accused cannot be convicted of the offence.

That comes perilously close to a regulatory licensing scheme.  It
avoids that trap by incorporating the same wording for the
vesting and limiting of authority regarding each issuer of each
of the "documents" in the firearms control system:

The issuer may refuse to issue, limit or revoke the
document "in the interests of the safety of the
applicant/holder or any other person."

That tied everything solidly to a public safety issue, and made
it lawful for Parliament to enact this pseudo-regulatory system
as lawful criminal law.  It was purely a public safety matter.
The documents were permanent, and issued without charge.

Over the years, Parliament and the Criminal Code have drifted far
from that original concept.  The obviously regulatory nature of
the system--intended to regulate the lawful activities of law-
abiding Canadians, rather than control the actions of criminals--
led Parliament into self-deception.  It began to believe that it
had authority to regulate, and the system became more and more
regulatory, less and less proper criminal law.

The catch is that the Firearms Act is an exact parallel to the
Narcotics Act, and has the same force.  It is regulatory law with
criminal law punishments.  The Minister says it can be enacted
constitutionally under the criminal law power.

The Narcotics Act has been validated by the courts on the grounds
that it was enacted to deal with a national emergency.  There is
no such justification for Bill C-68.  There is no emergency. 

The Minister has emphasized the regulatory nature of the new
Firearms Act, notably in his 24 Apr 95 testimony before the
Justice and Legal Affairs Committee, where he compared it to a
lawful regulatory scheme, complete with matching inspection
scheme, used for gas and electrical measuring instruments under
the federal Parliament's weights and measures powers.

Parliament is vested, by the Constitution, with the authority to
make regulatory law dealing with weights and measures, but not
one to make  regulatory law regarding firearms.  If it wants to
regulate firearms, it must do so through criminal law powers.

Mr. Rock cannot have it both ways.  If the Firearms Act is
regulatory law, then it is not criminal law--and vice versa.  If
it is regulatory law, it cannot be enacted under the criminal law
power.  If it is criminal law, it can be enacted, but cannot be,
"in pith and substance," regulatory law dealing with public
welfare offences.  It has to be one or the other, not both.

The idea that Parliament can enact firearms regulatory law because
firearms are dealt with in the Criminal Code is faulty.  If it
were true, the federal Parliament could enact a federal Motor
Vehicles Act, pre-empting the provincial Acts, simply because
motor vehicles area are sometimes involved in crimes.  Any such
attempt, of course, would fail the "pith and substance" test,
because the crime activities are vastly outweighed by the
ordinary activities of honest Canadians with motor vehicles.

The same is true of firearms.

Regulatory law regarding firearms is clearly within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the provincial Legislatures, and is ultra vires
of the federal Parliament.

The division of powers between federal Parliament and provincial
Legislatures is not something that can just be glossed over; it
is real and substantive.  Certainly, there are conflicts of
jurisdiction, but the test is and has always been, "In pith and
substance, does this legislation fall into the powers of the
federal Parliament or the powers of provincial Legislatures?"

Further, the division clearly and explicitly gives the provincial
Legislature the exclusive power to "raise a revenue" through
the imposition of a "licensing fee."  The language clearly
indicates that licensing businesses is the main intent of the
provision.  Even in the existing legislation, the federal
Parliament is imposing a hefty (several hundred dollars)
licensing fee for firearms dealer's permits.  That is an
intervention into the tax power of the provincial Legislature,
and it has serious effects.

The recent massive increases in dealer permit fees have
eliminated two thirds of all BC licensed dealers.  That has a
severe impact on fees and taxes that the province and the
municipalities would have collected if the federal Parliament had
not imposed this apparently-ultra-vires tax.

Placing a licensing scheme within the criminal law has other
effects.  In effect, Parliament is saying, "This behavior is so
heinous or dangerous to public safety that we characterize it as
a crime, and provide for the imposition of several yeaers
imprisonment to deter people from engaging in it."

At the same time, it is saying, "You may commit this crime if you
purchase permission to do so from the government."

To the best of our knowledge, the courts have never been asked,
When the federal Parliament defines a crime, and establishes a
penalty for committing it, can it also give permission to commit
that crime in exchange for a fee paid to government?

Nor have the courts been asked, In the Morgentaler case, it
was established that, where a specifically-tailored defence is
offered in the law, it must be available.  It cannot be illusory
or so difficult to obtain as to be practically illusory--or the
Supreme Court of Canada will strike down that law.  At what point
do escalating fees for licenses or specifically-tailored defences
render the defence illusory or so difficult to obtain as to be
practically illusory because the accused is poor? 

Under the existing law, the concept is that a permit/certificate/
authorization is a "defence to a particular [criminal] charge."
It is not a document which permits the holder to engage in
criminal behavior, behavior that could result in years of
imprisonment.  That mode of permission can only be upheld by the
use of a polite fiction, that the document is not a permission.

However, when the documents are "grandfathered" by the Firearms
Act, and emerge as being "deemed" to be "licenses" without any
major change in their function or status, that changes things.

Black's Law Dictionary defines a "license" as "certificate or the
document itself which gives permission."  The mask is off.

The Firearms Act is clearly regulatory in nature, and the
Minister is clearly on record as saying that he does not expect
criminals to use or abide by its provisions.

In sum, the Firearms Act is encroaching upon both the tax powers
and the legislative powers which belong exclusively to the
provincial Legislatures, as set forth by the Constitution.

The use of licenses has another interesting effect.  Both C-68's
Firearms Act (s. 104) and its Criminal Code (s. 91) provide for
the criminalization of a person as a result of the expiry or
non-criminal loss of his 5-year license. 

In Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act
(1985) 2 SCR 486, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that a
sentence which includes possible imprisonment cannot be imposed
regarding expiry or suspension of a license, because that is not
a criminal act by the accused.  It is just something that
happened, and was not something heinous that the person did.

The licenses established by the Firearms Act carry over into the
Criminal Code, and sentences of imprisonment are imposed by laws
in both for simple possession of a firearm--unless you also
possess a license which has not expired.

The Firearms Act also suffers from the suggestion by the
Minister, frequently repeated, that certain "offences" could be
"de-criminalized."  That, of course, is nonsense.  If the
"offence" is enacted through the criminal law powers of
Parliament, it is criminal law and a violation is a crime which
incurs a criminal penalty and a criminal record.

If the "offence" is not criminal, the legislation which contains
it is regulatory law and therefore ultra vires of Parliament.

The Firearms Act may also be void for vagueness.  For example,
the transfer of a firearm from one person to another requires [FA
s. 22(a)(ii), now 23(a)(ii)] the vendor to "obtain the
authorization of the chief firearms officer for the transfer."

However, the duties of the chief firearms officer when he
receives that request for an authorization [FA s. 26/27] do
not include providing the vendor with that authorization. 
Instead, he is directed to communicate with the Registrar.

The duties of the Registrar [FA s. 30/31] authorize him to revoke
the vendor's registration certificate, although they do
not require him to notify the vendor of what he did.

One wonders if this is a transfer procedure or a game of blind
man's buff.  The vendor becomes a criminal [under CC s. 91] at
the moment that the Registrar revokes his certificate--unless he
has already delivered the firearm, in which case he became a
criminal somewhat earlier [under CC s. 101].

There is nothing in the Firearms Act to indicate exactly when or
how the firearm itself is physically transferred--but any error
in their timing can send both vendor and receiver to prison.

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [5/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 15:29:02 GMT
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						NFA PAPER IIA

REGULATORY LAW, LICENSING FEES, AND LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTIONS

Reference: "CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA" by Peter W. Hogg.

PREFACE

Because this paper is addressed to a variety of readers, it has
to begin with some primary data.  For those experienced in the
basics of Constitutional law as it refers to the powers vested in
the federal Parliament and in the provincial Legislatures to
impose licensing fees and taxes, and the vested jurisdictions to
enact criminal law legislation and regulatory law legislation, I
apologize.

HOGG, 15.9(e): "...the distribution of powers between the
federal Parliament and the provincial Legislatures is exhaustive;
the totality of legislative power is distributed between the
federal Parliament and the provincial Legislatures."

Sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution vest the powers required
by a government to enact regulatory law in two groups, and
allot one group, exclusively, to the federal Parliament and the
other, exclusively, to the provincial Legislatures.

Sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution vest the powers required
by a government to impose taxes and fees in two groups, and
allot one group, exclusively, to the federal Parliament and the
other, exclusively, to the provincial Legislatures.

The power to enact criminal law is vested exclusively in the
federal Parliament.

Where either Parliament or a Legislature wishes to impose fees
or charges, it must be able to point to the justification of
such impositions in the form of powers vested in that Parliament
or Legislature to impose fees or charges under a regulatory law
power vested in it, or the imposition is ultra vires.

Two very similar laws can appear, one as a provincial and the
other as a federal law--an apparent breach of the "exclusive"
jurisdictions established by s. 91 and 92 of the Constitution.  

That is permissible only where the matter has a "double aspect";
i.e., where it can be seen by the provincial Legislature as
handling, say, "property and civil rights in the province" [s.
92(13)] and equally well by the federal Parliament as "criminal
law" [s. 91 (27)].  Where conflict arises between two valid laws,
the federal legislation is usually held to be paramount by the
courts--if it is not found to be ultra vires of Parliament.

Dual legislation is not permissible where the federal
Parliament enacts legislation which, "in pith and substance,"
lies within the provincial Legislature's exclusive jurisdiction,
or vice versa. That is particularly true of revenue-raising laws.

As an example: A Motor Vehicle Act will fall into the provincial
Legislature jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that ground
transportation was available to be regulated in 1867, on the date
of Confederation.  Air transport, because it was not there in
1867, fell into the jurisdiction of the federal Parliament
through a residual powers clause.

Motor vehicles have some aspects which require federal criminal
law to be written about them.  That makes them a "dual aspect"
subject, and they appear in both federal criminal laws and
provincial regulatory laws.

If the federal Parliament suddenly enacted a federal Motor
Vehicles Act, purporting to regulate ground transportation on a
national basis, that would clearly be ultra vires of the federal
Parliament, as an encroachment on provincial legislative powers.

If that federal Motor Vehicles Act provided for licensing fees to
be charged, that would clearly be ultra vires of the federal
Parliament, as an encroachment on provincial tax powers.

HISTORY

When the federal Parliament decided to take control of firearms,
it did so in the only way it could.  Because the power to
regulate firearms with regulatory law clearly fell into the
jurisdiction of the provincial Legislatures, Parliament created a
pseudo-criminal-law regulatory licensing scheme which could
survive judicial scrutiny--within the Criminal Code.

Each of a large number of actions involving firearms was defined
as a "crime"--an action so heinous or so damaging to some
fundamental right that imprisonment was provided as a punishment
for engaging in that prohibited behavior.

As in certain other areas [e.g., the abortion law that was
struck down [in Morgentaler et al. v. the Queen and the
Attorney General of Canada (1988) 1 SCR 30], the firearms control
laws defined a crime, then established "a specifically-tailored
defence to a particular [criminal] charge."  That is, the person
has engaged in the criminalized behavior, but cannot be convicted
because he or she has the "specifically-tailored defence."  

In the case of the firearms laws in Part III of the Criminal
Code, the "defences" provided were described as "permits,"
"authorizations in writing," and "registration certificates."

Apparently in order to maintain the polite fiction that this mass
of regulatory law was in fact proper criminal law, Part III made
repeated use of the wording "in the interests of the safety of
the applicant/holder or any other person."  That language tied
the matter solidly to the issue of safety, and made it law
permissible within the Criminal Code--though just barely.  It was
one small but vital step away from actually licensing someone
(giving him permission) to commit a crime.

Research does not clearly identify any vested power which allows
Parliament to define certain behavior as the commission of a
crime and gives it power to sell licenses to commit that crime.

At the time it was first enacted, the Criminal Code Part III set
of regulatory laws regarding firearm possession and use was not
subject to the strictures of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms--it had not yet come into existence.  At that time, the
accepted definition of "crime" was, roughly, "anything that
Parliament puts in the Criminal Code and imposes a penalty for."

Over the years, the licensing documents and regulatory scheme
have drifted away from the original, carefully engineered plan to
create valid criminal law.  Licensing fees of up to several
hundred dollars are currently imposed in order for the applicant
to qualify for a "specifically-tailored defence."

C-68 takes that tendency to drift much further; perhaps too far.

As the Morgentaler decision pointed out, where a "defence"
is offered by the law, it must be available; it cannot be
"illusory or so difficult to obtain as to be practically
illusory"--or the Supreme Court of Canada will strike that law
down, as it did the abortion law.

At what point does a licensing fee cause a "defence" to become
"illusory or so difficult to obtain as to be practically
illusory" for a poor person?  That is a serious question. 

Additionally, many of the licensing documents currently offered
by the existing laws are unobtainable.  The law provides for
their issuance, but the firearms control authorities refuse to
issue them as a matter of policy.  That position is vulnerable.

EFFECTS

As an example of the effect of federal encroachments on
provincial tax powers, recent heavy increases in the firearms
dealer's permit fee have resulted in the elimination of two-
thirds of all British Columbia firearms dealers.  That represents
a severe loss of business tax and licensing fee revenue to both
the provincial and municipal governments.  It also represents
loss of jobs and future employment opportunities, along with the
tax revenues that arise from those losses.

BILL C-68'S "FIREARMS ACT"

In Bill C-68, it seems probable that the federal Parliament's
Justice Minister has made serious blunders.

First, C-68 splits firearms control law into two parts.  The new
Firearms Act is basically regulatory in nature; it seems unlikely
that it could pass the "pith and substance" test.

If the Firearms Act is enacted by using the federal Parliament's
power to enact criminal law, it is criminal law, and an exact
parallel to the Narcotics Act.  Therefore, if it fails the "pith
and substance" test by being unmasked as a licensing scheme,
primarily intended to license, regulate, and control firearms
ownership and usage, it is ultra vires of Parliament.

If the Firearms Act is enacted by using Parliament's power to
enact regulatory law, it is apparently ultra vires of Parliament
because Parliament has no more power to enact regulatory law
dealing with firearms than it has to enact regulatory law dealing
with motor vehicles.  Neither is in the federal Parliament's list
of areas where it may enact regulatory law.

If the provincial governments accept these encroachments without
resistance, one wonders what further encroachments will be made
in other areas to take over provincial tax bases and legislative
powers.  It seems to be a very dangerous precedent.

If the Firearms Act, taken as a whole, fails the "pith and
substance" test and is struck down as ultra vires of the federal
Parliament, the C-68 Criminal Code amendments automatically fall,
because they are based on licensing documents issued under the
Firearms Act.  The results will probably be rather chaotic.

Undoubtedly, the Firearms Act will be challenged in this way.  If
it falls, the provincial Legislatures will probably be required
to pay or repay all the damages, fees, confiscations of property,
etc. that have been imposed under invalid law.

It may well prove difficult to recover such funds from the
federal Parliament responsible for the legislative errors. 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, HOGG 6.1

S. 122 of the BNA Act transferred the "customs and excise laws
of each province" to the new federal Parliament.  S. 91(3) gave
the federal Parliament the power to raise money "by any mode
or system of taxation."  Those two provisions gave the federal
Parliament the power to raise the revenues it needed.

The BNA Act gave the provincial Legislatures lesser powers for
their lesser funding needs.  S. 92(2) conferred on them the power
to raise only "direct" taxes (on property or income, and unlike
federal "indirect" customs and excise taxes).  S. 92(9) vested
provincial Legislatures with exclusive power to charge "licensing
fees," using language that seems oriented toward business
licenses, but which may well apply to other licensing fees.

The distinction between taxes and other charges imposed by
governments is sometimes unclear.  Black's Law Dictionary defines
"license" as "certificate or the document itself which gives
permission."  A "licensing fee" is the charge imposed by law to
purchase that document and gain that permission.

Black's defines "tax" as "a pecuniary burden laid upon
individuals or property to support the government, and is a
payment exacted by legislative authority."  One must pay a tax,
but no specific benefit is given for that payment.

30.1(c) The s. 92(9) exclusive provincial power to charge
"licensing fees" apparently allows the province to raise revenue
for general purposes through licensing fees, as opposed to
charging a licensing fee as a method of defraying the costs of a
regulatory scheme authorized by some other provision.

S. 92(9) does not explicitly limit the province's raising of a
revenue by direct means.  Therefore, to what extent, if at all,
does s. 92(9)'s exclusive authority to raise revenue by
"licensing fees" interact with s. 92(2) by authorizing
"forbidden" indirect taxing through license fees?  That question
has never been thoroughly or definitively tested in the courts.

La Forest's careful study of case law ["Disallowance and
Reservation of Provincial Legislation," Queen's Printer, 1965 and
"The Allocation of Taxing Power under the Canadian Constitution,"
Canadian Tax Foundation, Toronto, 2nd Ed., 1981] led him to the
conclusion that s. 92(9) authorizes indirect taxation through
licensing fees only if the money is directed to defraying the
expenses of an otherwise valid regulatory scheme. [30.10(c)]

That leaves s. 92(9) with no independent force of its own, but La
Forest felt that it seemed to be the better view, because of "the
overriding implication of s. 91 and 92 that the power to levy
indirect taxation should be reserved to Parliament."

If, however, Black's is correct, then the power of the provincial
Legislature to charge "licensing fees" is the power to charge a
fee for "a document... which gives permission."  Obviously, that
can only be done in areas where the provincial Legislature is
authorized to "give permission."  It has to be in an area where
the Legislature has regulatory authority.

PROVINCIAL POWERS, HOGG, 30.10(b)

Provincial legislation may impose licensing fees, which are
not necessarily taxation, and, if they are not, need not be
direct.  They are not taxes if they can be supported as
regulatory charges imposed under one of the province's
regulatory powers.

Conversely, if a government imposes charges in the guise of
"licensing fees" in an area where that government has no
authority to "give permission" under one of that government's
regulatory powers, then the charge is a tax.  It is simply a
charge imposed by a government with nothing given in return.

Licensing fees, registration fees, bridge tolls, water rates,
etc., imposed by a provincial Legislature, although they may
appear to be indirect taxation, are not taxes if their purpose is
merely 	to defray expenses.  Even if a charge is too high and
produces a surplus, the charge will not be characterized as a tax
so long as the court is satisfied that it is not a colorable
attempt to levy indirect taxation.

HOGG, 30.10(b): "The federal Parliament, not
being confined to direct taxation, can impose both direct and
indirect charges under its taxation power [s. 91(3)], but a
federal regulatory charge, like a provincial regulatory charge,
may well have to fall under some head of regulatory power. 
Thus, the distinction between taxes and charges may become
relevant to the validity of a federal law."

That is most significant.  If the licensing fee is not
imposed under some specifically named regulatory power vested in
the federal Parliament, it cannot be  for "a document... which
gives permission."  If the government which imposed the charge
has no authority to "give permission" as part of a regulatory
scheme which it is empowered to operate, then a "licensing fee"
does not fit the circumstances.  It must be a tax.

If the charge is imposed as a licensing fee by the federal
Parliament, that is an apparent violation of both the exclusive
jurisdiction of the provincial Legislature to impose a licensing
fee for the raising of a revenue, and an encroachment on the
revenue-raising power of the provincial Legislature.

If it is not a tax, then it must be levied under some
regulatory power vested in the federal Parliament.  There does
not seem to be any such power--rather a "Catch-22" situation.

EXAMPLES OF REGULATORY VERSUS CRIMINAL LAW DISTINCTIONS

Before 1976, the Criminal Code contained a dealer's permit. 
There was no fee, the permit did not expire, and it could be
denied only "in the interests of the safety of the applicant or
any other person."  It was clearly a safety matter.

Currently, the licensing dealer's permit can only be obtained by
paying a large fee, expires annually, and subjects the holder to
a variety of impositions enacted by Order in Council.  It has
drifted away from being proper criminal law, and has become in
pith and substance a regulatory licensing scheme.

There is no question that much of Part III of the Criminal Code
has minimal connections to crime and criminal investigations. 
The vast bulk of all activity controlled by Part III's regulatory
sections consists of regulating the lawful property of law-
abiding Canadians.  It has become, in pith and substance, a
regulatory licensing scheme which clearly does not belong in the
Criminal Code.

Currently, the Criminal Code (and in the future, if it passes,
the Firearms Act) establishes a licensing scheme for charging
"licensing fees," each thinly disguised as a "specifically-
tailored defence to a particular [criminal] charge" (in the words
of the Morgentaler decision).

Bill C-68 strips away that disguise, nakedly calling some of the
documents "licenses."  Further, it "grandfathers" a firearms
acquisition certificate, a minor's permit, a museum approval, a
dealer's permit, a museum permit, and even the designation of a
person, each as a "license" [FA s. 113 to 119 inclusive].

This unmasking of the licensing scheme, as it is understood by
the Minister of Justice, should be most valuable as evidence in
the courts on the status of various "licensing" documents.

It is apparent that the bulk of the firearms control law forms
a regulatory licensing scheme--and one which does not fall under
"some head of regulatory power" vested in the federal Parliament.

The conclusion is obvious: The federal Parliament does not have
the authority to impose charges through this licensing scheme. 
It lies outside Parliament's regulatory powers, and beyond its
power to "give permission."  It has no authority to impose
charges for "licensing fees" where it cannot "give permission."

Even if it did, the cost of a dealer's permit (or Firearms Act
"license") can now be hundreds of dollars.  Whether the document
is a "specifically-tailored defence to a particular [criminal]
charge" as described by Morgentaler, or a naked "license" as
described by the proposed Firearms Act, questions arise.

What are the Constitutional, legal, moral, and ethical problems
involved in the government's selling either "defences" to
criminal charges, or, and perhaps worse, "licenses" which are
legally defined as permission to commit the particular crimes? 

Where a particular action is defined within the Criminal Code as
an offence punishable by imprisonment, that action is a heinous
act so damaging to society that it is defined as a criminal
offence.  Shooting at an innocent person is such an offence.

Where the action is peaceful possession or acquisition of a
firearm for sporting purposes or as part of a collection of
historical artifacts, however, serious questions arise.  How and
why is that a crime?  Where is the harm to society?

That is where the "pith and substance" question arises.  Is the
firearms regulatory law contained in the current Part III of the
Criminal Code a licensing scheme, "in pith and substance," or is
it proper criminal law?

If it is a regulatory licensing scheme, and it would seem to be,
then it is ultra vires of Parliament.  At the very least,
licensing fees would be absolutely prohibited within it.

Governments and courts are very rigid about the division of
powers to impose charges between the federal Parliament and the
provincial Legislatures.  They have to be, to prevent
encroachment by either onto the other's revenue-raising areas.

Additionally, recent increases in federal licensing fee charges
have had severe effects in British Columbia and elsewhere. 
Recent increases in federally imposed fees for the dealer's
permit have eliminated about three quarters of all firearms
dealers in British Columbia (down from 774 to 181). 

That, in turn, has lost to the provincial Legislature many
business licensing fees properly authorized and charged by the
province and municipalities within the province.  It has reduced
local government's licensing fees and other expected revenues.

The licensing fees imposed by the federal Parliament apparently
violate the exclusive jurisdiction of the provincial Legislature
to raise revenue through "licensing fees."  They are an
encroachment by Parliament on Legislature revenue fields.

THE ILLUSIONS PROBLEM

The Morgentaler case established that where a "specifically-
tailored defence" is offered within the Criminal Code, it must be
available.  It cannot be "illusory, or so difficult to obtain as
to be practically illusory," or the Supreme Court of Canada will
strike down the law--as it did in Morgentaler.

The form of many laws within Part III of the Criminal Code is
identical to that of the failed abortion law: "Every person who
[does this] commits a criminal offence unless the person has
[this licensing document]."

Morgentaler identified such a licensing document as "a
specifically-tailored defence to a particular [criminal] charge." 
The licensing document apparently had to be identified in that
rather odd way to make the situation fall within the limits of
law.  It could not be a "license," because that would be a
document that "gives permission" to commit that particular
criminal offence, which is a ludicrous concept.

At what point does the fee make the offered "defence" illusory? 
What fee is the poorest of all Canadians confidently expected to
be able to put up to buy his defence against a criminal charge?

If a poor man and a rich man each inherit 100 firearms, is the
poor man unable to receive his inheritance because he cannot
afford to buy the firearms acquisition certificate or pay the
"user-pay" license fees the government now proposes to charge?

Is the poor man prohibited from entering the business of firearms
dealer because he cannot afford the multi-hundred-dollar dealer's
permit or "license"?  If he does enter that business, does that
make him a criminal, or would Morgentaler's effects result
in the law being struck down?

The firearms control legislation is very vulnerable, particularly
to Morgentaler attacks on the basis that some licensing
document is "illusory, or so difficult to obtain as to be
practically illusory."

It is also vulnerable to attacks based on the division of both
regulatory and revenue-raising powers, as allotted to the federal
Parliament and the provincial Legislatures by s. 91 and 92.

If the Firearms Act and the proposed amendments to the Criminal
Code actually pass, the firearms control laws become much more
vulnerable to both types of attack.

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [4/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 15:28:39 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan
Lines: 244
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Message-ID: <[email-masked]>
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						NFA PAPER IC

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF C-68

C-68 is in two parts, the new Firearms Act section and the
Criminal Code amendment section.  They should be examined
separately. 

THE FIREARMS ACT: This Act is an attempt to impose a
regulatory licensing scheme on law-abiding Canadians under the
criminal powers of the federal Parliament.

When firearms control was first put into the Criminal Code, it
was clearly recognized that the federal Parliament had no power
to make regulatory law (law dealing with public welfare offences
and including a licensing system) to deal with firearms.

Instead, Parliament defined a series of crimes regarding firearms
matters, and instituted penalties which included imprisonment. 
That, at a later date, made the legislation look toward Charter
section 7, the right to liberty.

Parliament also instituted a system of regulatory law, embedded
within the Criminal Code.  It could only do that by disguising it
as a system of criminal law, defining crimes and establishing
penalties for those crimes.

The format chosen was the same as that chosen for the now-failed
abortion law: "It is an indictable offence to [do this] unless
you have [this document]."  That is a dangerous format, as the
striking down of the abortion law proves.

According to the Supreme Court of Canada in the Morgentaler
case, that format works this way:

1.  The criminal behavior is defined.

2.  The document (therapeutic abortion certificate, carry permit,
registration certificate, etc.) is "a specifically-tailored
defence to a particular [criminal] charge."

3.  If the accused has engaged in the behavior, the accused is
guilty of the offence.  

4.  If the accused has the "specifically-tailored defence," the
accused cannot be convicted of the offence.

That comes perilously close to a regulatory licensing scheme.  It
avoids that trap by incorporating the same wording for the
vesting and limiting of authority regarding each issuer of each
of the "documents" in the firearms control system:

The issuer may refuse to issue, limit or revoke the
document "in the interests of the safety of the
applicant/holder or any other person."

That tied everything solidly to a public safety issue, and made
it lawful for Parliament to enact this pseudo-regulatory system
as lawful criminal law.  It was purely a public safety matter.
The documents were permanent, and issued without charge.

Over the years, Parliament and the Criminal Code have drifted far
from that original concept.  The obviously regulatory nature of
the system--intended to regulate the lawful activities of law-
abiding Canadians, rather than control the actions of criminals--
led Parliament into self-deception.  It began to believe that it
had authority to regulate, and the system became more and more
regulatory, less and less proper criminal law.

The catch is that the Firearms Act is an exact parallel to the
Narcotics Act, and has the same force.  It is regulatory law with
criminal law punishments.  The Minister says it can be enacted
constitutionally under the criminal law power.

The Narcotics Act has been validated by the courts on the grounds
that it was enacted to deal with a national emergency.  There is
no such justification for Bill C-68.  There is no emergency. 

The Minister has emphasized the regulatory nature of the new
Firearms Act, notably in his 24 Apr 95 testimony before the
Justice and Legal Affairs Committee, where he compared it to a
lawful regulatory scheme, complete with matching inspection
scheme, used for gas and electrical measuring instruments under
the federal Parliament's weights and measures powers.

Parliament is vested, by the Constitution, with the authority to
make regulatory law dealing with weights and measures, but not
one to make  regulatory law regarding firearms.  If it wants to
regulate firearms, it must do so through criminal law powers.

Mr. Rock cannot have it both ways.  If the Firearms Act is
regulatory law, then it is not criminal law--and vice versa.  If
it is regulatory law, it cannot be enacted under the criminal law
power.  If it is criminal law, it can be enacted, but cannot be,
"in pith and substance," regulatory law dealing with public
welfare offences.  It has to be one or the other, not both.

The idea that Parliament can enact firearms regulatory law because
firearms are dealt with in the Criminal Code is faulty.  If it
were true, the federal Parliament could enact a federal Motor
Vehicles Act, pre-empting the provincial Acts, simply because
motor vehicles area are sometimes involved in crimes.  Any such
attempt, of course, would fail the "pith and substance" test,
because the crime activities are vastly outweighed by the
ordinary activities of honest Canadians with motor vehicles.

The same is true of firearms.

Regulatory law regarding firearms is clearly within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the provincial Legislatures, and is ultra vires
of the federal Parliament.

The division of powers between federal Parliament and provincial
Legislatures is not something that can just be glossed over; it
is real and substantive.  Certainly, there are conflicts of
jurisdiction, but the test is and has always been, "In pith and
substance, does this legislation fall into the powers of the
federal Parliament or the powers of provincial Legislatures?"

Further, the division clearly and explicitly gives the provincial
Legislature the exclusive power to "raise a revenue" through
the imposition of a "licensing fee."  The language clearly
indicates that licensing businesses is the main intent of the
provision.  Even in the existing legislation, the federal
Parliament is imposing a hefty (several hundred dollars)
licensing fee for firearms dealer's permits.  That is an
intervention into the tax power of the provincial Legislature,
and it has serious effects.

The recent massive increases in dealer permit fees have
eliminated two thirds of all BC licensed dealers.  That has a
severe impact on fees and taxes that the province and the
municipalities would have collected if the federal Parliament had
not imposed this apparently-ultra-vires tax.

Placing a licensing scheme within the criminal law has other
effects.  In effect, Parliament is saying, "This behavior is so
heinous or dangerous to public safety that we characterize it as
a crime, and provide for the imposition of several yeaers
imprisonment to deter people from engaging in it."

At the same time, it is saying, "You may commit this crime if you
purchase permission to do so from the government."

To the best of our knowledge, the courts have never been asked,
When the federal Parliament defines a crime, and establishes a
penalty for committing it, can it also give permission to commit
that crime in exchange for a fee paid to government?

Nor have the courts been asked, In the Morgentaler case, it
was established that, where a specifically-tailored defence is
offered in the law, it must be available.  It cannot be illusory
or so difficult to obtain as to be practically illusory--or the
Supreme Court of Canada will strike down that law.  At what point
do escalating fees for licenses or specifically-tailored defences
render the defence illusory or so difficult to obtain as to be
practically illusory because the accused is poor? 

Under the existing law, the concept is that a permit/certificate/
authorization is a "defence to a particular [criminal] charge."
It is not a document which permits the holder to engage in
criminal behavior, behavior that could result in years of
imprisonment.  That mode of permission can only be upheld by the
use of a polite fiction, that the document is not a permission.

However, when the documents are "grandfathered" by the Firearms
Act, and emerge as being "deemed" to be "licenses" without any
major change in their function or status, that changes things.

Black's Law Dictionary defines a "license" as "certificate or the
document itself which gives permission."  The mask is off.

The Firearms Act is clearly regulatory in nature, and the
Minister is clearly on record as saying that he does not expect
criminals to use or abide by its provisions.

In sum, the Firearms Act is encroaching upon both the tax powers
and the legislative powers which belong exclusively to the
provincial Legislatures, as set forth by the Constitution.

The use of licenses has another interesting effect.  Both C-68's
Firearms Act (s. 104) and its Criminal Code (s. 91) provide for
the criminalization of a person as a result of the expiry or
non-criminal loss of his 5-year license. 

In Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act
(1985) 2 SCR 486, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that a
sentence which includes possible imprisonment cannot be imposed
regarding expiry or suspension of a license, because that is not
a criminal act by the accused.  It is just something that
happened, and was not something heinous that the person did.

The licenses established by the Firearms Act carry over into the
Criminal Code, and sentences of imprisonment are imposed by laws
in both for simple possession of a firearm--unless you also
possess a license which has not expired.

The Firearms Act also suffers from the suggestion by the
Minister, frequently repeated, that certain "offences" could be
"de-criminalized."  That, of course, is nonsense.  If the
"offence" is enacted through the criminal law powers of
Parliament, it is criminal law and a violation is a crime which
incurs a criminal penalty and a criminal record.

If the "offence" is not criminal, the legislation which contains
it is regulatory law and therefore ultra vires of Parliament.

The Firearms Act may also be void for vagueness.  For example,
the transfer of a firearm from one person to another requires [FA
s. 22(a)(ii), now 23(a)(ii)] the vendor to "obtain the
authorization of the chief firearms officer for the transfer."

However, the duties of the chief firearms officer when he
receives that request for an authorization [FA s. 26/27] do
not include providing the vendor with that authorization. 
Instead, he is directed to communicate with the Registrar.

The duties of the Registrar [FA s. 30/31] authorize him to revoke
the vendor's registration certificate, although they do
not require him to notify the vendor of what he did.

One wonders if this is a transfer procedure or a game of blind
man's buff.  The vendor becomes a criminal [under CC s. 91] at
the moment that the Registrar revokes his certificate--unless he
has already delivered the firearm, in which case he became a
criminal somewhat earlier [under CC s. 101].

There is nothing in the Firearms Act to indicate exactly when or
how the firearm itself is physically transferred--but any error
in their timing can send both vendor and receiver to prison.

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [5/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 15:29:02 GMT
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						NFA PAPER IIA

REGULATORY LAW, LICENSING FEES, AND LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTIONS

Reference: "CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA" by Peter W. Hogg.

PREFACE

Because this paper is addressed to a variety of readers, it has
to begin with some primary data.  For those experienced in the
basics of Constitutional law as it refers to the powers vested in
the federal Parliament and in the provincial Legislatures to
impose licensing fees and taxes, and the vested jurisdictions to
enact criminal law legislation and regulatory law legislation, I
apologize.

HOGG, 15.9(e): "...the distribution of powers between the
federal Parliament and the provincial Legislatures is exhaustive;
the totality of legislative power is distributed between the
federal Parliament and the provincial Legislatures."

Sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution vest the powers required
by a government to enact regulatory law in two groups, and
allot one group, exclusively, to the federal Parliament and the
other, exclusively, to the provincial Legislatures.

Sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution vest the powers required
by a government to impose taxes and fees in two groups, and
allot one group, exclusively, to the federal Parliament and the
other, exclusively, to the provincial Legislatures.

The power to enact criminal law is vested exclusively in the
federal Parliament.

Where either Parliament or a Legislature wishes to impose fees
or charges, it must be able to point to the justification of
such impositions in the form of powers vested in that Parliament
or Legislature to impose fees or charges under a regulatory law
power vested in it, or the imposition is ultra vires.

Two very similar laws can appear, one as a provincial and the
other as a federal law--an apparent breach of the "exclusive"
jurisdictions established by s. 91 and 92 of the Constitution.  

That is permissible only where the matter has a "double aspect";
i.e., where it can be seen by the provincial Legislature as
handling, say, "property and civil rights in the province" [s.
92(13)] and equally well by the federal Parliament as "criminal
law" [s. 91 (27)].  Where conflict arises between two valid laws,
the federal legislation is usually held to be paramount by the
courts--if it is not found to be ultra vires of Parliament.

Dual legislation is not permissible where the federal
Parliament enacts legislation which, "in pith and substance,"
lies within the provincial Legislature's exclusive jurisdiction,
or vice versa. That is particularly true of revenue-raising laws.

As an example: A Motor Vehicle Act will fall into the provincial
Legislature jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that ground
transportation was available to be regulated in 1867, on the date
of Confederation.  Air transport, because it was not there in
1867, fell into the jurisdiction of the federal Parliament
through a residual powers clause.

Motor vehicles have some aspects which require federal criminal
law to be written about them.  That makes them a "dual aspect"
subject, and they appear in both federal criminal laws and
provincial regulatory laws.

If the federal Parliament suddenly enacted a federal Motor
Vehicles Act, purporting to regulate ground transportation on a
national basis, that would clearly be ultra vires of the federal
Parliament, as an encroachment on provincial legislative powers.

If that federal Motor Vehicles Act provided for licensing fees to
be charged, that would clearly be ultra vires of the federal
Parliament, as an encroachment on provincial tax powers.

HISTORY

When the federal Parliament decided to take control of firearms,
it did so in the only way it could.  Because the power to
regulate firearms with regulatory law clearly fell into the
jurisdiction of the provincial Legislatures, Parliament created a
pseudo-criminal-law regulatory licensing scheme which could
survive judicial scrutiny--within the Criminal Code.

Each of a large number of actions involving firearms was defined
as a "crime"--an action so heinous or so damaging to some
fundamental right that imprisonment was provided as a punishment
for engaging in that prohibited behavior.

As in certain other areas [e.g., the abortion law that was
struck down [in Morgentaler et al. v. the Queen and the
Attorney General of Canada (1988) 1 SCR 30], the firearms control
laws defined a crime, then established "a specifically-tailored
defence to a particular [criminal] charge."  That is, the person
has engaged in the criminalized behavior, but cannot be convicted
because he or she has the "specifically-tailored defence."  

In the case of the firearms laws in Part III of the Criminal
Code, the "defences" provided were described as "permits,"
"authorizations in writing," and "registration certificates."

Apparently in order to maintain the polite fiction that this mass
of regulatory law was in fact proper criminal law, Part III made
repeated use of the wording "in the interests of the safety of
the applicant/holder or any other person."  That language tied
the matter solidly to the issue of safety, and made it law
permissible within the Criminal Code--though just barely.  It was
one small but vital step away from actually licensing someone
(giving him permission) to commit a crime.

Research does not clearly identify any vested power which allows
Parliament to define certain behavior as the commission of a
crime and gives it power to sell licenses to commit that crime.

At the time it was first enacted, the Criminal Code Part III set
of regulatory laws regarding firearm possession and use was not
subject to the strictures of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms--it had not yet come into existence.  At that time, the
accepted definition of "crime" was, roughly, "anything that
Parliament puts in the Criminal Code and imposes a penalty for."

Over the years, the licensing documents and regulatory scheme
have drifted away from the original, carefully engineered plan to
create valid criminal law.  Licensing fees of up to several
hundred dollars are currently imposed in order for the applicant
to qualify for a "specifically-tailored defence."

C-68 takes that tendency to drift much further; perhaps too far.

As the Morgentaler decision pointed out, where a "defence"
is offered by the law, it must be available; it cannot be
"illusory or so difficult to obtain as to be practically
illusory"--or the Supreme Court of Canada will strike that law
down, as it did the abortion law.

At what point does a licensing fee cause a "defence" to become
"illusory or so difficult to obtain as to be practically
illusory" for a poor person?  That is a serious question. 

Additionally, many of the licensing documents currently offered
by the existing laws are unobtainable.  The law provides for
their issuance, but the firearms control authorities refuse to
issue them as a matter of policy.  That position is vulnerable.

EFFECTS

As an example of the effect of federal encroachments on
provincial tax powers, recent heavy increases in the firearms
dealer's permit fee have resulted in the elimination of two-
thirds of all British Columbia firearms dealers.  That represents
a severe loss of business tax and licensing fee revenue to both
the provincial and municipal governments.  It also represents
loss of jobs and future employment opportunities, along with the
tax revenues that arise from those losses.

BILL C-68'S "FIREARMS ACT"

In Bill C-68, it seems probable that the federal Parliament's
Justice Minister has made serious blunders.

First, C-68 splits firearms control law into two parts.  The new
Firearms Act is basically regulatory in nature; it seems unlikely
that it could pass the "pith and substance" test.

If the Firearms Act is enacted by using the federal Parliament's
power to enact criminal law, it is criminal law, and an exact
parallel to the Narcotics Act.  Therefore, if it fails the "pith
and substance" test by being unmasked as a licensing scheme,
primarily intended to license, regulate, and control firearms
ownership and usage, it is ultra vires of Parliament.

If the Firearms Act is enacted by using Parliament's power to
enact regulatory law, it is apparently ultra vires of Parliament
because Parliament has no more power to enact regulatory law
dealing with firearms than it has to enact regulatory law dealing
with motor vehicles.  Neither is in the federal Parliament's list
of areas where it may enact regulatory law.

If the provincial governments accept these encroachments without
resistance, one wonders what further encroachments will be made
in other areas to take over provincial tax bases and legislative
powers.  It seems to be a very dangerous precedent.

If the Firearms Act, taken as a whole, fails the "pith and
substance" test and is struck down as ultra vires of the federal
Parliament, the C-68 Criminal Code amendments automatically fall,
because they are based on licensing documents issued under the
Firearms Act.  The results will probably be rather chaotic.

Undoubtedly, the Firearms Act will be challenged in this way.  If
it falls, the provincial Legislatures will probably be required
to pay or repay all the damages, fees, confiscations of property,
etc. that have been imposed under invalid law.

It may well prove difficult to recover such funds from the
federal Parliament responsible for the legislative errors. 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, HOGG 6.1

S. 122 of the BNA Act transferred the "customs and excise laws
of each province" to the new federal Parliament.  S. 91(3) gave
the federal Parliament the power to raise money "by any mode
or system of taxation."  Those two provisions gave the federal
Parliament the power to raise the revenues it needed.

The BNA Act gave the provincial Legislatures lesser powers for
their lesser funding needs.  S. 92(2) conferred on them the power
to raise only "direct" taxes (on property or income, and unlike
federal "indirect" customs and excise taxes).  S. 92(9) vested
provincial Legislatures with exclusive power to charge "licensing
fees," using language that seems oriented toward business
licenses, but which may well apply to other licensing fees.

The distinction between taxes and other charges imposed by
governments is sometimes unclear.  Black's Law Dictionary defines
"license" as "certificate or the document itself which gives
permission."  A "licensing fee" is the charge imposed by law to
purchase that document and gain that permission.

Black's defines "tax" as "a pecuniary burden laid upon
individuals or property to support the government, and is a
payment exacted by legislative authority."  One must pay a tax,
but no specific benefit is given for that payment.

30.1(c) The s. 92(9) exclusive provincial power to charge
"licensing fees" apparently allows the province to raise revenue
for general purposes through licensing fees, as opposed to
charging a licensing fee as a method of defraying the costs of a
regulatory scheme authorized by some other provision.

S. 92(9) does not explicitly limit the province's raising of a
revenue by direct means.  Therefore, to what extent, if at all,
does s. 92(9)'s exclusive authority to raise revenue by
"licensing fees" interact with s. 92(2) by authorizing
"forbidden" indirect taxing through license fees?  That question
has never been thoroughly or definitively tested in the courts.

La Forest's careful study of case law ["Disallowance and
Reservation of Provincial Legislation," Queen's Printer, 1965 and
"The Allocation of Taxing Power under the Canadian Constitution,"
Canadian Tax Foundation, Toronto, 2nd Ed., 1981] led him to the
conclusion that s. 92(9) authorizes indirect taxation through
licensing fees only if the money is directed to defraying the
expenses of an otherwise valid regulatory scheme. [30.10(c)]

That leaves s. 92(9) with no independent force of its own, but La
Forest felt that it seemed to be the better view, because of "the
overriding implication of s. 91 and 92 that the power to levy
indirect taxation should be reserved to Parliament."

If, however, Black's is correct, then the power of the provincial
Legislature to charge "licensing fees" is the power to charge a
fee for "a document... which gives permission."  Obviously, that
can only be done in areas where the provincial Legislature is
authorized to "give permission."  It has to be in an area where
the Legislature has regulatory authority.

PROVINCIAL POWERS, HOGG, 30.10(b)

Provincial legislation may impose licensing fees, which are
not necessarily taxation, and, if they are not, need not be
direct.  They are not taxes if they can be supported as
regulatory charges imposed under one of the province's
regulatory powers.

Conversely, if a government imposes charges in the guise of
"licensing fees" in an area where that government has no
authority to "give permission" under one of that government's
regulatory powers, then the charge is a tax.  It is simply a
charge imposed by a government with nothing given in return.

Licensing fees, registration fees, bridge tolls, water rates,
etc., imposed by a provincial Legislature, although they may
appear to be indirect taxation, are not taxes if their purpose is
merely 	to defray expenses.  Even if a charge is too high and
produces a surplus, the charge will not be characterized as a tax
so long as the court is satisfied that it is not a colorable
attempt to levy indirect taxation.

HOGG, 30.10(b): "The federal Parliament, not
being confined to direct taxation, can impose both direct and
indirect charges under its taxation power [s. 91(3)], but a
federal regulatory charge, like a provincial regulatory charge,
may well have to fall under some head of regulatory power. 
Thus, the distinction between taxes and charges may become
relevant to the validity of a federal law."

That is most significant.  If the licensing fee is not
imposed under some specifically named regulatory power vested in
the federal Parliament, it cannot be  for "a document... which
gives permission."  If the government which imposed the charge
has no authority to "give permission" as part of a regulatory
scheme which it is empowered to operate, then a "licensing fee"
does not fit the circumstances.  It must be a tax.

If the charge is imposed as a licensing fee by the federal
Parliament, that is an apparent violation of both the exclusive
jurisdiction of the provincial Legislature to impose a licensing
fee for the raising of a revenue, and an encroachment on the
revenue-raising power of the provincial Legislature.

If it is not a tax, then it must be levied under some
regulatory power vested in the federal Parliament.  There does
not seem to be any such power--rather a "Catch-22" situation.

EXAMPLES OF REGULATORY VERSUS CRIMINAL LAW DISTINCTIONS

Before 1976, the Criminal Code contained a dealer's permit. 
There was no fee, the permit did not expire, and it could be
denied only "in the interests of the safety of the applicant or
any other person."  It was clearly a safety matter.

Currently, the licensing dealer's permit can only be obtained by
paying a large fee, expires annually, and subjects the holder to
a variety of impositions enacted by Order in Council.  It has
drifted away from being proper criminal law, and has become in
pith and substance a regulatory licensing scheme.

