Subject: Re: Campaign and Petition Against Clipper

From: [email-masked] (Dorothy Denning)
Date: Wed, 09 Feb 1994 17:23:28 -0500 (EST)

CPSR has announced a petition campaign to oppose the Clipper initiative.  I
would like to caution people about signing the petition.  The issues are
extremely complex and difficult.  The Clipper initiative is the result of
considerable deliberation by many intelligent people who appreciate and
understand the concerns that have been expressed and who worked hard to
accommodate the conflicting interests.  The decisions that have been made were
not made lightly.

I would like to respond to some of the statements that CPSR has made
about Clipper in their campaign and petition letters:
 
     The Clipper proposal, developed in secret by the National Security
     Agency, is a technical standard that will make it easier for
     government agents to wiretap the emerging data highway.

The standard (FIPS 185) is not a standard for the Internet or any other high
speed computer network.  It is for the telephone system.  Quoting from FIPS
185: "Data for purposes of this standard includes voice, facsimile and
computer information communicated in a telephone system.  A telephone system
for purposes of this standard is limited to a system which is circuit switched
and operating at data rates of standard commercial modems over analog voice
circuits or which uses basic-rate ISDN or a similar grade wireless service."

The standard will not make it any easier to tap phones, let alone
computer networks.  All it will do is make it technically possible to
decrypt communications that are encrypted with the standard, assuming
the communications are not superencrypted with something else.  Law
enforcers still need to get a court order just to intercept the
communications in the first place, and advances in technology have made
interception itself more difficult.  The standard will make it much
harder for anyone to conduct illegal taps, including the government.

The purpose of the standard is to provide a very strong encryption algorithm -
something much stronger than DES - and to do so in a way that does not thwart
law enforcement and national security objectives.  Keys are escrowed so that
if someone uses this technology, they cannot use it against national
interests.

     Industry groups, professional associations and civil liberties
     organizations have expressed almost unanimous opposition to the
     plan since it was first proposed in April 1993.

     "The public does not like Clipper and will not accept it ..."

     The private sector and the public have expressed nearly unanimous
     opposition to Clipper.  

As near as I know, neither CPSR nor any other group has conducted any
systematic poll of industry, professional societies, or the public.  While
many people have voiced opposition, there are many more organizations and
people who have been silent on this issue.  The ACM is in the process of
conducting a study on encryption.  CPSR is a member of the study group, as am
I.  Steve Kent is chair.  Our goal is a report that will articulate the
issues, not a public statement either for or against.  The International
Association for Cryptologic Research has not to my knowledge made any official
statement about Clipper.

     The Administration ignored the overwhelming opposition of the
     general public. When the Commerce Department solicited public
     comments on the proposal last fall, hundreds of people opposed the
     plan while only a few expressed support.

Hundreds of people is hardly overwhelming in a population of 250 million,
especially when most of the letters were the same and came in through the net
following a sample letter that was sent out.
	
     The technical standard is subject to misuse and compromise. It
     would provide government agents with copies of the keys that
     protect electronic communications. "It is a nightmare for computer
     security."

I have been one of the reviewers of the standard.  We have completed our
review of the encryption algorithm, SKIPJACK, and concluded it was very
strong.  While we have not completed our review of the key escrow system, from
what I have seen so far, I anticipate