There is no question that much of Part III of the Criminal Code
has minimal connections to crime and criminal investigations. 
The vast bulk of all activity controlled by Part III's regulatory
sections consists of regulating the lawful property of law-
abiding Canadians.  It has become, in pith and substance, a
regulatory licensing scheme which clearly does not belong in the
Criminal Code.

Currently, the Criminal Code (and in the future, if it passes,
the Firearms Act) establishes a licensing scheme for charging
"licensing fees," each thinly disguised as a "specifically-
tailored defence to a particular [criminal] charge" (in the words
of the Morgentaler decision).

Bill C-68 strips away that disguise, nakedly calling some of the
documents "licenses."  Further, it "grandfathers" a firearms
acquisition certificate, a minor's permit, a museum approval, a
dealer's permit, a museum permit, and even the designation of a
person, each as a "license" [FA s. 113 to 119 inclusive].

This unmasking of the licensing scheme, as it is understood by
the Minister of Justice, should be most valuable as evidence in
the courts on the status of various "licensing" documents.

It is apparent that the bulk of the firearms control law forms
a regulatory licensing scheme--and one which does not fall under
"some head of regulatory power" vested in the federal Parliament.

The conclusion is obvious: The federal Parliament does not have
the authority to impose charges through this licensing scheme. 
It lies outside Parliament's regulatory powers, and beyond its
power to "give permission."  It has no authority to impose
charges for "licensing fees" where it cannot "give permission."

Even if it did, the cost of a dealer's permit (or Firearms Act
"license") can now be hundreds of dollars.  Whether the document
is a "specifically-tailored defence to a particular [criminal]
charge" as described by Morgentaler, or a naked "license" as
described by the proposed Firearms Act, questions arise.

What are the Constitutional, legal, moral, and ethical problems
involved in the government's selling either "defences" to
criminal charges, or, and perhaps worse, "licenses" which are
legally defined as permission to commit the particular crimes? 

Where a particular action is defined within the Criminal Code as
an offence punishable by imprisonment, that action is a heinous
act so damaging to society that it is defined as a criminal
offence.  Shooting at an innocent person is such an offence.

Where the action is peaceful possession or acquisition of a
firearm for sporting purposes or as part of a collection of
historical artifacts, however, serious questions arise.  How and
why is that a crime?  Where is the harm to society?

That is where the "pith and substance" question arises.  Is the
firearms regulatory law contained in the current Part III of the
Criminal Code a licensing scheme, "in pith and substance," or is
it proper criminal law?

If it is a regulatory licensing scheme, and it would seem to be,
then it is ultra vires of Parliament.  At the very least,
licensing fees would be absolutely prohibited within it.

Governments and courts are very rigid about the division of
powers to impose charges between the federal Parliament and the
provincial Legislatures.  They have to be, to prevent
encroachment by either onto the other's revenue-raising areas.

Additionally, recent increases in federal licensing fee charges
have had severe effects in British Columbia and elsewhere. 
Recent increases in federally imposed fees for the dealer's
permit have eliminated about three quarters of all firearms
dealers in British Columbia (down from 774 to 181). 

That, in turn, has lost to the provincial Legislature many
business licensing fees properly authorized and charged by the
province and municipalities within the province.  It has reduced
local government's licensing fees and other expected revenues.

The licensing fees imposed by the federal Parliament apparently
violate the exclusive jurisdiction of the provincial Legislature
to raise revenue through "licensing fees."  They are an
encroachment by Parliament on Legislature revenue fields.

THE ILLUSIONS PROBLEM

The Morgentaler case established that where a "specifically-
tailored defence" is offered within the Criminal Code, it must be
available.  It cannot be "illusory, or so difficult to obtain as
to be practically illusory," or the Supreme Court of Canada will
strike down the law--as it did in Morgentaler.

The form of many laws within Part III of the Criminal Code is
identical to that of the failed abortion law: "Every person who
[does this] commits a criminal offence unless the person has
[this licensing document]."

Morgentaler identified such a licensing document as "a
specifically-tailored defence to a particular [criminal] charge." 
The licensing document apparently had to be identified in that
rather odd way to make the situation fall within the limits of
law.  It could not be a "license," because that would be a
document that "gives permission" to commit that particular
criminal offence, which is a ludicrous concept.

At what point does the fee make the offered "defence" illusory? 
What fee is the poorest of all Canadians confidently expected to
be able to put up to buy his defence against a criminal charge?

If a poor man and a rich man each inherit 100 firearms, is the
poor man unable to receive his inheritance because he cannot
afford to buy the firearms acquisition certificate or pay the
"user-pay" license fees the government now proposes to charge?

Is the poor man prohibited from entering the business of firearms
dealer because he cannot afford the multi-hundred-dollar dealer's
permit or "license"?  If he does enter that business, does that
make him a criminal, or would Morgentaler's effects result
in the law being struck down?

The firearms control legislation is very vulnerable, particularly
to Morgentaler attacks on the basis that some licensing
document is "illusory, or so difficult to obtain as to be
practically illusory."

It is also vulnerable to attacks based on the division of both
regulatory and revenue-raising powers, as allotted to the federal
Parliament and the provincial Legislatures by s. 91 and 92.

If the Firearms Act and the proposed amendments to the Criminal
Code actually pass, the firearms control laws become much more
vulnerable to both types of attack.

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [6/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 15:29:45 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan
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						NFA PAPER IIB

JUSTICE MINISTER ALLAN ROCK COMMENTS ON BILL C-68

In his 19 May 95 appearance before the Justice and Legal Affairs
Committee, Mr. Rock apparently confirmed that Bill C-68's
proposed Firearms Act is ultra vires of the federal Parliament,
unlawfully encroaching upon the provincial Legislatures''
jurisdiction to enact regulatory law.

The power to enact regulatory law is divided into a series of
exclusive powers, vested either in the federal Parliament or in
the provincial Legislatures.  The lists are quite clear; the
federal Parliament is vested with the power to enact regulatory
law dealing with regulation of weights and measures, but it is
the provincial Legislatures who are vested with the power to
enact regulatory laws regarding firearms.

The current firearms control laws appear, at first glance, to be
regulatory law.  The appear to be a licensing scheme, but they
are not; they are criminal law, and form part of the Criminal
Code--as they must, to be within Constitutional limits.

In explaining his position, ideas and desires to the Committee,
Mr. Rock likened his new Firearms Act to the federal regulatory
weights and measures legislation.  He said,

"What is proposed is an inspection regime to complement
firearms control.  Any time a government at any level proposes a
regime of regulation, it is common that that government will
also provide for inspection to determine whether the
regulation is effective.

"I could give a variety of examples.  I could take, on the
federal level, the Electricity and Gas Inspection  Act, which
governs installation, use and measurement of gas and electrical
meters...

The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized the distinction,
consistently and practically, between regimes that involve
search and seizure in the criminal mode, in respect of which a
warrant is required, and on the other hand powers of inspection,
which are quite different--which are regulatory...

"There is a relatively low expectation of privacy with respect to
administrative searches in regulatory schemes, where
the key goal is to ensure compliance with the schemes rather than
the prosecution of criminal acts." [Emphasis added
throughout--NFA]

That seems quite clear.  In the mind of the Minister, the
Firearms Act is regulatory law, identical to the  the Electricity
and Gas Inspection  Act in scope, effects and methods of
enforcement--and enacted under a power to enact regulatory
law.

(Parenthetically, one should note that a gas or electrical meter
inspection is not done by a "police officer," as a Firearms Act
section 99 or 101 inspection is.  A police officer is charged
with the duty to take notice of anything he sees which involves
crime, and to deal with it and anyone connected with it in
accordance with the Criminal Code or other criminal law--
regardless of how he came into contact with that thing.  A meter
person is not.)

The problem with understanding his position is that the federal
Parliament is vested with the power to enact regulatory laws
dealing with weights and measures, but is not vested with
any power to enact regulatory laws dealing with firearms.

According to the Constitution, any regulatory laws or licensing
scheme enacted to regulate or license firearms would have to be
enacted by a provincial Legislature.

That is hardly a novel interpretation of the situation.  In
Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for the
Dominion and the Distillers' and Brewers' Association of Ontario
(1896) AC 328, the Privy Council said:

"But great caution must be observed in distinguishing
that which is local and provincial, and therefore within the
jurisdiction of the provincial legislatures, and that which has
ceased to be merely local and provincial, and has become a matter
of national concern, in such sense as to bring it within the
jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada.  An Act restricting the
right to carry weapons of offence, or their sale to young
persons, within the province would be within the authority of
the provincial legislatures. [Emphasis added--NFA] (361-362)

In his comments at various times regarding Bill C-68, and
particularly the proposed new Firearms Act within it, the
Minister has said that Bill C-68 will be enacted using the power
vested in the federal Parliament to enact criminal law.

The position that he took before the Justice and Legal Affairs
Committee is in conflict with those earlier positions.  It is not
Constitutional to enact regulatory law by using the powers
vested in the federal Parliament to enact criminal law.  If
that were Constitutional, we could have a national Motor Vehicles
Act, and the federal Parliament would be collecting all the
licensing fees from that regulatory and licensing scheme.

In reverse, it is not Constitutional to enact criminal law
which is, "in pith and substance," not criminal in nature, but
regulatory.  If that were Constitutional, we could have a
Criminal Code which criminalized failure to insure a vehicle or
parking beyond the time paid for at a parking meter.

In his presentation, Mr. Rock frequently commented upon the
concept that certain Firearms Act offences should be "de-
criminalized."  That is a source of great confusion; if the
Firearms Act is criminal law, all the offences are
crimes; conviction implies both a criminal penalty and a criminal
record.

On the other hand, if the Firearms Act is regulatory law,
none of the offences are crimes; conviction implies neither a
criminal penalty nor a criminal record.

In sum, Mr. Rock seems badly confused.  His Firearms Act is to be
enacted under the criminal law powers, but is to be "a regime of
regulation" rather than proper criminal law.  Some of the
offences defined by it are to be prosecuted as criminal
offences, and others as regulatory offences.  He has even
suggested that, in some cases, the same offence may be prosecuted
as a criminal offence or as a regulatory offence, depending
upon, apparently, the whims of the Crown prosecutor.  

The Firearms Act, being divorced from the amendments to the
Criminal Code also proposed by Bill C-68, is vulnerable to an
overall Constitutional challenge on the basis that it is, "in
pith and substance," regulatory law and is therefore ultra vires
of the federal Parliament.  It seems likely that such a challenge
would succeed, and the entire Firearms Act would be struck down.

The Criminal Code amendments, insofar as they rely upon the
licensing scheme set forth in the Firearms Act (quite heavily, in
fact), would crash into confusion if the Firearms Act were to be
struck down.  One cannot prosecute for possession of a firearm
without a license--when the issuance of the license was the
subject of an Act which has been ruled unconstitutional.

If such a confused situation develops, the fiscal liability of
provincial Legislatures may well be governed by the diligence
with which they attempted to enforce an unconstitutional Act.

The financial liability of the federal Parliament for the
financial results of the situation are unclear, but it seems
likely that the federal Parliament will at least attempt to
refuse to accept any financial liability--and might succeed in
the courts with that position. 

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [7/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 15:30:01 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan
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						NFA PAPER III

THE SECURITY OF OTTAWA'S COMPUTERIZED REGISTRATION RECORDS

The computer hacker's crime is a peculiar one.  First, he must
identify the target computer, which must be attached to the
telephone lines through a modem or similar circuitry.

The target computer is accessible to legitimate callers, who
simply use their own devices to dial the phone number of the
target computer.  Once a connection is established, the programs
running in the target computer and the calling computer begin a
series of back-and-forth exchanges to solidify the link.

If the hacker has or can get the target computer's phone number,
he can get that far with no trouble at all.

The target computer's program includes a request for "the
password," which is transmitted to the calling computer.  The
caller then enters "the password" and it is transmitted from the
calling computer to the target computer.  The legitimate caller,
of course, has "the password" to enter.

If the hacker has "the password"--and he often does--he enters
the target computer, which is satisfied that it is dealing with a
legitimate caller who has legitimate access.  

"The password" can often be found by the hacker by eavesdropping
in the coffee shop, fishing in trashcans, or watching finger
movements from afar.  It may be found by using an "educated
guess," such as the legitimate caller's initials, vanity license
plate word, or the default password that his brand of computer
used when it arrived from the factory--and he never changed.

When using educated guesses, where the calling computer's
operator enters a wrong "password," the target computer will make
its request again, on the assumption that it was a typing error.

Depending upon its program, the repeated request may be repeated
indefinitely, or it may cease after three or four iterations,
when the incoming call is automatically classified as an
unauthorized attempt to "break into" the target computer.

Early programs used unlimited iteration, and hackers used an
endless series of guessed "passwords"; "AAAA, AAAB, AAAC..."

The limited-iteration system stopped that; but by the time it
became the norm, the hackers had become far more sophisticated.
they were better at gaining illegitimate access to passwords. 

A very sophisticated hacker can bypass the request for "the
password."  He simply enters a machine language code which is not
responsive to the request, but which communicates directly with
the "system"--the innermost machine language programming of the
computer which is running the "user-friendly" program containing
the request.  The "system" program is running the "user-friendly"
program--which is the only program a normal user ever sees.

The hacker's command stops the "user-friendly" program and begins
to alter the "system" program directly.  

Having achieved communication at this deeper level, a command as
simple as "jump forward 5 steps in the "user-friendly" program
running at the moment and restart it" will move the security
program beyond its request for "the password."   The "user-
friendly" will then happily continue, offering full access,
because it could not have reached that point in its program if
"the password" had not already been entered and recognized as
valid.  It therefore assumes that the "password" was given.

There are many variations, too many to cover here.  In both the
above types, there is no indication left in the target computer
that it has been burgled; as far as it knows, no unauthorized
caller was able to get by the "password" requirement.

In order to add security, a sophisticated protection system will
record the date, time, and phone number of every incoming call. 
For that to work, it is necessary to rigorously scan the lists
every day to ensure that there are no calls from any number that
should not have access.  That type of check is nearly impossible
if the broad access envisioned by C-68 is put into place.

A more sophisticated target computer will access the phone number
that it is being called from, compare it with a list of
"authorized" phone numbers, and permit the call to go as far as
the request for "the password" only if the number is on the list.

The very sophisticated hacker deals with that by learning one or
more phone numbers which are on the list.  He then has his
computer deceive the phone company's computer by convincing it
that the call is coming from a legitimate number.

That is only one small step away from having his long distance
telephone charges billed to someone else--a frequent hacker ploy. 

The registration program probably has at least two levels of
access.  To read the data, one internal password is requested; to
alter it, another password is requested.  These passwords are no
more difficult to beat than the entry passwords.

Recently, one of the world's best computer experts--a person who
designs computer security systems for the military and large
corporations for a living--became a target.  The hacker "broke
into" the small computer in the target's home, and looted it by
copying the target's files into the hacker's computer.

Using clues found in the small computer, the hacker then
established contact with the large mainframe computer used by the
target for major projects.  Electronically disguising himself, he
convinced the target mainframe computer that it was dealing with
the target's small home computer--when in fact it was dealing
with the hacker's home computer calling from a totally different
number than the one the mainframe was reading as the caller.

In that single incident, the hacker stole copies of over 20,000
files.  Many of those files were high-security files dealing with
ways to evade computer security systems and ways to prevent such
evasions.  Those files entered illegal circulation immediately.

The entry, in that case, was detected.  That is unusual; unlike
the very sophisticated target in that case, the RCMP's computers
are rather unsophisticated.  Their operators are not computer
nerds.  Machine language programming skills--an absolute
necessity for detecting and apprehending very sophisticated
hackers--are well beyond their area of expertise.  

The lesson is quite clear to anyone who understands computer
crime.  The training, cost and sophistication required to prevent
all illegal entry into the FRAS records of firearms ownership are
well beyond possibility.  We simply cannot afford the training,
salaries, and sophisticated equipment that would be required.

Even the level of sophistication required to detect that the
system has been illegally entered is apparently impossible.  The
FRAS system is apparently going to be accessible by every police
officer in Canada, via any phone link.  With a system that wide
open, illegal access is guaranteed--one way or another.

If illegal access is gained, the hacker then "downloads" files
into his own computer.  That does not mean that the files
disappear from the FRAS computer; the effect is the same as
opening a paper file, photocopying its contents, then replacing
the originals in the file: The next time the file is examined by
someone who has legitimate access, the file is exactly as it was
before the intrusion and copying.  The theft goes undetected.

The concept that the firearm and owner data will be kept in
separate data banks is poppycock.  The system has to be able to
tell the police about "John Brown" AND his "Luger pistol"--and
that can only be done by accessing BOTH data banks.  It has to be
easy to do that, because the police user is not a computer
expert.  If it is difficult to access both data banks at once,
the police user won't be able to do it, and the computerized
registration system will be useless to the police.

Whatever the legitimate user can do, the hacker can do.  In fact,
because the hacker is far more sophisticated than the normal
legitimate user, he can do much more with the computerized
registration system than the police can.

POSSIBILITIES:

The hacker may copy the FRAS files as they are found, happily
subdivide and edit them into marketable lists on his home
computer, then print and sell the lists:

"Name, Address, Number and Types of Rifles, by city."

"Name, Address, Number and Types of Shotguns, by city."

"Name, Address, Number and types of Handguns, by city."

"Name, Address, Number and types of Full Autos, by city."

He may also manipulate the FRAS files, as a prank.  For example,
he could write and start a simple program which says,

1. Copy the NAME on first registration to memory location 1

2. Go to next registration 

3. Copy the NAME on this registration to memory location 2

4. Copy the NAME from memory location 1 to this registration  

5. Move the NAME from memory location 2 to memory location 1

6. Go to instruction 2 and continue to run this program.

This type of "looping" program will interchange names in the
FRAS files until interrupted or until all NAME data had been
transferred to the wrong registration.  With any luck, FRAS would
not notice what had been done until after the next routine
backup, and its records would then be both hopelessly scrambled
and impossible to return to their former state without knowing
precisely what the scrambling program did and how it did it.

A more sophisticated hacker might substitute the street address
line or Rural Route number line instead of the NAME data.  Few
operators LOOK at that line while transcribing data in a firearms
transfer.  They may even scramble things in a worse way.  

The possibilities are limitless; for example, all address and
serial number data could be scrambled with the command, "If the
number is less than 100, add a random number between 10 and 80;
If the number is greater than 100, subtract a random number
between 10 and 80."  The probability of early detection of that
type of tampering is quite low.

It should be borne in mind that 25 to 40 per cent of all Canadian
households contain recreational firearms.  A percentage of those
people are also computer experts.  Undoubtedly, a few of that
percentage are hackers,and an irritated hacker is a severe danger
to any computer system--especially if he's good at hacking.

All statements made about the security of the registration system
and the impossibility of access to it are hogwash.  They should
be accepted in the same careful way one accepts a father's
certainty that his 23-year-old daughter is a virgin.

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [8/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 15:30:17 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan
Lines: 127
Sender: [email-masked]
Distribution: na
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NNTP-Posting-Host: skatter.usask.ca

						NFA PAPER IV

C-68: THE DEFINITION PROBLEMS--WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?

In "an Act respecting firearms and other weapons," the least one
should expect is that the drafters get the definitions of
"firearm" and "weapon" correct.  In Bill C-68, they did not. 

Faced with a golden opportunity to correct an inane situation,
the drafters failed to correct this problem: They still define
"firearm" as "a barrelled weapon" and their definition of
"weapon" says it includes "any firearm."  They are unchanged.

The two create an unbreakable loop; one cannot fully know the
definition of "firearm" until one knows the meaning of "weapon"
and vice versa.  That is gross linguistic incompetence.

Further, the current definition of "weapon" is so broad that any
female Member of Parliament who conceals a spare pair of panty
hose in her purse for reasons of personal modesty is guilty of
carrying a concealed weapon, contrary to s. 90, if she is aware
that any other person has ever been strangled with panty hose.

The offence in s. 90 is colored by R v. Coleman (1987), 59
CR (3d) Alta QB at pp 90-91, in which the broad definition
preceding the current definition (which is even broader) was
addressed.  Parliament, by use of the phrase "anything used,"
defined the word "weapon" to include "anything used" by anyone
in the general public to threaten, intimidate, injure or kill any
other person.  That is hopelessly vague and too broad.

The meaning of the word "concealed" was settled by R v.
Felawka (1993), 85 CCC (3d) 248 SCC at pp. 259 and 263:

... it would appear that the requisite intent or mental
element should be that the accused intended to hide from others
an object he knew to be a weapon...

In order to prove concealment it would have to be established
that the accused took steps to hide the weapon so that it would
not be observed or come to the notice of others.

Bill C-68 is riddled with similar evidence of incompetence in
law, ignorance of good English, and incoherence.  C-68 is not
repairable; it is necessary to start over again from scratch.

In the existing firearms sections of the Criminal Code, the
practice of putting closely-related sections far apart often
leads to errors and erroneus decisions.  Very few Crown
attorneys or defence attorneys even find all related sections.

These are classic examples of the incompetence of the officials
who drafted Bill C-68:

In the existing law, the definition of "firearm" is in CC s.
84(1) and the exceptions to that definition are in s. 84(2).

In C-68, the broad definition of "firearm" (which we will call
"firearm A") is moved to s. 2, but the exceptions are moved to s.
84(3), where they have the effect of re-defining certain
"firearms" under the s. 2 "firearm A" definition as non-firearms. 
This narrower definition (which we will call "firearm B") means
that some "firearm A" firearms are not "firearms" under some (but
not all) sections of the Criminal Code, but are under others.

S. 86(3)'s "it-is-not-a-firearm" exceptions only apply to the 14
sections of the Criminal Code dealing with "firearm B" firearms.

In at least 41 other Criminal Code sections, the broad "firearm
A" definition applies.  The narrower "firearm B" definition
[modified by s. 84(3)] applies throughout the Firearms Act. 

Therefore, whenever one reads the word "firearm" in a criminal
charge, one must consider whether the exceptions apply ("firearm
B definition"), or not ("firearm A" definition).

For example, paintball guns fall into the "firearm A" definition,
but not the "firearm B" definition.  Because a paintball gun is
exempted from s. 91 under s. 84(3), a CC s. 91(1) charge of
possessing it without a license or a registration certificate
will fail; it is not a firearm for the purposes of s. 91.

However, a charge under CC s. 87 of pointing a "firearm"
(paintball gun) at another person will succeed.  It is a
"firearm" for the purposes of s. 87,  according to s. 84(3).

The word "weapon" is defined in CC s. 2.  It includes a paintball
gun, because it defines "any firearm" as a "weapon."  S. 84(3)
does not apply for the purposes of s. 2, so a s. 2 "firearm" 
comes under the "firearm A" definition.  Therefore, carrying a
paintball gun in a bag or out of sight in a vehicle is a
criminal offence, carrying a concealed weapon, under CC s. 90.

The technical aspects of firearms mechanisms are among the most
difficult and esoteric mechanical matters ever considered by the
courts.  There are very few firearms experts in Canada, and they
tend to be people who are expert only in one area, such as
sporting rifles and shotguns, or handguns, or military firearms.

The government has often suffered from this want of genuine
expertise, but the FA s. 117.13 solution is not good.  In that
section, it is proposed that when an "analyst" (the word is not
defined within the Criminal Code) supplies "a certificate," that
certificate "is evidence" in proceedings on firearms matters.

In most firearms cases, the "analyst" will turn out to be a
police officer with minimal qualifications to give technical
evidence.  The firearms field has a long history of cases which
have been determined on the basis of inadequate evidence supplied
by an ill-trained officer banking on the authority of the uniform
and the ignorance of the applicant's or defendant's counsel.

THIS IS NOT A CRIME CONTROL ISSUE; THIS IS AN INCOMPETENCE ISSUE.

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [9/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 15:37:52 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan
Lines: 129
Sender: [email-masked]
Distribution: na
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Reply-To: [email-masked]
NNTP-Posting-Host: skatter.usask.ca

						NFA PAPER IXA

WHY EXTRA PENALTIES FOR GUN USE DO NOT WORK

In a study done by the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, it
was found that there were some 600,000 convictions in 1991-92,
but only 12,287 were convictions for violent crimes.

Criminal Code section 85 imposes an extra penalty of one to 14
years, to be served consecutively, for using a gun in a crime.
In only 52 of those 12,287 cases was the criminal convicted under
CC s. 85.  In 100 per cent of those 52 convictions, the sentence
was the minimum allowed by s. 85: one year of imprisonment.

From those figures, Canada appears to have no serious problems
with criminals armed with firearms.  If criminals were armed with
firearms in only 52 out of the 12,287 violent crimes for which
convictions were obtained, then the problem is clearly minimal.  

However, "Research on the Application of Section 85 of the
Criminal Code of Canada WD1994-20e" states [p. 26], "Of charges
laid under section 85, approximately two-thirds are typically
stayed, withdrawn or dismissed."  

WD1994-20e also says [Exhibit III-5] that 24 per cent of the
accused were found guilty or pled guilty in 1991, 1992, and 1993. 
Only 4 to 8 per cent were found not guilty, but 67 to 70 per cent
of such charges were "withdrawn, dismissed or discharged."

There are apparently three lessons to be drawn from this data:
First, it is quite rare for a s. 85 charge to actually be laid
against an armed violent criminal.

Second, where such a charge is actually laid, the chance of the
charge resulting in conviction is 24 per cent, mainly because the
charge is usually withdrawn before the judge can consider it.

Third, the singling out of firearms for special charges is wrong. 
The criminal justice system reacts badly to imposing a mandatory
penalty that runs consecutively to any other sentence for being
armed with a firearm during the crime, while no extra penalty is
imposed for being armed with or threatening, injuring or even
killing a victim with any other type of weapon.

Police, prosecutors and judges are loath to lay the charge, eager
to plea bargain it away, and reluctant to impose the mandatory
extra sentence--probably because the singling out of one type of
weapon without consideration being given to how or whether the
weapon was actually used seems both unfair and unjust.

If the word "weapon" had been used instead of the word "firearm"
in s. 85, those three problems would probably not be so severe,
and s. 85 might be used more effectively.  As it is, it is an
ineffective deterrent--because it is not used in the real world.

In Bill C-68, the same blunder is repeated.  Being armed with a
firearm is given special status, even where the firearm is not
used, or even if it is only a harmless imitation of a firearm. 
At the same time, a criminal armed with--or even actually
using--an axe, knife, machete or other deadly weapon is not at
risk from the proposed legislation.  Simply stated, no deterrence
can be imposed on them by legislation silent on their armament.

Clearly, the legislation makes no sense if the intent is to deter
violent crime and prevent injury or death of victims.

A little more research into this type of proposal suggests
easily-predictable but quite horrifying results.  WD1994-20e also
tells us [Exhibit III-6, p. 24] that in over half of all s. 85
cases, the attached violent crime was armed robbery.

For the period 1988-91, "Weapons and Violent Crime" [Canadian
Centre for Justice Statistics, 1991, p. 12] tells us that 94.6
per cent of weapons causing injury or death to robbery victims
were not firearms.  Only 5.4 per cent of injured or killed
victims were injured or killed by firearms.

During the same 1988-91 period, 71.2 per cent of total robberies
were non-firearm and 28.8 per cent were firearm robberies. 
Comparing the two sets of data clearly indicates that victims are
5 times less likely to be injured or killed if the robber uses a
firearm.  That seems strange, but there is good reason for it.

In a major study reported in his book, "Point Blank: Guns and
Violence in America," Professor G. Kleck reported that the reason
for the shortage of injuries and deaths in firearms robbery cases
was that firearms can be used to control behavior at a distance,
but nearly all other weapons required the armed robber to be
within touching distance of his victim in order to make the
threat seem real.

Where robber and victim are in such close proximity, the
likelihood of the weapon being used is much higher.  Almost
anything can trigger the escalation from threat to violence.

It makes very little sense to deter robbers from using firearms,
with the predictable result is that if they switch to other
weapons, the injury and death rates will go up instead of down. 
If the word "weapon" had been used instead of the word "firearm"
throughout the proposed legislation, it might make some sense. 
As is, it does not.

A particularly asinine part of the proposed legislation is the
inclusion of "replica" (imitation) firearms.  The only possible
effect of such a provision is to drive the criminal away from
harmless imitation firearms, and toward real deadly weapons.

Instead of being encumbered with a handful that cannot do any
harm, the legislation proposes to push the criminal toward a real
gun, a knife, or a machete.  That is counterproductive.

We are fully aware that the new legislation, if enacted, will
suffer the same fate as s. 85--underused, underenforced, and a
waste of effort.  We are not impressed.

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [10/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 15:38:06 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan
Lines: 122
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						NFA PAPER IXB

ACTUAL VERSUS THEORETICAL STATISTICS AND EFFECTS

Canada, 1991: 67 per cent of accused murderers had a previous
criminal record, including charges dismissed or plea bargained
away.  Source: "Homicide in Canada 1991," Canadian Centre for
Justice Statistics (CCJS, a government office), Oct 92, p 15.

Canada, 1991: 45 per cent of homicide victims had a previous
criminal record, including charges dismissed or plea bargained
away.  Obviously, a lot of our homicides are disputes between
criminals, criminal revenge, or drug-related robberies.  Source:
"Homicide in Canada, 1991," CCJS, Oct 92, p 15.

Interpretation: Most Canadian murders are part of the criminal
subculture.  They are unlikely to be affected by gun control
laws, which, by their nature, affect only the law-abiding.

Canada, 1988-91: 94.9 per cent of all violent crime was
non-firearm; it was sharp or blunt instruments, hands or feet. 
Source: CCJS

England/Wales 1991: 97.0 per cent of all violent crime was
non-firearm; it was sharp or blunt instruments, hands or feet.
Source: "Information on the Criminal Justice System in England
and Wales," p 9.

Interpretation: Attacks on the criminal use of firearms cannot
have cost-effective effects on our violent crime rates.  At every
point where the word "firearm" is used in legislative attacks on
violent crime, the word should have been "weapon."

US robberies, 1991: 40.0 per cent involved firearms; 60.0 per
cent did not.  Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports.

Canadian robberies, 1988-1991: 28.8 per cent involved
firearms; 71.2 per cent did not.  Source: CCJS.

Canadian robberies, 1976-1992: 30.6 per cent involved
firearms; 69.4 per cent did not. There were 416,786, an average
of 26,174 per year.  Source: CCJS.

Canadian robberies, 1988-1991: 94.6 per cent of robbery victim
injuries or deaths were caused by sharp or blunt instruments,
hands or feet.  5.5 per cent were caused by firearms.  Source:
"Weapons and Violent Crime," CCJS 1991, p 12.

Interpretation: Victims are about five times less likely to be
injured or killed in a robbery when the robber is using a
firearm.  Therefore, to the extent that legislative attacks on
the use of firearms in robberies are successful, the result will
be a five-fold increase in the number of injured or dead victims.

Dr. Kleck reports the same phenomenon in the US.  Why? 
Obviously, use of almost any other weapon requires the criminal
to be within arm's reach of his victim for the threat to be real.

If anything disturbs the criminal--resistance, alarm sounding,
another customer entering, etc.--the victim is immediately
injured or killed.  If the criminal has a firearm, he controls
his victim at a distance, and has a better chance of controlling
two or more people at once.  He has more time for thought, and
knows that firing the firearm will attract unwanted attention. 

Those two factors account for the low injury/death rates in
firearms robberies.  True, the firearm is more lethal; but the
likelihood of it being actually used on the victim is so much
lower that it is unintelligent to attack its use by criminals.

Canada, 1961-90: 15,097 homicides, average 520 per year.  Of
those, 62.8 per cent (9481) were non-firearm; 15.2 per cent
(2295) were by no-registration-required rifles; 5.8 per cent
(876) were by no-registration-required shotguns; 13.1 per cent
(1978) were by registration-required firearms, but their
registration status was not determined; 0.7 per cent (106) were
by registration-required firearms whose status was determined as
being registered (although they may have been stolen from the
registered owner years before), and 2.4 per cent (362) were by
firearm of unrecorded type.  Source: CCJS

Interpretation: At only about 200 firearms homicides per year,
the Canadian homicide numbers are too low for meaningful
statistics to be calculated other than by grouping several years
worth of data into a single data set.

In Canada, most homicides fall into two categories: Homicide by a
criminal, often with a criminal victim, as part of criminal
activities (drug transfer disputes, etc.) and domestic homicide
involving alcohol and/or drugs in situations of poverty and
despair, mostly on Indian reservations, where firearms, daily
necessities used in hunting for food, cannot be removed.

Canada 1992, Alcohol/Drug abuse by accused murderers:  52.0 per
cent (331) had abused alcohol or drugs; 27.4 per cent (174) had
not; and 20.6 per cent (131) were unrecorded.

Canada 1992, Alcohol/Drug abuse by murder victims:  40.2 per
cent (294) had abused alcohol or drugs; 38.3 per cent (280) had
not; and 21.6 per cent (158) were unrecorded.

Interpretation: Alcohol and drug abuse are factors which cause
murders, but firearms are only instruments for committing the
minor percentage of murders in which firearms are used.  Firearms
do not cause murders; they are simply neutral tools chosen by a
person, often drunk or stoned, who decides to murder.  The
decision to murder necessarily comes earlier than the decision as
to the tool or instrument to be used for the murder. 

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [11/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 15:30:34 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan
Lines: 127
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						NFA PAPER VA

CRIME AND OUR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

Have you ever noticed that there's no definition of the word
"crime" in our Criminal Code?  That's important.

It's a crime to acquire any firearm--today.  No, that's neither
false nor a bad joke; it's what the Criminal Code says, in
section 97(3).  The penalty is up to two years imprisonment. 

The government will sell you a Firearms Acquisition Certificate
(FAC), which is a defence to that charge.  That means you're
guilty, but cannot be convicted--because you bought a defence.

That sounds completely insane, so let's explore further:

Three people you know each possess one unregistered handgun, a
Criminal Code offence; each is a criminal, committing a crime.

John has a souvenir Chinese pistol he picked up during his
service in the Korean war.  He will not try to register it,
because he's afraid the police will confiscate it.

Susan has a .22 rimfire target pistol that she occasionally uses
to knock over tin cans out on her acreage.

Clive has a .38 revolver that he uses to hold up gas stations and
milk stores.

If you are like most Canadians, you will turn Clive in to the
police, but not John or Susan.  Why?  Only Clive is evil.

There's a gut-level definition of the word "crime"--which isn't
to be found in the Criminal Code, nor in the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.  Most Canadians use it, without knowing what
it is.  You just used it when judging John, Susan and Clive.

Back about 1750, Sir William Blackstone pointed out that if you
enjoy the three Absolute Rights--the rights to personal
security, personal liberty and personal property--you are free. 
No one can coerce you.  If no one can injure, kill, libel or
infect you (personal security); detain, kidnap, or imprison you
(personal liberty); or take, damage or destroy your property--how
can anyone force you to do anything you don't want to do?

A crime is the inverse of an Absolute Right.  If someone
threatens, attacks or destroys one of your Absolute Rights, he's
committing a crime, which is criminal.  He is attacking your
basis of freedom--and that's what is meant by "crime."

There are levels of attack: deliberately acting with wanton and
reckless disregard for the fact that the action genuinely
threatens one of your Absolute Rights (criminal negligence) is a
crime. Deliberately taking, threatening, injuring, or destroying
your person or your property is a crime.  Is that simplistic?

Try to think of any "crime" which does not injure or genuinely
threaten an Absolute Right--and for which you would call the
police and turn in the "criminal."  Difficult, isn't it?

Society's punishment for the criminal is imposing an appropriate
injury to one or more of his Absolute Rights in fair exchange
for the injury he did to another's Absolute Rights.  Earlier
Parliaments understood all this; our present one, apparently not.

Many Canadians no longer blindly support our criminal justice
system.  Neither our government nor most government employees
working within the criminal justice system really understand why. 
The reasons are quite simple:

1.  The Criminal Code has been weakened by enacting
inappropriate "crimes" into it.  They aren't accepted as true
crimes, so public support for the Code is weakened.

2.  The criminal justice system is imposing inappropriate
injuries to the rights of those convicted of "crimes."

First example: It is a criminal offence [under Criminal Code
section 97(3)] to acquire a .22 rimfire target rifle for biathlon
use, but an FAC can prevent you from being convicted.  

Your .22 biathlon rifle has a broken firing pin.  You borrow your
brother's rifle to use in the match.  That is a criminal offence,
because your FAC has expired.  Does that make sense to you?

It is inappropriate that an innocent act is criminalized.  That
is not rational criminal law.  If an action is evil, it should be
punished; if it isn't, it shouldn't be a "crime."

Bill C-68, if enacted, provides for a "license" to replace the
FAC, which makes things worse.  The FAC is a "defence against a
criminal charge", but a "license" is government permission to
commit the crime!  "Licensing" crimes is a very strange concept.

Second example: A few years ago, in Edmonton, a thug demanded,
at knife point, that a courier hand over what he was carrying. 
The courier refused, and the thug killed him with his knife.

The thug's crime was plea-bargained down to manslaughter, and he
was sentenced to seven years imprisonment.  He lost his liberty.

Three years later, he escaped--from the custody of a female
nurse--while attending the Ice Capades.  That is a fact.

The inappropriate charge resulted in seven years, which was an
inappropriate penalty: The courier lost his life through a
deliberate crime, and his killer will be back on the streets far
too quickly.

It was inappropriate that his loss of liberty penalty was eased	
so early, and in such a silly fashion.  It was inappropriate that
he was where, when, with whom he was, at the time of his escape.

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [12/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 15:30:48 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan
Lines: 126
Sender: [email-masked]
Distribution: na
Message-ID: <[email-masked]>
Reply-To: [email-masked]
NNTP-Posting-Host: skatter.usask.ca

						NFA PAPER VB

ABSOLUTE RIGHTS, CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS

Three people you know each possess one unregistered handgun, a
Criminal Code offence; each is a criminal, committing a crime.

John has a souvenir Chinese pistol he picked up during his
service in the Korean war.  He will not try to register it,
because he's afraid the police will confiscate it.

Susan has a .22 rimfire target pistol that she occasionally uses
to knock over tin cans out on her acreage.

Clive has a .38 revolver that he uses to hold up gas stations and
milk stores.

If you are like most Canadians, you will turn Clive, the
criminal, in to the police, but not John or Susan.  But why?

There is a fundamental perception of justice, based on the
correct definition of the word "crime."  That word is not defined
in the Criminal Code, nor in the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms --but most Canadians have an unstated, gut-level
definition.  You just used it when judging John, Susan and Clive.

About 1750, Sir William Blackstone pointed out that if you have
what he called the three Absolute Rights--the rights to personal
security, personal liberty and personal property--you are free. 
No one can coerce you.  If no one can injure, kill, libel or
infect you (personal security); detain, kidnap, or imprison you
(personal liberty); or take, damage or destroy your property--
how can he coerce you to do anything you do not want to do?

A crime is the inverse of an Absolute Right.  If someone
threatens, attacks or destroys one of your Absolute Rights, he is
committing a crime, and he is a criminal.  There are levels of
attack: deliberately acting with wanton and reckless disregard
for the fact that the action genuinely threatens one of your
Absolute Rights (criminal negligence), or deliberately taking,
threatening, injuring, or destroying you or your property.  

You have called the police, and are about to turn in a criminal. 
Try to think of any "crime" which does not injure or genuinely
threaten an Absolute Right for which you would take that action.

Punishment for the criminal is simply imposing an appropriate
injury to one or more of his Absolute Rights in fair exchange for
the injury that he has done to the Absolute Rights of another.

Our criminal justice system has fallen into a state of disrepute
with the general public, and neither our government nor the
government employees working within the criminal justice system
understand why.  The reasons are quite simple:

1.  The Criminal Code is riddled with "crimes" which do
not meet the standard, and so are not accepted as true crimes
by Canadians.

2.  The criminal justice system is imposing inappropriate
injuries to the rights of those convicted of "crimes."

As a #1 example: It is a criminal offence [s. 97(3)] to acquire a
.22 rimfire target rifle for biathlon use.  The government will
sell you a specifically-tailored defence to that particular
criminal charge (a Firearms Acquisition Certificate or FAC).  An
FAC prevents you from being convicted.  It is inappropriate that
an innocent action is criminalized, and that you are then
exempted from conviction and punishment by a certificate you must 
buy from the government.  That is not rational criminal law.

Bill C-68, if enacted, provides for a "license" to replace the
FAC, which compounds the problem--the government criminalizes the
innocent action, then sells you permission to commit the crime.  

Objectively, Bill C-68 looks like a protection racket.  Canadian
governments have already taken over many Mafia money-making
schemes: the numbers racket (Lotto 6/49), other gambling, the
booze racket (Liquor Control Board Outlets).  One wonders if the
courts will support Bill C-68's interesting extension of that.

As an #2 example: A few years ago, in Edmonton, a thug demanded,
at knife point, that a courier hand over what he was carrying. 
The courier refused, and the thug killed him with the knife.

The thug's crime was plea-bargained down to manslaughter, and he
was sentenced to 7 years imprisonment: He lost his liberty.

3 Years later, he escaped--from the custody of a female nurse--
while attending the Ice Capades.  It is inappropriate that he was
considered to be suffering from loss of liberty at the time.

7 years was an inappropriate penalty; the courier lost his life
through a deliberate crime, and his killer will be back on the
streets far too quickly.  It was inappropriate that his loss of
Absolute Right penalty was mitigated so early, and in such a
silly fashion.  It was inappropriate that he was where he was,
when he was, with whom he was, at the time of his escape.

Every time the government puts things which do not meet the
standard for "true crimes" into the Criminal Code, it drives
wedges between citizen and lawmaker, between citizen and law
enforcement officer, between citizen and criminal justice system,
and between the citizen and the law.  That is unwise.

Enacting Bill C-68 would be unwise.  Attempting to disguise what
the government is doing by renaming parts of the Criminal Code as
"the Firearms Act" does nothing to help alleviate the problem,
particularly when the Firearms Act is enacted under the federal
government's power to enact criminal law, and Part III of the
Criminal Code is so thoroughly entwined into the Firearms Act.

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [13/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 15:35:46 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan
Lines: 128
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						NFA PAPER VII

EFFECTS OF BILL C-68 ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES

A special study of Bill C-68 was made to determine the
government's reaction to the Oka situation.  As usual with Bill
C-68, the intent is camouflaged and the related provisions are
widely scattered.  The Liberals don't want this recognized.
Firearms Act section 110/117 is the most obvious move:

110/117. The Governor in Council may make regulations...

(t) respecting the manner in which any provision of this
Act or the regulations applies to any of the aboriginal peoples
of Canada, and adapting any provision for the purposes of that
application.

That is very broad language, and opens the door for the Minister
of Justice to issue Orders in Council which completely change the
law's application, as far as it applies to "any of the aboriginal
peoples."  Worded that way, the Orders in Council can be Orders
which only apply to a single aboriginal people or reserve. Orders
in Council can have positive effects for the people, or very
negative effects; the broad language is wide open to abuse.

For example, FA s. 110/117(h) allows the Minister to issue an
Order in Council that every firearm belonging to an aboriginal
people shall be stored in the custody of the local police
detachment, and s. 110/117(a) allows him to issue an Order in
Council that renders any aboriginal people ineligible to hold a
firearms license.  S. 110/117 is powerful and open to abuse.

FA s. 111/118 says that each such Order in Council must be laid
before each House of Parliament for 30 sitting days before it
comes into force; but s. 112/119 eliminates that problem.

112/119.(1) No proposed regulation that has been laid
[before each House] pursuant to section 111/118 need again be
laid under that section, whether or not it has been
altered.

That means that once the Minister has issued a single Order in
Council under s. 110/117(t), he never has to place another one
before Parliament.  He can change it all, without scrutiny.

As an example of how this can work, an Order in Council called
"The Aboriginal Peoples Regulations" might ease the legislation's
effects for all aboriginal peoples.  When the people of one
reserve become militant, an Order in Council could immediately
make it illegal for anyone from that reserve to be in possession
of any firearm by revoking all their licenses and registrations--
for example, through s. 110/117(b) or (o):

110/117. The Governor in Council may make regulations...

(b) respecting the revocation of licenses, registration
certificates and authorizations...

(o) creating offences consisting of contravention of the
regulations made under paragraph (d), (e), (f), (g), (i), (j),
(l), (m), or (n)...

The power that the Minister enjoys through the combination of FA
s. 110/117, 111/118, and 112/119 is unbelievable.  When we add to
it the power of FA s. 98/101 to 101/105 plus 107/111 inclusive,
one wonders if one is still in Canada.

S. 112/119(6) says that Orders in Council issued under the
Criminal Code do not require Parliamentary scrutiny.  They are
the Orders with the most severe punitive effects, and one would
expect that they therefore should be scrutinized carefully.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE: FA s. 99/101 authorizes any person
"designated by the provincial Minister" [s. 98/100] to "enter and
inspect any place" where he "believes... there is a firearm,...
ammunition,... or a record [of] any of those things".

While inside, he may "open any container...", "examine any
firearm and... any other thing and take samples (which he may
dispose of in any manner that he considers appropriate)",
"conduct any tests or analyses", and "require any person to
produce... any records."

He may also "use any data processing system at the place to
examine any data... available to the system [say, through the
Internet?  NFA], reproduce any record... and remove [it]", and
"[copy] any record... or other document."

True, s. 101/103 says he may not enter a dwelling house--unless
he gets a warrant under s. 99/101's terms.  That means that he
must tell a justice that he "believes... there is a firearm,...
ammunition,... or a record [of] any of those things" in the
private home he wants to ransack, and that he has some reason to
believe that the owner objects to his idea.  Easy enough, no?

Note that he does NOT have to swear that he knows or even
suspects that any crime is involved.  The sections authorize him
to get a warrant and ransack the home of any person in Canada
who has a firearm, a cartridge, or a record of either.

FA s. 100/102 then provides that "The owner or person in charge
of a place that is inspected [with or without a warrant] and
every person found in the place shall give" the inspecting person
(a)"all reasonable assistance to enable him or her to... exercise
any power conferred by section 99/101; and (b) provide the
inspecting person "with any information relevant to the
enforcement of this Act or the regulations [made under s.
110/117(a) to (v)] or Part III of the Criminal Code that he or
she may reasonably require" under s. 107/111 threat of prison.

Whatever happened to a Canadian's right to remain silent until
competent legal advice is available?  What happened to our
Charter right to freedom from unreasonable search or seizure?

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [14/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 15:37:17 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan
Lines: 258
Sender: [email-masked]
Distribution: na
Message-ID: <[email-masked]>
Reply-To: [email-masked]
NNTP-Posting-Host: skatter.usask.ca

						NFA PAPER VIIIA

THE POWERS IN BILL C-68 REGARDING CONFISCATIONS

While the Minister of Justice has frequently stated that he has
no intent to arbitrarily confiscate firearms, cartridges and
firearms accessories, the power to do so is built into his Bill
C-68.  It is a fact that the Bill offers enormous potential for
abuse to this and any future Minister of Justice.

Another Bill, C-84, sounds an ominous note.  In section 2, it
defines "regulatory authority" thus:

"regulatory authority" means, with respect to a
regulation or other document, the authority authorized to make
the document but, if the document (e.g., an Order in Council)
is authorized to be made by the Governor in Council, it
means the Minister who recommends the document to the Governor
in Council [emphasis added--NFA].

That is no surprise; it merely strips away the polite fiction
that the Governor really sits down with his Council to consider
and issue Orders in Council.  Orders in Council are, and always
have been, mere products of individual Ministers.  It does,
however, significantly clarify the intentions of Bill C-68 for
those previously unaware of the realities of Order in Council.

There have been two significant amendments to Bill C-68.  In its
original form, C-68's Criminal Code Part III section 117.15 said:

117.15 (1) Subject to subsection (2), the Governor in
Council may make regulations prescribing anything that by this
Part is to be or may be prescribed.

(2) In making regulations, the Governor in Council may not
prescribe any thing to be a prohibited firearm, a restricted
firearm, a prohibited weapon, a restricted weapon, a prohibited
device, or prohibited ammunition if, in the opinion of the
Governor in Council, the thing to be prescribed is reasonable
for use in Canada for hunting or sporting purposes [emphasis
added--NFA].

That wording vests this or any future Minister (thinly disguised
as the Governor in Council) with the power to convert every
firearm, cartridge and firearm accessory in Canada to
"prohibited" status.  That, in turn, allows confiscation without
payment of compensation to the owners--a practice that may not be
lawful, but which has already been extensively used in Canada.

The underlined clause also has an effect that is not obvious to
anyone unfamiliar with firearms law precedents.  Where the
"thing to be prescribed" actually is "reasonable for use
in Canada for hunting or sporting purposes," the clause "in
the opinion of the Governor in Council" blocks any court
consideration of the fact that the Governor in Council might be
in error.

Any attempt to overturn an Order in Council of this type founders
on this rock: The court cannot substitute its own opinion for
the opinion specified in the law.  His power is absolute.

An objection to that view of the situation is raised by C-68's
Firearms Act section 111 [now renumbered as s. 118], which
requires "each proposed regulation" to be "laid before
each House of Parliament" for "thirty sitting days."

Unfortunately, that protection is meaningless. In order to
protect and further enhance the absolute power vested in the
Minister by CC s. 117.15, C-68's Firearms Act section 112(6) [now
renumbered as 119(6)] says:

119. (6) For greater certainty, a regulation may be made
under Part III of the Criminal Code without being laid before
either House of Parliament [emphasis added--NFA].

The House of Commons' Justice and Legal Affairs Committee
apparently saw the danger of vesting wide and possibly damaging
powers in a single Minister, without scrutiny by either
Parliament or the courts.  It amended CC s. 117.15(2) to read:  

117.15 (1) Subject to subsection (2), the Governor in
Council may make regulations prescribing anything that by this
Part is to be or may be prescribed.

(2) In making regulations, the Governor in Council may not
prescribe any thing to be a prohibited firearm, a restricted
firearm, a prohibited weapon, a restricted weapon, a prohibited
device, or prohibited ammunition if the thing to be prescribed is
reasonable for use in Canada for hunting or sporting purposes
[emphasis added--NFA].

That judicious alteration had the effect of opening the
Minister's personal opinion to scrutiny by the courts.  In the
event that some future Minister issued an Order in Council that
reclassified every .22 calibre single shot rifle in Canada to
"prohibited firearm" status, his opinion could be submitted to
judicial scrutiny.  If the court found that a .22 calibre single
shot rifle was indeed "reasonable for use in Canada for
hunting or sporting purposes," the court would have the power to
void the defective Order in Council. 

Alas, it ws not to be.  The Minister rejected the Committee's
amendment, and returned CC s. 117.15 to its absolute form.  He
apparently prefers that form of authority, neither subject to the
scrutiny of Parliament nor overturnable in a court of law.

When one bears in mind that this same Minister has already issued
Orders in Council that convert some 58 per cent of the 1.2
million "restricted" firearms in Canada to "prohibited" status,
the future look rather bleak.  It is already ordered, by Order in
Council, that well over 600,000 items of legally acquired and
legally owned property will be confiscated by the state without
payment of any compensation to their owners.

That represents a net loss of over $120,000,000 to the owners of
that legally-owned property, either immediately, or to the heirs
to the property on the death of the current owner.

Positively preventing both Parliamentary scrutiny and judicial
review of such sweeping powers--especially powers placed into in
the hands of a single Minister, and only subject to his personal
opinion judgements--seems questionable.

If the government does not intend to issue Orders in Council to
"prohibit" firearms and other things that are "reasonable for
use in Canada for hunting or sporting purposes," why does the
government insist--to the point of overriding the Justice and
Legal Affairs Committee--that neither Parliamentary scrutiny nor
judicial review of the Minister's actions are acceptable to it?

Another major worry lies in FA s. 121 [127], where today's
registration certificates are "grandfathered" to be registration
certificates as defined by C-68.  Each certificate is "deemed
to be a registration certificate issued under [FA] section 58."

Then, FA s. 121(2) [127(2)] says this:

121. (2) [127 (2)] A registration certificate...expires
on the earlier of [emphasis added--NFA]...

(b) December 31, 2002, or such other date as is
prescribed.

The Minister of Justice has repeatedly said that acquiring a
registration certificate is a one-time effort to obtain a
document that is good for the life of its holder.  FA s. 121
[127] clearly states that all 1.2 million current registration
certificates will be "grandfathered" and considered to be
registration certificates of the new c-68 type.  It then forces
the expiry of those certificates by 31 Dec 2002 at the latest.

From the wording of FA s. 121(2) [127(2)], it is clear that this
or any future Minister can issue an Order in Council which states
that every registration certificate in Canada expires tomorrow.

Where such an Order in Council is issued, C-68's CC s. 91 and 92
criminalize the owner of the previously registered firearm, and
make him liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five
years (CC s. 92) or ten years (CC s. 92).

The term of up to five years imprisonment imposed by CC s. 91 for
possession without knowledge that the Order in Council has been
issued is particularly disturbing.  The vast majority of
Canadians do not subscribe to the Canada Gazette.  They will
probably take some time to find out that they have been
criminalized by the Minister's Order in Council.

Another worrying point is that there is no mechanism in the
administrative procedures of Bill C-68 to renew a registration
certificate which has expired through the effects of FA s. 121
[127].  While the principles of fundamental justice require a
hearing on the question of such a renewal, C-68 is completely
silent on how the owner could even apply for a renewal.

Is it the intent of the government to use FA s. 121(2)(b) to
confiscate the 1.2 million firearms, worth over $240 million,
currently owned by law-abiding Canadians on 31 Dec 2002, or
earlier by an Order in Council, by refusing all attempts to renew
the 1.2 million expired registration certificates?

If that is not the government's intent, then why are these
provisions in Bill C-68?  If the government has no intention of
abusing the power to issue an Order in Council that forces the
expiry of any or all of the 1.2 million registration certificates
currently held by Canadians, why does FA s. 112(5) [119(5)] say:

112. (5) [119. (5)] A regulation may be made under
paragraph 110(v) [117(w)] prescribing a date for the purposes of
the application of any provision of this Act without being
laid before either House of Parliament [emphasis added--NFA]. 

Any Order in Council which sets a date for expiry of any or all
of those 1.2 million registration certificates cannot be attacked
in the courts, because there are no criteria limiting the
Minister as to how or why he may issue such an Order in Council.

As a result of FA s. 112(5) [119(5)], there is no Parliamentary
scrutiny of such an Order in Council.

Again, this or any future Minister is vested with absolute
power.  If C-68 passes, Parliament gives up its power to
scrutinize, and the courts are neutered.  If C-68 passes, the
absolute powers vested in the Minister are truly frightening.

There is a good deal of unrest in Canada, and many are worrying
that the government's long-term agenda includes confiscation of
all privately-owned firearms.  The government continually
protests that it has no such intentions.  

The present Minister's early pronouncements included statements
that he could see no reason why anyone other than a soldier or a
police officer--both employees of the state--should be allowed
to possess or use firearms.  While he later modified that
position, it has not been forgotten. 

If the government has no intent to confiscate, seven questions arise:

1.  Why does FA s. 112(6) prevent Parliamentary scrutiny
of CC s. 117.15 Orders in Council that confiscate private
property without paying for it?

2.  Why does CC s. 117.15 vest the Minister with absolute
power to confiscate any and all firearms?

3.  Why was the clause that prevented court scrutiny of CC 117.15
Orders in Council, which was deleted by the Justice and Legal
Affairs Committee from CC 117.15(2), returned to its original
position by the Minister before the House passed C-68?

4.  Why are both Parliamentary scrutiny and court review of CC s.
117.15/FA s. 112(6) [119(6)] Orders in Council prevented by Bill
C-68?

5.  Why does FA s. 121(2)(b) [127(2)(b)] force "permanent"
registration certificates to expire on 31 Dec 2002?

6.  Why does FA s. 121(2)(b) [127(2)(b)] vest the Minister with
absolute power to force "permanent" registration certificates to
expire at any earlier date chosen by him through Order in
Council issued by him?

7.  Why are both Parliamentary scrutiny and court review of FA s.
121(2)(b)/112(5) [127(2)(b)/119(5)] Orders in Council prevented
by Bill C-68?

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [15/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 15:38:16 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan
Lines: 125
Sender: [email-masked]
Distribution: na
Message-ID: <[email-masked]>
Reply-To: [email-masked]
NNTP-Posting-Host: skatter.usask.ca

						NFA PAPER X

THE GRANDFATHERING MESS IN BILL C-68

The fundamental principle of "grandfathering" is bringing the law
into disrepute.  On the one hand, Parliament is saying that the
firearms converted to "prohibited weapon" status (either by Order
in Council or by legislation) are so dangerous to society that
they must be eliminated.  On the other hand, Parliament is saying
that those same firearms are so safe in our society that the
owners can keep them until they die, and continue to buy, sell
and trade them.  One of those concepts has to be wrong.

Bill C-68 makes certain knives "prohibited weapons" which
cannot be imported, bought, sold or traded by anyone.  That is
clear, but its conditions regarding "prohibited firearms" are far
less clear:  They are treated like "restricted firearms" under FA
s. 12 (6) and 26/27(b), or like unrestricted firearms  under FA s.
12(2) to (5) and 26/27(a), but not like "prohibited weapons."  

That is curious; the "prohibited firearms" are, when in the hands
of someone who is malicious, untrained or incompetent, far more
dangerous than the knives selected as "prohibited weapons."  

Bill C-68 proposes subdividing "prohibited firearms" into 5
groups, owned by 5 groups of owners [FA s. 12(2) to (6)], who may
buy, sell and trade within each group [FA s. 113/120(2)(b)]. 
There are provisions for similar new groups to be established by
Order in Council later, further confusing things [FA s. 12(7)].

Each member of the 5 groups is therefore regarded, in law, as
a member of a trusted elite, while all other Canadians--and all
future Canadians--will not be trusted in the same way.  It is
difficult to understand the basis for that discrimination.  Does
it mean that C-68's drafters believe Canadians are degenerating?

The 5 groups of "prohibited firearms" do not include the firearms
most commonly used by Canadian violent criminals.  If the
firearms control provisions were intended to affect crime and
criminals, that would obviously not be the situation today.

It is often not possible to determine whether a particular
firearm is unrestricted, a "restricted weapon," or a "prohibited
weapon" simply by examining the firearm.  The status of the
firearm often depends upon its status in government records on
one particular date.  The government's own survey ("Review of
Firearms Registration, TR1994-9e") proves that those records are
grossly inadequate to prove anything in a court of law.

Frequently, two identical firearms fall into different status
categories; one is a grandfathered "prohibited weapon," and the
other is not.  It is not possible to distinguish between them by
any physical characteristic.  One can be bought, sold, traded and
owned within the law; the other never can.

In such a scrambled-egg situation, it is becoming steadily more
apparent that allowing the government to register firearms has
the result that the government then confiscates the firearm or at
least gets the owner into trouble due to the government's proven
inefficiency at operating the registration system.

Kim Campbell's regime converted many firearms from unrestricted
status to "restricted weapon" status, so that the government
would know where they were.  Almost as soon as they entered the
registration system, the Alan Rock regime converted them to
"prohibited weapon" status.  That has been widely accepted as
indicative of the overall scheme of things to come.

The cost of operating within the law has steadily risen, and it
is now frequently easier, cheaper and quicker to buy illegal
firearms in Canada than it is to buy legal ones.  Respect for the
law has declined, primarily because the arrogance, ignorance and
incompetence of the government officials running the system and
drafting revisions to it is apparent to anyone directly involved. 

This ludicrous state of affairs has brought the law into
disrepute.  It apparent to the meanest wit that the firearms
control provisions of the Criminal Code are being used by the
Party in power as a way to impose its simplistic social
engineering theories upon Canadians.

The theory apparently is that progressive firearms control,
tending toward complete elimination of all privately-owned
firearms, has beneficial effects for the society.  Evidence that
the theory is true ranges from scanty to nil.  Evidence that it
reduces violent crime, suicides, or homicides proves that it does
not.  They all tend to rise after a wave of firearms control.

On the other hand, there is a great deal of well-researched
scientific evidence that the theory is false.  The office of the
Minister of Justice was castigated by the Auditor General in his
1993 Report for failing to evaluate the evidence and proceeding
on the basis of unsubstantiated theory.  That was ignored.

It has not escaped the notice of the recreational firearms
community that the few safeguards in place today are severely
eroded or totally destroyed by Bill C-68.  For example, the
requirement to place Orders in Council before each House of
Parliament for 30 sitting days has been neatly destroyed by the
combination of FA s. 112/119(6) and CC s. 117.15.  The objective-
determination ("a kind not commonly used in Canada for hunting or
sporting purposes") protection offered to hunters for their
firearms by the current CC s. 84(1) "prohibited weapon" (e) has
been replaced by the Minister's opinion ("in the opinion of the
Governor in Council... is reasonable for use in Canada...").

If Bill C-68 passes, the Minister has carte blanche to convert
any and all firearms to "prohibited firearm" status; to revoke
their registration certificates under FA s. 121/127(2)(b); and
thereby to force their confiscation as "prohibited firearms."

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [16/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 15:41:11 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan
Lines: 126
Sender: [email-masked]
Distribution: na
Message-ID: <[email-masked]>
Reply-To: [email-masked]
NNTP-Posting-Host: skatter.usask.ca

						NFA PAPER XI

TRAFFICKING IN GUNS

Our government talks about "phasing in" Bill C-68's registration
and controls over several years--but every new firearm, cartridge
or used firearm one acquires or parts with (even by gift) is
subject to controls and registration from the first day the
relevant part of Bill C-68 is passed and proclaimed.

If Bill C-68 passes, Criminal Code Section 99 will say:

99.(1) Every person commits an offence who

(a) manufactures or transfers, whether or not for
consideration, or

(b) offers to do anything referred to in paragraph (a) in respect
of

a firearm [or]...any ammunition knowing that [he] is not
authorized to do so under the Firearms Act or any other Act of
Parliament or any regulations [made by Order in Council (OIC)].

(2) Every person who commits [that] offence...is liable to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years and to a minimum
punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year.

So giving a firearm or an unusual cartridge to your father for
his birthday earns you a minimum of one year in prison, as does
offering to will your firearms to your children.

If you don't know that some Act or regulation forbids the
transfer, CC s. 101 reduces that to "imprisonment for a term
not exceeding five years"--a penalty for ignorance of the law.

These section of the Criminal Code are called the "Trafficking
Offences."  It is quite clear that the government intends to
treat all transfers of firearms and ammunition in the same way
that it treats transfers of narcotics--as crimes.

It is neither accident nor coincidence that much of C-68's
Firearms Act looks like it was taken from the Narcotics Act. 
Both are based on the federal government's power to make criminal
law, and both are trying to evade the Constitutional power split
that gives regulatory power over property and property transfers
to the provincial Legislatures.  

The link between the Firearms Act and the Narcotics Act is so
close that s. 98/101 to 101/105 of the Firearms Act are designed
to be used for Charter-violating police "fishing expedition"
searches for narcotics, either without a warrant or with a
warrant obtained on evidence that would be flatly rejected by any
judge who issues search warrants for narcotics today.

Parliament's interest in "trafficking" apparently stems at least
partly from current United Nations interest in controlling
international transfers of arms.  The UN has been agitating for
rigorous control over private possession of arms in all
countries, primarily because most of the UN countries have
problems with internal dissidence, armed or otherwise.

The theory that dissidents can be prevented from getting arms by
international control of every firearm in the world by the
existing governments seems unlikely to prove true.  It has
certainly been proved true that criminals cannot be prevented
from acquiring guns by any type of firearms control law.

Rather than correct the government excesses which cause rising
dissidence, most of the UN's member governments try to crush
dissidence.  Correcting the excesses might lead to a change in
government or shifting power's benefits to a new group.

In order to prop up existing governments (many of which would be
immediately eliminated if their citizens had the power to do it),
the UN has been encouraging its members to "crack down on illicit
arms and the transfer of illicit arms."  Many, like Canada, are
using the UN's requests as an excuse to crack down on their own
country's recreational firearms community.

Look a little deeper; in most UN-member countries, "illicit arms"
means arms in the possession of anyone who does not actively
support the country's current local government.  That is a
dangerous concept.  Throughout the world, many government
officials--like Allan Rock--believe that no one but a soldier or
policeman employed by the government should be armed.

The difference between a police state and a state where no one
but police and soldiers employed by the existing government is
allowed to own firearms is very small.  Power corrupts, and
absolute power corrupts a government quite quickly.  It is one
small step from "The voters are disarmed and could not stop us if
we decided not to hold any more elections" to actually doing it.

The idea that war and rebellion can be eliminated by arms
controls is unlikely to prove true.  It is very similar to the
idea that criminals can be disarmed and crime eliminated by a gun
control law, and that idea has been proven to be false.

The concept that dissidence and rebellion can be eliminated by
government repression and a steady diet of reduction in civil
rights has never worked, anywhere it has been tried.  It has been
tried repeatedly throughout human history.  The usual result is
rebellion, followed by elimination of either the rebels or the
government.  Repression can work, but only temporarily.

It is particularly interesting that the periods we historically
recognize as "the golden age" of each particular nation is
usually the period when government interference with the civil
rights of its citizens was at an all-time low.  Because most
people are good, trying to repress the evil people by repressing
everyone always fails; it turns the good against the government.

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [17/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 15:41:19 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan
Lines: 131
Sender: [email-masked]
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						NFA PAPER XII

POLICE CONFIRM AUDITOR GENERAL'S REPORT

Canada's Auditor General, in his 1993 Annual Report, strongly
condemned office of the Minister of Justice for basing firearms
control policies and legislation on grossly inadequate research. 
Now the Peel, Hamilton-Wentworth, Metro Toronto, Halton and
Durham police have confirmed the Minister's failures.

Project Gun Runner, financed by the Ontario Solicitor General,
was an intelligence-gathering operation designed to find out
where crime firearms come from.  It ran for 9 months.

The Project people began by believing the same bureaucrat's
theory that successive Ministers of Justice have been buying for
years.  That theory was that crime guns--particularly handguns--
are just Canadian guns stolen from legal owners here in Canada.

Because every legal handgun in Canada is listed in the RCMP's
firearms registration records, that theory could have been
exploded years ago.  All anyone had to do was to check crime guns
against the RCMP's computerized registration data bank.

Astonishingly, no one did that.  The RCMP's elaborate records
weren't used; the statistics mavens never checked the records. 
Instead, firearms control policies, laws and Orders in Council
were solidly based on an incorrect theory.  That's shameful.

Project Gun Runner quickly and easily learned that the vast
majority of crime firearms were illegal imports, mostly smuggled
in from the US.  77% of the crime revolvers and 91% of the crime
semi-automatic pistols they checked were smuggled imports.

They identified a few dealers in smuggled guns.  A typical case
involved Stephen Gooding and David Gill.  Metro Toronto police
say they drove into Michigan, where they bought from an illegal
dealer.  The economics of their business looked like this:

An illegal Michigan dealer bought small .380-caliber handguns,
each worth US$73.95 wholesale, and sold them to Gooding and Gill
for US$130 each.  Gooding and Gill packed a dozen or two into a
hidden cranny in their car, and drove back across the border at
Windsor.  With 26,000 people crossing through Windsor-Detroit
Customs every day, their car was not searched.  Twelve handguns
proved to be as easy to smuggle as one carton of cigarettes.

Back in Toronto, they would sell each gun for $300 to $500.
Gooding and Gill admit to successfully smuggling in and selling
over 300 handguns.  They apparently made over $50,000 doing it.

Were they caught by the astute work of a Customs officer, or by a
sophisticated police sting operation?  No.  They were stopped on
the highway for not wearing seat belts.

When the police tried to arrest Gooding (he was driving while his
driver's license was suspended), he struggled, and three handguns
dropped to the pavement.  Two more were found tucked into his
waistband, and another seven under the car's front seat.

Those 12 handguns were worth $3600 to $6000 on the street in
Toronto.  Gooding and Gill say they paid about US$1560 for them. 
They had an easy, simple and profitable business, which would
still be ongoing today--if they had done up their seat belts.

C-68's gun control system largely ignores the real problems and
attacks honest recreational firearms owners and dealers, imposing
largely useless storage requirements, tangles of red tape, and
pointless expense.  The government is apparently only trying to
make legitimate gun ownship difficult, expensive and risky.

One hopes that they won't succeed, because then only criminals
will still have firearms.  Operation Gun Runner proved that.

Currently, the Minister is pushing legislation that authorizes
the outlawing of all legally owned and registered firearms.  He
is, so far as can be ascertained, doing nothing whatever to ease
the wastage of police resources used for excessive control of
honest recreational firearms owners, or to re-direct them toward
reality--the smuggled guns and other firearms used by criminals.

Successive Ministers using wrong methods based on incorrect
theories failed us.  As Detective Don MacCullum said (Toronto
Sun, 27 Mar 94) of the firearms situation, "Now the place is out
of control, and there's no chance of bringing it back."

As the Ottawa Citizen said (03 Apr 94), "The fact is, nobody
knows or has reliable statistical estimates on how many guns are
smuggled into Canada."  We do know that street prices are
falling, a sure sign of a saturated marketplace.

Fermo Stefanelli, director of intelligence services with Revenue
Canada and Customs, said, "There's a lot of areas and ways and
means to get into Canada without coming through Customs.  There
are lakes and backroads and rivers and unmanned locations."

Kim Campbell's law changes ordered more wastage of scarce and
costly police resources.  The changes were designed to reduce
"major problems" that just weren't real--theft from honest
owners, and criminal use by people who bought firearms from
legitimate sources.  They did nothing to combat real crime,
smuggling or the genuinely criminal gun marketplace. 

As the Toronto Sun said (27 Mar 94), "Ottawa's answer is
paperwork.  Our new gun control law requires prospective gun
owners to get their photo taken, pass a course, pay $50, undergo
a police background check, and answer four pages of questions to
apply for a Firearms Acquisition Certificate (FAC).  As if any of
it will deter the punk who buys his pistol in a back alley."

31 Division Metro Toronto police Detective Sergeant Bruce
Crawford [waving bundles of FAC applications] doesn't think much
of the Minister's methods.  He said (Toronto Sun, 27 Mar 94),
"All these regulations don't mean a thing.  I've never arrested a
bad guy yet with an FAC.  It just means having to take a [police
officer] off the road to do nothing but check these out."

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [18/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 15:41:32 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan
Lines: 71
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						NFA PAPER XIIIA

AUSTRALIAN GUN CONTROL SITUATION, 30 MAY 95

FROM THE AUSTRALIAN, 27 MAY 95:

"The nation's police ministers [their equivalent to a conference
of all Canada's provincial Attorneys General plus the federal
Minister of Justice] yesterday bit the bullet on national gun
laws, choosing a uniform standard for licensing firearms owners
rather than a registration of individual guns.

"Prompted by the Queen and Hoddle Street massacres in Victoria,
the growing incidence of gun crimes throughout the nation and the
interstate trade in firearms to avoid local controls, Federal and
State ministers agreed at their meeting in Hobart to establish a
national licensing code.

"The breakthrough came as the ministers shed their staff and
advisers to do some straight talking after years of
circumlocution and as latest statistics showed 435 gun suicides
in Australia annually, 16 deaths through gun accidents and 64
homicides. 

"The new order, to be coordinated by [the state of] Victoria,
will concentrate on owners rather than weapons, is likely to
involve dealers as an information source, and could be ratified
by all governments by the end of this year.

"Mr. McNamara said he believed the moves would lead to a
universal improvement in public safety while giving recognition
to legitimate firearms owners--sporting shooters, hunters and
farmers.  

"He calculated that under the present registration regime in
Victoria, only about 27 per cent of all guns in the state... were
registered."  

Instead of Bill C-68--which will probably leave Canada in the
situation described in the last paragraph of the Australian's
article, Canada should look at a firearms license that is an
exact equivalent to an automobile driver's license.

Firearms control is primarily a matter of regulatory law, except
in cases where a firearm is used to threaten, injure or kill a
person, or is used in a property crime, or is used in a crime
against the liberty of a person.  All the rest is regulatory.

It follows that the regulatory parts of the legislation should
properly be enacted by the provincial Legislatures who hold that
authority.  The standards should be nationwide, as they are
for an automobile driver's license.  That pattern makes sense.

Attempting to control ownership, distribution and usage of small
pieces of recreational equipment through a massive national
registration system--mounted on top of a licensing system--makes
no sense at all.  The Australians are more likely to succeed.

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [19/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 15:41:40 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan
Lines: 245
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						NFA PAPER XIIIB

THE PRACTICAL FIREARMS CONTROL SYSTEM

Firearms, motorcycles and old fighter planes are dangerous
equipment, if used by malicious, incompetent, or untrained
people.  Many people have such equipment--for recreational
purposes.  Others are afraid of anyone who has such equipment.

A dangerous equipment control system can deny legal unsupervised
access to the equipment to a person who should not have it.  It
cannot deny illegal access, or prevent misuse of the equipment.

Analyzing the successful methods used to deal with problems where
dangerous equipment is in common use, this paper applies them to
the design of a practical firearms control system.

The system is based on the pilot's license, which is also a
system designed to control unsupervised legal access to dangerous
equipment.  That system works; anyone who gets a pilot's license
isn't, and isn't seen as, a menace to the safety of others.

This system uses a graduated Firearms Permit as the control for
acquisition, possession, movement, use, and disposition of
firearms.  The graduated method is necessary; adequate training
to use a single-shot .22 rifle on a basic range is not adequate
training for complex practical handgun competitions.

While this method may seem cumbersome at first glance, it
actually reduces costs.  It also benefits the public, the police,
and the firearms owner--in that order of precedence.

1.  When a first-time applicant wishes to have legal and
unsupervised access to firearms, he or she first applies to an
Instructor.  Such an Instructor is a person certified by one of
the many existing firearms bodies and is not paid by tax money,
but is registered in the system for recognition purposes.  The
Instructor is qualified to certify only for specified entries.

3.  The Instructor trains and tests the applicant; the applicant
has no legal unsupervised access to firearms in this period.

4.  The Instructor certifies and recommends the applicant as
eligible for a Firearms Permit with specified entries, saying:

(a) The applicant knows how to use firearms of this class
safely for this class of use.

(b) The applicant knows the rules of safety and safe handling,
and the laws that apply.

(c) The applicant is the kind of person who obeys the rules.

NOTE: That certification is very meaningful; the Instructor is
saying, "I trust this person to stand next to me, unsupervised,
with a loaded firearm."  He bets his life.  Effective screening
can only be done by someone who sees and considers the
applicant's behavior with a firearm over an extended period.

5. The applicant then applies to the police, who check his
criminal record.  They then issue or refuse (or are precluded
from issuing by a statutory condition) a Police Clearance
Certificate (PCC) authorizing issuance of a Firearms Permit and
specifies the entries which will form part of it.

6. The applicant takes the PCC to the issuing office (which may
be a motor vehicle license office) for routine issuance of the
Firearms Permit.  The actual issuer has no decisions to make.  

NOTE: This procedure has the advantage of using scarce and costly 
police resources only in those areas where they are needed,
instead of wasting them on Firearms Permit issuance and other
"red tape" paperwork.  In the city of Edmonton, for example, this
change alone will free one sergeant, one constable, two clerks,
and three rooms of the police station for real-police-work
duties--a great financial saving.  The criminal-record check is the
only thing currently done by the police which can't be done
more cheaply and efficiently elsewhere.

7.  The Firearms Permit is in the form of a grid, with firearms
classes down the left edge and firearms usage across the top.  It
replaces all twelve "licensing" documents currently used.

8.  The Firearms Permit authorizes possession, acquisition,
carriage, transport and use, with control appropriate to the
holder's status in the law, not forever re-typed on permits.

9.  The Firearms Permit is required for legal possession of any
firearm and offers a thumbnail sketch of the holder's status. 
Being able to determine the status of the possessor by a required
document is useful for the police.  Documenting the status of the
firearm isn't nearly as useful for real police work.

10.  The system sets national minimum standards for local police,
security guards, and anyone else licensed to carry a loaded
firearm to protect human life from criminal violence.  This is
done by making the Armed Forces and the RCMP exempt, then using
RCMP Constable standards for issuing "Police" endorsements. 

12.  Instructors won't certify people who act unsafely with
firearms, and police won't issue PCC's to people with records.  

13.  Police are protected because absence of a Firearms Permit is
grounds to seize any firearm (no such document exists in the
current system) and a Firearms Permit provides much meaningful
information as to the holder's character and status.

14.  Firearms owners are protected, because they can demonstrate
who they are and what they're qualified to have and use.

15.  This system uses "grandfathering" for firearms owners and
users who have already proven that they are not a menace to
society; such people may use past history to gain a Firearms
Permit, without "going through the hoops".

EXAMPLES OF FIREARMS PERMIT ENTRY PATTERNS: 
******************************************

EXAMPLE 1: .22 rifle target-range-only shooter.

Type/Usage: * POSSESS * BASIC * ADVANCED * FIELD * PROF * POLICE 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CLASS A     |         |       |          |       |      |       |
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CLASS B     |         |       |          |       |      |       |
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CLASS C     |         |       |          |       |      |       |
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CLASS D     |   Q     |  Q    |          |       |      |       |
-----------------------------------------------------------------
WEAPON      |         |       |          |       |      |       |
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Q = Qualified * I = Instructor * Issuer: G H Jenks, Alta Wildlife
-----------------------------------------------------------------

*****************************************************************

EXAMPLE 2: Police officer/expert witness; hunter; PPC shooter.

Type/Usage: * POSSESS * BASIC * ADVANCED * FIELD * PROF * POLICE 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CLASS A     |        |        |          |       |  Q   |       |
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CLASS B     |   Q    |   Q    |    Q     |   Q   |  Q   |   Q   |
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CLASS C     |   Q    |   Q    |    Q     |       |  Q   |   Q   | 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CLASS D     |   Q    |   Q    |    Q     |   Q   |  Q   |       | 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
WEAPON      |        |        |          |       |  Q   |   Q   |
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Q = Qualified * I = Instructor * Issuer: Sgt R Collins, RCMP
-----------------------------------------------------------------

*****************************************************************

EXAMPLE 3: IPSC Range officer/Instructor; recreational hunter

Type/Usage: * POSSESS * BASIC * ADVANCED * FIELD * PROF * POLICE 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CLASS A     |        |        |          |       |      |       |
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CLASS B     |   Q    |  QI    |   QI     |   Q   |      |       |
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CLASS C     |   Q    |  QI    |   QI     |       |      |       | 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CLASS D     |   Q    |  QI    |   QI     |   Q   |      |       | 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
WEAPON      |        |        |          |       |      |       |
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Q = Qualified * I = Instructor * Issuer: C M Jones, Ont Wildlife
-----------------------------------------------------------------

DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED ON THE FIREARMS PERMIT

POSSESS:  To possess the firearm at one location, as a collector
	  might require.

BASIC:    To use on a basic shooting range.

ADVANCED: To use on an advanced range, where one moves about
	  with a loaded firearm or draws one from a holster.

FIELD:    To use at any place, other than a shooting range, where
	  a firearm may lawfully be fired.

PROF:     To carry and use for professional reasons, as a salesman
	  or expert witness, etc. might require.

POLICE:   To carry and use for protection of human life from
	  criminal violence; requires meeting all relevant
	  standards required of an RCMP Constable.

Q and I:  Qualified and Instructor; R for Range Officer
	  may also be used in the identical single-document
	  System used within the firearms community.

CLASS A:  All full automatic firearms.

CLASS B:  All centerfire rifles and shotguns over 660mm (26").

CLASS C:  All short firearms, fireable when under 660mm (26").

CLASS D:  Rimfire rifles and shotguns over 660mm (26") and all
	  muzzle-loading firearms.

WEAPONS:  Weapons which are not firearms, such as police batons.
	  (This category is needed for the POLICE column.)

The Firearms Permit authorizes its holder to acquire, possess,
and transport firearms of each specified CLASS for all purposes
relevant to of each specified type of USAGE.  It thus replaces,
for example, Canada's Firearms Acquisition Certificate, Permit to
Carry, Registration Certificate, and Permit to Transport.

Each entry on the Firearms Permit is subject to specific rules: 

A "CLASS C/POLICE" endorsement, for example, licenses a local
police detective for loaded concealed handgun carriage on the
person to protect human life from criminal violence. 

A "CLASS C/FIELD" endorsement, on the other hand, similarly
licenses a geologist loaded handgun carriage on the person, but
only in the FIELD and for the purposes of survival hunting,
signalling, and protecting human life from animal attack.

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [20/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 15:41:51 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan
Lines: 236
Sender: [email-masked]
Distribution: na
Message-ID: <[email-masked]>
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NNTP-Posting-Host: skatter.usask.ca

						NFA PAPER XIVA

TANGLED MESSES IN OUR FIREARMS REGISTRATION SYSTEM

by David A Tomlinson

In the first C-300 Application to Register and C-306 Registration
Certificate pair, we see a common error.  The firearm is
correctly designated in the C-300 Application, in part, as:

MAKE: BROWNING     MODEL: 115

SERIAL NO.: 525628

The firearm was designed by John M. Browning, hence its name; but
Browning is the name of the designer, not the name of the maker. 
There is an American firm called Browning, but its firearms are
made in Belgium, Japan or elsewhere by or under contract to a
Belgian firm which owned Browning during part of the period where
that relationship was in force.  The full name of the Belgian
firm is or was Fabrique Nationale d' Armes de Guerre.  

That firm, now commonly known as FN, began production on a
firearm very similar to my Model 115 in 1910, making it and
several minor variants of it for the next 70 years.  The initial
Model designation was "Model 1910", but they sometimes gave later
variants other "Model" designations.

The Dutch police decided to adopt it, at some time during the
reign of Queen Juliana.  They ordered a large number of a
recent variation, which FN was calling the Model 115. 

The Model 115, as made for the Dutch police, differs from the
Model 1910 by having different sights (raised above the slide
instead of smaller sights milled into the slide), a squared-off
rear end on the slide and frame, different grips, and a different
magazine (one which included an extension for the little finger,
a feature not found on the Model 1910).

The Dutch police apparently specified that the serial number
would appear on the breech end of the barrel (visible through the
ejection port), on the slide (just below the ejection port), and
on the frame (just below the other two numbers).  They also
apparently specified a block of all-numeric numbers as the serial
number range.  This firearm's Dutch serial number is 535628.

That was in conflict with FN's own serial numbering system, a
coded system which included one or two letters.  FN compromised
by stamping their own number on the frame, located on the forward
face of the grip, in addition to the Dutch police serial number. 
This firearm's FN serial number is 78H45928.

When I applied to register it, the police chose to use the Dutch
police serial number, rather than the FN number.  That was not a
problem, as either will identify the firearm as a unique specimen
in the group of Model 115's.  However, when the C-306
Registration Certificate arrived, it showed this data: 

MAKE: BROWNING (FABRIQUE NATIONALE)  MODEL: 1910

SERIAL NO.: 525628

The end result of registering the firearm as a Model 1910 is that
I now have an apparent duplicate of a genuine Model 1910, serial
number 525628.  That firearm was actually manufactured, and may
still be in existence--in Canada or elsewhere in the world. 

I wrote to FRAS, the responsible authority, and pointed out the
problem.  They sent me a letter of acknowledgement, but have
never made any effort to correct the situation.  Incidentally, I
bought a spare barrel for it, so it is now both a 7.65mm (.32
ACP) and a 9mm (.380 ACP).  Those two cartridges were designed
for the Model 1910, and it was designed to fire both by easy
interchange of the barrel with no other alteration.

Because it is now both a .32 and a .380, it is apparently both a
"restricted firearm" and a "prohibited firearm" under the terms
of Bill C-68's Firearms Act.  I have no idea how the government
plans to deal with that problem.

In the second C-306 Registration Certificate, we see another
common error.  The firearm is a full automatic Browning M1918A2
Light Machine Gun,  nearly four feet long and shooting the
powerful .30-06 rifle cartridge.  The C-306 registration
certificate state, in part, that it is:

MAKE:  BROWNING     MODEL:  1918-A-2

TYPE:  HG

In that data, "BROWNING" was the name of the designer, not the
name of the factory that produced it.  The "TYPE:" is not "HG"
(handgun), it is "MG" (machine gun).  This error is quite common,
and apparently is made because the vast majority of firearms
being registered are "TYPE:  HG" and it becomes automatic to type
in "HG."  The effect in criminal court is seen in the third case:

Another problem that comes up is that some "MG" and "SM"
(submachine gun) registration certificates show the firearm as
"SA" (semiautomatic) instead of "FA" (full automatic).

Any firearm registered as "FA" on 01 Jan 78 is "grandfathered" as
a legal full automatic.  At some later date it may have been
converted to semi-automatic or manual operation, or deactivated. 
In such a case, where it comes into the hands of a
"grandfathered" collector of full automatic firearms, it may be
legally re-converted to full automatic.

Unfortunately, while the RCMP's records can be used to state
fairly positively that a particular full automatic firearm was
registered on 01 Jan 78, they are not good enough to prove the
firearm in question was not registered in Canada on that date.

In the third case, two documents were entered as "evidence" in
the criminal trial of Douglas Anderson.  The notarized document
introduced by the prosecution states:

4.  I have made a careful examination and search of such
records (i.e., the RCMP Firearms Registration and Administration
Section (FRAS) records of all registered firearms in Canada) and
have been unable to find any record of a valid registration
certificate having been issued for a CHINESE MACHINE GUN, Calibre
9mm, Serial Number 001120.

The second document, introduced by the defence, is a copy of the
FRAS file copy of the registration certificate for the  firearm
described in the above paragraph, with the following annotation: 

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL TO WHICH IT
PURPORTS TO BE A TRUE COPY OF.

Both documents clearly refer to the same gun (Serial Number
001120).  Both were signed by the same man on the same day.

If either document had been entered alone, it would have been
accepted without question by the court as valid and as good
evidence.  The potential for wrongful conviction is obvious.

The registration certificate is interesting; it contains several
incorrect entries.  

"make: CHINESE" is incorrect; "Chinese" is
the nationality of a people, not the name of a maker.  

"model:  M3A1" is incorrect; the firearm is a Type 36, a
Nationalist Chinese imitation of an American M3A1, but it isn't
an M3A1.

"type: HG" is incorrect; it should be "type: SM" (for submachine
gun), but it's registered as a handgun.  That error may have
arisen in the same way as for the Browning light Machine Gun
above, or it may have resulted from a Local Registrar of Firearms
regarding the fact that it had been converted to semi-automatic
only as precluding calling it a submachine gun.

It is worthy of note that the Crown, with the firearm in its
possession, apparently asked the RCMP's FRAS to search for any
record of a "9mm" firearm.  The firearm is actually a .45, or
11.25mm.  Sloppy work by the Crown also increases error levels.

When I notified FRAS of the above two problems, I received a
letter of acknowledgement, with the inclusion of a photocopy
which indicated that I was correct regarding the Type 36.  To the
best of my knowledge, no corrective action was ever taken.

In any firearms registration system, the only way to find
something by computer search is to enter the database with the
serial number and no other information.  Had that been done with
the "Chinese machine gun," the error would not have occurred; but
adding "SM" or "MG" or "9mm" to the search objects would cause
the computer to reject the real registration certificate as not
being the one sought.  And that's just what happened.

The fourth case illustrates the problem from a lightly different
angle; the two C-306 registration certificates say, in part:

   make: ROHM (R. G. INDUSTRIES)  model: RG 12   barrel: 90mm
   make: ARMINIUS (H. WEIHRAUCH)  model: GECADO  barrel: 92mm

The two handguns are identical, except for serial number and the
small metal plates embedded in the plastic grips.  The plastic
grips, complete with their plates, interchange between the two.

The errors do not result from any attempt by anyone to confuse
the system.  They are inherent in the registration process.

The causes of error in such a system are multiple: a maker who
changes the Model designation of a firearm for commercial
reasons, where no change in design has been made, a maker who
changes the design of a firearm and continues to call it by the
model name of its predecessor Model, a person who assembles a
firearm from the parts of two or more different firearms,
producing a hybrid with no factory Model designation, etc.  

The possibilities for confusion are endless, and the concept that
any firearm can be absolutely identified--even by a ranking
firearms expert--is quite wrong.  Identification can be good, but
it cannot be absolute.  Even as simple an error as a careless
workman stamping two firearms with the same serial number and
the company selling both of them cannot be ruled out. 

All but two (the Chinese .45 SM) of the above erroneous documents
are examples from registered firearms in my own small collection. 
I made no effort to confuse the system.  I made efforts to
correct it; but FRAS is usually not interested in correcting
errors.  I changed the barrel length on one handgun in 1957, and
notified FRAS.  I've notified them  several times since, but no
action has ever been taken; it's still incorrectly registered.

What makes that situation rather amusing is that the real barrel
length on that firearm is under 105mm (4.14"), and has been since
1957.  The registration record in Ottawa shows it as being 5"
(127mm).  Therefore, if that had been the only sub-105mm barrel
length firearm I owned on 14 Feb 95, I would be a "grandfathered"
person for the purposes of ownership and acquisition of
sub-105mm-barrelled, .25 calibre, and .32 calibre handguns.

The Ottawa records, however, would not show me qualified as a
"grandfathered" person under C-68's Firearms Act sections 12(6)
and 113(2)(b)--and that could cause serious problems for everyone
concerned at a later date.

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

From elastic!jaywon.pci.on.ca!noc.tor.hookup.net!nic.wat.hookup.net!wire!van-bc!unixg.ubc.ca!rover.ucs.ualberta.ca!tribune.usask.ca!usenet Wed Sep 27 00:29:33 1995
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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [21/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 15:43:23 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan
Lines: 299
Sender: [email-masked]
Distribution: na
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Reply-To: [email-masked]
NNTP-Posting-Host: skatter.usask.ca

						NFA PAPER XIX

DOES GOVERNMENT DISTRIBUTE FACTS?  OR LIES?

In the Department of Justice Little Red Booklet, "Facts about
the Firearms Bill, June 1995," we find many things to question.
In what follows, we will use the Little Red Booklet's
"Q(uestion)" numbers.

Q1 paragraph 1: "The registration system will be similar to
driver's licenses and car ownership permits."  That is false.

Driver's licenses come under regulatory law; firearms licenses
come under criminal law.  There is no such thing as a "car
ownership permit" in law; there is car registration, but one can
own a car without a registration certificate if it is not used on
public roadways.  Violations of laws regarding drivers' licenses
do not involve imprisonment or a criminal record; all firearms
license violations involve both.

Q1 paragraph 1: "...a Firearms License, which will be similar to
a driver's license in that it will show that a person is
entitled to have or acquire certain firearms."

A driver's license certifies that the holder has been tested, and
has demonstrated adequate skill to use the equipment safety and
adequate knowledge of the rules.  In no way does it show that
a person is entitled to have or acquire certain motor vehicles.

Q1 paragraph 1: "The license will...not identify the types of
firearms owned."

That is patently ridiculous, if true, because the selleror loaner
or giver of a firearm is required to determine, from the
license, whether or not the buyer is entitled to buy firearms of
that class.  {See Firearms Act section (FA s.) 22(a) [now
renumbered as FA s. 23(a)].

Q1 paragraph 2: "This [Registration] Certificate will be
similar to a car ownership permit."

Since there is currently no such document as a "car ownership
permit," these questions arise: Does this indicate that the
federal Parliament now intends to take over law regulating motor
vehicles from the provinces, in that same way that it took over
the Provincial Legislatures' power to regulate firearms?  Does
the federal Parliament intend to control ownership of motor
vehicles in the same way it now controls firearms possession?

Q2: "A [Firearms License] renewal form will be mailed to you..."

If you fail to renew (renewal notice did not arrive, on vacation,
etc.) you automatically become a criminal, subject to at least 5
years imprisonment, via Criminal Code section (CC s.) 91 or 92.

In Reference re Section 94 of the Motor Vehicle Act (1985) 2
SCR 486, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that type of
legislation unconstitutional and struck it down, because it could
imprison a person who had not done anything wrong.

Q3: "The Registration Certificate is good for the life of
the firearm..."  That is false.  FA s. 121(2) [now renumbered to
127(2)]: "A registration certificate...expires on (b) December
31, 2002, or such other date as is prescribed [by Order in
Council]."  Interestingly, there is no procedure for renewal of
the certificates that expire on 31 Dec 2002--which include all
registration certificates in existence today.

Q4: This says that Registration will not cost $100.  It will
cost "no more than $10" but you can expect "costs (sic)
increasing on a sliding scale over the five-year phase-in periods
(sic)."  That means that the fees will increase--probably to
well over $100. The legislation is silent on dollar amounts, but
allows unlimited increases, unscrutinized by Parliament, through
FA s. 110(q.1) [117(r)] and 112(1) [119(1)].

Compare those statements with "Fact 9" in the section below
this "Q" series, where the initial fee is shown as $15 or
$60, depending on the type of firearm.

Q5: This promises "volume discounts" for registering
numbers of firearms.  The legislation is silent on this point,
but perhaps the Little Red Booklet's author knows more than the
law tells.  One wonders at his ability to predict a future
Minister's future Orders in Council, which will set such things.  

Q6: "An FAC will be good until its five-year expiry date."
That is false.  FA s. 113 [120] says that an FAC is "deemed to
be a license," of one of several types, on proclamation of FA s.
113 [120]; it is not "valid until...expiry", but changes its
nature, status, and meaning--at once.

Q7: Firearms owners "will be able to obtain their Firearms
License and a Registration Certificate by mailing in the
applications."

That is quite insane.  It delivers both documents with no
screening of the applicant, and with no examination of the
firearm to see if the registration data matches the firearm.

That is a display of the "Catch-22" nature of C-68's system:
Registration and licensing can only be done economically if the
safeguards are omitted.  They are useless if the safeguards are
omitted, because they grant licenses to unscreened applicants and
issue Registration Certificates that are riddled with errors. 

Q9: The requirement to present a License prevents a farmer's wife
from buying .22 rimfire cartridges to kill rats on the farm when
the farmer is busy with planting or reaping.  It is an admission
that the system does not and cannot keep firearms out of the
hands of criminals, but one wonders how and why a system that
fails to control firearms can succeed in controlling cartridges.

Q11: "All fees will be reviewed by Parliament."  That is
false and grossly misleading; while an initial fee should be
reviewed under FA s. 111 [118], any subsequent change in the fee
structure will not be, under FA s. 112(1) [119(1)].  The
potential for abuse is unlimited.

Q13: "Police who find someone in possession of an unregistered
firearm will check out this person."  Possession of an
unregistered firearm will be a crime under CC s. 91 and 92, and
they will "check out this person"?!  Why not arrest him?

Q14: "Australia's National Committee on Violence recently
recommended that registration of all firearms be made national in
scope."  Australia's federal government rejected that
recommendation, so why tell us this and not that?

Q17: Americans can, at the border, apply for a "renewable
60-day license" (which doubles as a Firearms License,
Registration Certificate and Customs Declaration) without
having to meet the standards that Canadian citizens must.  Why
does our government trust Americans more than Canadians?

One interesting aspect of this document is that the Customs part
of it is an absolute requirement, demanding information under
Customs law, while the rest comes under criminal law.  Mixing the
two results in mandatory self-incrimination, forbidden by the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 

Q18: "The security of CPIC has never been broken."  That is
flatly false; CPIC data has often been given to unauthorized
people by police officers and others with access to the system,
and it is completely unknown whether or not skilled hackers have
entered the system.  A skilled hacker leaves no traces.

Q18: "Firearms will be registered in the system separate
from the owner's name and address..."  Whoever wrote that is a
complete ignoramus on this subject.  If the authorized user
cannot combine a firearms owner's name and address with records
of the firearms he holds, the system is useless to him.  If the
authorized user can do it, so can the unauthorized hacker.

Q19: "...opponents argued that [the FAC] would lead to the
confiscation of all firearms.  That did not happen."

To date, many categories of registered firearms have been
re-designated as "prohibited weapons" or "prohibited firearms,"
to be confiscated immediately, or on the death of the owner.

Some 58 per cent of all registered firearms have already been
confiscated, or their later confiscation has already been
ordered.  That is cause for serious concern, especially when FA
s. 111 [118] and 112 [119] combine with CC s. 117.15 to authorize
this or any future Minister of Justice to "prohibit" any
firearm, cartridge or firearm accessory by Order in Council (OIC).

Scrutiny of such an OIC by Parliament is avoided by FA s. 112(6)
[119(6)].  Any possibility of the overturning of his "opinion"
by a court of law is avoided by the language of CC s. 117.15(2). 
The courts cannot substitute the opinion of a court for the
"opinion of the Governor in Council" specified in the law.

And we're not supposed to fear confiscation?

Q20: "Nothing in the Firearms Act will permit search and
seizure."  That is a completely false statement.

FA s. 99(1) [101(2)]: "...an inspector may...enter and inspect any
place where the inspector believes on reasonable grounds that a
business is being carried on, or there is a record of a
business...[or] a gun collection or a record [of] a gun
collection or...a prohibited firearm or...more than 10 firearms
and may"

(a) open any container...

(b) examine any firearm and examine any other thing...

(c) conduct any tests or analyses..."

FA s. 99(4) [102(4)]: "An inspector who takes any thing while
carrying out an inspection...must give...a receipt."

If "seizure" is not permitted, how does he "take" it?  

FA s. 101(2) [104(2)]: "A justice who is satisfied [that]

(a)the conditions...described in section 99 exist...

may issue a warrant authorizing the inspector to enter that
dwelling-house..."

Once in, the "inspector" (who is expected to normally be a police
officer) may behave as specified in FA s. 99 [102].

*****************************************************************

In the Justice Department's "FIREARMS ACT--GENERAL FACTS" paper
we also find much to question, here using their "fact" numbers.

Fact 1: "Inspection will require prior notice and approval by
gun owners."  That is false.  C-68's Firearms Act section [FA
s.] 99 [now renumbered to 102] says, "an inspector may at any
reasonable time enter and inspect any place..." 

"Those owning fewer than 10 firearms are exempt." That is
false.  FA s. 99 [102] says "a gun collection" of any size is
subject to these inspections, and the existing Criminal Code
deals with a "collection" as small as one firearm [CC s. 84(1)]. 

Fact 3: "Owners are entitled to retain all handguns except
those prohibited."  Under CC s. 117.15, any or all handguns in
Canada can be prohibited and confiscated without compensation by
Order in Council.  FA s. 112(6) [119(6)] says that may be done
without notice to anyone and without scrutiny by Parliament. The
precise language of CC s. 117.15 ensures that such Orders in
Counccil are immune from any appeal to the courts.

Fact 4: "Tourist outfitters will be able to complete permits
prior to guests arriving..."  The outfitting business is already
in a slump due to cancellations from Americans unwilling to have
their firearms recorded here, with records then sent to the BATF.

Fact 5: When lending a firearm, "The registered owner of
the firearm does not need to see written proof of the borrower's
licensing."  That is false.  FA s. 32 [33] says, "a person
may lend a firearm only if (a) the person (i) ensures that the
borrower holds a license authorizing [him] to possess that kind
of firearm."  

The CC s. 84(1) definition of "transfer" includes "lend"
as one type of transfer, so it appears that the entire complex
procedure set forth in FA s. 22 [23], 26 [27] and 30 [31] applies
to any loaning of a firearm, and a firearm cannot be loaned
before the loaner receives "the authorization of the chief
firearms officer for the transfer under FA s. 22(b)(ii)
[23(b)(ii)]."  

However, closer examination turns up FA s. 20 [21], which
re-defines "transfer" to exclude the word "lend". 
Using the same word to express two very different meanings is
confusing and should not be done.  While this example is not too
bad, the double meaning of the word "firearm" is similar, and
much more serious [see CC s. 2, FA s. 2(2), and CC 84(1)].

Fact 9: "Registration is a once in a lifetime cost."  That is
false.  FA s. 121(2) [127(2)] says, "A registration certificate
[that is in force on the date of proclamation of Bill C-68]
expires on... (b) December 31, 2002, or such other date as is
prescribed [by Order in Council]."

Fact 9: "Registration for newly-acquired firearms will be $15
for non-restricted firearms...and $60 for restricted firearms.]" 
Compare that with Q3 in the "Q" series above.  Which one
is false?  Or are they both false?

Fact 11: "The electronic database to store all firearms
registration will be the same as the taxation system used by
Revenue Canada, which has proven fail-safe and secure."  That
statement is poppycock; a skilled hacker leaves no traces of his
illegal entry, and copying data from a computer file leaves no
trace that the data has been copied.  The government's computer
systems have long been reputed, among knowledgeable computer
people, to be grossly insecure.  They will not be improved by
refusing to admit this problem exists.

The part of the paper entitled "Proposals Before Changes --
Legislation After Changes" is meaningless.  The "Legislation
After Changes" table merely lists things which are subject to
reversal by Order in Council, without notice and without
Parliamentary scrutiny, at any future date, and by this or any future
Minister of Justice.  C-68 isn't law, it's a bowl of Jello.

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [22/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 15:42:17 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan
Lines: 249
Sender: [email-masked]
Distribution: na
Message-ID: <[email-masked]>
Reply-To: [email-masked]
NNTP-Posting-Host: skatter.usask.ca

						NFA PAPER XV

COMMENTS ON TWO ONTARIO POLICE REPORTS

"PROJECT GUN RUNNER INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY" 

"Project Gun Runner Investigative Summary" (PGIS) opens windows
not obvious to the inexpert reader.  This additional commentary
may be valuable to those studying it.

For example, the "5 machine guns" mentioned on page 4 are
probably not real.  On page 5, the report says, "The TEC-9
machine pistol which can be purchased in the U.S. for $160.00 can
be sold illicitly in Canada for between $800 and $1000.00."

The TEC-9 is not a full automatic "machine pistol."  It is a
semi-automatic pistol which resembles a a full automatic machine
pistol, carefully tailored to the U.S. law "pistol" definition.

In the U.S., there is a small but thriving industry which creates
legal semi- automatic firearms that closely resemble illegal full
automatic firearms.  When such a firearm comes into the hands of
Canadian police, it is often misidentified as a "machine gun."

In 1985, RCMP HQ became alarmed at the number of "machine guns"
being reported as used in crimes, in the initial crime reports. 
A special study was done, in which all police forces reporting
"machine guns" were asked to go to the completed cases to
determine how many of the "machine guns" turned out not to be
real "machine guns."

All of the "machine guns" turned out not to be "machine guns"
except those reported by Montreal police.  A check on that found
that the Montreal police had re-reported the initial report
figures.  Once they had been required to check the later reports,
all of those "machine guns" also evaporated.

The PGIS material contained in pages 5 to 7 inclusive appears to
be largely guesswork plus a rehash of the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms positions, rather than an analysis of what is
actually happening in Canada.  

The gravest concern regarding PGIS is that there is material
which should be there, but is not.  The page 4 summary on
firearms taken by the police is sadly defective.

"54 of 70 revolvers were not registered in Canada."  Of the 16
that were, how many were found in the hands of the registered
owner?  How many had been reported stolen by that owner before
the firearm came into the hands of the police?  How did the
firearm come into the hands of the police?  Taken from a violent
criminal during a crime?

Obviously, a sample of 16 is far too small for meaningful
statistical analysis, but the information given is sadly weak.

Combining "revolvers" and "semi-automatic pistols" tells us that,
of 193 handguns seized, only 27 (14 per cent) were "registered."

Of those "not registered in Canada," how many were involved in
some actual crime?  Taken from an innocent American, ignorant of
Canadian law, who declared them and surrendered them at the
border?  Were taken from a smuggler, an illicit dealer, a
professional criminal, a young offender, an otherwise apparently
innocent Canadian?  Answers to these questions are important.

"2.5% of all firearms analyzed were machine guns."  As noted
above, that is questionable.  What does "analyzed" mean, in the
context of this report?

Analyzing the figures given, it is apparent that the total number
of firearms seized was 198; 193 handguns and 5 "machine guns." 
So why does the author say, "2 out of 3 machine guns had their
serial numbers removed"?  What about the other 2?

PGIS reports that six Canadian police forces, funded by the
Policing Services Division of the Ontario Ministry of the
Solicitor General, labored at "Project Gun Runner" for 9 months,
collecting illegal firearms at the rate of 22 per month.

That either indicates that the problem is relatively minor, or
that it is very difficult to find illegal firearms.  If the
problem were large, one would expect that seizure of a single
shipment would have accounted for 200 firearms.

"THE USE OF FIREARMS IN CRIMINAL INCIDENTS IN TORONTO" 

"The use of Firearms in Criminal Incidents in Toronto" (FCIT)
also opens windows not obvious to the inexpert reader.  This
additional commentary may be valuable to those studying it.

The gravest concern regarding FCIT is that there is material
which should be there, but is not.  The entire set or records of
firearms taken by the police is sadly defective.

The police "clearance" figures on page 1 are interesting but
useless.  In "55%" of the "67 incidents of firearm homicides,"
FCIT says, "a murder charge was laid against an offender."  

How many of those offenders were convicted or murder?  How many
of the charges were later plea bargained downwards?  How many
"offenders" were convicted, and of what?

FCIT attempts some statistical analysis, as in: "Also different
from the national perspective, it was found that homicides were
less likely to involve family members (34% nationally versus 18%
in the study), and were more likely to involve strangers (13%
nationally versus 26% in the study)."

That sort of analysis is not only useless, it is dangerous.  Wide
variation is always to be expected when the sample in the study
is so small; the figures all fall within the one-standard-
deviation band which must be exceeded before a statistical
analysis figure can be seriously considered to be meaningful.

That comment also applies to the analysis of firearm types; the
sample is simply too small to get any meaningful data from it.

FCIT page 1 contains the statement: "In (29 incidents)...there
was clear evidence that the gun was illegally held by the
offender in 52% of cases."  Again, too small for significance.

The statement on page 1, "...police reports did not routinely
indicate whether the offender was required to have, and did
have, a valid FAC [emphasis added--DAT]" indicates confusion. 
No one is "required" to have an FAC at any time other than the
moment of acquisition of a firearm.

FCIT (page 2) says, "Beyond the murder charges and other charges
that were laid against offenders, few cases involved charges
related to the gun itself--566 charges for first degree murder,
second degree murder, or manslaughter were laid by the police,
compared to seven weapons-related charges.  It seems that
police do not find it necessary to lay firearms charges when
there are grounds for a serious charge like murder [emphasis
added--DAT]."

In an Edmonton, Alberta case, the offender held up a gun store,
to steal guns.  He was armed with a "prohibited weapon"
(sawed-off rifle).  He ordered the fully-cooperating store clerk
to his knees, then executed him with a bullet to the head.

He was not charged with possession of a "prohibited weapon" (CC
s. 90(1), up to 10 years imprisonment), use of a firearm while
committing the offence (s. 85(1), up to 14 years which "shall be
served consecutively to any other punishment"), or armed robbery
(s. 343 and 344, up to life imprisonment). 

Because those charges were not laid, the judge could not impose
additional sentencing.  He will be eligible for full parole in
twelve and a half years--before his victim's children are grown
up, and still younger than his victim was on the day he died.

FCIT (page 2) says that "272 cases of armed robbery with a
firearm were reviewed" but in "only one third [91 of 272--DAT]...
[was] a suspect apprehended and charged."

FCIT (page 2) goes on to say that s. 85(1) charges were laid in
"55%" of all armed robbery with a firearm "cleared" cases [50 of
91 "cleared", 50 of 272 total--DAT]."

It does not say what percentage of the few s. 85(1) charges
evaporated during the plea bargaining phase, but other sources
indicate that most of them never appeared before a judge, so 55
per cent of 33-1/3 per cent (18-1/3 per cent) is far too high.

FCIT discusses "All Handguns Seized and Found" but the data is
nearly useless.  Of 550 handguns seized, "forty-five per cent"
(247.5?) were "linked to a criminal occurrence" and "51%"
(280.5?) were not.  One wonders about the other 22 handguns.

FCIT says (page 3), "It was not possible to search the
registration of 17% [93.5?] of the handguns... in more than
one-half of the [17%/93.5] the gun was untraceable due to an
erased serial number."

Of the remaining 83 per cent [457], "40% [183] were registered
and 60 % [274] were unregistered."  No figures are given as to
how many of the "registered" handguns were in the hands of the
registered owner at the time of seizure, as opposed to those
found in other hands.

Each so-called "registered" handgun may have been stolen at some
long-previous time and so reported; transferred illegally by the
legal owner; transferred legally by the previous owner and been
found as still registered to him through a fouled transfer record
in Ottawa (regrettably common!), etc.  A trace which turns up the
information that the handgun was reported stolen 5 years ago is
of very little use.  It would have helped if data of that type
had been included in FCIT.

FCIT does not fully record the reasons for seizure, but says,
"the police were often being proactive in seizure cases.  The
subject was in passive possession of the firearms at the time of
seizure in one-half of the incidents, and specific police powers
to search and seize firearms were were used in 20% of the cases."

That statement raises the ugly possibility that some of the
"incidents" were not criminal, but the result of police CC s.
102. fishing expeditions based on their power of warrantless
search and seizure--even within private homes.

FCIT (page 4) says, "It is important to exercise some caution
when interpreting the results of this study."  That is certainly
true; the statistics are based on numbers too small to be used,
one-standard-deviation changes are lacking, criminal activities
are mixed with paper errors, and the whole paper is vague.

One valuable insight (page 4) is that "...it became apparent that
the majority were not registered with the RCMP, and that they may
have been illegally imported or smuggled into Canada."  If that
is true, and all evidence indicates that it is, then registration
should be reconsidered; it cannot trace any such firearm.

It also says (page 4), "It is also evident that many firearms
offenders have a criminal record and are not in legal possession
of the firearm prior to committing a firearms offence."  That
demonstrates the futility of a firearms control system as a
deterrent to firearms crime; any criminal willing to violate the
laws forbidding murder, robbery or rape is highly unlikely to be
deterred by a firearms control law--especially one that is
largely used against the recreational firearms community and is
almost never used where a firearm is used for violent crime.  

FCIT's flaws are inevitable.  As it says (page 5), "In many
cases, information was missing... information on the firearm was
simply not available to police... particulars relating to the
firearm were often unclear from police files..."  Until the
reporting of firearms matters is markedly improved, any
legislation can only be based on theories.  Good data is simply
not available.

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [23/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 15:42:27 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan
Lines: 359
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						NFA PAPER XVI

Auditor General of Canada
242 Sparks St 10th Flr
OTTAWA ON K1A 0G6
Attn: ******* * ******
							6 PAGES
23 Mar 93

Dear *******:

Shortly after the first distribution of the Orders in Council
which "converted" large numbers of firearms to "restricted" or
"prohibited weapon" status, the NFA placed ads in the two
firearms trade papers, Canadian Access to Firearms and the
Gunrunner, circulation 14,000 and 23,000 respectively.

(If you're not familiar with the trade papers, they're 50-page
(average) newsprint and consist almost entirely of firearms trade
advertisements.  The ads are wholesalers' display ads aimed at
retailers, retailers display ads aimed at customers, and
classified ads placed by individuals to sell or buy specific
firearms or firearms-related goods.)

In the ads, we requested individuals who had been financially
injured by the Orders in Council to send us a tally of their
losses, on a provided form.  The ads appeared in the October
issues of the papers, circulated in late September.

By 09 Nov 92, we had 48 returns, listing some $158,835.36 in
personal losses.  Since then, quite a few more have trickled in,
despite our not (financial and space reasons) repeating them.

Bearing in mind the limited circulation of the papers, plus the
reluctance of collectors to identify themselves, that's only the
tip of the iceberg.  The actual losses run into the millions.

My 24 Feb 93 phone conversation with Michael Zigayer of the
Minister of Justice's office was occasioned by my Access to
Information Act return on a request to supply all records
considered by officers of that office while drawing up the list
of which firearms would be made "restricted" or "prohibited."

I queried the complete absence of any crime statistics, police
records, etc. dated prior to the issuance of the first list to
Chief Provincial Firearms Officers and RCMP HQ.  In my simple
mind, it would have been proper to determine which firearms
criminals in Canada actually use before deciding which ones to
ban or control; I was curious as to why they hadn't done that.

Mr. Zigayer said they had not consulted any written records, and
that was why none had been sent to me.  He said they were under
no obligation to consider anything like that, because choice was
vested in the Minister's discretion.

You may find the following partial transcript illuminating as to
the methods and mindset of the Department's officials.  There's a
lot more on the tape, if you want it, and on other tapes.
 
Excerpt from tape:

Tomlinson (DAT): What we were trying to do with our application
under the Access to Information Act was to find out what the
basis was that you selected the various firearms to go on the
"restricted" and "prohibited" lists.

Zigayer (Zig): No secret there.

DAT: Then what was it?

Zig: The Minister announced it way back in June of--was it--'80,
'90-- June of '90-- when she introduced the first Bill, C-80? She
was talking about military and paramilitary firearms.

DAT: Yeah, but the question is: Why?  If the firearms are no
problem in Canadian society--and all the evidence indicates that
they are not--then what was the rationale for saying that these
things are so dangerous they have to be banned from society?

Zig: That's a policy issue.  That's the Minister's made the
decision. 

DAT: You mean the Minister can just arbitrarily say, "I have
decided that Canadians should not have this particular type of
property and therefore we are going to confiscate it without any
payment to the owners"?  On the basis of absolutely nothing
except personal prejudice?

Zig: I'm not saying that.

DAT: Well, what did you just say?  Because that's certainly what
it sounded like to me.

Zig: No, all I said was that--I confirmed what you said
originally, that there was no documentation to provide you in
repsonse to your Access to Information Act request.

DAT: So there is no basis for the firearms-

Zig: Basis, I-

DAT: The basis was simply a statement-

Zig: There was no documentation for it.

DAT: There was, yes, well, you're telling me then, that the basis
is simply a statement by the Minister that she wants to ban this
particular class of firearms. 

Zig: Look at the section.  "Prohibited weapons," the definition
of "prohibited weapons," under the Criminal Code, section (84),
paragraph (e), where it says what type of firearms or weapons can
be declared to be "prohibited" by Order in Council.

DAT: Yes, I'm well aware of that.  But surely there should have
been some particular reason?  You know, you're talking about conf-

Zig: They're dangerous guns!  They're military!  They're not
designed for hunting!  They're not designed for sporting!  They're
designed to kill people!  They're military!  Do you have to go
further?

DAT: Well, that's absolutely ludicrous.  What do you think is the
difference between a military firearm and a sporting firearm?  In
its ability to kill people?  They use the same cartridges, they
have the same magazines, they have the same actions.  And there's
no- 

Zig: You asked me a question, I gave you the answer, we can't
take it any further than that.  I mean, first off, whether or
not, if you ask were the use of firearms or these weapons used,
er, something consulted, there were reports, from time to time,
that we're all aware of, news reports, of certain weapons turning
up, in relation to a, you'd call it a criminal offence, but no
one was convicted, so, or, in another case, you did have someone
convicted, it happened to be a stolen lawful gun. So the
relationship of specific weapons to offences could or could not,
depending on the circumstances, be relevant, but at any rate,
under the considerations set out in the Code, the use or the
prevalence of use of a certain type of firearm wasn't a matter
that, er

DAT: It wasn't relevant?

Zig: Not specifically.  Now we do know that one of the reasons
why sawed-off firearms were specifically included in the
prohibited weapons list in the Code was because those were being
used, or have been used and continue to be used in the commission
of criminal offences.

DAT: Yes, but what you're telling me, then-

Zig: So that's been used.  Certainly we reacted to the use of the
Stun Gun in criminal offences by having it declared a "prohibited
weapon."  But, even, in some areas, you could say, "Oh, we did do
something, and there's--we did something there."  You were provided
with the stuff on the Stun Gun.

DAT: Yes, I found that very interesting.  As far as I could see,
you had two incidents of it being used in crime, and thirty calls
a day from women wanting them for self-protection.

Zig: That's wrong.

DAT: Well, it's in the material you supplied me. 

Zig: I didn't say anything about thirty calls a day.

DAT: No, you didn't, but it was in the material you supplied me,
from the Toronto Police, and that was only from the Toronto
Police. 

Zig: The Toronto Police, and whether that's accurate, or whether
they were estimating, or whatever they were saying, I don't talk,
or I don't explain what the Toronto Police say.  But I can tell
you we didn't have that experience here.  And I can tell you that
we responded quite quickly to something that was developing.

DAT: Yeah, but the question in my mind on that, is: Did you
consider the difference between those which were purchased and
were being used for legitimate purposes and those which were used
for illegitimate purposes? And how many actual cases did you have
where they were used in crime?  Because certainly from the
information we got under the Information Act-

Zig: You got everything in our files.

DAT: Yeah. Well, you had virtually no cases of it being used for
crime, and in at least one of the cases, 

Zig: I had no cases of their not being used for crime.

DAT: What?

Zig: I had no cases at all indicating that a Stun Gun had been
used to defend someone.  

DAT: So? You didn't have enough cases to indicate anything.  You
certainly didn't have enough to create any reasonable degree of
statistical information at all.  It was a knee-jerk reaction,
Michael. 

Zig: It was a speedy reaction, it wasn't a knee-jerk reaction. It
was something that was brought to us, in the normal course of
events, the normal channels for these sorts of things, and strong
support for the action.  

DAT: Strong support from whom? (Long silence)  

Zig: Do you know-

DAT: There certainly wasn't any strong-

Zig: You've received the documents that say how you go about
having something placed on the "prohibited" list or the
"restricted" list.

DAT: I know that.  But you just said that there was "strong
support" for it, and my question is: From whom?  It certainly
wasn't from the public.

Zig: It was from the CPFOs.

DAT: Ah.  Those boys.  Okay, that's very interesting.  And my
question on the CPFOs is: Where on earth are they provided with
the authority to make determinations like that in the law?

Zig: They didn't make the determination, they made
recommendations. 

DAT: Okay, where in law are they in that process at all?

Zig: Anybody can make a recommendation or request.  We get them
from various police departments and civic groups all the time.

DAT: Well, how do you make a decision, then?  Do you simply
accept it?  

Zig: What we do, is we review everything, and we prepare it in a
package and send up to the Minister who makes the decision.  And in
fact it's not the Minister alone who makes the decision on
something being declared a "prohibited weapon;" it goes to
Cabinet. 

DAT: Okay, but did you at any time make any attempt whatever to
ask the public what their opinions on this were? (Silence) Or did
you do this entirely within the officialdom of the government? 
(Long silence) Well, it's a simple question.  

Zig: There were public discussions.  I remember there were
discussions with the importers, and, er, there were, er, there
was a, er- 

DAT: No. With the general public.  With the thousands of people
who were buying these things for self-protection.  

Zig: Hah!  Deluded into-- Anyway, listen, I'm not going to
discuss this any further.  The thing was on whether you had
recieved everything, and you were provided with everything, and
as I said to you, there weren't any documents dealing with or
including data on use--and I wasn't thinking of the Stun Gun in
your request. I thought your request had to do more with the
firearms, but because the language of the request as I understood
it was so broad we tossed in the Stun Gun stuff too.

DAT: Yes. We also have a question on the spray cannisters of Mace
and Capiscum. We now have a situation where spray cannisters
of Mace are completely outlawed as "prohibited weapons" in
Canada; however, Capiscum is still floating in limbo. Now, what is
the position of your Department on that?  Because the Minister
said one thing, and the Department's saying another thing. 

Zig: Well, all I'll say is that it's a matter for, it's in the
hands of the provincial Attrorneys General to prosecute if they
find appropriate circumstances.

DAT:  So you don't feel any requirement that the legislation
should be clarified?  You certainly did in the case of the Stun
Guns. 

Zig: I'm not saying that.  I'm not saying that.  I'm just saying
that if it's appropriate to clarify the language of the Order,
that action will be taken, but we're still waiting, I mean, no
one, we're waiting to see if some one is gonna, er, let me put it
this way, one of the reasons why the Stun Gun Order which used to
be the Taser and we thought Stun Gun Order was clarified to make
specific inclusion of the Stun Gun was that there was a tribunal
that interpreted the law.  It was a different interpretation than
had been obtained in a provincial court in Alberta, but it did
lead to confusion, and on the basis of that decision, large
quantities of, er, or possible, possibly large quantities of what
was otherwise thought to be a "prohibited weapon" were now coming
into, or could now come into the country, so there was a
definitely a need to clarify the language of the law.  At
present, I'm not aware of any court having said that a certain
Capsicum container or disperser did not fall within the ambit of
the Order.  In general terms-

DAT: You're not making any sense, Michael.  Capiscum is currently
bering sold by mail order all over Canada.  

Zig: Well, heh, it shouldn't be.  It depends on, we're not, the
enforcement of the law is a matter that's been assigned to the
provinces.  And if they come across an instance where a
"prohibited weapon" is being sold or possessed, it's their
resopnsibility to prosecute.  And it it turns out that the court
decides that the law is too vague, or the certain device that the
police and others believe is a "prohibited weapon" is not a
"prohibited weapon" then we would have to revise the Order and
make sure that, clarify the legislation.

DAT:  That's very puzzling, because you have the identical
situation that you have with the Stun Guns.  You reacted very
fast to the Stun Guns,  but the importation of the spray
cannisters of Capsicum came in at almost exactly the same time,
the circumstances are the same, and the whole thing has been left
floating in limbo.  

Zig: Look, to tell you the truth, no one has brought this
to--you're the first one who's telling me this.  We do have a
case that comes out of the BC Court of Appeal, a number of years
ago, that says that Capsicum is a "prohibited weapon."  In fact,
it was a product, very much, a spray cannister, I think it was
called Bodyguard, and was intended for use in self-defence, and
the thing was ruled to be a "prohibited weapon."  That's the only
case I'm aware of, and it appears that the law was clear. It was
Capsicum and it was "prohibited weapon."

DAT: Yeah, but the problem is that in the Order in Council, it
says it's a "prohibited weapon" if it is designed and intended
for use against people.  And it is commonly being sold, all over
Canada, designed and intended for use against animals.

Zig: Well, does the design change simply because you change the
packaging? 

DAT: Of course it doesn't; but that it the situation today.  It's
being sold as Bear Guard, it's being sold as dog repellent, it's
being issued by Canada Post to their letter carriers, it's
commonly on sale everywhere in Canada.

Zig: Okay. I again will have to say, it's up to the police to
enforce it, if they find there's a problem with it. [END]

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [24/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 15:42:37 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan
Lines: 1559
Sender: [email-masked]
Distribution: na
Message-ID: <[email-masked]>
Reply-To: [email-masked]
NNTP-Posting-Host: skatter.usask.ca

						NFA PAPER XVIIA

ANALYSIS OF "VARIANT OR MODIFIED VERSION"

David A. Tomlinson

The author of this paper, having been qualified by various courts
in four provinces as an expert witness for firearms matters, was
commissioned to study the firearms Orders in Council (OIC)
JUS-92-567-01, JUS-92-569-01 and JUS-92-599-01, to comment on
them, and to analyze the actual relationships involved in those
and sundry other OICs issued in the same period.

In each relevant subsection of the OICs in question, one "design"
of firearm is converted to "prohibited weapon" status or to
"restricted weapon" status by the OIC in question; hereinafter,
such a design is referred to as the "parent" firearm design.

The phrase "and any variant or modified version thereof" is
repeatedly used in each firearms OIC to convert other firearms
(firearms not on the list included in the OIC) to "prohibited
weapon" or "restricted weapon" status; hereinafter, such a
firearm is referred to as a "variant."

The chosen method ("parent" firearm designs converting
"variants") is then expounded in each OIC by providing
incomplete (necessarily; new "variants and modified
versions" appear on the market frequently) lists of the
"variants" to clarify which firearms are "variants."

That situation raises a serious question as to the meaning,
in law, of the phrase "and any variant or modified version
thereof." What criteria are applied to determine whether or not a
particular firearm is a prohibited or restricted "variant"?  

The question is a very serious one, because simple possession of
any prohibited "variant" is a serious criminal offence under s.
90(1) of the Criminal Code, and  simple possession of any
restricted "variant" which has not been registered with the RCMP
is a serious criminal offence under s. 91(1).  In the former
case, the penalty is imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten
years, and in the latter not exceeding five years.

It is therefore vitally necessary that each possessor of a
firearm should know the status, in law, of his possession with
precision; without such knowledge, his life may easily be
destroyed by arrest, criminal prosecution, imprisonment, and the
stigma of a criminal record.

Obviously, each OIC law must be clear enough for a reasonable
person to understand it, just as any other part of the Criminal
Code must meet that standard.

Because the "variant" lists demonstrate various relationships, it
is necessary to study each relationship actually used in each
OICs to define where a "parent"-to-"variant" relationship exists,
as a result of some rule being applied, to determine what that
rule was, and to determine which possible similarities are
important, and which are not important.  

In this study, no written indication of the rule, in law, for any
"parent"-to-"variant"  relationship used by any OIC's authors
was discovered; it was necessary to learn the relationships by
comparisons of "parent" designs to their "variant" lists.  The
"point rating system" described in literature distributed by the
Minister was clearly ignored in many cases, leaving off firearms
which exceeded 50 points and including those which did not.

The wording, specifying conversion of particular some "parent"
design and "any variant or modified version thereof" was probably
adopted to prevent reverse conversion by a manufacturer or
importer through simply making some minor alteration to the
design and renaming the resulting firearm. 

One major difficulty with this study arose because no examples
are given of somehow-similar firearms which are specifically
declared to be excluded; i.e., not to be "variants."  The
effect of that omission is to leave the relationships open-ended;
that is, there is no exclusion limit as to where a possible
"variant" relationship may not, in law, exist.

It is respectfully submitted that one effect of the absence of
somehow-similar but excluded firearms from each list is important
to the criminal justice system generally.  That effect is to
leave the determination of whether or not a particular firearm is
a "variant" to officers of the state who are also deciding upon
such matters as arrest, criminal charges, criminal prosecution,
imprisonment, and the stigma of a criminal record regarding the
possessor of a firearm which may or may not be a "variant"
firearm in law.

Any such decision is, of course, a judgement as to the guilt or
innocence of a person regarding a criminal offence.

The absence of any adequate objective standards to guide such
officers is surprising, because the expertise needed for reasoned
determinations is formidable.  An encyclopedic knowledge of the
internal mechanisms of rare firearms is necessary (see the
AK-47-to-Dragunov relationship below), plus a similar depth of
knowledge of the outline and appearance of many firearms, as we
shall see. 

Firearms do not fall into tidy classifications.  Each group
described by a word as if it were a homogeneous group has members
which may also be labelled with another word, with equal
accuracy.  The words "rifle" and "carbine", for example, describe
certain firearms which can be called by either name.  More
serious illustrations of this problem arise below.

Where the status of a firearm (or any other device which may be a
"prohibited weapon") is unclear, the possessor may well be
subjected to the full rigors of a criminal prosecution.  Even if
he successfully demonstrates his innocence, the cost and the the
stigma of having been charged, having his property seized, and
being subjected to criminal prosecution may considerably damage
his life and reputation.

I have consistently borne in mind that this is not administrative
law; in every aspect, it is criminal law, intimately related to
criminal prosecution consequences for any error in interpretation
on the part of a firearms owner or an officer of the state.  

Because the OICs in question form a part of the Criminal Code, no
one is vested, in law, with authority to decide whether or not
a particular firearm is a prohibited or restricted "variant."  

Indeed, no such vested authority can be established; such a
decision, once the OIC has been given force of law within the
Criminal Code, may be made only by a court of criminal law.

It should also be borne in mind that no decision by a court of
criminal law can be absolutely relied upon until the Supreme
Court of Canada has ruled upon the same question as to the
status of the same, or an identical, item of property. 

If any person or tribunal had been vested with the authority to
make such a decision, its decision would be a decision as to
whether or not the possessor has violated s. 90(1) or s. 91(1) of
the Criminal Code (committed a crime), and that is clearly a
decision reserved to the criminal courts. 

The fact that the "variant" lists included in the OICs exhibited
such breadth for the relationship between "parent" and "variant"
has left me with more questions than answers.

In my opinion, it is not possible for a person with my expertise
(over 40 years as a firearms collector and student of firearms
design and firearms history) to make a certain judgement of
whether or not a particular firearm is "prohibited" or
"restricted" through its similarity to a "parent"--unless it is
inscribed on a "variant" list.

In my opinion, it is not possible to accurately identify the
firearms which are on the various lists; the identifying data is
far too limited and ambiguous.

From my court and personal experience with officers of the state,
including the RCMP, OPP, and QPP firearms experts in their
respective forensic laboratories, I submit that their expertise
in this field of relationships is not superior to my own.  The
forensic scientists and officers in those laboratories have very
little call to study the mechanical or historical aspects of
firearms relationships; in that area, they are not superior to
any private citizen who has involved himself or herself in broad,
long-term studying of such relationships.  Their primary work
areas are forensic ballistics and firearms identification--and
neither requires extensive knowledge of firearms mechanisms.

ANALYSIS

Solely because it has the longest "variant" lists, I began my
study with OIC JUS-92-569-01, which converts unrestricted
firearms to "restricted weapon" status, and, in several areas,
purports to convert an already-restricted firearm to "restricted
weapon" status.  The intent and effects of the latter action are
most unclear.

EXAMPLES FROM OIC JUS-92-569-01:

In s. 3(a), the "firearm of the design [emphasis added]
commonly known as the AK-47 rifle" is designated as a "parent,"
and the first question arises: 

Does the definition "firearm of the design commonly known as the
AK-47 rifle" mean the original AK-47, as designed and produced in
the former Soviet Union, or does it mean all firearms of that
"design"--and, if the latter, how far must the "design" of a
particular firearm diverge from the "parent" design before the
firearm in question is no longer within the group of "variant"
firearms?

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer that question. 
The language was too vague and ambiguous.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

The apparent "parent" AK-47 was originally a 7.62X39mm calibre
selective-fire (capable of semi-automatic or full automatic fire
at the user's choice) short rifle, issued as standard for the
armed forces of the former Soviet Union.  As such, it is a
"prohibited weapon" as a result of its full automatic capability,
and is excluded from the scope of the OIC by s. 3's preamble, and
thus is probably not the intended "parent."
 
The "parent" also cannot be the "converted" (from selective fire to
semi-automatic only) military surplus firearm, because as the
subject of the CC s. 84(1) "restricted weapon" (c.1) definition,
they are also specifically excluded by s. 3 of the OIC.

Therefore, it would apparently be the semi-automatic redesign of
the original AK-47 that is the subject of the OIC in question,
although which of the many possible variations is unknown.

The original AK-47 design has been produced by many factories in
many countries under many names, with minor or extensive
modifications being incorporated by many of the manufacturers.

Some of that production has been under licence from the
originators, and some has been of "pirated" nature.  As a
civilian-market semi-automatic, it has been produced in the
original 7.62X39mm calibre, in .223 calibre to improve sales in
western bloc countries, and in a few other calibres.

The original AK-47 was soon redesigned in its country of origin
by the substitution of a stamped sheet metal receiver for the
original machined steel receiver, and renamed the AKM.

Since the AKM does appear [(iii)] on the "variant" list, it would
appear that the "parent" designation is limited to the original
design, from the original factory, though that is far from
certain.  The Soviet-made AKM never appeared in the civilian
marketplace as a semi-automatic made for that market, so it is
specifically excluded by the OIC itself from consideration.

The AKM was, however, made under licence in Egypt as a
selective-fire military rifle.  Later, the Egyptian AKM was
modified for the civilian market as a semi-automatic rifle,
imported by the Austrian arms firm, Steyr Daimler Puch, and sold
commercially,  at least as early as 1983.

It is unknown whether s. 3 (iii), the "AKM" on the list, is
intended to designate the Soviet ("prohibited weapon") AKM, and
include the Egyptian AKM as a "variant" of the Soviet AKM, or to
designate the Egyptian AKM directly.  The designation "AKM,"
without further data, is also quite ambiguous.  To further
confuse things, the Hungarians also called one of their
heavily-modified versions the "AKM," as have others.

Leaving that unresolved, the AK-47 "variants" are defined thus:
"and any variant or modified version thereof, including...
[emphasis added]."  It is clear that the wording is intended
to place other, unlisted, firearms in the "variant" class as
"restricted weapons" defined by law.

Some 68 firearms are in the AK-47 list as designated "variants"
of the AK-47, and I am aware of many unlisted but quite obvious
further "variants."  Serious questions arise, however:

Which types of similarity make a firearm a "variant" of the
"parent" design, and which do not?  Which differences do not
remove a firearm from the "variant" group?

In order to answer those questions, absent any relevant guidance
from the plain meaning of the words in the OICs, I was forced to
analyze the relationships which had been used in the OICs.

For example, (xii) on the AK-47 list is "Dragunov."  The apparent
"parent" AK-47 was originally a 7.62X39mm calibre selective-fire
(capable of semi-automatic or full automatic fire at the user's
choice) short rifle, issued as a standard infantry rifle for the
armed forces of the former Soviet Union.

The Dragunov was originally a 7.62X54mm calibre semi-automatic
long rifle, issued as standard for the armed forces of the former
Soviet Union as a telescope-sighted sniper rifle.  (It is also a
desirable collector's item, target rifle, and hunting rifle.)

The Dragunov is much longer than the AK-47, shoots a much more
powerful cartridge, has virtually no parts which interchange with
those of the AK-47 (even when both are from original Soviet
production), and does not closely resemble the AK-47 in outline
or appearance.  The similarity of mechanical design is not close,
but that's what triggered the "parent"-to-"variant" relationship.

The Dragunov is a firearm which is similar but not identical
in mechanical design to the "parent" firearm, but is not
similar in designed outline or appearance.

In contrast, (xlviii) on the list is the Mitchell AK-22.  The
"parent" AK-47 is a gas-operated (the gases following the bullet
down the barrel escape through a hole to push a piston back to
unlock the action and push the bolt to the rear), locked-breech
(the bolt must be locked into position until the bullet has left
the barrel, or an explosion will injure or kill the operator as
the bolt opens) rifle using high-powered centerfire cartridges.

The "variant" AK-22 is a blowback-operated (the empty
cartridge case pushes the bolt to the rear), unlocked-breech
(the bolt need not be locked into position until the bullet has
left the barrel, because the low pressure and small mass of the
departing bullet are balanced by the relatively large mass of the
bolt, and that is enough to prevent the bolt from opening too
soon) rifle using low-powered .22 rimfire cartridges.

The AK-22 is a firearm which is similar but not identical in
designed outline or appearance but is not similar in
mechanical design to the "parent" design.

The Dragunov is much more powerful (much larger, more powerful
long-range cartridge) and the AK-22 is much less powerful (much
smaller, weaker short-range cartridge) than the "parent" design;
therefore, the calibre, size, and power of the "variant" firearm
and its cartridge are not relevant factors.

The Dragunov is much longer than the AK-47, both in barrel length
and in overall length; therefore, those factors aren't relevant.

Examining the phrase used in every case "the firearm of the
design [emphasis added] commonly known as..." demonstrated a
principle (later proved by demonstration that it had been used): 
It is not a particular firearm which is selected as the
"parent," with only firearms which first appeared later becoming
"variants;" it is the general design rather than the
particular firearm. 

The "parent"-to-"variant" relationship is determined by
similarity of "design."  The insights gained to this point,
solidly determined from study of the relationships illustrated by
all the various "variant" lists, allow me to state five rules
used by the OIC authors to determine "parent"-to-"variant"
relationships:

1.  A firearm which is similar but not identical in
mechanical design to the "parent" design, and is similar
in designed outline or appearance is a "variant," even if it
is of a different calibre, and made in a different factory in a
different country.

2.  A firearm which is similar but not identical in
mechanical design to the "parent" design, but is not
similar in designed outline or appearance, is a "variant,"
even if it is of a different calibre, and made in a different
factory in a different country.

3.  A firearm which is similar but not identical in designed
outline or appearance to the "parent" design but is not similar
in mechanical design, is a "variant," even if it is of a
different calibre, and made in a different factory in a different
country.  (Such a firearm is commonly referred to by firearms
experts as a "lookalike.")

4.  The calibre, size, and power of a "variant" and its cartridge
are not relevant factors.

5.  The barrel length and overall length of a "variant" are not
relevant factors.  

The above five rules were confirmed by thorough examination of
the entire range of firearms OICs.  Many examples of "variant"
relationships to "parent" designs were located which confirmed
the rules; none were found which contradicted them, although
there was some confusion resulting from dual "variants;" i.e., in
some cases, two OICs seem to be trying to convert certain
firearms to both "prohibited" and "restricted" status.  Examples
of that will be given in due course.

The major question which immediately arises is:  What degree of
similarity of design--mechanical or appearance--triggers the
"variant" relationship for an unlisted firearm? 

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer that question. 
The language was too vague and ambiguous.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

Let us now consider the further effects of having those two
examples--the Dragunov, and the Mitchell AK-22--as "variants" on
the AK-47 "parent" list.  First, the Dragunov:

The Mitchell M-76 is a variant of the Dragunov.  It uses a
different cartridge (8X57mm instead of 7.62X54mm), is different in
appearance, and is made in Yugoslavia.  The Yugoslav origin is
clearly not enough to exclude it from "variant" status; other
firearms on the list come from China [(v) AKS-56S], Hungary [(x)
AMD-65], Israel [(xiii) Galil], Yugoslavia [(xlix) Mitchell
AK-47], etc.

It may be that the difference in cartridge, or the fact that the
Mitchell M-76 is not similar in outline or appearance, or both,
take the M-76 out of the "variant" class; but that is not
certain.  If the "variant" of a "variant" is included, then it
is a "restricted weapon" and anyone caught in possession of one
which is not registered with the state is liable to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding five years. 

On the AK-47 list, (xix) is "M76," but the meaning of that entry
is uncertain.  There are other firearms on the market which are
called "M76," and the presence of three "Mitchell" firearms on
the list is evidence that all the "Mitchell" imports were
examined.  Only certain firearms were then chosen and entered as
the "Mitchell" firearms sublist [entries (xlix), (l), and (li)
within the AK-47 "variant" list]. It seems most unlikely that
(xix)'s "M76" is the Mitchell M-76.

Another interesting question arises from the 9.3X54mm Medved
rifle.  The Medved is a hunting rifle, made in the former Soviet
Union as a hunting rifle; it has aspects of Kalashnikov's AK-47
design in it, aspects of the Dragunov Kalashnikov-derived design,
and aspects of the Simonov SKS design--yet is none of those. 
Like many firearms, it is an eclectic mixture of several design
concepts.  It is impossible, from either the OIC's wording or the
derived rules above, to say whether it qualifies as a restricted
AK-47 "variant" or not.

In such a case, a decision could only be made by a court of
criminal law, as noted earlier.

Other confusions arise.  There is a "Type 56" on the market which
is an obvious variant of the AK-47 design; and another commonly
available "Type 56" which is a variant on the Soviet SKS design.
It is not possible to determine from the list whether the s. 3(a)
(xxxv) Type 56 is the AK-47 variant, the SKS variant, or both.

The fact that the SKS variant is not similar in mechanical design
to the AK-47 would seem, at first glance, to exclude it; but the
Mitchell AK-22 is even less similar in mechanical design.

In identifying groups of firearms, no one in Canada has greater
expertise than the Firearms Registration Administrative Section
of the RCMP.  In order to identify one firearm within a group of
identical firearms for the purposes of registration, they have
found it necessary to use seven identifying entries.  Example:

MAKE: (MANUFACTURER'S NAME)       MODEL: (MODEL OF FIREARM)      

TYPE: RIFLE  ACTION: SEMI-AUTO     CALIBRE: .223                 

SHOTS: 5     BARREL LENGTH: 410mm  SERIAL NUMBER: _______________ 

Of the identifying entries above, only the serial number
identifies the particular firearm within the group of identical
or near-identical firearms.  All the other entries are an attempt
to identify the particular group of which the individual firearm
is a specimen.  Even with this comparatively elaborate scheme,
their computerized data-bank identification often fails; as I
said before, firearms do not fall into tidy classifications. 

It is, in my expert opinion, ludicrous to attempt to identify
groups of firearms by the simplistic methods used in the OICs in
question.  Failure of adequate identification--in the light of
the very serious criminal law consequences of error, either on
the part of the possessor or of the officials of the criminal
justice system--is very dangerous. 

Passing to s. 3(a) (xlviii):  The Mitchell AK-22 is, as stated
above, a "lookalike" not similar in mechanical design to the
AK-47.  Examination of  1987 Gun Digest data (P337) and 1992
Guns and Ammo Annual (P161) data indicates that the AK-22 is
38 inches long, weighs 6 pounds, and was imported from Italy. 
This "lookalike" is designed to be outwardly similar to the
AK-47, but the similarity is not terribly close.

The Mitchell AK-47, in contrast, is 40.6 inches long, weighs 9.1
pounds, and is imported from Yugoslavia (data from 1987 Gun
Digest, P305).

As a further illustration of the major differences between those
two firearms, the Mitchell AK-47 price is listed as US$495.00,
while the Mitchell AK-22 price is only US$249.00 (both prices from
1987 Gun Digest, P305 and P337).

In s. 3(m) of the OIC, we find another "parent": "the firearm of
the design commonly known as the Galil assault rifle."  That is
curious, because the Galil is already listed, in s. 3(a) (xiii),
as a "variant" of the AK-47.

S. 3(m) lists several "variants" of the "parent" Galil, and they
include the "Mitchell Galil/22 Auto Rifle," which is the rifle
listed as the "Mitchell Arms Galil-Style Rifle" (1992 Guns
and Ammo Annual P161).  It's a "lookalike" again, simply the
Italian Mitchell AK-22 with a few amendments, such as changed
sight locations and a bent cocking handle.  It is 36 inches long,
and weighs 6 pounds, compared to 39 inches long with a weight of
9.6 pounds for a Galil AR (1989 Gun Digest, P296).

I accept that as evidence that, in law, the "variant" of a
"variant" firearm's "variant" is a "variant;" that is, the
Mitchell Galil/22 Auto Rifle is a "variant" of the Galil itself,
which is a "variant" design derived from the Finnish M-78, which
in turn is a "variant" derived from the original AK-47.  That is
an example of four generations of derivation.

The Finnish M-62 was a major redesign of the original AK-47 which
did not follow the Soviet AKM redesign; it continued to use the
machined steel receiver, as did its "variant," the Valmet M-78.

The Finnish M-78 was a redesign of the Finnish M-62, again not
following the Soviet AKM redesign; it continued to use the
machined steel receiver, as did its "variant," the Galil.

EXAMPLES FROM OIC JUS-92-567-01, WITH COMPARISONS

OIC JUS-92-567-01 s. 3(j) converts, as a "parent," "the rifle of
the design commonly known as the FAMAS rifle, and any variant or
modified version thereof" to "prohibited weapon" status.  That is
more serious; the penalty for simple possession of a prohibited
weapon is imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years. 

Included in the list of "variants" we find "the Mitchell MAS/22."
That is the firearm designated as the "Mitchell Arms FAMAS-Style
Rifle" in the 1990 Guns and Ammo Annual (P347).  It's merely
another cosmetic variation of their Italian-made AK-22 design. 
It is only mildly similar the FAMAS in designed outline or
appearance, and not at all similar in mechanical design to it.  

That lack of close similarity is disturbing; it means that a
reasonable officer of the state, when examining an unlisted
possible "variant" firearm, is justified in deciding that it is a
"prohibited" or "restricted" "variant" in law on the basis of
quite minor similarity.

Interestingly, the FAMAS "variant" list does not include the
semi-automatic .22 rimfire Unique F-11, another FAMAS "lookalike"
which is actually a training rifle designed to closely resemble
the FAMAS.  Both the FAMAS and the Unique training rifle have
been officially adopted as standard firearms of the French armed
forces, and the Unique has been widely sold in Canada.

At this point, a side road branches off.  Under the definition s.
84(1) "firearm" in the Criminal Code, pellet guns are definitely
included.  Although at first glance low velocity pellet guns seem
to be excluded from the "prohibited weapon" and "restricted
weapon" categories by s. 84(2)(d), each is still classified as a
firearm except for the purposes of a few specified sections. 
The law in this area is very complex and convolutted; I have found it
necessary to expand upon it below.

A firearm may be a "variant" by reason of being similar only
in outline or appearance.  Many pellet firearms are specifically
designed to appear as similar as possible to firearms listed in
these OICs. 

The FAMAS semi-automatic air rifle (.177 calibre, 10-shot, 1989
Gun Digest, P409) is designed to duplicate the FAMAS .223
military rifle, for use as an indoor training rifle for the
French armed forces.  It was widely sold in Canada, and I doubt
that many of the owners would suspect that it may be converted to
"prohibited weapon" status as of 01 Oct 92; yet, by the plain
meaning of the words in the OIC and CC s. 84(2), it may well be.

Is the FAMAS semi-automatic air rifle included as "variant"
firearms in the "prohibited weapon" category by OIC JUS-92-567-01
s. 3(i), and, if not, why not?  

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer that question. 
The language, both in the OIC and in the Criminal Code, was too
vague and ambiguous.  Any definitive answer, of course, can only
come from a court of criminal law.  If, however, the answer is
"yes," as it well may be, the effects spread widely.  

There are many other "lookalike" pellet and paintball guns which
are "firearms" within the meaning of that definition in s. 84(1)
of the Criminal Code.  In flipping through the 1989 Gun
Digest, for example, I found "lookalike" air- or CO2-powered
versions of the MAC 10 (Model 85 Paint Ball Machine Pistol,
P414), H & K MP5 A3 (Command Post MP5-A3 carbine, P412)), Uzi SMG
(Command Post Uzi Pump, P412), M-16 rifle (Command Post XM-177E2
carbine, P413), FAMAS (FAMAS Semi-Auto air rifle, P409), Mini-Uzi
(Crosman Z-77 carbine, P406), M-16 rifle (Crosman A*I*R* 17,
P406), SIG-551 rifle (Air Arms Firepower air rifle, P400),
Skorpion (Command Post Tracer Scorpion, P400), and a MAC 10 with
silencer(!) (Command Post M-11 Gas Pistol, P399).

All of the above are, in law, firearms, unless exempted from that
category by CC s. 84(2), which says, in part:

84.(2) Notwithstanding the definition "firearm" in
subsection (1), for the purposes of the definitions "prohibited
weapon" and "restricted weapon" in that subsection and for the
purposes of section 93, subsections 97(1) and (3) and sections
102, 104, 105, and 116, the following weapons shall be deemed not
to be firearms [emphasis added]:...

(d) any other barrelled weapon where it is proved that that
weapon is not designed or adapted to discharge a shot, bullet, or
other projectile at a muzzle velocity exceeding 152.4 m per
second or to discharge a shot, bullet or other projectile that is
designed or adapted to attain a velocity exceeding 152.4 m per
second.

At first glance, that appeared to void any application of the
OICs to the list given above; but it may not.  Many pellet
firearms are quite capable of exceeding that 152.4 m per second
standard.  

More seriously, the Minister has not relied upon CC s. 116 in the
issuance of these firearm OICs.  Under the doctrine that the
specific overrides the general, does the conversion of a specific
air- or CO2-powered "variant" firearm from its previous
unrestricted status to "prohibited weapon" or "restricted weapon"
status by OIC override that blanket exemption?  If it does, the
fact that neither CC s. 90 or s. 91 are mentioned in s. 84(2) may
be very important.

While definitions under "subsection [84] (1), for the purposes of
the definitions "prohibited weapon" and "restricted weapon" in
that subsection" are expempted, those definitions include the
words "is declared by order of the Governor in Council to be a
(prohibited) (restricted) weapon."  Does the exemption override
the Order in Council which the definition says is law? 

I am not qualified to make any judgement as to the validity, in
law, of that concern; but I do believe that it should be
carefully considered.  Study of the OICs has already led me into
some very unexpected areas, and this one is quite tangled.

The FAMAS-Mitchell link, in turn, throws more light on one of the
earlier rules defining a "variant":

3.  A firearm which is similar but not identical in
designed outline or appearance to the "parent" firearm but
is not similar in mechanical design, is a "variant,"
even if it is of a different calibre, and made in a different
factory in a different country.

The Mitchell MAS/22 is nearly identical in mechanical design to
the Mitchell AK-22; but its "parent" FAMAS assault rifle  design
is very different from the AK-22's "parent" AK-47 design.  

The AK-47 is a gas-operated (the gases following the bullet down
the barrel escape through a hole to push a piston back to unlock
the action and push the bolt to the rear), locked-breech (the
bolt must be locked into position until the bullet has left the
barrel, or an explosion will injure or kill the operator as the
bolt opens) rifle using high-powered centerfire cartridges.

The FAMAS is a delayed-blowback (the cartridge, trying to escape
rearwards, moves the bolt very slowly against an enormous
mechanical disadvantage), semi-locked-breech (It's never truly
locked, just very hard to open) rifle, using high-powered
centerfire cartridges.

Obviously, those two have very little in common; yet the two
"variant" .22 rimfire rifles are very closely related to each
other; many of their parts, for example, are interchangeable.  Of
the two "variants," one (the MAS/22) is converted to "prohibited
weapon" status, and the other to "restricted weapon" status. 
Neither is close in mechanical design to either of their "parent"
firearms.

What effect does that have upon the "variant"-of-a-"variant"
relationship between those two firearms, and are they
"restricted" or "prohibited"?   Is this situation an indication
that being similar in designed outline or appearance is more
important to the "parent"-to-"variant" relationship than being
similar in mechanical design?

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer those questions. 
The language was too vague and ambiguous.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

At this point, I began to consider time:  If the "parent"
converts the status of a "variant," is it possible that the
conversion works backward in time?  That is, can an earlier
firearm be considered to be a "variant or modified version" of
the "design" of a later firearm?  Can a "variant" be older than
its designated "parent"?

The answer to each of those questions is apparently "yes," and that
adds further complications to this scheme of determining the
status of firearms by Order in Council.

COMPARISONS, OIC JUS-92-567-01 AND JUS-92-569:

OIC JUS-92-567-01 s. 3(c) selects as "parent" the "design" of the
"Calico Model 900 rifle" with "any variant or modified version
thereof, including the Calico M-951 carbine, M-100 carbine, and
M-105 carbine (as "variants")".  The Calico Model 100 carbine
preceded the Model 900 rifle by at least a year, and more
probably by two years; therefore, in the intent of the OIC, a
"variant" older than the "parent" is a deliberate situation.

That isn't an isolated instance; OIC JUS-92-569-01 s. 3(l)
selected the G3 rifle as the "parent" with the earlier HK 91 as a
"variant."  Similarly, s. 3(r) specifies the much earlier AR-15
as a "variant" of the earlier "parent" M16.

THE DUAL CONVERSION PROBLEM

OIC JUS-92-599-01 s. 2(a) converts the Sterling Mk 6 Carbine "and
any variant or modified version thereof" to "prohibited weapon"
status.  S. 3 then "grandfathers" the possessor for retention of
the "prohibited weapon" if he applies for its registration.

OIC JUS-92-567-01 s. 4(k) converts the Sterling Mk 7 pistol "and
any variant or modified version thereof" to "prohibited weapon"
status, but has no "grandfathering" section equivalent to s. 3 of
OIC JUS-92-599-01.

The Sterling Mk 6 and Mk 7 are virtually identical in designed
outline or appearance and in mechanical design, save for length. 
They are both "prohibited," but is that with or without
"grandfathering," considering that they are obvious "variants" of
each other?  

Both OICs have the same effective date; but does the "599" OIC
come later in time than the "567," and is that significant?  

Is the Sterling Mk 4 (the most commonly-found member of this
"family" within Canada, which pre-dates both the Mk 6 and Mk 7)
converted to "prohibited weapon" status by either OIC, and, if
so, is it a grandfathered "variant" of the Mk 6 or an
ungrandfathered "variant" of the Mk 7? 

In my analysis of these OICs, I could not answer those questions. 
The language was too vague and ambiguous.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

THE UNRESTRICTED RIFLE AND THE PROHIBITED WEAPON

OIC JUS-92-567-01 s. 3(p) converts "the firearm of the design
commonly known as the PMAI 'Assault' 22 rifle", and "any variant
or modified version thereof" to "prohibited weapon" status.  

An examination of the US Arms PMAIP "Assault" 22 (1984 Gun
Digest P344) shows that it is simply a Mossberg Model 353
semi-automatic .22 rimfire rifle with a different wooden stock
and a longer magazine. All metal parts are identical.  The PMAI
is simply a PMAIP (illustrated p47 of the Minister's "WEAPONS
PROHIBITED AND RESTRICTED BY ORDER IN COUNCIL REFERENCE MANUAL")
with a black wooden stock of normal rifle configuration, and an
18-inch barrel.  It's virtually identical to a Mossberg 353.

The only real difference between the two firearms is that the
Mossberg 353 has a buttstock which is wood-colored, and the PMAI
does not.  The PMAI is, but for OIC JUS-92-567-01 s. 3(m),
unrestricted under the existing Criminal Code definitions.

To illustrate the effects, let us take four firearms: two
unrestricted Mossberg 353's, "A" and "B," and two prohibited
PMAIs, "C" and "D."  Moving a simple catch allows us to remove
the magazine from Mossberg "B" and PMAI "C."  Unscrewing one
captive screw allows us to remove the wooden stock from each.

We now attach the PMAI stock to Mossberg "B", and the Mossberg
stock to PMAI "C."  Then we insert the PMAI magazine into
Mossberg "B" and the Mossberg magazine into PMAI "C."

Mossberg "B" is now identical to the unaltered PMAI "D", and
PMAI "C" is now identical to the unaltered Mossberg "A".

Which of those four firearms are "prohibited weapons"?  Two?  Or
three? Or all four?

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer those questions. 
The language was too vague and ambiguous.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

It seems obvious, though, that if the intent is to prohibit "any
variant or modified version thereof," the Mossberg 353 is also
converted to "prohibited weapon" status by this OIC.  Any
contrary interpretation will result in this:

From the above example, the Mossberg with the PMAI stock and
magazine would be unrestricted, while identical in every
significant respect of designed appearance and mechanical design
to the prohibited PMAI.  The PMAI with the Mossberg stock would
be a "prohibited weapon," while identical in every significant
respect of designed appearance and mechanical design to the
unrestricted Mossberg.

I can't believe that such a ludicrous result was intended; hence,
the Mossberg must be considered a "variant" of the PMAI, both by
reversed-timing "variant"-of-a"variant" rules and by similarity.

Mossberg has been making this design of semi-automatic .22 rifle
for a very long time.  The Mossberg 353, for example, is listed
in the 1974 Gun Digest, and earlier variants of the design
go back much further than that.  All of them are virtually
identical, mechanically, to the "prohibited" PMAI; all of them
could, by interchange of commercially-available minor parts, be
easily converted to become near-identical "clones" of the PMAI.

It follows that, under the rules apparently used in the OICs for
"parent"-to-"variant" relationships, and "variant"-to-"variant"
relationships, every semi-automatic .22 Mossberg rifle (not just
the 353) in Canada may well be "prohibited" by the language in
OIC JUS-92-567-01 s. 4(m), both by similarity in designed outline
or appearance and by similarity in mechanical design.

If those Mossberg rifles are not "variants" of the PMAI, then a
curious situation arises.  One can purchase the stock and
magazine of a PMAI, and use them to replace those parts of any
unrestricted Mossberg 353.  The resulting firearm, while
identical to a prohibited PMAI in all characteristics, is an
unrestricted firearm under the Criminal Code definitions.  

Equally, any other semi-automatic Mossberg .22 with a clip
magazine may be so fitted with a PMAI stock.  Those with tubular
magazines merely require minor wood alteration to the stock to
become similar in designed outline or appearance and similar in
mechanical design to the PMAI.

It is puzzling that the PMAI was chosen as the "parent" firearm,
because it is far less common than the Mossberg rifles.

If the Mossberg .22 rimfire rifles are "variants," then the
problem of how far the "variant" relationship extends becomes
very interesting.  It may well be that every semi-automatic .22
rifle which physically resembles the Mossberg, even to the quite
limited degree that the Mitchell MAS/22 resembles the FAMAS, is
also converted to "prohibited weapon" status by OIC JUS-92-567-01
s. 4(m).  That would "prohibit" most .22 semi-auto rifles.

RIFLES AND CARBINES V. PISTOLS AND CARBINES

OICs JUS-92-567-01 ss. (3) and (4), at first glance, divide
firearms into two groups, although using identical language for
each: 

3.  The following firearms, other than those described
in paragraph (c) of the definition "prohibited weapon" and
paragraphs (c) and (c.1) of the definition "restricted weapon" in
subsection 84(1) of the Criminal Code, are hereby declared
to be prohibited weapons:

4.  The following firearms, other than those described
in paragraph (c) of the definition "prohibited weapon" and
paragraphs (c) and (c.1) of the definition "restricted weapon" in
subsection 84(1) of the Criminal Code, are hereby declared
to be prohibited weapons:

Neither mentions the pre-OIC status of the firearm, or even
whether or not the "parent" or any "variant" is semi-automatic.

At first glance, it appeared that all of the firearms listed in
s. 3 of the OIC were, at the time of its writing, unrestricted
(in law) rifles, while those in s. 4 were of the class loosely
called pistols, and were all "restricted firearms" in law.

The presence of the unrestricted PMAIP [4(m)] demonstrates that
this is not true for s. 4, and the presence in s. 3 of the
restricted Feather AT-9 (it was restricted, prior to this OIC)
demonstrates that s. 3 isn't limited to unrestricted firearms.

Comparing the firearms in s. 3 with those in s. 4, I found
that s. 3 prohibits firearms which are called "rifles" and
"carbines" (without definition) by it.  "Carbine" is a loose
term, historically understood to refer to a short rifle; but many
"carbines" are actually longer than other firearms normally
referred to as "rifles."  The terms have no meaning in law.  

S. 4 then prohibits firearms which are called, again without
definition, "pistols" and "carbines."  There is also overlap
between those two groups.  The terms have no meaning in law.  

For example, the PMAIP [4(m)] is called a "pistol," both by the
OIC and by the maker, but it was not a restricted weapon prior to
this OIC; while the Universal Enforcer Model 3000 Auto Carbine
[4(l)] was actually a "restricted weapon" within the Criminal
Code prior to the OIC, and is often classified as a pistol. It
lies at the extreme limit of size and weight to be classified as
a "pistol".  It weighs 4-1/2 pounds, is 17-3/4" long, and it is
virtually impossible for it to be "aimed and fired by the action
of one hand," as specified in the CC s. 84(1) "restricted weapon"
(a) definition.  That definition is usually considered to be the
proper definition for a pistol.  It uses .30 calibre rifle
cartridges. 

The Feather AT-9 is called a "Semi-Auto Carbine," both by the OIC
[3(j)] and its maker.  It weighs 5 pounds, and is 26-1/2 inches
long. It uses 9mm pistol cartridges, and may be fired in the same
way as the Universal Enforcer 3000 Auto Carbine normally is,
using both hands.

With such overlapping of categories, the separation of s. 3 from
s. 4 firearms is meaningless.  It is definitely not an attempt to
vary the relationship rules to say that previously-unrestricted
"parent" firearms have different "variants" from previously-
restricted "parent" firearms; there's no hint of any such intent.

The intent of the separation, if any, is unknown.  The collapse
of my original theory of the meaning of the separation has
serious consequences for "parent"-to-"variant" relationships.

For example, s. 4(l)'s  conversion of the "firearm of the design
commonly known as the Universal Enforcer Model 3000 Carbine and
any variant or modified version thereof"  to "prohibited weapon"
pulls in a wide range of "variants."  The "design" is that of
the earlier American M1 Carbine, which was a military rifle
produced during the World War II and Korean War eras.  The
Universal Enforcer is merely short-barrelled postwar version of
that rifle, with a different stock.

Literally millions of surplus M1 Carbines were later sold to
civilians, and there are at least 100,000 in Canada.  This little
rifle is so popular that when surplus stocks ran out, several
manufacturers put it back into production.  This OIC, then,
apparently converts all of those M1 Carbines, surplus and later
production, to "prohibited weapon" status.  They are all
identical in mechanical design to the "parent" and differ in
appearance only in barrel length and the shape of wooden parts.

A currently-"restricted" Universal Enforcer 1002 (not mentioned
in the OIC; a post-war duplicate of the original military M1
Carbine) can easily become an unrestricted firearm, by fitting a
commercially available 20-inch barrel.  The resulting firearm is
identical to an original "restricted" Universal Enforcer 3000
Carbine which had had a 20-inch barrel and rifle stock fitted.

If the modified 1002 is unrestricted, is the modified 3000 also
unrestricted, or are both prohibited "variants" of the 3000 no
matter what has been done to them?

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer that question. 
The language was too vague and ambiguous.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law. 

THE EFFECTS OF THE VAGUENESS AND AMBIGUITY 

Whether or not such massive conversion of unlisted "variants" is
the correct interpretation of any particular OIC, it is a fact
that the "parent"-to-"variant" relationship pattern allows any
reasonable enforcing officer of the state to reach the
conclusions detailed above, and then to arrest the possessor of,
say, virtually any .22 semi-automatic rifle for possession of
a "prohibited weapon" contrary to s. 90(1) of the Criminal Code.

It is then possible for such an arresting officer to convince a
prosecutor (who is quite unlikely to be a firearms expert)
that his interpretation of the OIC is correct, because the
officer's firearm expertise is greater than the prosecutor's.

It is then possible that the possessor will find himself in the
dock, charged with a criminal offence and facing imprisonment for
a term not exceeding ten years, or perhaps only five.

In my analysis of the OICs, I have become more and more
concerned as example "parent"-to-"variant" relationships were
worked out.  Each time the linkage extended into unexpected
areas, I tried to find clarification of the intent; I found none
beyond what I have set forth in this paper.  It was rather like
examining an unexploded bomb of a new type, in the dark, and
solely by touch.  I became more alarmed as I proceeded.

One thing is quite clear; the OICs have the potential to create a
very large number of interesting court cases before all of the
ambiguities and the vagueness are resolved.

EXAMPLES FROM OIC JUS-92-569-01:

Continuing, I examined OIC JUS-92-569-01 s. 3(r), which converts
"the firearm of the design commonly known as the M-16 rifle and
any variant or modified version thereof" to "restricted weapon"
status.  I found that curious; the M-16 exists only as a
military selective- fire firearm.  No semi-automatic-only
civilian M-16 exists or has ever existed, other than through
conversion of a selective-fire rifle to semi-automatic-only
status, and that type of firearm is specifically excluded from
consideration by s. 3 of the OIC.  (That is a universal provision
found in each of the firearms OICs.)

Again, the intent appears to be to focus on the "design" element
of the "parent" firearm, rather than on the firearm itself--to
the extent even that the basic nature of the firearm in question
(selective-fire) is unimportant compared to the other "design"
elements already identified as important in determining "parent"-
to-"variant" relationships.

The "variant" relationships again illustrate the three
principles guiding the determination of whether a particular
firearm is a "variant" or not.  The AP-74 is listed as a
"variant," both as s. 3 (xvii) and again as (xxiii)(D).  The
dual listing is curious, unless one is aware that there are two
AP-74's; one [(xvii)] uses feeble .32 ACP centerfire pistol
cartridges, and the other [(xxiii)(D)] uses .22 rimfire.

Due to the rarity of both firearms, that dual listing would be
quite mysterious to anyone who is not a firearms expert.

Included in the "variant" list is:

(xxiii) any 22-calibre variant, including the

(A) Mitchell M-16A-1/22

(B) Mitchell M-16/22

(C) Mitchell CAR-15/22, and

(D) AP74 Auto Rifle;

Those .22 rimfire rifles, of course, stand in the same
relationship to the M-16 that the Mitchell AK-22 stands to the
AK-47; they are not at all similar in mechanical design, but are 
similar in designed appearance ("lookalikes").

There are many other "lookalike" variants.  For the M-16, they
include the AP-15 (an earlier version of the AP74), the Armscor
1600, and the Squires Bingham M16, which aren't on the list.  By
the rules as inferred, they are apparently unlisted "variants."

The Squires Bingham M16 raises another type of question.  It is
simply the Squires Bingham Model 20D semi-automatic .22 rimfire
rifle with a new stock and different sights to make it somewhat
resembles the M-16 military rifle.  If the .22 M16 is a "variant"
of the military M-16, is the Model 20D also converted to
"restricted weapon" status by this OIC?  It is identical in
mechanical design and partly similar in designed appearance to
the .22 M16, so it seems certain that this entirely conventional
.22 rimfire rifle is converted to "prohibited weapon" status.

Again, failure to so convert the 20D only results in a licit 20D
fitted with an M16 stock and sights which is not a "restricted
weapon."  That effect would be ludicrous. 

It should be noted that the Armscor 1600 is merely the Squires
Bingham M16 renamed, presumably by a new importer.  Similarly,
the Armscor 20D is the old Squires Bingham Model 20D with a new
name.  The manufacturing plant is in the Philippines.  "Make" and
"model" changes, purely for business reasons, are quite common.

DUAL CONVERSION PROBLEMS

What happens when one OIC apparently converts a "variant" firearm
to "restricted weapon" status, and another apparently converts it
to "prohibited weapon" status?

That situation arises with the comparison of OIC JUS-92-567-01 s.
3(f) converting "the firearm of the design commonly known as the
Heckler and Koch (HK) SP89 pistol and any variant or modified
version thereof" to prohibited weapon status, while OIC
JUS-92-569-01 s. 3(o) is converting "the firearm of the design
commonly known as the MP5 submachine gun and MP5 carbine, and any
variants or modified versions thereof" to "restricted weapon"
status.  

If the "parent"-to-"variant" sequence were limited to firearms
which follow the "parent" firearm's first appearance in time,
that might make sense--but only until a new firearm of the
"family" appears, at which time a decision would be required:
Is the new "family" member an MP 5 or an SP89 "variant"?

Since such a matter involves a decision which can imprison any
possessor of such a firearm, the only possible tribunal to make
such a decision is a court of criminal law.  With today's
proliferation of models and variations, it is apparent that many
such cases will be before the courts every year.

The SP89 will accept the shoulder stock of the MP5K, a listed
"variant" of the MP5; then the only remaining difference between
the two is the shape of the forward plastic handgrip.  The two
handgrips are easily interchangable.

As with the Mossberg-PMAI situation, either the MP5K is
prohibited, or one can create an exact "restricted" duplicate of
the "prohibited" SP89 by removing one part and altering one part
on a "restricted" MP5K.  Because H & K firearms are modular in
construction, it is also possible to create a "restricted" SP89
exact duplicate from various other combinations of "restricted
weapon" parts.  What is the status of such a firearm?

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer that question. 
The language was too vague and ambiguous.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

With the Heckler and Koch firearms generally, we find a rather
different situation, when compared to the AK-47.  In the AK-47
subsection, no attempt was made to separate the various types of
"variant or modified version thereof" by calibre; in the H & K
sections, [OIC JUS-92-567-01 ss. 3(l), (o) and (s)], each calibre
is given its own subsection.  The reason for the difference is
unknown, but is patently irrelevant; many other subsections mix
calibres without hesitation.

In s. 3(l) of the OIC, as mentioned above, the G3 selective-fire
military rifle is the "parent," and the situation in that respect
is identical to that outlined for the M-16 rifle above.

The basic civilian version of the G3 is the .308 calibre HK 91. 
When small-calibre high-velocity military rifles became popular,
the rifle was redesigned and appeared in much smaller form as the
HK 33 [s. 3(o)], later mildly redesigned and renamed as the HK
93.  Another military selective-fire version, smaller yet and
firing the 9mm Parabellum pistol cartridge, was called the HK MP5
submachine gun.  It, in turn, reappeared as a sub-"family," the
civilian-market semi-automatic-only versions called the HK 94s.    

The HK 91, HK 93 and HK 94 are similar in mechanical design but
not identical to the "parent" G3 design, and similar in outline
or appearance to the "parent" G3.  Why they were individually
converted in separate subsections is not known, although it may
have been an attempt to justify the special status of the SP89.

Within the "variant" lists appended to s. 3(l), (o) and (s)
there are several striking omissions.  Heckler and Koch also
manufactured the SL6 .223 rifle, SL7 .308 rifle, 270 .22 rimfire
rifle, 300 .22 rimfire Magnum rifle, 630 .223 rifle, 770 .308
rifle, and 940 .30-06 rifle. 

All of those rifles stand in considerably closer relationship to
the "restricted" H & K's than do many of the "variant" firearms
listed under the AK-47 and M-16 entires; they all came out of the
original designer's plants.  All, except the Model 270 are
similar in mechanical design.  They all use the H & K roller-lock
delayed-blowback system of operation common to all the
"restricted" H & K's.  All use detachable box magazines, and thus
can be fitted with extended magazines.

The H & K SL6 and SL7 rifles are military-style 10-shot
semi-automatic rifles. The SL6's .223 cartridge is militarily
known as 5.56mm NATO.  The SL7's .308 cartridge is militarily
known as 7.62mm NATO.

Considering the H & K hunting rifles, the 630 also uses the .223
cartridge, and the 770 uses the .308 cartridge.  The 940 uses the
.30-06 cartridge, which is the former standard military cartridge
of the United States.

On the face of it, all of those firearms (with the possible
exception of the H & K 270 .22 rimfire) are restricted "variants"
of the HK 91-93-94 groups by reason of similarity of mechanical
design.  If they are, then the H & K 270, as a "variant"-of-a-
"variant," is also affected.  It is similar in designed outline
or appearance to the 300, 630, 770, and 940.

Or are they all prohibited "variants" of the H & K SP89?  The
relationship is equally close to that firearm, which is converted
to "prohibited weapon" status by OIC JUS-92-567-01 s. 4(f). 

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer those questions. 
The language was too vague and ambiguous.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

It is an important question; the difference in penalty for simple
possession of one is five years of imprisonment, and any
confusion may lead to the wrong charge being laid initially [CC
s. 90(1) instead of 91(1), or vice versa], which would double the
workload of the courts.

It is not known which was the intent of the author of the OIC,
but it is difficult to see how either can be escaped; their
relationship is so much closer to both "parents" than, say, that
of the Valmet Hunter (a Finnish walnut-stocked 5-shot
scope-sighted hunting rifle) to its "parent" Soviet AK-47 that
both conclusions seem inescapable.

PROBLEMS WITH THE NON-FIREARMS OICS

Vagueness, confusion and concatenations of effects also appear in
the non-firearms OICs, such as OIC JUS-92-0564-01, where s. 2(a)
says, in part:

2.  The following types of ammunition are hereby
declared to be prohibited weapons:

(a) any cartridge that is capable of being discharged from
a commonly available semi-automatic handgun or revolver
and that is manufactured or assembled with a projectile that
is capable of penetrating body armour composed of aramid fibre
or similar fabric [emphasis added];...

(c) any projectile that is designed, manufactured, or altered to
explode on impact, where the projectile is designed for use in
conjunction with a cartridge and does not exceed 15mm in
diameter [emphasis added];... 

In 2(a) above, there are several problem areas for the
interpreter.  What does "commonly available" mean?  

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer that question. 
The language was too vague and confused.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a criminal law court.

It may mean, to one reasonable officer of the state, available
through the catalogue of a specialty firm from a foreign country;
to another, it the meaning might be limited to demonstrated
availablity in shops within the city where the question arose.

Where two such differing interpretations may be enforced with all
the sanctions of criminal law, it would appear that there is some
chance of the law being brought into disrepute.

The expression "semi-automatic handgun or revolver" is ambiguous. 
Is "semi-automatic" intended as a modifier of both "handgun" and
"revolver," as the rules of English grammar would indicate, or
not?  

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer that question. 
The language was too vague and confused.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

If it means what it says, then the expression limits the meaning
to a few rare semi-automatic revolvers like the Webley-Fosbery. 
(Few people even realize that there are a few semi-automatic
revolvers in circulation.)  If it is not intended to limit the
meaning in that way, then the expression should be "revolver or
semi-automatic handgun."  I suspect that the author was unaware
that semi-automatic revolvers exist; if they did not, his meaning
would have been fairly clear, although the English is poor.

What does "projectile that is capable of penetrating body
armour composed of aramid fibre or similar fabric" mean?  

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer that question. 
The language was too vague and confused.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

Because the thickness of the armour is unstated, one reasonable
officer of the state might interpret the description to mean that
any cartridge with a projectile capable of penetrating one layer
of aramid fibre cloth becomes a "prohibited weapon."  By that
standard, the soft lead bullet of a .22 rimfire cartridge
qualifies, and all .22 rimfire cartridges become "prohibited
weapons" on 01 Oct 92.

Another equally reasonable officer of the state might interpret
the subsection to mean only projectiles which are
specifically designed for the purpose of defeating soft body
armour; but that is not what s. 2(a) says.  That interpretation
was widely issued by the Minister of Justice in a 5-page summary
of these OICs, later withdrawn, which said, in part:

A list of cartridges and components are declared
prohibited weapons.  These are of a military or para-military
nature, and not suited for sporting applications.  They include
"cop-killer" armour piercing bullets, explosive and incendiary
cartridges [emphasis added; it was actually only projectiles
that were converted to "prohibited weapon" status], and exotic
shotgun cartridges known as "flechettes" [emphasis added;
"flechettes" are projectiles, not cartridges]. 

The very common 9mm Parabellum full metal jacket projectile is
quite good at penetrating thin versions of soft body armour vests;
does it convert cartridges to "prohibited weapon" status?     

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer that question. 
The language was too vague and confused.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

An interesting point is that it is only the projectile which
is to be considered regarding whether or not it is "capable of
penetrating body armour".  If some combination of firearm,
cartridge and the projectile is not capable of penetrating the
body armour, that is unimportant, and not to be considered,
according to the plain meaning of the words in the OIC.

If the projectile is capable of doing so, when fired from
some other, more powerful, cartridge, and from some other,
longer-barrelled firearm, that is apparently enough to mean that
the projectile, loaded into a feeble cartridge for a feeble
handgun, and incapable of actual penetration of even one
thickness of soft body armour cloth, by its very presence renders
the entire cartridge a "prohibited weapon."

For example, the 125-grain full-metal-jacketed projectile used in
9mm Parabellum cartridges normally used for target practice can
be loaded into a .35 Whelan rifle cartridge.  It can then fired
from a rifle at a velocity of over 3000 feet per second.  The
projectile, used in that way, will penetrate virtually any soft
body armour vest on the market.

Similarly, the 148-grain soft lead projectile, designed for use
in low-power target load .38 Special cartridges, can also be
loaded into a .35 Whelan rifle cartridge, then fired at a
velocity of over 2000 feet per second.  The projectile, used in
that way, will penetrate virtually any soft body armour vest on
the market--although, used as intended, it has no such effect.

In sum, the OIC, by the plain meaning of its wording, seems to
have converted every handgun cartridge in Canada to "prohibited
weapon" status, opening the possessor of any such cartridge to
criminal prosecution, imprisonment, and the stigma of a criminal
record.  Certainly, the logical progression I have followed is a
road open to any officer of the state attempting to understand
the plain meaning of the words in that OIC.

If that analysis is incorrect, and I sincerely hope that it is,
then where, in the plain meaning of the words of the OIC, does
the dividing line lie between a licit cartridge and a "prohibited
weapon" actually lie?

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer that question. 
The language was too vague and confused.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

It is vitally necessary for any person in possession of any
cartridge to know whether or not it is a "prohibited weapon"
within the meaning of the OIC.  Does the fact that one
manufacturer in the US produces small numbers of revolvers
chambering .444 Marlin rifle cartridges make the .444 Marlin
rifle cartridge a "cartridge that is capable of being discharged
from a commonly available semi-automatic handgun or revolver"? 
Or must the revolver be more "commonly available" than that? 
And, if so, how much more "commonly available"?

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer those questions. 
The language was too vague and confused.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

Similarly, "explode on impact" is unclear.  Most projectiles
designed for use in high-velocity small-bore centerfire rifle
cartridges are designed to disintegrate explosively into small
fragments on impact.  That is a safety measure, intended to
prevent ricochets when such projectiles are used for pest
control; the small fragments do not fly more than a few yards
from the point of impact.

I suspect that what the author meant to prohibit was projectiles
containing chemical explosives, but I cannot be certain of that
from the plain meaning of the wording used.  A reasonable officer
of the state might well conclude that the OIC also prohibits any
bullet designed to disintegrate explosively on impact.  

If that happens, and it may, and that interpretation is sustained
by a court unfamiliar with the safety reasons for that type of
projectile, the result will be a criminal record for the person
who was charged with possession of the "prohibited weapon".  A
secondary effect will be a diminution of pubic safety, caused by
a statute which is supposed to protect public safety.  Does
the OIC prohibit projectiles which disintegrate?  And, if so,
under what conditions? 

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer those questions. 
The language was too vague and confused.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

My overall impression of the OICs--both those cited above, and
the remaining OICs from the group studied--is that they were
written by someone lacking in adequate technical knowledge.  It
is apparent that the author had little grasp of the modular
nature of modern firearms, the interconnectivity of firearms
makers from country to country, or the ramifications of the
worldwide trade in firearms.

Taking a broad view of the entire pattern, it is apparent that
the firearms chosen for "prohibition" or "restriction" were
selected simply on the basis of physical appearance, with little
attention to whether or not Canadian murderers, suicides, or
violent criminals use them.  The impression is that one firearm
was prohibited because it "looked nasty," while another of equal
capability was ignored because it had a walnut stock.

It proved easy to find an example of three firearms of equal
capacity (each using the same cartridge, plus having the same
magazine capacity and overall length), one of which is
unrestricted, one restricted, and one prohibited:

MAKE	MODEL		CALIBRE		SHOTS	STATUS           

RUGER   MINI-14 5F	.223 		20	UNRESTRICTED
	  
DAEWOO	AR-100		.223		20	RESTRICTED

FAMAS	MAS 223		.223		20	PROHIBITED

Both the Ruger and the Daewoo have folding stocks, which reduce
them to essentially the same overall length as the FAMAS. 
Unfolding the stock takes a fraction of a second.  They have
equivalent accuracy, and every other characteristic relevant to
their capacity as "weapons" is essentially equal.

From that data, plus the data contained in the "point system," it
was obvious that the actual capacity of the firearms to do harm
was not important in the selection of firearms for restriction or
prohibition. 

From my own expert knowledge of the firearms situation in Canada,
it was obvious that common actual use by criminals in Canada was
not important in the selection of firearms for restriction or
prohibition.

From my examination of the choices actually made, it was obvious
that a "military of paramilitary" appearance was the main
criterion for selecting "parent" designs for restriction or
prohibition and "variants" for listing.  Whether or not the
firearm had any military utility (cartridge power, magazine
capacity, etc.) was frequently ignored--as is evidenced by the
many militarily useless .22 rimfire firearms so converted.

As evidence of that, I submit the following table:

MAKE		MODEL		CALIBRE	   SHOTS    STATUS       
-----------------------------------------------------------------
SPRINGFIELD	M1A		.308	   20	     UNRESTRICTED

FN		FAL		.308	   20	     RESTRICTED

NO RIFLES IN THIS (THE MOST POWERFUL) CLASS ARE PROHIBITED BY OIC
-----------------------------------------------------------------
RUGER   	MINI-14 5F	.223 	   20	     UNRESTRICTED
  
DAEWOO		AR-100		.223	   20	     RESTRICTED

MAS		223		.223	   20	     PROHIBITED
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MITCHELL	PPS-50		.22 RF	   50	     UNRESTRICTED

MITCHELL	M16/22		.22 RF	   25	     RESTRICTED

FEATHER		AT-22		.22 RF	   20	     PROHIBITED
-----------------------------------------------------------------

From the above table, it is clear that firearms of equal or more
powerful character in each equivalent-power group are found in
each classification, and that neither cartridge power nor
magazine capacity have been considered as important factors.

In my analysis of these firearms OICs, it became obvious that
either the OICs are either deliberately intended to vastly
increase the "variant" lists through gradual re-interpretation
until the extremes illustrated above are reached and virtually
all firearms are "prohibited"--or the author was unqualified to
do this work.

Whether the former or the latter, I am forced to the conclusion
that the OICs are very confused and confusing.  If I, with many
years of study behind me, cannot come to firm conclusions as to
the effect, in law, of so many provisions, then the average
firearms owner and user will be completely at a loss.

Worse, any officer of the state will be able to pick and choose
from a vast array of possible interpretations of these vague
provisions.  The absolute meaning of such vague provisions is
unknowable until defined by a court of criminal law.

The combination of an officer of the state who has some (however
limited) degree of firearms expertise which is superior to that
of a prosecutor and lack of expert knowledge on the part of the
person charged are likely to bring the law into disrepute through
violation of the principles of fundamental justice.

This paper does not include all of the problems and flaws I found
in this study; it is only a representative sampling.  I have
severely curtailed the paper in an effort to keep it at a
readable length; it could easily have been much book length.

As a final point on "parent"-to"variant" relationships, OIC
JUS-92-567-01 3(d) converts the bolt-action single-shot Iver
Johnson AMAC rifle to "prohibited weapon" status, and s. 3(b)
converts the bolt-action 5-shot Barrett rifle to "prohibited
weapon" status.

As we have seen, the authors of the OICs used their rules to
determine which firearms become "prohibited weapons" to create
the "variant" lists--"similar but not identical in mechanical
design", or "similar but not identical in designed outline
or appearance", and regardless of the power of the cartridge used
by the "parent" design.

By an understanding of those rules based solidly upon the degrees
of similarity demonstrated by examples from within the listed
"variants" as compared to their listed "parent" firearms, an
excellent case can be made that OIC JUS-92-567-01 converts every
bolt-action rifle in Canada to "prohibited weapon" status on 01
Oct 91.  Any officer of the state might well interpret it so.

If that is not the case, and I sincerely hope that it is not,
then precisely where does the line lie between the "parent" plus
the listed "variants" (all directly converted to "prohibited"
status by the OIC) plus the (indirectly converted) unlisted
"variants"--all bolt-action firearms--and all other bolt-action
rifles and shotguns which which do not become "prohibited"?  

In my analysis of the OIC, I could not answer that question.  The
language was too vague and confused.  Any definitive answer, of
course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

Similarly, an excellent case can be made that OIC JUS-92-567-01
s. 2(a) converts all semi-automatic shotguns with tubular
magazines to "prohibited weapon" status; and that s. 2(c)
converts the remainder.  Between the two, both common operating
systems (recoil-operated and gas-operated) and both magazine
systems (tubular and box) are features of "parent" firearms
designs.  There are very few successful shotgun basic designs,
and many of them share designs on which patents have elapsed.

Further, the SPAS 12 can be operated as either a semi-automatic
shotgun or a pump-action shotgun.  The SPAS 12 is still a
"prohibited weapon" if its semi-automatic capability is
permanently deleted or disabled.  Therefore, a good case can be
made that OIC JUS-92-567-01 converts all pump-action shotguns to
"prohibited weapon" status.

There is nothing outre or far-fetched about such interpretations.
The Dragunov and Mitchell AK-22, with their minimal similarity in
mechanical design or designed outline or appearance, plus
major variance in power and cartridge, are both specified as
"variants" of the "parent" AK-47.  The Mitchell Galil/22 is even
less similar in designed outline or apperance to the FAMAS
.223 rifle, and is not even remotely similar to it in mechanical
design or cartridge--yet is specifically designated as a
"variant" of the FAMS by OIC JUS-92-567-01 s. 3(i).

No limiting rules are specified in any of the OICs to define what
degree of mechanincal design or designed outline or
appearance similarity implies "variant" status for a particular
firearm.  Any officer of the state thus must infer the degree of
similarity required, by comparisons between the "parent" firearm
designs and the listed "variants"--with the above results. 

I have been most disturbed by the open-ended but unidirectional
character of each of these OICs.  Each converts a vaguely-defined
group of firearms (or devices) to "prohibited weapon" or
"restricted weapon" status.  Each group is so poorly described
that the door is open to more and more firearms (or devices)
being so converted by simple re-interpretation of the meaning of
the OIC, until every firearm in Canada is a "prohibited weapon."

The conspicuous absence of any indication of where the process of
conversion of more firearms (or devices) through simple
re-interpretation of the plain meaning of the words must, in law,
stop, is a major problem to me.

Over the past few years, cases requiring accurate definition
of the meaning of "restricted weapon" and "prohibited weapon" have
been in and out of the courts repeatedly.  In my expert opinion,
this OIC subordinate law will exacerbate that situation markedly,
through its vagueness and ambiguity.  It will definitely add
markedly to the current congestion in the law courts.

In closing, I cannot resist the temptation to quote from the
ruling of Mr. Justice Gibbs of the Supreme Court of British
Columbia in Hurley v. Dawson (1986) BCSC unreported(?) No.
CC8612383, 21 Aug 86:

This is a difficult case.  Not the least of the
difficulties is due to the tortuous language of the gun control
provisions of the Criminal Code.  In Regina v. Neil, Provincial
Court Judge Gordon was moved, with some justification, to refer
to those provisions as "one of the most horrifying examples of
bad draftsmanship that I have had the misfortune to consider," as
"so convoluted that even those responsible for enforcing the
provisions are apparently unable to understand them," and as "a
challenge to one's sense of logic."

One can only concur with the learned Justice and the learned
Judge, and note that things do not appear to have improved.

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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						NFA PAPER XVIIA

ANALYSIS OF "VARIANT OR MODIFIED VERSION"

David A. Tomlinson

The author of this paper, having been qualified by various courts
in four provinces as an expert witness for firearms matters, was
commissioned to study the firearms Orders in Council (OIC)
JUS-92-567-01, JUS-92-569-01 and JUS-92-599-01, to comment on
them, and to analyze the actual relationships involved in those
and sundry other OICs issued in the same period.

In each relevant subsection of the OICs in question, one "design"
of firearm is converted to "prohibited weapon" status or to
"restricted weapon" status by the OIC in question; hereinafter,
such a design is referred to as the "parent" firearm design.

The phrase "and any variant or modified version thereof" is
repeatedly used in each firearms OIC to convert other firearms
(firearms not on the list included in the OIC) to "prohibited
weapon" or "restricted weapon" status; hereinafter, such a
firearm is referred to as a "variant."

The chosen method ("parent" firearm designs converting
"variants") is then expounded in each OIC by providing
incomplete (necessarily; new "variants and modified
versions" appear on the market frequently) lists of the
"variants" to clarify which firearms are "variants."

That situation raises a serious question as to the meaning,
in law, of the phrase "and any variant or modified version
thereof." What criteria are applied to determine whether or not a
particular firearm is a prohibited or restricted "variant"?  

The question is a very serious one, because simple possession of
any prohibited "variant" is a serious criminal offence under s.
90(1) of the Criminal Code, and  simple possession of any
restricted "variant" which has not been registered with the RCMP
is a serious criminal offence under s. 91(1).  In the former
case, the penalty is imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten
years, and in the latter not exceeding five years.

It is therefore vitally necessary that each possessor of a
firearm should know the status, in law, of his possession with
precision; without such knowledge, his life may easily be
destroyed by arrest, criminal prosecution, imprisonment, and the
stigma of a criminal record.

Obviously, each OIC law must be clear enough for a reasonable
person to understand it, just as any other part of the Criminal
Code must meet that standard.

Because the "variant" lists demonstrate various relationships, it
is necessary to study each relationship actually used in each
OICs to define where a "parent"-to-"variant" relationship exists,
as a result of some rule being applied, to determine what that
rule was, and to determine which possible similarities are
important, and which are not important.  

In this study, no written indication of the rule, in law, for any
"parent"-to-"variant"  relationship used by any OIC's authors
was discovered; it was necessary to learn the relationships by
comparisons of "parent" designs to their "variant" lists.  The
"point rating system" described in literature distributed by the
Minister was clearly ignored in many cases, leaving off firearms
which exceeded 50 points and including those which did not.

The wording, specifying conversion of particular some "parent"
design and "any variant or modified version thereof" was probably
adopted to prevent reverse conversion by a manufacturer or
importer through simply making some minor alteration to the
design and renaming the resulting firearm. 

One major difficulty with this study arose because no examples
are given of somehow-similar firearms which are specifically
declared to be excluded; i.e., not to be "variants."  The
effect of that omission is to leave the relationships open-ended;
that is, there is no exclusion limit as to where a possible
"variant" relationship may not, in law, exist.

It is respectfully submitted that one effect of the absence of
somehow-similar but excluded firearms from each list is important
to the criminal justice system generally.  That effect is to
leave the determination of whether or not a particular firearm is
a "variant" to officers of the state who are also deciding upon
such matters as arrest, criminal charges, criminal prosecution,
imprisonment, and the stigma of a criminal record regarding the
possessor of a firearm which may or may not be a "variant"
firearm in law.

Any such decision is, of course, a judgement as to the guilt or
innocence of a person regarding a criminal offence.

The absence of any adequate objective standards to guide such
officers is surprising, because the expertise needed for reasoned
determinations is formidable.  An encyclopedic knowledge of the
internal mechanisms of rare firearms is necessary (see the
AK-47-to-Dragunov relationship below), plus a similar depth of
knowledge of the outline and appearance of many firearms, as we
shall see. 

Firearms do not fall into tidy classifications.  Each group
described by a word as if it were a homogeneous group has members
which may also be labelled with another word, with equal
accuracy.  The words "rifle" and "carbine", for example, describe
certain firearms which can be called by either name.  More
serious illustrations of this problem arise below.

Where the status of a firearm (or any other device which may be a
"prohibited weapon") is unclear, the possessor may well be
subjected to the full rigors of a criminal prosecution.  Even if
he successfully demonstrates his innocence, the cost and the the
stigma of having been charged, having his property seized, and
being subjected to criminal prosecution may considerably damage
his life and reputation.

I have consistently borne in mind that this is not administrative
law; in every aspect, it is criminal law, intimately related to
criminal prosecution consequences for any error in interpretation
on the part of a firearms owner or an officer of the state.  

Because the OICs in question form a part of the Criminal Code, no
one is vested, in law, with authority to decide whether or not
a particular firearm is a prohibited or restricted "variant."  

Indeed, no such vested authority can be established; such a
decision, once the OIC has been given force of law within the
Criminal Code, may be made only by a court of criminal law.

It should also be borne in mind that no decision by a court of
criminal law can be absolutely relied upon until the Supreme
Court of Canada has ruled upon the same question as to the
status of the same, or an identical, item of property. 

If any person or tribunal had been vested with the authority to
make such a decision, its decision would be a decision as to
whether or not the possessor has violated s. 90(1) or s. 91(1) of
the Criminal Code (committed a crime), and that is clearly a
decision reserved to the criminal courts. 

The fact that the "variant" lists included in the OICs exhibited
such breadth for the relationship between "parent" and "variant"
has left me with more questions than answers.

In my opinion, it is not possible for a person with my expertise
(over 40 years as a firearms collector and student of firearms
design and firearms history) to make a certain judgement of
whether or not a particular firearm is "prohibited" or
"restricted" through its similarity to a "parent"--unless it is
inscribed on a "variant" list.

In my opinion, it is not possible to accurately identify the
firearms which are on the various lists; the identifying data is
far too limited and ambiguous.

From my court and personal experience with officers of the state,
including the RCMP, OPP, and QPP firearms experts in their
respective forensic laboratories, I submit that their expertise
in this field of relationships is not superior to my own.  The
forensic scientists and officers in those laboratories have very
little call to study the mechanical or historical aspects of
firearms relationships; in that area, they are not superior to
any private citizen who has involved himself or herself in broad,
long-term studying of such relationships.  Their primary work
areas are forensic ballistics and firearms identification--and
neither requires extensive knowledge of firearms mechanisms.

ANALYSIS

Solely because it has the longest "variant" lists, I began my
study with OIC JUS-92-569-01, which converts unrestricted
firearms to "restricted weapon" status, and, in several areas,
purports to convert an already-restricted firearm to "restricted
weapon" status.  The intent and effects of the latter action are
most unclear.

EXAMPLES FROM OIC JUS-92-569-01:

In s. 3(a), the "firearm of the design [emphasis added]
commonly known as the AK-47 rifle" is designated as a "parent,"
and the first question arises: 

Does the definition "firearm of the design commonly known as the
AK-47 rifle" mean the original AK-47, as designed and produced in
the former Soviet Union, or does it mean all firearms of that
"design"--and, if the latter, how far must the "design" of a
particular firearm diverge from the "parent" design before the
firearm in question is no longer within the group of "variant"
firearms?

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer that question. 
The language was too vague and ambiguous.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

The apparent "parent" AK-47 was originally a 7.62X39mm calibre
selective-fire (capable of semi-automatic or full automatic fire
at the user's choice) short rifle, issued as standard for the
armed forces of the former Soviet Union.  As such, it is a
"prohibited weapon" as a result of its full automatic capability,
and is excluded from the scope of the OIC by s. 3's preamble, and
thus is probably not the intended "parent."
 
The "parent" also cannot be the "converted" (from selective fire to
semi-automatic only) military surplus firearm, because as the
subject of the CC s. 84(1) "restricted weapon" (c.1) definition,
they are also specifically excluded by s. 3 of the OIC.

Therefore, it would apparently be the semi-automatic redesign of
the original AK-47 that is the subject of the OIC in question,
although which of the many possible variations is unknown.

The original AK-47 design has been produced by many factories in
many countries under many names, with minor or extensive
modifications being incorporated by many of the manufacturers.

Some of that production has been under licence from the
originators, and some has been of "pirated" nature.  As a
civilian-market semi-automatic, it has been produced in the
original 7.62X39mm calibre, in .223 calibre to improve sales in
western bloc countries, and in a few other calibres.

The original AK-47 was soon redesigned in its country of origin
by the substitution of a stamped sheet metal receiver for the
original machined steel receiver, and renamed the AKM.

Since the AKM does appear [(iii)] on the "variant" list, it would
appear that the "parent" designation is limited to the original
design, from the original factory, though that is far from
certain.  The Soviet-made AKM never appeared in the civilian
marketplace as a semi-automatic made for that market, so it is
specifically excluded by the OIC itself from consideration.

The AKM was, however, made under licence in Egypt as a
selective-fire military rifle.  Later, the Egyptian AKM was
modified for the civilian market as a semi-automatic rifle,
imported by the Austrian arms firm, Steyr Daimler Puch, and sold
commercially,  at least as early as 1983.

It is unknown whether s. 3 (iii), the "AKM" on the list, is
intended to designate the Soviet ("prohibited weapon") AKM, and
include the Egyptian AKM as a "variant" of the Soviet AKM, or to
designate the Egyptian AKM directly.  The designation "AKM,"
without further data, is also quite ambiguous.  To further
confuse things, the Hungarians also called one of their
heavily-modified versions the "AKM," as have others.

Leaving that unresolved, the AK-47 "variants" are defined thus:
"and any variant or modified version thereof, including...
[emphasis added]."  It is clear that the wording is intended
to place other, unlisted, firearms in the "variant" class as
"restricted weapons" defined by law.

Some 68 firearms are in the AK-47 list as designated "variants"
of the AK-47, and I am aware of many unlisted but quite obvious
further "variants."  Serious questions arise, however:

Which types of similarity make a firearm a "variant" of the
"parent" design, and which do not?  Which differences do not
remove a firearm from the "variant" group?

In order to answer those questions, absent any relevant guidance
from the plain meaning of the words in the OICs, I was forced to
analyze the relationships which had been used in the OICs.

For example, (xii) on the AK-47 list is "Dragunov."  The apparent
"parent" AK-47 was originally a 7.62X39mm calibre selective-fire
(capable of semi-automatic or full automatic fire at the user's
choice) short rifle, issued as a standard infantry rifle for the
armed forces of the former Soviet Union.

The Dragunov was originally a 7.62X54mm calibre semi-automatic
long rifle, issued as standard for the armed forces of the former
Soviet Union as a telescope-sighted sniper rifle.  (It is also a
desirable collector's item, target rifle, and hunting rifle.)

The Dragunov is much longer than the AK-47, shoots a much more
powerful cartridge, has virtually no parts which interchange with
those of the AK-47 (even when both are from original Soviet
production), and does not closely resemble the AK-47 in outline
or appearance.  The similarity of mechanical design is not close,
but that's what triggered the "parent"-to-"variant" relationship.

The Dragunov is a firearm which is similar but not identical
in mechanical design to the "parent" firearm, but is not
similar in designed outline or appearance.

In contrast, (xlviii) on the list is the Mitchell AK-22.  The
"parent" AK-47 is a gas-operated (the gases following the bullet
down the barrel escape through a hole to push a piston back to
unlock the action and push the bolt to the rear), locked-breech
(the bolt must be locked into position until the bullet has left
the barrel, or an explosion will injure or kill the operator as
the bolt opens) rifle using high-powered centerfire cartridges.

The "variant" AK-22 is a blowback-operated (the empty
cartridge case pushes the bolt to the rear), unlocked-breech
(the bolt need not be locked into position until the bullet has
left the barrel, because the low pressure and small mass of the
departing bullet are balanced by the relatively large mass of the
bolt, and that is enough to prevent the bolt from opening too
soon) rifle using low-powered .22 rimfire cartridges.

The AK-22 is a firearm which is similar but not identical in
designed outline or appearance but is not similar in
mechanical design to the "parent" design.

The Dragunov is much more powerful (much larger, more powerful
long-range cartridge) and the AK-22 is much less powerful (much
smaller, weaker short-range cartridge) than the "parent" design;
therefore, the calibre, size, and power of the "variant" firearm
and its cartridge are not relevant factors.

The Dragunov is much longer than the AK-47, both in barrel length
and in overall length; therefore, those factors aren't relevant.

Examining the phrase used in every case "the firearm of the
design [emphasis added] commonly known as..." demonstrated a
principle (later proved by demonstration that it had been used): 
It is not a particular firearm which is selected as the
"parent," with only firearms which first appeared later becoming
"variants;" it is the general design rather than the
particular firearm. 

The "parent"-to-"variant" relationship is determined by
similarity of "design."  The insights gained to this point,
solidly determined from study of the relationships illustrated by
all the various "variant" lists, allow me to state five rules
used by the OIC authors to determine "parent"-to-"variant"
relationships:

1.  A firearm which is similar but not identical in
mechanical design to the "parent" design, and is similar
in designed outline or appearance is a "variant," even if it
is of a different calibre, and made in a different factory in a
different country.

2.  A firearm which is similar but not identical in
mechanical design to the "parent" design, but is not
similar in designed outline or appearance, is a "variant,"
even if it is of a different calibre, and made in a different
factory in a different country.

3.  A firearm which is similar but not identical in designed
outline or appearance to the "parent" design but is not similar
in mechanical design, is a "variant," even if it is of a
different calibre, and made in a different factory in a different
country.  (Such a firearm is commonly referred to by firearms
experts as a "lookalike.")

4.  The calibre, size, and power of a "variant" and its cartridge
are not relevant factors.

5.  The barrel length and overall length of a "variant" are not
relevant factors.  

The above five rules were confirmed by thorough examination of
the entire range of firearms OICs.  Many examples of "variant"
relationships to "parent" designs were located which confirmed
the rules; none were found which contradicted them, although
there was some confusion resulting from dual "variants;" i.e., in
some cases, two OICs seem to be trying to convert certain
firearms to both "prohibited" and "restricted" status.  Examples
of that will be given in due course.

The major question which immediately arises is:  What degree of
similarity of design--mechanical or appearance--triggers the
"variant" relationship for an unlisted firearm? 

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer that question. 
The language was too vague and ambiguous.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

Let us now consider the further effects of having those two
examples--the Dragunov, and the Mitchell AK-22--as "variants" on
the AK-47 "parent" list.  First, the Dragunov:

The Mitchell M-76 is a variant of the Dragunov.  It uses a
different cartridge (8X57mm instead of 7.62X54mm), is different in
appearance, and is made in Yugoslavia.  The Yugoslav origin is
clearly not enough to exclude it from "variant" status; other
firearms on the list come from China [(v) AKS-56S], Hungary [(x)
AMD-65], Israel [(xiii) Galil], Yugoslavia [(xlix) Mitchell
AK-47], etc.

It may be that the difference in cartridge, or the fact that the
Mitchell M-76 is not similar in outline or appearance, or both,
take the M-76 out of the "variant" class; but that is not
certain.  If the "variant" of a "variant" is included, then it
is a "restricted weapon" and anyone caught in possession of one
which is not registered with the state is liable to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding five years. 

On the AK-47 list, (xix) is "M76," but the meaning of that entry
is uncertain.  There are other firearms on the market which are
called "M76," and the presence of three "Mitchell" firearms on
the list is evidence that all the "Mitchell" imports were
examined.  Only certain firearms were then chosen and entered as
the "Mitchell" firearms sublist [entries (xlix), (l), and (li)
within the AK-47 "variant" list]. It seems most unlikely that
(xix)'s "M76" is the Mitchell M-76.

Another interesting question arises from the 9.3X54mm Medved
rifle.  The Medved is a hunting rifle, made in the former Soviet
Union as a hunting rifle; it has aspects of Kalashnikov's AK-47
design in it, aspects of the Dragunov Kalashnikov-derived design,
and aspects of the Simonov SKS design--yet is none of those. 
Like many firearms, it is an eclectic mixture of several design
concepts.  It is impossible, from either the OIC's wording or the
derived rules above, to say whether it qualifies as a restricted
AK-47 "variant" or not.

In such a case, a decision could only be made by a court of
criminal law, as noted earlier.

Other confusions arise.  There is a "Type 56" on the market which
is an obvious variant of the AK-47 design; and another commonly
available "Type 56" which is a variant on the Soviet SKS design.
It is not possible to determine from the list whether the s. 3(a)
(xxxv) Type 56 is the AK-47 variant, the SKS variant, or both.

The fact that the SKS variant is not similar in mechanical design
to the AK-47 would seem, at first glance, to exclude it; but the
Mitchell AK-22 is even less similar in mechanical design.

In identifying groups of firearms, no one in Canada has greater
expertise than the Firearms Registration Administrative Section
of the RCMP.  In order to identify one firearm within a group of
identical firearms for the purposes of registration, they have
found it necessary to use seven identifying entries.  Example:

MAKE: (MANUFACTURER'S NAME)       MODEL: (MODEL OF FIREARM)      

TYPE: RIFLE  ACTION: SEMI-AUTO     CALIBRE: .223                 

SHOTS: 5     BARREL LENGTH: 410mm  SERIAL NUMBER: _______________ 

Of the identifying entries above, only the serial number
identifies the particular firearm within the group of identical
or near-identical firearms.  All the other entries are an attempt
to identify the particular group of which the individual firearm
is a specimen.  Even with this comparatively elaborate scheme,
their computerized data-bank identification often fails; as I
said before, firearms do not fall into tidy classifications. 

It is, in my expert opinion, ludicrous to attempt to identify
groups of firearms by the simplistic methods used in the OICs in
question.  Failure of adequate identification--in the light of
the very serious criminal law consequences of error, either on
the part of the possessor or of the officials of the criminal
justice system--is very dangerous. 

Passing to s. 3(a) (xlviii):  The Mitchell AK-22 is, as stated
above, a "lookalike" not similar in mechanical design to the
AK-47.  Examination of  1987 Gun Digest data (P337) and 1992
Guns and Ammo Annual (P161) data indicates that the AK-22 is
38 inches long, weighs 6 pounds, and was imported from Italy. 
This "lookalike" is designed to be outwardly similar to the
AK-47, but the similarity is not terribly close.

The Mitchell AK-47, in contrast, is 40.6 inches long, weighs 9.1
pounds, and is imported from Yugoslavia (data from 1987 Gun
Digest, P305).

As a further illustration of the major differences between those
two firearms, the Mitchell AK-47 price is listed as US$495.00,
while the Mitchell AK-22 price is only US$249.00 (both prices from
1987 Gun Digest, P305 and P337).

In s. 3(m) of the OIC, we find another "parent": "the firearm of
the design commonly known as the Galil assault rifle."  That is
curious, because the Galil is already listed, in s. 3(a) (xiii),
as a "variant" of the AK-47.

S. 3(m) lists several "variants" of the "parent" Galil, and they
include the "Mitchell Galil/22 Auto Rifle," which is the rifle
listed as the "Mitchell Arms Galil-Style Rifle" (1992 Guns
and Ammo Annual P161).  It's a "lookalike" again, simply the
Italian Mitchell AK-22 with a few amendments, such as changed
sight locations and a bent cocking handle.  It is 36 inches long,
and weighs 6 pounds, compared to 39 inches long with a weight of
9.6 pounds for a Galil AR (1989 Gun Digest, P296).

I accept that as evidence that, in law, the "variant" of a
"variant" firearm's "variant" is a "variant;" that is, the
Mitchell Galil/22 Auto Rifle is a "variant" of the Galil itself,
which is a "variant" design derived from the Finnish M-78, which
in turn is a "variant" derived from the original AK-47.  That is
an example of four generations of derivation.

The Finnish M-62 was a major redesign of the original AK-47 which
did not follow the Soviet AKM redesign; it continued to use the
machined steel receiver, as did its "variant," the Valmet M-78.

The Finnish M-78 was a redesign of the Finnish M-62, again not
following the Soviet AKM redesign; it continued to use the
machined steel receiver, as did its "variant," the Galil.

EXAMPLES FROM OIC JUS-92-567-01, WITH COMPARISONS

OIC JUS-92-567-01 s. 3(j) converts, as a "parent," "the rifle of
the design commonly known as the FAMAS rifle, and any variant or
modified version thereof" to "prohibited weapon" status.  That is
more serious; the penalty for simple possession of a prohibited
weapon is imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years. 

Included in the list of "variants" we find "the Mitchell MAS/22."
That is the firearm designated as the "Mitchell Arms FAMAS-Style
Rifle" in the 1990 Guns and Ammo Annual (P347).  It's merely
another cosmetic variation of their Italian-made AK-22 design. 
It is only mildly similar the FAMAS in designed outline or
appearance, and not at all similar in mechanical design to it.  

That lack of close similarity is disturbing; it means that a
reasonable officer of the state, when examining an unlisted
possible "variant" firearm, is justified in deciding that it is a
"prohibited" or "restricted" "variant" in law on the basis of
quite minor similarity.

Interestingly, the FAMAS "variant" list does not include the
semi-automatic .22 rimfire Unique F-11, another FAMAS "lookalike"
which is actually a training rifle designed to closely resemble
the FAMAS.  Both the FAMAS and the Unique training rifle have
been officially adopted as standard firearms of the French armed
forces, and the Unique has been widely sold in Canada.

At this point, a side road branches off.  Under the definition s.
84(1) "firearm" in the Criminal Code, pellet guns are definitely
included.  Although at first glance low velocity pellet guns seem
to be excluded from the "prohibited weapon" and "restricted
weapon" categories by s. 84(2)(d), each is still classified as a
firearm except for the purposes of a few specified sections. 
The law in this area is very complex and convolutted; I have found it
necessary to expand upon it below.

A firearm may be a "variant" by reason of being similar only
in outline or appearance.  Many pellet firearms are specifically
designed to appear as similar as possible to firearms listed in
these OICs. 

The FAMAS semi-automatic air rifle (.177 calibre, 10-shot, 1989
Gun Digest, P409) is designed to duplicate the FAMAS .223
military rifle, for use as an indoor training rifle for the
French armed forces.  It was widely sold in Canada, and I doubt
that many of the owners would suspect that it may be converted to
"prohibited weapon" status as of 01 Oct 92; yet, by the plain
meaning of the words in the OIC and CC s. 84(2), it may well be.

Is the FAMAS semi-automatic air rifle included as "variant"
firearms in the "prohibited weapon" category by OIC JUS-92-567-01
s. 3(i), and, if not, why not?  

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer that question. 
The language, both in the OIC and in the Criminal Code, was too
vague and ambiguous.  Any definitive answer, of course, can only
come from a court of criminal law.  If, however, the answer is
"yes," as it well may be, the effects spread widely.  

There are many other "lookalike" pellet and paintball guns which
are "firearms" within the meaning of that definition in s. 84(1)
of the Criminal Code.  In flipping through the 1989 Gun
Digest, for example, I found "lookalike" air- or CO2-powered
versions of the MAC 10 (Model 85 Paint Ball Machine Pistol,
P414), H & K MP5 A3 (Command Post MP5-A3 carbine, P412)), Uzi SMG
(Command Post Uzi Pump, P412), M-16 rifle (Command Post XM-177E2
carbine, P413), FAMAS (FAMAS Semi-Auto air rifle, P409), Mini-Uzi
(Crosman Z-77 carbine, P406), M-16 rifle (Crosman A*I*R* 17,
P406), SIG-551 rifle (Air Arms Firepower air rifle, P400),
Skorpion (Command Post Tracer Scorpion, P400), and a MAC 10 with
silencer(!) (Command Post M-11 Gas Pistol, P399).

All of the above are, in law, firearms, unless exempted from that
category by CC s. 84(2), which says, in part:

84.(2) Notwithstanding the definition "firearm" in
subsection (1), for the purposes of the definitions "prohibited
weapon" and "restricted weapon" in that subsection and for the
purposes of section 93, subsections 97(1) and (3) and sections
102, 104, 105, and 116, the following weapons shall be deemed not
to be firearms [emphasis added]:...

(d) any other barrelled weapon where it is proved that that
weapon is not designed or adapted to discharge a shot, bullet, or
other projectile at a muzzle velocity exceeding 152.4 m per
second or to discharge a shot, bullet or other projectile that is
designed or adapted to attain a velocity exceeding 152.4 m per
second.

At first glance, that appeared to void any application of the
OICs to the list given above; but it may not.  Many pellet
firearms are quite capable of exceeding that 152.4 m per second
standard.  

More seriously, the Minister has not relied upon CC s. 116 in the
issuance of these firearm OICs.  Under the doctrine that the
specific overrides the general, does the conversion of a specific
air- or CO2-powered "variant" firearm from its previous
unrestricted status to "prohibited weapon" or "restricted weapon"
status by OIC override that blanket exemption?  If it does, the
fact that neither CC s. 90 or s. 91 are mentioned in s. 84(2) may
be very important.

While definitions under "subsection [84] (1), for the purposes of
the definitions "prohibited weapon" and "restricted weapon" in
that subsection" are expempted, those definitions include the
words "is declared by order of the Governor in Council to be a
(prohibited) (restricted) weapon."  Does the exemption override
the Order in Council which the definition says is law? 

I am not qualified to make any judgement as to the validity, in
law, of that concern; but I do believe that it should be
carefully considered.  Study of the OICs has already led me into
some very unexpected areas, and this one is quite tangled.

The FAMAS-Mitchell link, in turn, throws more light on one of the
earlier rules defining a "variant":

3.  A firearm which is similar but not identical in
designed outline or appearance to the "parent" firearm but
is not similar in mechanical design, is a "variant,"
even if it is of a different calibre, and made in a different
factory in a different country.

The Mitchell MAS/22 is nearly identical in mechanical design to
the Mitchell AK-22; but its "parent" FAMAS assault rifle  design
is very different from the AK-22's "parent" AK-47 design.  

The AK-47 is a gas-operated (the gases following the bullet down
the barrel escape through a hole to push a piston back to unlock
the action and push the bolt to the rear), locked-breech (the
bolt must be locked into position until the bullet has left the
barrel, or an explosion will injure or kill the operator as the
bolt opens) rifle using high-powered centerfire cartridges.

The FAMAS is a delayed-blowback (the cartridge, trying to escape
rearwards, moves the bolt very slowly against an enormous
mechanical disadvantage), semi-locked-breech (It's never truly
locked, just very hard to open) rifle, using high-powered
centerfire cartridges.

Obviously, those two have very little in common; yet the two
"variant" .22 rimfire rifles are very closely related to each
other; many of their parts, for example, are interchangeable.  Of
the two "variants," one (the MAS/22) is converted to "prohibited
weapon" status, and the other to "restricted weapon" status. 
Neither is close in mechanical design to either of their "parent"
firearms.

What effect does that have upon the "variant"-of-a-"variant"
relationship between those two firearms, and are they
"restricted" or "prohibited"?   Is this situation an indication
that being similar in designed outline or appearance is more
important to the "parent"-to-"variant" relationship than being
similar in mechanical design?

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer those questions. 
The language was too vague and ambiguous.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

At this point, I began to consider time:  If the "parent"
converts the status of a "variant," is it possible that the
conversion works backward in time?  That is, can an earlier
firearm be considered to be a "variant or modified version" of
the "design" of a later firearm?  Can a "variant" be older than
its designated "parent"?

The answer to each of those questions is apparently "yes," and that
adds further complications to this scheme of determining the
status of firearms by Order in Council.

COMPARISONS, OIC JUS-92-567-01 AND JUS-92-569:

OIC JUS-92-567-01 s. 3(c) selects as "parent" the "design" of the
"Calico Model 900 rifle" with "any variant or modified version
thereof, including the Calico M-951 carbine, M-100 carbine, and
M-105 carbine (as "variants")".  The Calico Model 100 carbine
preceded the Model 900 rifle by at least a year, and more
probably by two years; therefore, in the intent of the OIC, a
"variant" older than the "parent" is a deliberate situation.

That isn't an isolated instance; OIC JUS-92-569-01 s. 3(l)
selected the G3 rifle as the "parent" with the earlier HK 91 as a
"variant."  Similarly, s. 3(r) specifies the much earlier AR-15
as a "variant" of the earlier "parent" M16.

THE DUAL CONVERSION PROBLEM

OIC JUS-92-599-01 s. 2(a) converts the Sterling Mk 6 Carbine "and
any variant or modified version thereof" to "prohibited weapon"
status.  S. 3 then "grandfathers" the possessor for retention of
the "prohibited weapon" if he applies for its registration.

OIC JUS-92-567-01 s. 4(k) converts the Sterling Mk 7 pistol "and
any variant or modified version thereof" to "prohibited weapon"
status, but has no "grandfathering" section equivalent to s. 3 of
OIC JUS-92-599-01.

The Sterling Mk 6 and Mk 7 are virtually identical in designed
outline or appearance and in mechanical design, save for length. 
They are both "prohibited," but is that with or without
"grandfathering," considering that they are obvious "variants" of
each other?  

Both OICs have the same effective date; but does the "599" OIC
come later in time than the "567," and is that significant?  

Is the Sterling Mk 4 (the most commonly-found member of this
"family" within Canada, which pre-dates both the Mk 6 and Mk 7)
converted to "prohibited weapon" status by either OIC, and, if
so, is it a grandfathered "variant" of the Mk 6 or an
ungrandfathered "variant" of the Mk 7? 

In my analysis of these OICs, I could not answer those questions. 
The language was too vague and ambiguous.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

THE UNRESTRICTED RIFLE AND THE PROHIBITED WEAPON

OIC JUS-92-567-01 s. 3(p) converts "the firearm of the design
commonly known as the PMAI 'Assault' 22 rifle", and "any variant
or modified version thereof" to "prohibited weapon" status.  

An examination of the US Arms PMAIP "Assault" 22 (1984 Gun
Digest P344) shows that it is simply a Mossberg Model 353
semi-automatic .22 rimfire rifle with a different wooden stock
and a longer magazine. All metal parts are identical.  The PMAI
is simply a PMAIP (illustrated p47 of the Minister's "WEAPONS
PROHIBITED AND RESTRICTED BY ORDER IN COUNCIL REFERENCE MANUAL")
with a black wooden stock of normal rifle configuration, and an
18-inch barrel.  It's virtually identical to a Mossberg 353.

The only real difference between the two firearms is that the
Mossberg 353 has a buttstock which is wood-colored, and the PMAI
does not.  The PMAI is, but for OIC JUS-92-567-01 s. 3(m),
unrestricted under the existing Criminal Code definitions.

To illustrate the effects, let us take four firearms: two
unrestricted Mossberg 353's, "A" and "B," and two prohibited
PMAIs, "C" and "D."  Moving a simple catch allows us to remove
the magazine from Mossberg "B" and PMAI "C."  Unscrewing one
captive screw allows us to remove the wooden stock from each.

We now attach the PMAI stock to Mossberg "B", and the Mossberg
stock to PMAI "C."  Then we insert the PMAI magazine into
Mossberg "B" and the Mossberg magazine into PMAI "C."

Mossberg "B" is now identical to the unaltered PMAI "D", and
PMAI "C" is now identical to the unaltered Mossberg "A".

Which of those four firearms are "prohibited weapons"?  Two?  Or
three? Or all four?

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer those questions. 
The language was too vague and ambiguous.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

It seems obvious, though, that if the intent is to prohibit "any
variant or modified version thereof," the Mossberg 353 is also
converted to "prohibited weapon" status by this OIC.  Any
contrary interpretation will result in this:

From the above example, the Mossberg with the PMAI stock and
magazine would be unrestricted, while identical in every
significant respect of designed appearance and mechanical design
to the prohibited PMAI.  The PMAI with the Mossberg stock would
be a "prohibited weapon," while identical in every significant
respect of designed appearance and mechanical design to the
unrestricted Mossberg.

I can't believe that such a ludicrous result was intended; hence,
the Mossberg must be considered a "variant" of the PMAI, both by
reversed-timing "variant"-of-a"variant" rules and by similarity.

Mossberg has been making this design of semi-automatic .22 rifle
for a very long time.  The Mossberg 353, for example, is listed
in the 1974 Gun Digest, and earlier variants of the design
go back much further than that.  All of them are virtually
identical, mechanically, to the "prohibited" PMAI; all of them
could, by interchange of commercially-available minor parts, be
easily converted to become near-identical "clones" of the PMAI.

It follows that, under the rules apparently used in the OICs for
"parent"-to-"variant" relationships, and "variant"-to-"variant"
relationships, every semi-automatic .22 Mossberg rifle (not just
the 353) in Canada may well be "prohibited" by the language in
OIC JUS-92-567-01 s. 4(m), both by similarity in designed outline
or appearance and by similarity in mechanical design.

If those Mossberg rifles are not "variants" of the PMAI, then a
curious situation arises.  One can purchase the stock and
magazine of a PMAI, and use them to replace those parts of any
unrestricted Mossberg 353.  The resulting firearm, while
identical to a prohibited PMAI in all characteristics, is an
unrestricted firearm under the Criminal Code definitions.  

Equally, any other semi-automatic Mossberg .22 with a clip
magazine may be so fitted with a PMAI stock.  Those with tubular
magazines merely require minor wood alteration to the stock to
become similar in designed outline or appearance and similar in
mechanical design to the PMAI.

It is puzzling that the PMAI was chosen as the "parent" firearm,
because it is far less common than the Mossberg rifles.

If the Mossberg .22 rimfire rifles are "variants," then the
problem of how far the "variant" relationship extends becomes
very interesting.  It may well be that every semi-automatic .22
rifle which physically resembles the Mossberg, even to the quite
limited degree that the Mitchell MAS/22 resembles the FAMAS, is
also converted to "prohibited weapon" status by OIC JUS-92-567-01
s. 4(m).  That would "prohibit" most .22 semi-auto rifles.

RIFLES AND CARBINES V. PISTOLS AND CARBINES

OICs JUS-92-567-01 ss. (3) and (4), at first glance, divide
firearms into two groups, although using identical language for
each: 

3.  The following firearms, other than those described
in paragraph (c) of the definition "prohibited weapon" and
paragraphs (c) and (c.1) of the definition "restricted weapon" in
subsection 84(1) of the Criminal Code, are hereby declared
to be prohibited weapons:

4.  The following firearms, other than those described
in paragraph (c) of the definition "prohibited weapon" and
paragraphs (c) and (c.1) of the definition "restricted weapon" in
subsection 84(1) of the Criminal Code, are hereby declared
to be prohibited weapons:

Neither mentions the pre-OIC status of the firearm, or even
whether or not the "parent" or any "variant" is semi-automatic.

At first glance, it appeared that all of the firearms listed in
s. 3 of the OIC were, at the time of its writing, unrestricted
(in law) rifles, while those in s. 4 were of the class loosely
called pistols, and were all "restricted firearms" in law.

The presence of the unrestricted PMAIP [4(m)] demonstrates that
this is not true for s. 4, and the presence in s. 3 of the
restricted Feather AT-9 (it was restricted, prior to this OIC)
demonstrates that s. 3 isn't limited to unrestricted firearms.

Comparing the firearms in s. 3 with those in s. 4, I found
that s. 3 prohibits firearms which are called "rifles" and
"carbines" (without definition) by it.  "Carbine" is a loose
term, historically understood to refer to a short rifle; but many
"carbines" are actually longer than other firearms normally
referred to as "rifles."  The terms have no meaning in law.  

S. 4 then prohibits firearms which are called, again without
definition, "pistols" and "carbines."  There is also overlap
between those two groups.  The terms have no meaning in law.  

For example, the PMAIP [4(m)] is called a "pistol," both by the
OIC and by the maker, but it was not a restricted weapon prior to
this OIC; while the Universal Enforcer Model 3000 Auto Carbine
[4(l)] was actually a "restricted weapon" within the Criminal
Code prior to the OIC, and is often classified as a pistol. It
lies at the extreme limit of size and weight to be classified as
a "pistol".  It weighs 4-1/2 pounds, is 17-3/4" long, and it is
virtually impossible for it to be "aimed and fired by the action
of one hand," as specified in the CC s. 84(1) "restricted weapon"
(a) definition.  That definition is usually considered to be the
proper definition for a pistol.  It uses .30 calibre rifle
cartridges. 

The Feather AT-9 is called a "Semi-Auto Carbine," both by the OIC
[3(j)] and its maker.  It weighs 5 pounds, and is 26-1/2 inches
long. It uses 9mm pistol cartridges, and may be fired in the same
way as the Universal Enforcer 3000 Auto Carbine normally is,
using both hands.

With such overlapping of categories, the separation of s. 3 from
s. 4 firearms is meaningless.  It is definitely not an attempt to
vary the relationship rules to say that previously-unrestricted
"parent" firearms have different "variants" from previously-
restricted "parent" firearms; there's no hint of any such intent.

The intent of the separation, if any, is unknown.  The collapse
of my original theory of the meaning of the separation has
serious consequences for "parent"-to-"variant" relationships.

For example, s. 4(l)'s  conversion of the "firearm of the design
commonly known as the Universal Enforcer Model 3000 Carbine and
any variant or modified version thereof"  to "prohibited weapon"
pulls in a wide range of "variants."  The "design" is that of
the earlier American M1 Carbine, which was a military rifle
produced during the World War II and Korean War eras.  The
Universal Enforcer is merely short-barrelled postwar version of
that rifle, with a different stock.

Literally millions of surplus M1 Carbines were later sold to
civilians, and there are at least 100,000 in Canada.  This little
rifle is so popular that when surplus stocks ran out, several
manufacturers put it back into production.  This OIC, then,
apparently converts all of those M1 Carbines, surplus and later
production, to "prohibited weapon" status.  They are all
identical in mechanical design to the "parent" and differ in
appearance only in barrel length and the shape of wooden parts.

A currently-"restricted" Universal Enforcer 1002 (not mentioned
in the OIC; a post-war duplicate of the original military M1
Carbine) can easily become an unrestricted firearm, by fitting a
commercially available 20-inch barrel.  The resulting firearm is
identical to an original "restricted" Universal Enforcer 3000
Carbine which had had a 20-inch barrel and rifle stock fitted.

If the modified 1002 is unrestricted, is the modified 3000 also
unrestricted, or are both prohibited "variants" of the 3000 no
matter what has been done to them?

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer that question. 
The language was too vague and ambiguous.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law. 

THE EFFECTS OF THE VAGUENESS AND AMBIGUITY 

Whether or not such massive conversion of unlisted "variants" is
the correct interpretation of any particular OIC, it is a fact
that the "parent"-to-"variant" relationship pattern allows any
reasonable enforcing officer of the state to reach the
conclusions detailed above, and then to arrest the possessor of,
say, virtually any .22 semi-automatic rifle for possession of
a "prohibited weapon" contrary to s. 90(1) of the Criminal Code.

It is then possible for such an arresting officer to convince a
prosecutor (who is quite unlikely to be a firearms expert)
that his interpretation of the OIC is correct, because the
officer's firearm expertise is greater than the prosecutor's.

It is then possible that the possessor will find himself in the
dock, charged with a criminal offence and facing imprisonment for
a term not exceeding ten years, or perhaps only five.

In my analysis of the OICs, I have become more and more
concerned as example "parent"-to-"variant" relationships were
worked out.  Each time the linkage extended into unexpected
areas, I tried to find clarification of the intent; I found none
beyond what I have set forth in this paper.  It was rather like
examining an unexploded bomb of a new type, in the dark, and
solely by touch.  I became more alarmed as I proceeded.

One thing is quite clear; the OICs have the potential to create a
very large number of interesting court cases before all of the
ambiguities and the vagueness are resolved.

EXAMPLES FROM OIC JUS-92-569-01:

Continuing, I examined OIC JUS-92-569-01 s. 3(r), which converts
"the firearm of the design commonly known as the M-16 rifle and
any variant or modified version thereof" to "restricted weapon"
status.  I found that curious; the M-16 exists only as a
military selective- fire firearm.  No semi-automatic-only
civilian M-16 exists or has ever existed, other than through
conversion of a selective-fire rifle to semi-automatic-only
status, and that type of firearm is specifically excluded from
consideration by s. 3 of the OIC.  (That is a universal provision
found in each of the firearms OICs.)

Again, the intent appears to be to focus on the "design" element
of the "parent" firearm, rather than on the firearm itself--to
the extent even that the basic nature of the firearm in question
(selective-fire) is unimportant compared to the other "design"
elements already identified as important in determining "parent"-
to-"variant" relationships.

The "variant" relationships again illustrate the three
principles guiding the determination of whether a particular
firearm is a "variant" or not.  The AP-74 is listed as a
"variant," both as s. 3 (xvii) and again as (xxiii)(D).  The
dual listing is curious, unless one is aware that there are two
AP-74's; one [(xvii)] uses feeble .32 ACP centerfire pistol
cartridges, and the other [(xxiii)(D)] uses .22 rimfire.

Due to the rarity of both firearms, that dual listing would be
quite mysterious to anyone who is not a firearms expert.

Included in the "variant" list is:

(xxiii) any 22-calibre variant, including the

(A) Mitchell M-16A-1/22

(B) Mitchell M-16/22

(C) Mitchell CAR-15/22, and

(D) AP74 Auto Rifle;

Those .22 rimfire rifles, of course, stand in the same
relationship to the M-16 that the Mitchell AK-22 stands to the
AK-47; they are not at all similar in mechanical design, but are 
similar in designed appearance ("lookalikes").

There are many other "lookalike" variants.  For the M-16, they
include the AP-15 (an earlier version of the AP74), the Armscor
1600, and the Squires Bingham M16, which aren't on the list.  By
the rules as inferred, they are apparently unlisted "variants."

The Squires Bingham M16 raises another type of question.  It is
simply the Squires Bingham Model 20D semi-automatic .22 rimfire
rifle with a new stock and different sights to make it somewhat
resembles the M-16 military rifle.  If the .22 M16 is a "variant"
of the military M-16, is the Model 20D also converted to
"restricted weapon" status by this OIC?  It is identical in
mechanical design and partly similar in designed appearance to
the .22 M16, so it seems certain that this entirely conventional
.22 rimfire rifle is converted to "prohibited weapon" status.

Again, failure to so convert the 20D only results in a licit 20D
fitted with an M16 stock and sights which is not a "restricted
weapon."  That effect would be ludicrous. 

It should be noted that the Armscor 1600 is merely the Squires
Bingham M16 renamed, presumably by a new importer.  Similarly,
the Armscor 20D is the old Squires Bingham Model 20D with a new
name.  The manufacturing plant is in the Philippines.  "Make" and
"model" changes, purely for business reasons, are quite common.

DUAL CONVERSION PROBLEMS

What happens when one OIC apparently converts a "variant" firearm
to "restricted weapon" status, and another apparently converts it
to "prohibited weapon" status?

That situation arises with the comparison of OIC JUS-92-567-01 s.
3(f) converting "the firearm of the design commonly known as the
Heckler and Koch (HK) SP89 pistol and any variant or modified
version thereof" to prohibited weapon status, while OIC
JUS-92-569-01 s. 3(o) is converting "the firearm of the design
commonly known as the MP5 submachine gun and MP5 carbine, and any
variants or modified versions thereof" to "restricted weapon"
status.  

If the "parent"-to-"variant" sequence were limited to firearms
which follow the "parent" firearm's first appearance in time,
that might make sense--but only until a new firearm of the
"family" appears, at which time a decision would be required:
Is the new "family" member an MP 5 or an SP89 "variant"?

Since such a matter involves a decision which can imprison any
possessor of such a firearm, the only possible tribunal to make
such a decision is a court of criminal law.  With today's
proliferation of models and variations, it is apparent that many
such cases will be before the courts every year.

The SP89 will accept the shoulder stock of the MP5K, a listed
"variant" of the MP5; then the only remaining difference between
the two is the shape of the forward plastic handgrip.  The two
handgrips are easily interchangable.

As with the Mossberg-PMAI situation, either the MP5K is
prohibited, or one can create an exact "restricted" duplicate of
the "prohibited" SP89 by removing one part and altering one part
on a "restricted" MP5K.  Because H & K firearms are modular in
construction, it is also possible to create a "restricted" SP89
exact duplicate from various other combinations of "restricted
weapon" parts.  What is the status of such a firearm?

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer that question. 
The language was too vague and ambiguous.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

With the Heckler and Koch firearms generally, we find a rather
different situation, when compared to the AK-47.  In the AK-47
subsection, no attempt was made to separate the various types of
"variant or modified version thereof" by calibre; in the H & K
sections, [OIC JUS-92-567-01 ss. 3(l), (o) and (s)], each calibre
is given its own subsection.  The reason for the difference is
unknown, but is patently irrelevant; many other subsections mix
calibres without hesitation.

In s. 3(l) of the OIC, as mentioned above, the G3 selective-fire
military rifle is the "parent," and the situation in that respect
is identical to that outlined for the M-16 rifle above.

The basic civilian version of the G3 is the .308 calibre HK 91. 
When small-calibre high-velocity military rifles became popular,
the rifle was redesigned and appeared in much smaller form as the
HK 33 [s. 3(o)], later mildly redesigned and renamed as the HK
93.  Another military selective-fire version, smaller yet and
firing the 9mm Parabellum pistol cartridge, was called the HK MP5
submachine gun.  It, in turn, reappeared as a sub-"family," the
civilian-market semi-automatic-only versions called the HK 94s.    

The HK 91, HK 93 and HK 94 are similar in mechanical design but
not identical to the "parent" G3 design, and similar in outline
or appearance to the "parent" G3.  Why they were individually
converted in separate subsections is not known, although it may
have been an attempt to justify the special status of the SP89.

Within the "variant" lists appended to s. 3(l), (o) and (s)
there are several striking omissions.  Heckler and Koch also
manufactured the SL6 .223 rifle, SL7 .308 rifle, 270 .22 rimfire
rifle, 300 .22 rimfire Magnum rifle, 630 .223 rifle, 770 .308
rifle, and 940 .30-06 rifle. 

All of those rifles stand in considerably closer relationship to
the "restricted" H & K's than do many of the "variant" firearms
listed under the AK-47 and M-16 entires; they all came out of the
original designer's plants.  All, except the Model 270 are
similar in mechanical design.  They all use the H & K roller-lock
delayed-blowback system of operation common to all the
"restricted" H & K's.  All use detachable box magazines, and thus
can be fitted with extended magazines.

The H & K SL6 and SL7 rifles are military-style 10-shot
semi-automatic rifles. The SL6's .223 cartridge is militarily
known as 5.56mm NATO.  The SL7's .308 cartridge is militarily
known as 7.62mm NATO.

Considering the H & K hunting rifles, the 630 also uses the .223
cartridge, and the 770 uses the .308 cartridge.  The 940 uses the
.30-06 cartridge, which is the former standard military cartridge
of the United States.

On the face of it, all of those firearms (with the possible
exception of the H & K 270 .22 rimfire) are restricted "variants"
of the HK 91-93-94 groups by reason of similarity of mechanical
design.  If they are, then the H & K 270, as a "variant"-of-a-
"variant," is also affected.  It is similar in designed outline
or appearance to the 300, 630, 770, and 940.

Or are they all prohibited "variants" of the H & K SP89?  The
relationship is equally close to that firearm, which is converted
to "prohibited weapon" status by OIC JUS-92-567-01 s. 4(f). 

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer those questions. 
The language was too vague and ambiguous.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

It is an important question; the difference in penalty for simple
possession of one is five years of imprisonment, and any
confusion may lead to the wrong charge being laid initially [CC
s. 90(1) instead of 91(1), or vice versa], which would double the
workload of the courts.

It is not known which was the intent of the author of the OIC,
but it is difficult to see how either can be escaped; their
relationship is so much closer to both "parents" than, say, that
of the Valmet Hunter (a Finnish walnut-stocked 5-shot
scope-sighted hunting rifle) to its "parent" Soviet AK-47 that
both conclusions seem inescapable.

PROBLEMS WITH THE NON-FIREARMS OICS

Vagueness, confusion and concatenations of effects also appear in
the non-firearms OICs, such as OIC JUS-92-0564-01, where s. 2(a)
says, in part:

2.  The following types of ammunition are hereby
declared to be prohibited weapons:

(a) any cartridge that is capable of being discharged from
a commonly available semi-automatic handgun or revolver
and that is manufactured or assembled with a projectile that
is capable of penetrating body armour composed of aramid fibre
or similar fabric [emphasis added];...

(c) any projectile that is designed, manufactured, or altered to
explode on impact, where the projectile is designed for use in
conjunction with a cartridge and does not exceed 15mm in
diameter [emphasis added];... 

In 2(a) above, there are several problem areas for the
interpreter.  What does "commonly available" mean?  

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer that question. 
The language was too vague and confused.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a criminal law court.

It may mean, to one reasonable officer of the state, available
through the catalogue of a specialty firm from a foreign country;
to another, it the meaning might be limited to demonstrated
availablity in shops within the city where the question arose.

Where two such differing interpretations may be enforced with all
the sanctions of criminal law, it would appear that there is some
chance of the law being brought into disrepute.

The expression "semi-automatic handgun or revolver" is ambiguous. 
Is "semi-automatic" intended as a modifier of both "handgun" and
"revolver," as the rules of English grammar would indicate, or
not?  

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer that question. 
The language was too vague and confused.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

If it means what it says, then the expression limits the meaning
to a few rare semi-automatic revolvers like the Webley-Fosbery. 
(Few people even realize that there are a few semi-automatic
revolvers in circulation.)  If it is not intended to limit the
meaning in that way, then the expression should be "revolver or
semi-automatic handgun."  I suspect that the author was unaware
that semi-automatic revolvers exist; if they did not, his meaning
would have been fairly clear, although the English is poor.

What does "projectile that is capable of penetrating body
armour composed of aramid fibre or similar fabric" mean?  

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer that question. 
The language was too vague and confused.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

Because the thickness of the armour is unstated, one reasonable
officer of the state might interpret the description to mean that
any cartridge with a projectile capable of penetrating one layer
of aramid fibre cloth becomes a "prohibited weapon."  By that
standard, the soft lead bullet of a .22 rimfire cartridge
qualifies, and all .22 rimfire cartridges become "prohibited
weapons" on 01 Oct 92.

Another equally reasonable officer of the state might interpret
the subsection to mean only projectiles which are
specifically designed for the purpose of defeating soft body
armour; but that is not what s. 2(a) says.  That interpretation
was widely issued by the Minister of Justice in a 5-page summary
of these OICs, later withdrawn, which said, in part:

A list of cartridges and components are declared
prohibited weapons.  These are of a military or para-military
nature, and not suited for sporting applications.  They include
"cop-killer" armour piercing bullets, explosive and incendiary
cartridges [emphasis added; it was actually only projectiles
that were converted to "prohibited weapon" status], and exotic
shotgun cartridges known as "flechettes" [emphasis added;
"flechettes" are projectiles, not cartridges]. 

The very common 9mm Parabellum full metal jacket projectile is
quite good at penetrating thin versions of soft body armour vests;
does it convert cartridges to "prohibited weapon" status?     

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer that question. 
The language was too vague and confused.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

An interesting point is that it is only the projectile which
is to be considered regarding whether or not it is "capable of
penetrating body armour".  If some combination of firearm,
cartridge and the projectile is not capable of penetrating the
body armour, that is unimportant, and not to be considered,
according to the plain meaning of the words in the OIC.

If the projectile is capable of doing so, when fired from
some other, more powerful, cartridge, and from some other,
longer-barrelled firearm, that is apparently enough to mean that
the projectile, loaded into a feeble cartridge for a feeble
handgun, and incapable of actual penetration of even one
thickness of soft body armour cloth, by its very presence renders
the entire cartridge a "prohibited weapon."

For example, the 125-grain full-metal-jacketed projectile used in
9mm Parabellum cartridges normally used for target practice can
be loaded into a .35 Whelan rifle cartridge.  It can then fired
from a rifle at a velocity of over 3000 feet per second.  The
projectile, used in that way, will penetrate virtually any soft
body armour vest on the market.

Similarly, the 148-grain soft lead projectile, designed for use
in low-power target load .38 Special cartridges, can also be
loaded into a .35 Whelan rifle cartridge, then fired at a
velocity of over 2000 feet per second.  The projectile, used in
that way, will penetrate virtually any soft body armour vest on
the market--although, used as intended, it has no such effect.

In sum, the OIC, by the plain meaning of its wording, seems to
have converted every handgun cartridge in Canada to "prohibited
weapon" status, opening the possessor of any such cartridge to
criminal prosecution, imprisonment, and the stigma of a criminal
record.  Certainly, the logical progression I have followed is a
road open to any officer of the state attempting to understand
the plain meaning of the words in that OIC.

If that analysis is incorrect, and I sincerely hope that it is,
then where, in the plain meaning of the words of the OIC, does
the dividing line lie between a licit cartridge and a "prohibited
weapon" actually lie?

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer that question. 
The language was too vague and confused.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

It is vitally necessary for any person in possession of any
cartridge to know whether or not it is a "prohibited weapon"
within the meaning of the OIC.  Does the fact that one
manufacturer in the US produces small numbers of revolvers
chambering .444 Marlin rifle cartridges make the .444 Marlin
rifle cartridge a "cartridge that is capable of being discharged
from a commonly available semi-automatic handgun or revolver"? 
Or must the revolver be more "commonly available" than that? 
And, if so, how much more "commonly available"?

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer those questions. 
The language was too vague and confused.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

Similarly, "explode on impact" is unclear.  Most projectiles
designed for use in high-velocity small-bore centerfire rifle
cartridges are designed to disintegrate explosively into small
fragments on impact.  That is a safety measure, intended to
prevent ricochets when such projectiles are used for pest
control; the small fragments do not fly more than a few yards
from the point of impact.

I suspect that what the author meant to prohibit was projectiles
containing chemical explosives, but I cannot be certain of that
from the plain meaning of the wording used.  A reasonable officer
of the state might well conclude that the OIC also prohibits any
bullet designed to disintegrate explosively on impact.  

If that happens, and it may, and that interpretation is sustained
by a court unfamiliar with the safety reasons for that type of
projectile, the result will be a criminal record for the person
who was charged with possession of the "prohibited weapon".  A
secondary effect will be a diminution of pubic safety, caused by
a statute which is supposed to protect public safety.  Does
the OIC prohibit projectiles which disintegrate?  And, if so,
under what conditions? 

In my analysis of this OIC, I could not answer those questions. 
The language was too vague and confused.  Any definitive answer,
of course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

My overall impression of the OICs--both those cited above, and
the remaining OICs from the group studied--is that they were
written by someone lacking in adequate technical knowledge.  It
is apparent that the author had little grasp of the modular
nature of modern firearms, the interconnectivity of firearms
makers from country to country, or the ramifications of the
worldwide trade in firearms.

Taking a broad view of the entire pattern, it is apparent that
the firearms chosen for "prohibition" or "restriction" were
selected simply on the basis of physical appearance, with little
attention to whether or not Canadian murderers, suicides, or
violent criminals use them.  The impression is that one firearm
was prohibited because it "looked nasty," while another of equal
capability was ignored because it had a walnut stock.

It proved easy to find an example of three firearms of equal
capacity (each using the same cartridge, plus having the same
magazine capacity and overall length), one of which is
unrestricted, one restricted, and one prohibited:

MAKE	MODEL		CALIBRE		SHOTS	STATUS           

RUGER   MINI-14 5F	.223 		20	UNRESTRICTED
	  
DAEWOO	AR-100		.223		20	RESTRICTED

FAMAS	MAS 223		.223		20	PROHIBITED

Both the Ruger and the Daewoo have folding stocks, which reduce
them to essentially the same overall length as the FAMAS. 
Unfolding the stock takes a fraction of a second.  They have
equivalent accuracy, and every other characteristic relevant to
their capacity as "weapons" is essentially equal.

From that data, plus the data contained in the "point system," it
was obvious that the actual capacity of the firearms to do harm
was not important in the selection of firearms for restriction or
prohibition. 

From my own expert knowledge of the firearms situation in Canada,
it was obvious that common actual use by criminals in Canada was
not important in the selection of firearms for restriction or
prohibition.

From my examination of the choices actually made, it was obvious
that a "military of paramilitary" appearance was the main
criterion for selecting "parent" designs for restriction or
prohibition and "variants" for listing.  Whether or not the
firearm had any military utility (cartridge power, magazine
capacity, etc.) was frequently ignored--as is evidenced by the
many militarily useless .22 rimfire firearms so converted.

As evidence of that, I submit the following table:

MAKE		MODEL		CALIBRE	   SHOTS    STATUS       
-----------------------------------------------------------------
SPRINGFIELD	M1A		.308	   20	     UNRESTRICTED

FN		FAL		.308	   20	     RESTRICTED

NO RIFLES IN THIS (THE MOST POWERFUL) CLASS ARE PROHIBITED BY OIC
-----------------------------------------------------------------
RUGER   	MINI-14 5F	.223 	   20	     UNRESTRICTED
  
DAEWOO		AR-100		.223	   20	     RESTRICTED

MAS		223		.223	   20	     PROHIBITED
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MITCHELL	PPS-50		.22 RF	   50	     UNRESTRICTED

MITCHELL	M16/22		.22 RF	   25	     RESTRICTED

FEATHER		AT-22		.22 RF	   20	     PROHIBITED
-----------------------------------------------------------------

From the above table, it is clear that firearms of equal or more
powerful character in each equivalent-power group are found in
each classification, and that neither cartridge power nor
magazine capacity have been considered as important factors.

In my analysis of these firearms OICs, it became obvious that
either the OICs are either deliberately intended to vastly
increase the "variant" lists through gradual re-interpretation
until the extremes illustrated above are reached and virtually
all firearms are "prohibited"--or the author was unqualified to
do this work.

Whether the former or the latter, I am forced to the conclusion
that the OICs are very confused and confusing.  If I, with many
years of study behind me, cannot come to firm conclusions as to
the effect, in law, of so many provisions, then the average
firearms owner and user will be completely at a loss.

Worse, any officer of the state will be able to pick and choose
from a vast array of possible interpretations of these vague
provisions.  The absolute meaning of such vague provisions is
unknowable until defined by a court of criminal law.

The combination of an officer of the state who has some (however
limited) degree of firearms expertise which is superior to that
of a prosecutor and lack of expert knowledge on the part of the
person charged are likely to bring the law into disrepute through
violation of the principles of fundamental justice.

This paper does not include all of the problems and flaws I found
in this study; it is only a representative sampling.  I have
severely curtailed the paper in an effort to keep it at a
readable length; it could easily have been much book length.

As a final point on "parent"-to"variant" relationships, OIC
JUS-92-567-01 3(d) converts the bolt-action single-shot Iver
Johnson AMAC rifle to "prohibited weapon" status, and s. 3(b)
converts the bolt-action 5-shot Barrett rifle to "prohibited
weapon" status.

As we have seen, the authors of the OICs used their rules to
determine which firearms become "prohibited weapons" to create
the "variant" lists--"similar but not identical in mechanical
design", or "similar but not identical in designed outline
or appearance", and regardless of the power of the cartridge used
by the "parent" design.

By an understanding of those rules based solidly upon the degrees
of similarity demonstrated by examples from within the listed
"variants" as compared to their listed "parent" firearms, an
excellent case can be made that OIC JUS-92-567-01 converts every
bolt-action rifle in Canada to "prohibited weapon" status on 01
Oct 91.  Any officer of the state might well interpret it so.

If that is not the case, and I sincerely hope that it is not,
then precisely where does the line lie between the "parent" plus
the listed "variants" (all directly converted to "prohibited"
status by the OIC) plus the (indirectly converted) unlisted
"variants"--all bolt-action firearms--and all other bolt-action
rifles and shotguns which which do not become "prohibited"?  

In my analysis of the OIC, I could not answer that question.  The
language was too vague and confused.  Any definitive answer, of
course, can only come from a court of criminal law.

Similarly, an excellent case can be made that OIC JUS-92-567-01
s. 2(a) converts all semi-automatic shotguns with tubular
magazines to "prohibited weapon" status; and that s. 2(c)
converts the remainder.  Between the two, both common operating
systems (recoil-operated and gas-operated) and both magazine
systems (tubular and box) are features of "parent" firearms
designs.  There are very few successful shotgun basic designs,
and many of them share designs on which patents have elapsed.

Further, the SPAS 12 can be operated as either a semi-automatic
shotgun or a pump-action shotgun.  The SPAS 12 is still a
"prohibited weapon" if its semi-automatic capability is
permanently deleted or disabled.  Therefore, a good case can be
made that OIC JUS-92-567-01 converts all pump-action shotguns to
"prohibited weapon" status.

There is nothing outre or far-fetched about such interpretations.
The Dragunov and Mitchell AK-22, with their minimal similarity in
mechanical design or designed outline or appearance, plus
major variance in power and cartridge, are both specified as
"variants" of the "parent" AK-47.  The Mitchell Galil/22 is even
less similar in designed outline or apperance to the FAMAS
.223 rifle, and is not even remotely similar to it in mechanical
design or cartridge--yet is specifically designated as a
"variant" of the FAMS by OIC JUS-92-567-01 s. 3(i).

No limiting rules are specified in any of the OICs to define what
degree of mechanincal design or designed outline or
appearance similarity implies "variant" status for a particular
firearm.  Any officer of the state thus must infer the degree of
similarity required, by comparisons between the "parent" firearm
designs and the listed "variants"--with the above results. 

I have been most disturbed by the open-ended but unidirectional
character of each of these OICs.  Each converts a vaguely-defined
group of firearms (or devices) to "prohibited weapon" or
"restricted weapon" status.  Each group is so poorly described
that the door is open to more and more firearms (or devices)
being so converted by simple re-interpretation of the meaning of
the OIC, until every firearm in Canada is a "prohibited weapon."

The conspicuous absence of any indication of where the process of
conversion of more firearms (or devices) through simple
re-interpretation of the plain meaning of the words must, in law,
stop, is a major problem to me.

Over the past few years, cases requiring accurate definition
of the meaning of "restricted weapon" and "prohibited weapon" have
been in and out of the courts repeatedly.  In my expert opinion,
this OIC subordinate law will exacerbate that situation markedly,
through its vagueness and ambiguity.  It will definitely add
markedly to the current congestion in the law courts.

In closing, I cannot resist the temptation to quote from the
ruling of Mr. Justice Gibbs of the Supreme Court of British
Columbia in Hurley v. Dawson (1986) BCSC unreported(?) No.
CC8612383, 21 Aug 86:

This is a difficult case.  Not the least of the
difficulties is due to the tortuous language of the gun control
provisions of the Criminal Code.  In Regina v. Neil, Provincial
Court Judge Gordon was moved, with some justification, to refer
to those provisions as "one of the most horrifying examples of
bad draftsmanship that I have had the misfortune to consider," as
"so convoluted that even those responsible for enforcing the
provisions are apparently unable to understand them," and as "a
challenge to one's sense of logic."

One can only concur with the learned Justice and the learned
Judge, and note that things do not appear to have improved.

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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						NFA PAPER XVIIB

UNLISTED "VARIANTS" IN 1993 GUN DIGEST -- FILE: ANALVA2.993

In an attempt to clarify the scope of the problem created by the
use of the clause "and any variant or modified version thereof"
in the Orders in Council (OICs) in question, a sweep through the
1993 Gun Digest was done, seeking unlisted "variants."  The Gun
Digest is an annual publication with an extensive listing of
current offerings in the firearms field.  It is far from
comprehensive; many available firearms are not listed, but it
does offer a  wide window on the recreational firearms trade.

1.  The Feather AT-9 Semi-Auto Carbine is "converted" to
"prohibited weapon" status by OIC JUS-92-567-01 s. 3(j), along
with "any variant or modified version thereof, including the
Feather AT-22 Auto Carbine."  

A new firearm, the Feather F9 (GD 93/329), has now appeared.  It
is a possible "variant" of the Feather AT-9.  Has it been
"converted" to "prohibited weapon" status by an OIC which
predates any knowledge of the F9's existence?  Or did the authors
of the OIC know of it and intend to exclude it?  Or did the
authors of the OIC not know of it, and intend to exclude it
because its differences from the AT-9 do not bring it within the
unstated rules which render a particular firearm a "variant"?

I could not answer any of those questions; the OICs are too vague
and confused.  Any definitive answer can only come from a court
of criminal law, with the usual caveat that a finally definitive
answer can only come from the Supreme Court of Canada.

2.  That pattern of confusion is repeated with each new possible
"variant," including the Calico M951S [GD 93/328, JUS-92-567-01
s. 3(c)]; TEC-22TK, TEC-DC9S, TEC-DC9K, TEC-DC9, TEC-DC9MS,
TEC-DC9MS, TEC-DC9MK and TEC-DC9M [GD 93/286, JUS-92-567-01 S.
4(G)].

3.  While the "prohibited" Goncz High-Tech Long Pistol
[JUS-92-567-01 s. 4(n)] has disappeared from the 1993 Gun Digest,
two new design families which appear to be based on the Goncz
have appeared, with several variations.  These are the AA Arms
family, consisting of the AP-9, Mini AP9, and Target AP9 [GD
93/273]; and the Claridge family, consisting of the Hi-Tec Models
S, L, and T [GD 93/279].  The Claridge family appears to be
simply the Goncz family with new nomenclature, probably the
result of business transactions. 

Additionally, the new AA Arms AR9 carbine [GD 93/327] is
apparently merely an extended version of the AP9 fitted with a
longer barrel and a shoulder stock.  

Similarly, another new long arm, the Grendel R-31 Auto Carbine
[GD 93/361] has an even stronger degree of similarity to the
Goncz High-Tech Long Pistol.

Finally, another new long arm, the Claridge Hi-Tec Auto Carbine
[GD 93/361] has an even stronger degree of similarity to the
Goncz High-Tech Long Pistol.

More questions arise because the earlier Goncz High-Tech Carbine
[GD 86/307] was not mentioned by the OIC, although it is similar
to the Goncz High-Tech Long Pistol in mechanical design and in
designed appearance.  Indeed, one can be converted into the other
by judicious substitution of parts.  

Is the Goncz High-Tech Carbine a "variant" of the "prohibited"
pistol, or is it in a different class on the basis of the
separation, by name, of the Sterling Mark 6 and Mark 7?  If it is
a different class, that apparently throws its status to the rules
set forth in CC s. 84(1), and it is a "restricted weapon."  If
that is correct, then do the other new Carbines also have no
"variant" relationship to the "prohibited" Goncz pistol?

I could not answer those questions; the OICs are too vague.  A
definitive answer can only come from the Supreme Court of Canada.

3.  The Mitchell AK-22 is deemed to be a "restricted weapon" and
a "variant" of the AK-47 design by OIC JUS-92-569-01 s.
3(a)(xlviii).  The new Armscor AK-22 [GD 93/360] is similar to
the Mitchell in designed appearance, but is probably not similar
in mechanical design; the Mitchell is an Italian design, while
the Armscor comes from the Philippines.  

Is the Armscor to be considered as a "variant" of the AK-47?

I could not answer those questions; the OICs are too vague.  A
definitive answer can only come from the Supreme Court of Canada.

4.  Similarly, the .22 rimfire Armscor Model 1600 "resembles" the
"Colt AR-15," although it is apparently only a cosmetically
reworked Armscor Model 20P.  Is the Armscor Model 1600 a
"variant," and, if it is, does that mean that its close relative
(the Armscor Model 20P) is also now a "restricted weapon"?  If
the Armscor Model 20P is a "prohibited weapon" through this
concatenated relationship and despite its complete lack of
either similarity of mechanical design or similarity of desinged
appearance to the M-16 design, how many other conventional .22
rimfire rifle designs are also "prohibited weapons"?

I could not answer those questions; the OICs are too vague.  A
definitive answer can only come from the Supreme Court of Canada.

5.  The Heckler and Koch (H & K) G3 design is "prohibited" by s.
3(l).  Two new H & K designs, the SR9 and the SR9(T) [GD 93/330]
have been introduced as further-"civilianized" variations on the
basic H & K rifle action.  Did the manufacturer's efforts to
estrange his design from the "military and paramilitary" group
succeed in Canada as it did in the US?  Or are these two new
types "restricted weapons" and "variants" under Canadian law?

I could not answer those questions; the OICs are too vague.  A
definitive answer can only come from the Supreme Court of Canada.

6.  The M-16 rifle "design" is "converted" to "restricted weapon"
status by s. 3(r).  A number of new manufacturers are now
producing copies and variations on that basic action, including:

(a) The Colt family, including: 

(i) the Sporter Lightweight rifle [GD 93/329], plus

(ii) the Sporter Match HBAR rifle, Sporter Competition HBAR
rifle, Sporter Competition HBAR Range Selected rifle, and Sporter
Target Model rifle [GD 93/372].

(b) The Eagle family, including: 

(i) the EA-15, EA-15 Action Master, EA-15 H-BAR, EA-15 Golden
Eagle, EA-15 E1 Carbine, and EA-15 E2 Carbine [GD 93/329]

(c) The Olympic Arms family, including: 

(i) the CA-9, CAR-15, CAR-40, CAR-45, and CAR-310 Carbines,
and K-4 AR-15 rifle [GD 93/331], plus

(ii) the Service Match, Multimatch, Ultramatch, and International
Match rifles [GD 93/375].

(d) The Quality Parts family, including:

(i) the XM-15 E2 Target rifle. Model [GD 93/375].

Which of those are "restricted weapons"?  Which are unrestricted
because their design similarities are far enough from the
"parent" design to escape "variant" status?  Have the
manufacturer's attempts to "civilianize" their products succeeded
under Canadian law, as they have under US law?

I could not answer those questions; the OICs are too vague.  A
definitive answer can only come from the Supreme Court of Canada.

6.  There are three new products which apparently fit into the
scheme of things as visualized by the authors of the OICs,
products which the OICs do not mention, and which do not closely
resemble any firearm in any of the OICs.  

The D Max Auto Pistol (GD 93/282 ) is similar in configuration
and concept to the Sterling Mark VII Pistol which was converted
to non-grandfathered "prohibited weapon" status by OIC
JUS-92-567-01 at s. 4(k). 

Its close relative, the D Max Carbine (GD 93/329), is similar in
configuration and concept to the Sterling Mark 6 Carbine which
was converted to grandfathered "prohibited weapon" status by
OIC JUS-92-599-01 at s. 2(a).

The status of these two firearms is unknown; are they to be
considered under the rules for determining status set forth in CC
s. 84(1)?  Are they "variants" of some firearm on an OIC list?

Since both are mildly similar to both the Sterling Mark 6 Carbine
and Mark 7 Pistol, if they are considered as "variants" of a
Sterling, which one are they "variants" of, and why?

The question is further confused by the question: Are the
Sterling Mark 6 and Mark 7 to be considered as "variants" of each
other (which they clearly seem to be) or not?  If they are, which
is the "parent" and which is the "variant" that determines the
status of both?  If they are to be considered separately, is that
because both are named, or because some unstated rule is
involved? 

I could not answer those questions; the OICs are too vague.  A
definitive answer can only come from the Supreme Court of Canada.

The resemblance of these D Max firearms to the Sterlings cited is
only a general similarity of layout, but it is approximately as
accurate as, say, the resemblance that the Mitchell MAS/22 has to
the "prohibited" FAMAS "parent" design.  Furthermore, these two
makes use cartridges which are identical or similar, unlike the
FAMAS and the Mitchell.

In sum, the problems are horrendous.  Had the OICs specified some
rational basis, defining clearly how one firearm necessarily
becomes a "variant" of another, it would be different.  Since
they did not, it is necessary to establish the rules by
examination of the firearms which are definitely identified as
"variants" by name, and comparing them to the "parent" designs.

When that exercise is attempted, one quickly becomes lost in a
maze of conflicting relationships.  One firearm which is not at
all similar to a "parent" design is a named "variant;"  another,
which is very similar to a "parent" design, is placed in a
different category by name, or is omitted from the OICs entirely. 

Is such an omission evidence of intent, or only of carelessness? 
Did the OIC author's placement of two nearly-identical firearms
in different categories signal some obscure rule which must be
obeyed, or was it an arbitrary and irrational decision based upon
nothing?  Are we intended to infer the rules, or must every
question be submitted to a court of criminal law?  If two people
hold different opinions as to the relationship between a "parent"
and a possible "variant," whose opinion triggers a criminal
prosecution, and based on what?

I could not answer any of those questions; the OICs are too vague
and confused.  Any definitive answer can only come from a court
of criminal law, with the usual caveat that a finally definitive
answer can only come from the Supreme Court of Canada.

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [26/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 15:42:54 GMT
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						NFA PAPER XVIII

RETROACTIVE CRIMINALIZATION IN BILL C-68

Bill C-68's Criminal Code (CC) section 84(1) "prohibited firearm"
(a) converts all handguns with barrels 105mm or less in length,
and all .25 and .32 handguns, to "prohibited firearm" status,
thus rendering them valueless to their lawful owners.

Firearms Act (FA) section 113/120(1) and (2)(b) [including
reference to s. 12(6)] convert the Firearms Acquisition
Certificate of any person who held a registration certificate for
a handgun with a barrel at or under 105mm length, or a handgun in
.25 or .32 calibre, on or before 14 Feb 95, into a licence to
"acquire and possess" more such firearms.  The holders are
"grandfathered," forming a group other Canadians cannot join.

Until Bill C-68 is passed, such handguns are "restricted
firearms" under CC s. 84(1) "restricted firearm" (a).  It is
legal to own and register them.  If C-68 passes, they become
"prohibited firearms"--retroactive to 14 Feb 95.

A person may lawfully acquire his first "14 Feb" handgun after 14
Feb 95 and before proclamation of Bill C-68.  On C-68's date of
proclamation, his firearm becomes a "prohibited firearm" as of 14
Feb 95, and he becomes a criminal, subject to prosecution under
[Bill C-68's] CC s. 91(2) and/or 92(2).  The penalties are
imprisonment not exceeding five [91(2)] and ten [92(2)] years.

(Oddly enough, it might be proper for the prosecution to use the
version of s. 90 that was in force before the proclamation of
Bill C-68, on the grounds that C-68 made the firearm a
"prohibited firearm" as of 14 Feb 95 and that the old law was in
force from 14 Feb 95 to C-68's proclamation date.)

The passage of Bill C-68 will immediately result in police trying
to confiscate lawfully-acquired "14 Feb" firearms from those not
"grandfathered"--using threats of prosecution, heavy lawyer fees,
and possible imprisonment to deter access to the courts.

In effect, the police offer the owner a choice: "Voluntarily"
surrender your property, or face criminal prosecution.  That is
apparently a violation of CC s. 346:

346. (1) Every one commits extortion who, without reasonable
justification or excuse and with intent to obtain anything, by
threats...[or] menaces... induces or attempts to induce any
person... to do anything...

(1.1) Every one who commits extortion is guilty of an indictable
offence and liable to imprisonment for life.

If a court rules that the actions of the police and Parliament do
not amount to a conspiracy to commit extortion, the perception of
Canada's huge recreational firearms community will be at odds
with the perception of that court.  The facts are too obvious.
Parliament apparently does not wish to pay compensation to most
of the owners of the many newly-"prohibited" firearms now
scheduled for immediate or later confiscation.

That is contrary to the principles of fundamental justice.  As
Peter W. Hogg noted in "Constitutional Law of Canada" at 28.5(d): 

"There is a rule of statutory interpretation in
Anglo-Canadian law that a statute which takes property is to be
read as implicitly requiring that compensation be paid to the
private owner."

Because many Canadians have their life savings largely tied up in
firearms collections that will be rendered valueless by Bill
C-68, the damage to their interests will be huge--as will the
damage to heirs who will be unable to inherit valuable property.

If the Supreme Court of Canada follows Manitoba Fisheries v.
the Queen [(1979) 1 SCR 101] and The Queen (BC) v. Tener
[(1985) 1 SCR 533] it seems likely that Bill C-68's plan to
refuse compensation payments to nearly everyone affected by Bill
C-68 will be overruled by the courts, and Parliament will pay.

Whatever happens--and it will take years to sort the mess out--
the law will have been brought into disrepute, the police will
have been forced into adversarial positions against honest gun
owners, and the non-system-using criminals will be unaffected.

Conclusions of Chief Inspector Colin Greenwood, West Yorkshire
Constabulary (writing in Police Review, Britain) after he had
done a six-month study of firearms control methods and their
actual (as opposed to theoretical) effects in many countries: 

"The number of firearms required to satisfy the crime
market is small, and these are supplied no matter what controls
are instituted.  Controls have had serious effects on legitimate
users of firearms, but there is no case, either in the history of
this country or in the experience of other countries in which
controls can be shown to have restricted the flow of weapons to
criminals, or in any way reduced crime."

He was right.  The latest British Home Office statistics for
England and Wales show their violent crime rates (excluding
"political" crime) have doubled every 10 years since 1946. 
Britain's recreational firearms industry has been destroyed. 
Many honest shooters now keep their firearms in Belgium to avoid
the next confiscation.  Has gun control legislation worked? No.

British firearms crime rates are at an all-time high and continue
to rise.  What else could one expect?  Firearms are easy to
smuggle, police are easy to avoid while committing a violent
crime, and their government guarantees that any criminal who has
a firearm can totally dominate any criminal-victim situation.

Our Minister of Justice, Alan Rock, has said on several occasions
that no Canadian has any need of firearms for self-protection. 
If so, why does he regularly dip into the public purse to cover the
expense of armed bodyguards to protect his own precious skin?

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.politics,talk.politics.guns,can.legal,can.talk.guns,can.gov.general
Subject: NFA presentation to Senate committee: Bill C-68 [27/27]
Followup-To: can.talk.guns
Date: 24 Sep 1995 15:43:32 GMT
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						NFA PAPER XX

THE INDEPENDENCE OF QUASI-JUDICIAL LICENSING TRIBUNALS

While the standards of independence required for a quasi-judicial
one-man licensing tribunal do not necessarily conform precisely
to the standards required for a tribunal which is trying an
accused for a criminal offence, it is necessary that such a
quasi-judicial licensing tribunal be able to display and
demonstrate a reasonable degree of judicial independence.  Should
such a tribunal actually or apparently have its decision-making
powers controlled by some outside agency, the statutory appeal
process would engender a hearing aimed at the wrong person (not
the actual decision-maker) and the law brought into disrepute.

In Regina v. Genereux (1992) 1 70 CCC (3d), Lamer C.J.C.
ruled for the Supreme Court of Canada:

To assess the impartiality of a tribunal, the
appropriate frame of reference is the "state of mind" of the
decision-maker.  The circumstances of the case must be examined
to determine whether the decision-maker, perhaps by having a
personal interest in the case, will be subjectively biased in the
particular situation.  The question of independence, in contrast,
extends beyond the subjective attitude of the decision-maker. 
The independence of a tribunal is a matter of its status.  The
status of a tribunal must guarantee not only its freedom from
interference by the executive and legislative branches of
government but also by any other external force, such as business
or corporate interests or other pressure groups; see, for
example, the recent judgement of this court in R. v. Lippe
(1991) 64 CCC (3d) 513, [1991] 2 SCR 114, 5 CRR (2d) 31. 
Dickson C.J.C. aptly summarized the essence of independence in
Beauregard, supra at p. 491:

Historically, the generally accepted core of the
principle of judicial independence has been the complete liberty
of individual judges to hear and decide the cases that come
before them: no outsider, be it government, pressure group,
individual or even another judge - should interfere in fact, or
attempt to interfere, with the way a judge conducts his or her
case, and makes his or her decision,  This core continues to be
central to the principle of judicial independence.

The ability of independent judges to make decisions in discrete
cases free from external interference or influence continues...
to be an important and necessary component of the principle.

Dickson C.J.C. noted that an additional purpose of judicial
independence, over and above the principle that a tribunal have
complete decision-making liberty in individual cases, is to allow
the courts to fulfil their historical role as protector of
constitutional law and values.  (19 and 20)

Lamer C.J.C. went on to cite, with approval, Le Dain J. in R.
v. Valente [1985] 23 CCC (3d) 193, 24 DLR (4th) 161, [1985] 2
SCR 673, 49 CR (3d) 97, 19 CRR 354, 37 MVR 9, 64 NR 1, 52 OR (2d)
779n, 15 WCB 326, apid, saying:   

Mechanisms that are suitable and necessary to
achieve the independence of the superior courts, for example, may
be highly inappropriate in the context of a different tribunal. 
For this reason, the court chose to define three essential
conditions of independence that can be applied flexibly, being
capable of attainment by a variety of legislative schemes or
formulas (at p. 208 CCC, p. 178 DLR):

The standard of judicial independence for the
purposes of s. 11(d) cannot be a standard of uniform provisions.
It must necessarily be a standard that reflects what is common
to, or at the heart of, the various approaches to the essential
conditions of judicial independence in Canada.

The first essential condition of judicial independence, as
defined in Valente, is security of tenure.  This condition,
like the other two, can be satisfied in a number of ways.  What
is essential is that the decision-maker must be removable only
for cause. (19)

Any quasi-judicial one-man licensing tribunal established by
appointment of a police constable or other police employee as a
firearms control decision-maker does not meet this standard.  

Such a one-man tribunal's tenure in office is at the sole
discretion of his police superiors.  He may be removed from that
position at any time, either as a result of routine transfer or
as a result of some perceived defect in his work or some need
elsewhere--by his police superiors.  He has no security.

Lamer C.J.C. went on to say:

Similarly, s. 11(d) of the Charter requires that a
decision-maker have a basic degree of financial security.  The
substance of this condition is as follows (at p. 216 CCC, p. 184
DLR:

The essence of such security is that the right to
a salary and pension should be established by law and not subject
to arbitrary interfeerence by the executive in a manner that
could affect judicial independence.

Within the limits of this requirement, however, the federal and
provincial governments must retain the authority to design
specific plans of renumeration that are appropriate to different
types of tribunals.  Consequently, a variety of schemes may
equally satisfy the requirement of financial security, provided
that the essence of the condition is maintained.  (19 and 20)

Any quasi-judicial one-man licensing tribunal established by the
appointment of a police constable or other police employee as a
firearms control decision-maker does not meet this standard.  

Such an individual's financial security is at the sole discretion
of his police superiors.  Indeed, his performance as a tribunal
is considered to be his performance as a police employee, and he
is annually rated by his police superiors on that performance in
order to determine his salary increases and promotion prospects. 

Therefore, he must at all times keep in mind the necessity of
pleasing his police superiors, for the good of his career.  His
service as a tribunal is temporary and unpaid, while his service
as a police officer or police employee is his livelihood.

Lamer C.J.C. went on:

The third essential condition of judicial
independence is institutional independence with regard to matters
of administration that relate directly to the exercise of the
tribunal's judicial function.  It is unacceptable that an
external force be in a position to interfere in matters that are
directly and immediately relevant to the adjudication function,
for example, assignment of judges, sittings of the court, and
court lists.  (20) 

Any quasi-judicial one-man licensing tribunal established by
appointment of a police constable or other police employee as a
firearms control decision-maker does not meet this standard.  

Such a one-man tribunal's institutional independence is at the
sole discretion of his police superiors.  For example: The
assignment of decision-makers to the position, the hours and
dates when cases will be considered, and the assignment of work
are all at the sole discretion of his police superiors.  All his
clerical staff are employees of the police.  Procedures and
policies are dictated to him by his police superiors, who give
him orders affecting every detail of his work.

While such a quasi-judicial one-man licensing tribunal is a
lesser creature of the law than a court subject to Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms section 11(d), such a tribunal
affects the rights of those before it under s. 9 of the Charter,
because those affected by his decisions may be imprisoned as a
direct or indirect result of his decisions.

Perhaps inadequate standards in re of one or two of the three
essential requirements for judicial independence might be found
acceptable, but it seems probable that the absence of all three
requires that this form of tribunal be struck down.

Lamer C.J.C. went on:

The tribunal must be free to make its decision on the
merits.  (58)

Any quasi-judicial one-man licensing tribunal established by
appointment of a police constable or other police employee as a 
firearms control decision-maker either is not free to make its
decision on the merits, or is so defective in independence that
it is commonly perceived not to be independent.  Therefore, its
decision-making authority always brings the law into disrepute.  

When a low-ranking individual is assigned as a firearms control
decision-maker to quasi-judicial licensing tribunal duties by the
police, paid by the police, disciplined by the police, has his
work, hours of operation, policies, and procedures set by the
police, is rated on his performance by the police, and depends
for tenure on the whims of his police superiors, then the
administrative structure and procedures involved exhibit grave
deficiencies as to that tribunal's necessary independence.

Senior officers of the police have strong interests in what
decisions are made by such a quasi-judicial one-man licensing
tribunal, and may well exert undue influence on such a firearms
control decision-maker, or cause him to inappropriately consider
either their wishes or his perception of their wishes as a factor
in his decision, thus bringing the law into disrepute.

The conflicts of interest imposed upon such a quasi-judicial
one-man licensing tribunal are too severe to expect the
independent exercise of his judgement to prevail.  It is too much
to expect that an applicant should believe that the merits of his
case will prevail over the influence of the tribunal's police
superiors.  Instead, he may confidently expect that the wishes of
those police superiors, who have no statutory right or duty to
affect the tribunal's decision, will usually prevail. 

Finally, either the person so established is a quasi-judicial
one-man licensing tribunal with the above defects, or he is not a
quasi-judicial statutory decision-maker.  In the latter case, the
person apparently has no power of decision, and must issue on
demand except where precluded by law, is precluded from revoking,
and is precluded from setting terms and conditions of issue.

                  National Firearms Association (NFA)
            Headquarters            Membership and publication
              Box 1779                 Box 4384, Station C
         Edmonton AB T5J 2P1           Calgary AB  T2T 5N2
         ph.: (403) 439-1394           ph.: (403) 640-1110
         fax: (403) 439-4091           fax: (403) 640-1144

--
[email-masked]  <------------------>  Saskatoon Free-Net
Just my $1.62 (expressed in 1995 dollars and adjusted for inflation
and appreciation).  No one else's opinions are implied.  DO NOT EAT

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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.talk.guns,can.politics,talk.politics.guns,soc.culture.canada,can.general,can.legal,can.gov.general
Subject: Bill C-68: It's about more than registration [weekly post]
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Date: 30 Aug 1996 14:08:50 GMT
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         Changes or additions to this posting should be sent to:
                        [email-masked]

This article attempts to give a broader perspective to Bill C-68 (now
Chapter 39, 1995) which will significantly alter Canada's firearm laws and
regulations if and when it is proclaimed.  It's about a lot more than just
registration of all firearms.

NB: this is a summary of a series of articles entitled "It's about a lot
more than just registration" posted in 1995.  When I have time, the
information in this article will be put into the can.talk.guns FAQ list,
posted weekly on the can.talk.guns newsgroup.  The excerpts from Bill C-68
are all from the June 1995 version.  Minor changes were made before it was
passed by the Senate.  I will update the excerpts soon.  The latest version
of C-68 is available from the Cdn-firearms Home Page and from the Department
of Justice web site (URLs listed at the end of this posting).

Legally acquiring a firearm in Canada
=====================================

Most people are not aware of what laws already exist regarding acquisition
and ownership of firearms in Canada.  It is not true that someone can just
walk into a store and legally purchase a gun.

CLASSES OF FIREARMS

There are three general classes of firearms: non-restricted, restricted and
prohibited.  In general, non-restricted firearms must be longer than 26
inches and the barrel must be longer than 18 inches.  (There are exceptions,
e.g. where the firearm was manufacture with a shorter barrel.)  Restricted
firearms are those shorter than the above and also firearms restricted by
Order In Council (OIC).  Prohibited firearms are those prohibited by OIC and
those firearms "capable" of fully automatic fire (that is, one pull of the
trigger fires more than one round) and not registered before 01 Jan 1978.
By signing an OIC, the Minister of Justice can restrict or prohibit firearms
without parliamentary debate or consent.

TO BUY AND OWN A NON-RESTRICTED FIREARM:

1. You must either pass the 10 hour Canadian Firearms Safety Course (CFSC)
or "challenge the exam".  To pass, you must achieve a score of at least 80%
on the written exam (50 questions) as well as pass all three practical exams
where you must demonstrate safe handling skills and knowledge of current
firearm laws and regulations.  You can "challenge the exam" instead of
taking the CFSC if you have owned at least one firearm since 1979.  If you
are planning to "challenge the exam" you should study the CFSC manual
first.  Minors and those who have had prohibition orders must take the
CFSC.

2. You must apply for a Firearm Acquisition Certificate (FAC).  The
application requires that you (among other things):
	- prove you have passed the CFSC exams
	- supply a recent, good-quality photo of yourself 
	- fill out a four page application and answer questions about
	  recent relationships and business failures
	- supply the references of at least two persons who have known
	  you for at least three years (must be a fellow employee,
	  spouse, minister, doctor, lawyer, tribal elder, etc.)
	- pass a background in the Canadian Police Information
	  Computer (CPIC) which lists all "encounters" with police
	  in Canada; not just criminal convictions.
	- pay $50
	- wait at least 28 days before getting your FAC (with a typical
	  wait being six to eight weeks).
You must renew your FAC every five years and, if you apply before the
expiration date, you may skip most of the above and pay $25 instead of $50.

3. You may purchase a non-restricted firearm if you hold a valid FAC.  It
will take about four months to get a firearm legally if you do not yet have
a valid FAC.

TO BUY AND OWN A RESTRICTED FIREARM:

4. you must have a valid FAC, and:
	- show a need for the pistol or restricted rifle/shotgun.
	- buy the firearm, but leave it at the store
	- take the receipt (and all required information) to the police
	- (You may be have to bring the gun to the police station (after
		getting a permit) or you may have to leave it at the
		store.)
	- your firearm will stay at the store or with the police until
		the registration papers come back from Ottawa.  This is
		typically a two month wait.
	- you may now take your gun home and keep
		it there after getting a permit to convey.

At this point you will have your registered rifle/shotgun/pistol at home.
The entire process will take about six months.  If you are a collector who
never want to take your firearm(s) anywhere, there is nothing more to do
under the current system.

If you are a target shooter or you are interested in selling or trading your
firearm(s), you must show a need.  If you want to take your firearms to a
hobby show, you must get a permit.  If you want to shoot a range you must
get a membership, show the membership to the police, and get a carrying
permit.  (The carrying permit doesn't allow you to actually carry the gun,
just transport it.)

ONCE CHAPTER 39 (BILL C-68) IS PROCLAIMED, citizens will have to register
all their firearms and obtain firearms licences.  A licence will be for
possession (or possession and acquisition) of certain classes of firearms.
(There will be more than three classes of firearms.)  Since possessing
firearms without a licence (that you must remember to renew every five
years) will make you a criminal, even if the firearms are all registered, no
Canadian citizen will actually _own_ firearms.  In effect, all firearms will
be owned by the Crown and _rented_ for not less that $60 every five years.
There will also be a registration charge every time a firearm changes
hands.

Current Criminal Offences and Penalties
=======================================

From Part III of the Canadian Criminal Code
(as of 31 Dec 1995.  On 01 Jan 1996, new minimum sentences of four years
were added for commission of one or more of 10 specific crimes with a
firearm.  Details to be added to this document soon.)

Section	Offense                                 Type       Max. Sentence
-------	-------                                 ----       -------------

 85 (1) Using a firearm during the              indictable 14 years
        commission of an offense

 86 (1) Pointing a firearm at a person	        indictable  5 years

 86 (2) Careless handling of a firearm	        indictable  2 years

 86 (3) Handling and Transporting a	        indictable  2 years
        firearm contrary to regulations

 87     Possession of a weapon or imitation     indictable 10 years
        for a purpose dangerous to the
        public

 88     Possession of a weapon while            summary     2 years
        attending or on his way to a
        public meeting

 89     Carrying a Concealed Weapon	        indictable  5 years

 90 (1) Possession of a prohibited weapon       indictable 10 years

 90 (2) Possession of a prohibited weapon       indictable  5 years
        in a motor vehicle

 91 (1) Possession of a restricted weapon       indictable 10 years
        without a registration
        certificate

 91 (2) Possession of a restricted weapon       indictable  5 years
        at a place other than was
        registered

 91 (3) Possession of a restricted weapon       indictable  5 years
        in a motor vehicle

 93 (1) Giving, lending, transferring or        indictable  2 years
        delivering a firearm to someone
        under 18

 94     Selling, bartering, giving, lending,    indictable  5 years
        transferring or delivering a
        weapon, ammunition or explosive
        to someone who is of unsound
        mind, impaired or prohibited
        from possessing weapons

 95 (1) Importing, Exporting, selling,          indictable 10 years
        bartering, giving, lending,
        transferring or delivering
        prohibited weapons or
        components for prohibited weapons

 95.1   Manufacturing or Altering a             indictable  5 years
        weapon so that it is fully
        automatic

 96 (1) Selling, bartering, giving,             indictable  5 years
        lending, transferring or
        delivering a restricted weapon
        to someone who is not authorized
        to possess such a weapon

 96 (3) Importing a restricted weapon if        indictable  5 years
        not authorized to possess such
        a weapon

 97 (1) Selling, bartering, giving,             indictable  2 years
        lending, transferring or
        delivering a weapon to someone
        without a Firearm Acquisition
        certificate (FAC)

 97 (3) Acquisition of a firearm without        indictable  2 years
        a firearms acquisition certificate

103(10) Possession of a firearm, offensive      indictable 10 years
        weapon or ammunition or FAC while
        prohibited

104 (1) Finding a lost firearm and not          indictable  2 years
        turning it over to the police

104 (2) Losing a restricted firearm or if       indictable  5 years
        the restricted firearm is stolen,
        and not reporting it

104 (3) Defacing a firearms serial number,      indictable  5 years
        or knowingly having a firearm with
        a defaced serial number

Firearms already prohibited and confiscated (without compensation)
==================================================================

The following is a list of firearms prohibited in Canada and, even though
registered as required by law, confiscated without compensation.

PLEASE NOTE:  This list was accurate as of Nov. 28, 1994, but it is not
complete.  Many models of rifles, shotguns, cross bows and knives were
prohibited on January 1, 1995.  i.e. THERE ARE MORE FIREARMS PROHIBITED IN
CANADA THAN THOSE LISTED BELOW.  (Fully-automatic firearms--those capable of
"firing projectiles in rapid succession during one pressure of the
trigger"--have been prohibited since 1978 (they remain "restricted" for
those who had them registered before 01 January 1978.)
 
- Franchi SPAS 12
- Striker 12
- USAS 12
- American 180 Auto Carbine
- Barret 50 Calibre rifle
- Iver Johnson AMAC long range rifle
- Pauza Specialties P50, 50 BMG
- Pauza Specialties P50 Carbine
- McMillan M87 50 BMG
- McMillan 87R 50 BMG
- McMillan M88 50 BMG
- Research Armament Industries Model 500 50 BMG
- Calico M-900
- Calico M-951
- Calico M-100 Carbine
- Calico M-105 Carbine
- Feather AT-9 Semi-Auto Carbine
- Feather AT-22 Auto Carbine
- Federal XC-450
- Federal XC-900
- Federal XC-220
- Keckler & Koch G11
- Illinois Arms Co. Model 180 Auto
- MAS 223
- US ARMS PMAI
- Weaver Arms Nighthawk
- Bushmaster Pistol
- Calico M-950
- Calico M-110
- Encom MP-9
- Encom MP-45
- Encom MK-IV
- Goncz High-tech pistol
- HK-SP89
- Intratec 9
- Intratec Skorpion in .22LR
- Tec-9s
- Tec 9M
- Tec-9MS
- Tec-22T
- Tec-22TN
- Iver-Johnson Enforcer Model 3000
- Iver Johnson Plainfield Super Enforcer Carbine
- Ingram M10
- Ingram M11
- Cobray M10
- Cobray M11
- RPB M10
- RPB M11
- RPBSM10
- RPBSM11
- SWD M10
- SWD M11
- SWD SM10 
- SWD SM11
- Partisan Avenger auto pistol
- Spectre (Semi) Auto Pistol
- Universal Enforcer model 3000

Existing safe storage (and other) regulations
=============================================

STORAGE

When not is use, non-restricted firearms (most shotguns and rifles) must be
kept unloaded in a secure* cabinet or stored unloaded with a trigger lock in
place.  Ammunition must be stored separate from the firearms.

When not in use, restricted firearms (pistols and some rifles and shotguns)
must stored unloaded with a trigger lock in place and kept in a secure*
container.  Ammunition must be locked in a separate container or
compartment.  A trigger lock is not required only if the firearm is kept in
a safe or vault.

*secure means "not easily broken into", so the container must be locked and
constructed of a "substantial" material.

INSPECTION

Owners must also submit to periodic inspections of the storage area.  You
cannot refuse an inspection, but an appointment must be made at a
"reasonable" time.

TRANSPORTATION

Transporting a restricted firearm away from the address on the
registration requires a permit.  There are several permits: 
Form C-300 Permit to Convey - part of the registration application
Form C-301 Permit to Transport - repair, inspection, etc. 
Form C-302 Permit to Carry - competition or range use
Form 3273  Permit to Temporarily Store a Restricted Weapon
 
A Permit to Carry won't permit you to actually carry the firearm on your
person (unless it is a condition of employment).  Safe storage regulations
apply.  This permit allows you to take the pistol to a competition or a
range where you have a membership.

A Permit to Transport is needed to take the firearm to a gunsmith for repair
or inspection.

A Permit to Temporarily Store a Restricted Weapon is needed when you want to
store the pistol elsewhere (while you are moving and changing your address,
for example) and contains a space for transport times to be stipulated.

A Permit to Convey is actually part of the Application to Register.  It's
usually only good for a few hours.

Mini Timeline of Firearms Control in Canada
===========================================
 
1877 - Justices of the Peace are allowed to jail for 6 months persons in
possession of a handgun where there is not reasonable cause to fear assault
to life or property.

1892 - First nation-wide permit system for the carrying of small arms is
established.

1913 - Sale of handguns is restricted to permit holders only. A three-month
sentence is introduced for possession of a firearm without a permit outside
home or business.

1919 - Following the Winnipeg General Strike, aliens are no longer permitted
to possess any guns (including long-arms) without a permit.

1933 - Penalty for carrying a handgun outside the home or business is
increased to a maximum of five years. A maximum two-year sentence for any
offender carrying a handgun while committing a criminal offence is imposed
in addition to any other sentence. (Repealed in 1951.)

1934 - All handguns are to be registered, wherever kept.

1940 - All firearms are registered during the war, but the records are
destroyed after 1945.

1947 - Criminal Code amendment provides for a murder charge if a gun
discharges, even accidentally, and kills someone during a robbery or any
other specific offence.

1951 - A centralized restricted firearms registry system under the
Commissioner of the RCMP is established.

1968 - Firearms classes (prohibited weapons, restricted weapons and
long-arms) are introduced.

1977 - Most recent firearms legislative changes. (For details see Section II
"Strengthening Firearms Control (1977).")

The above information is from "Firearms Control in Canada: An Evaluation"
Ministry of Supply and Services Canada 1983. (page 4 - figure 3)

1978 - Firearm Acquisition Certificate (FAC) necessary for all firearm
purchases.  Fully automatic firearms prohibited, but for current owners they
remain "restricted".

1992 - Expanded Order in Council (OIC) powers allow the Minister of Justice
to restrict or prohibit (without compensation) certain weapons or weapons
parts or any firearm not "commonly used in Canada for hunting or sporting
puposes"
     - Over 200 models of rifles and shotguns are prohibited or restricted
(refer to "Firearms Prohibited and Restricted by Order in Council Reference
Manual - 1992").
     - Prohibited magazines holding more than 5 cartridges (rifles) or
shells (shotguns) or 10 cartridges (pistols).
     - Prohibited Mace, capiscum and other sprays.  - Required storage site
     inspection (and compliance).  - Firearms classes made mandatory for
     Firearm Acquisition Certificate (FAC), effective 1994.
     - FAC price increased from $10 to $50, effective 1994.

1994 - (Ontario) Picture ID required for all ammunition purchases.
     - (Nov. 29) new Orders in Coucil laid before Parliament.
     - (Nov. 30) Proposal for more firearms control, regulation, prohibition
and confiscation presented to Parliament.

1995 - (Jan. 1) Effective date of new Orders in Council (OICs) prohibiting
many models of rifles, shotguns, cross bows and knives.  (Refer to "Weapons
Prohibited by Order in Council - 1994")
     - (Feb. 14) Bill C-68, based on 1994 proposals, receives first reading
in Parliament.
     - (Apr. 5) Bill C-68 approved in principle (second reading) and sent to
the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs.
     - (June 13) Bill C-68 passed by the House of Commons with minor
amendments and sent to the Senate.
     - (Nov. 22) Twenty-two Tory senators voted for Bill C-68 or abstain,
so it is passed.  If they had all voted against the bill, it would
have been defeated (just like the Pearson airport bill) by 50 to 46.
     - (Dec. 05) Bill C-68 received Royal Assent

The present power of the Minister of Justice
============================================

ORDERS IN COUNCIL

By Order in Council the Minister of Justice* currently has the power to
make regulations:
 - regulating the storage, display, handling and transportation of all
	firearms.
 - prescribing anything that is required to be prescribed by the
	regulations.
 - prohibiting any ammunition.
 - prohibiting a part, component, accessory of a weapon (as 
	described below).
 - prohibiting, without "grandfathering"**, anything deemed to be a
	weapon and not being an antique firearm*** and NOT COMMONLY USED
	IN CANADA FOR HUNTING OR SPORTING PURPOSES.

These powers stem mostly from Bill C-17, passed in 1992.

*In reality, the Firearms Control Task Group in the Department of
Justice prepares a recommendation for the Minister of Justice based on
requests made by a Chief Provincial/Territorial Firearms Officer.  The
group then prepares an Order in Council for submission to the Governor
in Council.  Technically, the Governor in Council makes the
regulations.  Nevertheless, the Minister of Justice can prohibit
firearms without any parliamentary or committee debate, with only a
'rubber stamp' from the Governor in Council.

**"grandfathering" is granted for some firearms and means the lawful
owner is allowed to keep the firearm until she or he dies.

***an antique firearm means any firearm manufactured before 1898 that
was not designed to use rim-fire or centre-fire ammunition and that has
not been redesigned to use such ammunition, or, if so designed or
redesigned, is capable only of using rim-fire or centre-fire ammunition
that is not commonly available in Canada.

The Minister of Justice must lay before each House of Parliament, at
least thirty (30) sitting days before its effective date, every regulation
that is proposed to be made ("sitting day" means, in respect of either
House of Parliament, a day on which that House sits.)

Every appropriate committee _may_ conduct enquiries or public hearings
with respect to the proposed regulation and report its findings to the
appropriate House.  There is nothing to say that either House _must_
debate the proposed OICs, or that committees must review and comment.
Even if a committee does recommend changes, the Minister may override.
There is also no provision for a vote on proposed OICs by either
House.  The bottom line is that the supremacy of Parliament has been
seriously undermined by giving an enormous amount of power to one
person.

INVALID OICs 

Both the 1992 Orders in Council (OICs) and 1995 OICs are ultra vires
(pronounced ultra veye-reez, meaning "without lawful effect").  Why?
Last year, the National Firearms Association (NFA) challenged a firearm
confiscation.  In R. v Theodore Pierce Simmermon, on August 12, 1994,
Mr. Justice Cooke of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench ruled that the
1992 OICs, which the Government stated were made under Section 84 (1)
of the Criminal Code, paragraph (e) of the "prohibited weapon"
definition, are subject to Section 116 (2) which stipulates that OICs
must be laid before both Houses of Parliament at least thirty sitting
days before the effective date.  (Section 116 (3) further defines a
"sitting day" as a day on which that House sits.)  The OICs may then be
scrutinized by the appropriate committees (although, they never have
been and they don't need to be).

Since the OICs were not presented to both Houses at least thirty sitting
days before their effective dates, they were ruled invalid.  The
1995 OICs (tabled on November 29, 1994) were subject to the same rules
as the 1992 OICs, and are, therefore, also without lawful effect.

Unfortunately, police across Canada are still confiscating firearms
(without any compensation, of course).  These confiscations are
illegal, but how many people know this?

The New Powers of the Minister of Justice 
=========================================

At present, the minister may make recommendations to the Governor in
Council regarding import, sale and storage of all firearms, as well as
restriction and prohibition of all ammunition and firearms, _except_
those "commonly used in Canada for hunting and sporting purposes".

Under Bill C-68, the minister's powers encompass every aspect of
firearm use and ownership.  He may also restrict and prohibit all
firearms except where, "in the opinion of the Governor in Council, the
thing to be prescribed is reasonable for use in Canada for hunting or
sporting purposes." [proposed Criminal Code Section 117.15 (2)]  Note the
powerful change in wording.

The minister would have the power to create new offences under this act.

The minister would have the power to alter the dates at which portions
of the bill will take lawful effect.  The fact that the act states
something will happen on January 1, 2003, is meaningless, since the
date can be altered at any time.

These changes, and others, would seriously undermine the supremacy of
Parliament.

Under the current system, Orders in Council (OICs) must be laid before
each House of Parliament for 30 sitting days.  Under Bill C-68, this is
not necessary.  Section 117.15, allowing the Minister to prohibit any
"thing" not "reasonable", in his or her _opinion_, for hunting or
sporting purposes, is specifically _not_ subject to parliamentary
review. [Firearms Act Section 119 (6)]  This is undemocratic in the
extreme.

Below are some of the relevant extracts from "Bill C-68, An Act
respecting firearms and other weapons".

The complete text of Bill C-68 (now Chapter 39, 1995 S.C.) is at:
http://canada.justice.gc.ca/folio.pgi/ebills.nfo/query=*/doc/{4892,0,0,0}/hit_headings?
http://teapot.usask.ca/cdn-firearms/Gov/c68.html
http://www.sscl.uwo.ca/~eric/cfa/Gov/c68.html
http://www.mae.carleton.ca/~ijeff/guns/cdn-firearms/Gov/c68.html
http://www.interlog.com/~alton/c68.html
ftp://ftp.usask.ca/pub/cdn-firearms/Gov/c68

Excerpts from the Firearms Act:

  117. The Governor in Council may make
regulations

  (a) regulating the issuance of licences,
  registration certificates and authorizations,
  including regulations respecting the purposes
  for which they may be issued under any
  provision of this Act and prescribing the
  circumstances in which persons are or are not
  eligible to hold licences;

  (b) regulating the revocation of licences,
  registration certificates and authorizations;
  
  (c) prescribing the circumstances in which an
  individual does or does not need firearms
  
    (i) to protect the life of that individual or
    of other individuals, or
  
    (ii) for use in connection with his or her
    lawful profession or occupation;
  
  (d) regulating the use of firearms in target
  practice or target shooting competitions;

  (e) regulating

    (i) the establishment and operation of
    shooting clubs and shooting ranges,

    (ii) the activities that may be carried on at
    shooting clubs and shooting ranges,

    (iii) the possession and use of firearms at
    shooting clubs and shooting ranges, and

    (iv) the keeping and destruction of records
    in relation to shooting clubs and shooting
    ranges and members of those clubs and ranges;

  (f) regulating the establishment and
  maintenance of gun collections and the
  acquisition and disposal or disposition of
  firearms that form part or are to form part
  of a gun collection;

  (g) regulating the operation of gun shows,
  the activities that may be carried on at gun
  shows and the possession and use of firearms
  at gun shows;

  (h) regulating the storage, handling,
  transportation, shipping, display,
  advertising and mail-order sale of firearms
  and restricted weapons and defining the
  expression "mail-order sale" for the purposes
  of this Act;

  (i) regulating the storage, handling,
  transportation, shipping, possession for a
  prescribed purpose, transfer, exportation or
  importation of

    (i) prohibited firearms, prohibited weapons,
    restricted weapons, prohibited devices and
    prohibited ammunition, or

    (ii) components or parts of prohibited
    firearms, prohibited weapons, restricted
    weapons, prohibited devices and prohibited
    ammunition;

  (j) regulating the possession and use of
  restricted weapons;

  (k) for authorizing

    (i) the possession at any place,

    (ii) the manufacture or transfer, whether or
    not for consideration, or offer to
    manufacture or transfer, whether or not for
    consideration, or

    (iii) the importation or exportation
    of firearms, prohibited weapons, restricted
    weapons, prohibited devices, ammunition,
    prohibited ammunition and components and
    parts designed exclusively for use in the
    manufacture of or assembly into automatic
    firearms;

  (m) regulating the keeping and destruction of
  records in relation to firearms, prohibited
  weapons, restricted weapons, prohibited
  devices and prohibited ammunition;

  (n) regulating the keeping and destruction of
  records by businesses in relation to
  ammunition;

  (o) creating offences consisting of
  contraventions of the regulations made under
  paragraph (d), (e), (f), (g), (i), (j), (l),
  (m) or (n);

  (p) prescribing the fees that are to be paid
  to Her Majesty in right of Canada for
  licences, registration certificates,
  authorizations, approvals of transfers and
  importations of firearms and confirmations by
  customs officers of documents under this Act;

  (q) waiving or reducing the fees payable
  under paragraph (p) in such circumstances as
  may be specified in the regulations;

  (r) prescribing the charges that are to be
  paid to Her Majesty in right of Canada in
  respect of costs incurred by Her Majesty in
  right of Canada in storing goods that are
  detained by customs officers or in disposing
  of goods;

  (s) respecting the operation of the Canadian
  Firearms Registry;

  (t) regulating the sending or issuance of
  notices and documents in electronic or other
  form, including

    (i) the notices and documents that may be
    sent or issued in electronic or other form,

    (ii) the persons or classes of persons by
    whom they may be sent or issued,

    (iii) their signature in electronic or other
    form or their execution, adoption or
    authorization in a manner that pursuant to
    the regulations is to have the same effect
    for the purposes of this Act as their
    signature, and

    (iv) the time and date when they are deemed
    to be received;

  (u) respecting the manner in which any
  provision of this Act or the regulations
  applies to any of the aboriginal peoples of
  Canada, and adapting any such provision for
  the purposes of that application;

  ...

  (w) prescribing anything that by any
  provision of this Act is to be prescribed by
  regulation.

  118. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the
federal Minister shall have each proposed
regulation laid before each House of
Parliament.

  (2) Where a proposed regulation is laid
pursuant to subsection (1), it shall be laid
before each House of Parliament on the same
day.

  (3) Each proposed regulation that is
laid before a House of Parliament shall, on
the day it is laid, be referred by that House
to an appropriate committee of that House, as
determined by the rules of that House, and
the committee may conduct inquiries or public
hearings with respect to the proposed
regulation and report its findings to that
House.

  (4) A proposed regulation that has been
laid pursuant to subsection (1) may be made

  (a) on the expiration of thirty sitting days
  after it was laid; or

  (b) where, with respect to each House of
  Parliament,

     (i) the committee reports to the House, or

     (ii) the committee decides not to conduct
     inquiries or public hearings.

  (5) For the purpose of this section,
"sitting day" means a day on which either
House of Parliament sits.

  119. (1) No proposed regulation that has
been laid pursuant to section 118 need again
be laid under that section, whether or not it
has been altered.

  (2) A regulation made under section 117
may be made without being laid before either
House of Parliament if the federal Minister
is of the opinion that the changes made by
the regulation to an existing regulation are
so immaterial or insubstantial that section
118 should not be applicable in the
circumstances.

  (3) A regulation made under paragraph
117(i), (l), (m), (n), (o), (q), (s) or (t)
may be made without being laid before either
House of Parliament if the federal Minister
is of the opinion that the making of the
regulation is so urgent that section 118
should not be applicable in the
circumstances.

  (4) Where the federal Minister forms the
opinion described in subsection (2) or (3),
he or she shall have a statement of the
reasons why he or she formed that opinion
laid before each House of Parliament.

  (5) A regulation may be made under
paragraph 117(w) prescribing a date for the
purposes of the application of any provision
of this Act without being laid before either
House of Parliament.

  (6) For greater certainty, a regulation
may be made under Part III of the Criminal
Code without being laid before either House
of Parliament.

Excerpt from revised Criminal Code, Part III:

     117.15 (1) Subject to subsection (2),
the Governor in Council may make regulations
prescribing anything that by this Part is to
be or may be prescribed.

     (2) In making regulations, the Governor
in Council may not prescribe any thing to be
a prohibited firearm, a restricted firearm, a
prohibited weapon, a restricted weapon, a
prohibited device or prohibited ammunition
if, in the opinion of the Governor in
Council, the thing to be prescribed is
reasonable for use in Canada for hunting or
sporting purposes.

New search and seizure powers for "inspectors"
==============================================

Typically, police need 1.) either a warrant or permission from the lawful
occupant to search a place and 2.) "reasonable and probable grounds" to
believe an offence has been committed.  3.) Normally, police carry out
searches.

Condition 1 changes under Bill C-68 because police won't need a search
warrant when the place is not a "dwelling house" and they will be able to
get a warrant to search your house if they believe "on reasonable grounds"
(but not "probable grounds") that:  there are more than 10 firearms of any
kind present, there is a business being carried on (or a record of such is
present), or there is a "gun collection", a record of a "gun collection"**,
or a prohibited firearm present at the place.

**"gun collection" is not defined in C-68.  It will likely be defined later,
by Order in Council, under Section 117 (f).

Condition 2:  Bill C-68 uses the phrase "reasonable grounds" instead of the
traditional "reasonable and probable grounds".

Condition 3:  Anyone deemed by "the provincial minister" to be an
"inspector" may act in this new capacity.

Under Bill C-68, any place that is not a "dwelling house" will be subject to
a search, and seizures of any computer data and/or records.  Registration
would obviously give inspectors grounds to search or obtain a warrant to
search a place where there are more than 10 registered, legal firearms, or
where there is a "gun collection" or a business being carried on, or only a
_record_ of a business or a "gun collection".

Under Canadian law, a criminal offence is usually an action against another
person, usually requiring criminal intent or "mens rea" (pronounced mens
ray-uh, meaning "guilty mind").  Under Bill C-68, possession of a
registered, licenced and, therefore, completely legal "gun collection" is
grounds for a search.  Possession of a record related to a legal "gun
collection" is grounds for a search.  Possession of more than 10 legal
firearms is grounds for a search.  No crime needs to be committed.

As you read the following excerpt from Bill C-68, please be sure to
note these things:

1. a "reasonable" but not "probable" belief of the presence of:
 - a business being carried on 
 - a record of a business being carried on
 - a "gun collection"
 - a record of a "gun collection"
 - more than 10 firearms of any kind
 - a prohibited firearm
would be grounds for a search.

2. inspectors may copy any records found at the place as well as any data
on, or accessible to, any computer at the place

3. inspectors may take samples of any thing they find at the place

4. you could go to prison for two years if you do _not_ assist the inspector
in their search

Excerpt from Bill C-68:

  101. In sections 102 to 105, "inspector"
means a firearms officer and includes, in
respect of a province, a member of a class of
individuals designated by the provincial
minister.

  102. (1) Subject to section 104, for the
purpose of ensuring compliance with this Act
and the regulations, an inspector may at any
reasonable time enter and inspect any place
where the inspector believes on reasonable
grounds a business is being carried on or
there is a record of a business, any place in
which the inspector believes on reasonable
grounds there is a gun collection or a record
in relation to a gun collection or any place
in which the inspector believes on reasonable
grounds there is a prohibited firearm or
there are more than 10 firearms and may

  (a) open any container that the inspector
  believes on reasonable grounds contains a
  firearm or other thing in respect of which
  this Act or the regulations apply;

  (b) examine any firearm and examine any other
  thing that the inspector finds and take
  samples of it;

  (c) conduct any tests or analyses or take any
  measurements; and

  (d) require any person to produce for
  examination or copying any records, books of
  account or other documents that the inspector
  believes on reasonable grounds contain
  information that is relevant to the
  enforcement of this Act or the regulations.

  (2) In carrying out an inspection of a
place under subsection (1), an inspector may

  (a) use or cause to be used any data
  processing system at the place to examine any
  data contained in or available to the system;

  (b) reproduce any record or cause it to be
  reproduced from the data in the form of a
  print-out or other intelligible output and
  remove the print-out or other output for
  examination or copying; and

  (c) use or cause to be used any copying
  equipment at the place to make copies of any
  record, book of account or other document.

  (3) In carrying out an inspection of a
place under subsection (1), an inspector may
not use force.

  (4) An inspector who takes any thing
while carrying out an inspection of a place
under subsection (1) must give to the owner
or occupant of the place at the time that the
thing is taken a receipt for the thing that
describes the thing with reasonable
precision, including, in the case of a
firearm, the serial number if available of
the firearm.

  (5) For greater certainty, in this
section, "business" has the meaning assigned
by subsection 2(1).

   103. The owner or person in charge of a
place that is inspected by an inspector under
section 102 and every person found in the
place shall

  (a) give the inspector all reasonable
  assistance to enable him or her to carry out
  the inspection and exercise any power
  conferred by section 102; and

  (b) provide the inspector with any
  information relevant to the enforcement of
  this Act or the regulations that he or she
  may reasonably require.

  104. (1) An inspector may not enter a
dwelling-house under section 102 except

  (a) on reasonable notice to the owner or
  occupant, except where a business is being
  carried on in the dwelling-house; and

  (b) with the consent of the occupant or under
  a warrant.

  (2) A justice who on ex parte
application is satisfied by information on
oath

  (a) that the conditions for entry described
  in section 102 exist in relation to a
  dwelling house,

  (b) that entry to the dwelling-house is
  necessary for any purpose relating to the
  enforcement of this Act or the regulations,
  and

  (c) that entry to the dwelling-house has been
  refused or that there are reasonable grounds
  for believing that entry will be refused

may issue a warrant authorizing the inspector
named in it to enter that dwelling-house
subject to any conditions that may be
specified in the warrant.

  (3) For greater certainty, an inspector
who is carrying out an inspection of a
dwelling-house may enter and inspect only

  (a) that part of a room of the dwelling-house
  in which the inspector believes on reasonable
  grounds there is a firearm, prohibited
  weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device,
  prohibited ammunition, a record in relation
  to a gun collection or all or part of a
  device or other thing required by a
  regulation made under paragraph 117(h)
  respecting the storage of firearms and
  restricted weapons; and

  (b) in addition, in the case of a dwelling-
  house where the inspector believes on
  reasonable grounds a business is being
  carried on, that part of a room in which the
  inspector believes on reasonable grounds
  there is ammunition or a record of the
  business.

Failure to correctly register _and_ licence will be criminal
============================================================

Under Canadian law, a criminal offence is usually an action against another
person, usually requiring criminal intent or "mens rea" (pronounced mens
ray-uh, meaning "guilty mind").  Under Bill C-17 (passed in 1992) the crime
can be as simple as leaving an unloaded firearm unlocked, or possession of a
magazine that holds more than 5 cartridges (similar to possession of a
controlled substance under the Narcotics Act).  There are also procedural
and regulatory offences that can get you time in prison and a criminal
record (not just a fine).  Bill C-68 makes a bad situation worse by
expanding on this principle and creating more offences that are punishable
by imprisonment.

Contrary to some media reports, failure to register a firearm (even
inadvertently) was _not_ de-criminalised.  It will be a "dual procedure"
offence (where the crown may indict or go for a summary conviction), and it
remains criminal, not regulatory.  The first, non-deliberate failure to
register is supposed to be a summary offence (instead of an indictable
offence), but it is still criminal.

The onus is on the accused (you) to prove that firearms are legally
registered.  You will be fingerprinted and photographed.  If you are found
guilty of possessing an unregistered firearm, you can be summarily
convicted, fined and/or indicted and imprisoned for up to ten years.  You
will have a criminal record.  You will also be subject to a mandatory
10-year prohibition against owning any firearms.  You will have just 14 days
to appeal before your firearms are forfeited to the government.  If the
Crown goes for a summary conviction instead of indictment, you will be able
to apply for the destruction of the prints and pictures.

Excerpts from Bill C-68:

  112. (1) Subject to subsections (2) and
(3), every person commits an offence who, not
having previously committed an offence under
this subsection or subsection 91(1) or 92(1)
of the Criminal Code, possesses a firearm
that is neither a prohibited firearm nor a
restricted firearm without being the holder
of a registration certificate for the
firearm.
 
  (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to
 
  (a) a person who possesses a firearm while
  the person is under the direct and immediate
  supervision of a person who may lawfully
  possess it, for the purpose of using it in a
  manner in which the supervising person may
  lawfully use it;
 
  ...
 
  (3) Every person who, at any particular
  time between the commencement day and the
  later of January 1, 1998 and such other date
  as is prescribed, possesses a firearm that,
  as of that particular time, is neither a
  prohibited firearm nor a restricted firearm
  is deemed for the purposes of subsection (1)
  to be, until January 1, 2003 or such other
  earlier date as is prescribed, the holder of
  a registration certificate for the firearm.
 
  (4) Where, in any proceedings for an
  offence under this section, any question
  arises as to whether a person is the holder
  of a registration certificate, the onus is on
  the defendant to prove that the person is the
  holder of the registration certificate.
 
  ...
 
  115. Every person who commits an offence
under section 112, 113 or 114 is guilty of an
offence punishable on summary conviction.
 
  116. Any proceedings in respect of an
offence under this Act may be commenced at
the instance of the Government of Canada and
conducted by or on behalf of that government.

The history of Bill C-68 (now Chapter 39)
=========================================

Most of Bill C-68 (now "Chapter 39 of the Annual Statutes of Canada, 1995"
or "S.C. 1995, c. 39") is not yet law.  The licence sections have been
pushed back to 01 Jan 1997 and "universal" registration of won't start until
01 Jan 1999.  The deadline for registration of non-restricted firearms (i.e.
long arms) is 01 Jan 2003.

Two small portions of Bill C-68 (Chapter 39) -- increasing minimum sentences
for the use of a firearm during the commission of one or more of ten crimes
from 1 or 3 years to 4 -- were proclaimed on 01 January 1996.  IF YOU FIND
AN EXAMPLE OF THE NEW 4 YEAR MINIMUM SENTENCES NOT BEING APPLIED, PLEASE FAX
THE CLIPPING TO JACK RAMSAY, REFORM JUSTICE CRITIC, AT (613) 947-4611.

The PC Senators could have killed C-68, but did not.  There were three
Senate votes on C-68 on 22 November 1995.  The second vote, to pass the bill
with a package of amendments, was very close: 47 for, 53 against (4 didn't
vote).  C-68 was then passed on the third vote, without any amendments 64
for, 28 against.  Eleven abstained or didn't vote.  (There were 104 senators
at the time of the vote, but the speaker doesn't vote unless there is a
tie.)

If the 18 Conservative senators who voted for the final bill had voted
against it, the vote would have been 46 to 46.  If the 4 Tories who
abstained had also voted against the bill, the vote would have been 50-46
against and C-68 would have been sent back to the Commons and may have
"died" there.

Instead, Bill C-68 received Royal Assent on 05 December 1995.  

NB:  The excerpts from Bill C-68 are all from the June 1995 version.  Minor
changes were made before it was passed by the Senate.  I will update the
excerpts soon.  The latest version of C-68 is available from the
Cdn-firearms Home Page and from the Department of Justice web site
(URLs listed below).

For more information...
=======================

You can find a few reasons to oppose Bill C-68 at:
http://teapot.usask.ca/cdn-firearms/Faq/ctg.html#C68
http://www.sscl.uwo.ca/~eric/cfa/Faq/ctg.html#C68
http://www.mae.carleton.ca/~ijeff/guns/cdn-firearms/Faq/ctg.html#C68

Chapter 39, 1995 (Bill C-68) is available from:
http://canada.justice.gc.ca/folio.pgi/ebills.nfo/query=*/doc/{4892,0,0,0}/hit_headings?
http://teapot.usask.ca/cdn-firearms/Gov/c68.html
http://www.sscl.uwo.ca/~eric/cfa/Gov/c68.html
http://www.mae.carleton.ca/~ijeff/guns/cdn-firearms/Gov/c68.html
http://www.interlog.com/~alton/c68.html
ftp://ftp.usask.ca/pub/cdn-firearms/Gov/c68

or ask your Member of Parliament to send you a copy of
"Chapter 39 of the Statutes of Canada, 1995".

The current regulations are available from:
http://canada.justice.gc.ca/folio.pgi/eregs.nfo/query=*/doc/{59757,0,0,0}/hit_headings?

The Cdn-Firearms Home Page can be found at the following URLs:
http://teapot.usask.ca/cdn-firearms/homepage.html
http://www.sscl.uwo.ca/~eric/cfa/homepage.html
http://www.mae.carleton.ca/~ijeff/guns/cdn-firearms/homepage.html

================================== END ==================================

This article is available from:
http://teapot.usask.ca/cdn-firearms/Faq/c68.txt
http://www.sscl.uwo.ca/~eric/cfa/Faq/c68.txt
http://www.mae.carleton.ca/~ijeff/guns/cdn-firearms/Faq/c68.txt
ftp://ftp.usask.ca/pub/cdn-firearms/Faq/c68.txt

         Changes or additions to this posting should be sent to:
                        [email-masked]

--
[email-masked]  <--------------------->  Saskatoon Free-Net
My opinions may be unlike others.  No one else's opinions are implied.
                  The Cdn-Firearms Home Page is now at:
            http://teapot.usask.ca/cdn-firearms/homepage.html

From elastic!lethe!geac!onramp.ca!news2.insinc.net!news.insinc.net!news.bc.net!arclight.uoregon.edu!news.sprintlink.net!news-stk-200.sprintlink.net!news.mindspring.com!www.nntp.primenet.com!nntp.primenet.com!howland.erols.net!newsfeed.internetmci.com!in3.uu.net!news1.gte.net!usenet Wed Sep 11 22:36:46 1996
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From: [email-masked] (James Gluckin, MD)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.libertarian,alt.politics.libertarian,alt.politics.usa.constitution,alt.censorship,alt.journalism,alt.society.civil-liberty,misc.legal,soc.rights.human,rec.pyrotechnics,rec.martial-arts
Subject: Re: Canada has no guarantees of freedom
Date: Wed, 04 Sep 1996 10:28:24 GMT
Organization: Eye Care For You
Lines: 91
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References: <[email-masked]> <[email-masked]> <[email-masked]> <[email-masked]> <[email-masked]> <[email-masked]> <01bb8510$54f601c0$48721fcc@IanGrey> <[email-masked]> < <[email-masked]> <[email-masked]> <[email-masked]>  <[email-masked]> <[email-masked]> <[email-masked]>
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On Tue, 3 Sep 1996 16:31:54 GMT, Bonedaddy <[email-masked]>
wrote:

>A recent study done by myself revealed that mere possesion of an umbrella 
>prevents elephants from falling upon my head approximately 2.5 million 
>times a year.  Furthur studies indicated that it does not necessarily 
>have to be open to do so.   Your statistic is wonderful, but you cannot 
>discount the (much)larger figure of crimes committed using handguns, 
>rifles, etc.  I agree with you that the handgun could be a useful tool 
>but it should be in the possesion of a law enforcement official only.  
>
>

Entirely specious agrement and completely invalid. You have NO data -
NO sample - NO hypothesis - and NO valid conclusion. 
To illustrate your faulty reasoning, In the last hour I have not been
approached by any intelligent alien species -- therefore there are non
anywhere in the galaxy!!

>point CLOSER MONITORING, to prevent crazy people, etc. from buying 
>weapons of this nature.  Of course this may take a little while...say 
>maybe a WEEK!!!

You can NOT run any enterprise by always designing your parameters to
accommodate EVERYONE. Less than 1% of the population can not legally
buy a handgun

You can't teach effectively when you limit the academic mil eau to the
lower 1% of the class... 

You can't write effectively when you write on the level of the lower
1%.

You can't do anything effectively when you limit yourself to the lower
1% of any population...

>
>
>If guns were restricted to law officials there wouldn't be any 
>possibility of buying one off the street.  

WRONG -- with 65 million guns already in the hands of the general
population [thank God!] you are blowing hot air!!

>restricted the only way of obtaining them would be breaking into an 
>armoury of some kind.  

Drugs are restricted and you see how much comes in the country EVERY
HOUR of EVERY DAY!!!

>Yeah, yeah, yeah...guns don't kill people, people kll people (how 
>very droll)...blah, blah, blah.  You've got to admit though that the chances of a knife
>wound being fatal are a lot less than a gunshot wound to the body cavity.

No -- no again true. 
In fact on a wound for wound basis they are about equal. Most pistol
shots are misses or non lethal. The NYPD is proud of their 18% HIT
rate. Of course that means they MISS 82% of the time!!!

>In case you haven't noticed, the penal system doesn't work.

Wrong again, it works when it is implemented. The problem is that
Judges don't put people into it for the length of time commensurate
with their conviction. There is no deterrence when you are not going
to remain in jail for any length of time.

>This is why capital punishment doesn't have any effect because 
>no-one expects to be caught anyway.

You almost have it right here for once... No one expects to serve
his/her full term -- that is where deference is promoted.

>enacted and restrictions fixed to prevent some gun toting maniac from 
>even getting his hands on one in the first place...

Wrong again. You can NEVER depend on laws to do what family and
upbringing should impart to the citizen during his/her formative years

Michael, You arguments are just that emotional arguments -- more
reasoning and more facts would help you a lot...

Jim

James Gluckin, M.D.
******
I believe in outcome based education. 
When I was in school they called it repeating the year...
******
PGP 2.6.2 public key fingerprint = B1 99 92 DB 43 B3 90 2C  1B F5 78 40 67 19 A0 1A 
******

From elastic!lethe!gts!geac!herboid!whome!infoshare!n2ott.istar!ott.istar!istar.net!tor.istar!east.istar!news1.istar.ca!news Wed Jan  1 12:26:39 1997
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From: [email-masked]
Newsgroups: can.talk.guns,can.general,ont.general
Subject: Ont. Solicitor General Speaks on C68
Date: 31 Dec 1996 10:54:18 GMT
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CC: [email-masked]

FOR THE RECORD, the following is a verbatim written response by Ontario 
Solicitor General in answer to a letter passed on to me by a voter for 
distribution.  In NO UNCERTAIN TERMS, it describes succinctly why the 
Ontario government opposes the implementation of Bill C-68's mandatory 
registration system.

If you are a Ontario voter and a gun owner, your voice has been heard by 
the Ontario government.  Let's all give the the Ontario govt all the 
support they need to DELIVER EXACTLY AS THEY PROMISED IN THEIR ELECTION 
PROMISES.

As for all gun owners in Canada, take a bow!  Although not every one of 
us picked up a phone, wrote a letter, picketed a Rock speech, or marched 
on the Hill on that momentous day in 1995, enough of us have made a 
difference in getting the provinces/territories to take this 
unprecedented step (which certainly was not expected by the federal 
Liberal government).  And, now if any of you read this and haven't yet 
decided to take an ACTIVE ROLE to defeat the Liberal govt in the next 
federal election, PLEASE LISTEN! It is time for YOU TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE 
- if we all unite and work to make a political statement that says that 
WE AS A PEOPLE WILL NOT ACCEPT THE LIBERAL PARTY SOCIAL ENGINEERING, THE 
CONFISCATION OF LEGITIMATELY OWNED PROPERTY, AS WELL AS EFFORTS TO KILL 
THE RECREATIONAL FIREARMS COMMUNITY.  The only way politicians will take 
us seriously at any time in the future, as Dave Tomlinson said so many 
times, WE MUST SHOW THAT WE AS A UNITED BLOCK CAN MEAN TO A POLITICIAN 
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BEING ELECTED OR "BEING A STRONG SECOND - WHICH IS 
THE SAME AS LOSING." Until politicians understand that we are voters, 
they will continue to implement "feel good" gun confiscation policies to 
try to assure the public they are doing something to deal with violent 
crime.  Because no matter how many guns are confiscated from legitimate 
owners, there will continue to be murders whether with knives, poison, 
strangling, beating and guns.  But, the Coalition of Gun Control WILL NOT 
STOP until civilian ownership of guns is eliminated by the Canadian 
government.  In Britain and Australia with their mandatory registration 
schemes, we have seen how these schemes were not complete in listing gun 
owners, and how INEFFECTIVE they were in preventing crime.  Nevertheless, 
the schemes made it easier for both the British and Australian this year 
to initiate gun banning and confiscation programmes - probably in an 
effort to follow the lead of our own Canadian government when Rock 
introduced C68 in 1995. And all those law-abiding gun owners in Britain 
and Australia who "followed the law and registered their guns", were 
compelled by the law to, sonner or later, surrender their property - 
exactly what C68 has done to Canadians.

Remember, the Liberals and especially Rock, have always said they were 
not interested in criminals with guns - as criminals will not follow 
regulations anyway (i.e. if A robs banks for a living, or sells drugs, 
and worries about being attacked or robbed by a rival gangster, wouldn't 
it make sense for A to do whatever is necessary to "protect" himself 
including carrying a gun - even though being caught carrying a gun might 
precipitate firearms charges - when it might save his life and/or deter 
attack?).  

In a speech to women's groups in western Ontario in October 1995, Rock 
said that the threat is not from criminals with guns on the street, but 
from men who have guns in their houses.  THIS IS THE REAL THRUST OF C68. 
That means every gun owner in Canada is a potential threat to others by 
virtue of their owning a gun. THAT MEANS YOU ARE NOT TRUSTWORTHY FOR THE 
LIBERAL GOVT AND ALLAN ROCK, AND ESPECIALLY FOR THE COALITION FOR GUN 
CONTROL.

This is the Liberal "social engineering" values system they want to 
impose on us through C68 - which MEANS they will not stop until they put 
enough draconian controls in place, and thin out the number of gun owners 
in the future - so as to make them "ineffective" as a social and 
political adversary.  Then they will completely ban civilian firearms 
ownership. In their "perfect Canada without guns" - this will "protect 
innocent women and children who are being massacred by gun toting men - 
but not just any men, but their husbands, brothers and sons."

WAKE UP AND SMELL THE JUSTICE MINISTER!

IF YOU:

- VALUE YOUR OWN DEFINITION OF BEING A CANADIAN;
- DO NOT WISH TO BE A PART OF A SOCIETY THAT PROHIBITS CIVILIAN FIREARMS 
OWNERSHIP;
- WISH TO MAINTAIN THE TRADITIONAL CULTURAL HERITAGE OF FIREARMS OWNING 
CANADIANS;

THEN, DON'T LET THE LIBERALS SOCIALLY-ENGINEER YOU!

SAY NO!

VOTE, AND WORK FOR FEDERAL ELECTION VICTORY OF THE REFORM PARTY IN YOUR 
RIDING!

----------------------Letter by Mr.Runciman-----------------------

Dear ------------:

Thank you for your letter of _________, 1996, in which you expressed 
support for Ontario's position on the federal government's Firearms Act 
(Bill C-68).  I will be glad to share your letter and my response with 
Premier Michael Harris.  

Ontario supports real and effective gun control.  We recognize the need 
to keep firearms out of the hands of violent criminals and that is why we 
fully support those measures of Bill C-68 that are aimed at reducing the 
number of crimes committed with firearms and increasing public safety.

However, it is our view that the imposition of universal firearms 
registration is beyond the constitutional jurisdiction of the federal 
government.  For this reason, Ontario will be joining its 
provincial/territorial partners in challenging the registry provisions of 
Bill C-68 before the Alberta Court of Appeal.  Until this court challenge 
is resolved, Ontario will not participate in the further development of 
the registration program.

As well, at a time when governments are facing financial restraints, 
taxpayers' dollars must be focused on areas where they will have a real 
impact.  We believe that the registration provisions of Bill C-68 before 
the Alberta Court of Appeal.  Until this court challenge is resolved, 
Ontario will not participate in the further development of the 
registration program.

As well, at a time when governments are facing financial restraints, 
taxpayers' dollars must be focused on areas where they will have a real 
impact.  We believe that the registration provisions of Bill C-68 will 
divert police officers from their front-line law enforcement duties and 
will have little impact on crime reduction.  It is not the best use of 
the scarce resources available.  The costs involved in the registry could 
be better spent in real crime prevention and crime fighting activities.

I appreciate your support of this government's direction.

Sincerely,

[signed in blue ink]

Robert W. Runciman, MPP
Leeds-Grenville
Solicitor General and 
Minister of Correctional Services

cc  The Honourable Michael D. Harris, Premier of Ontario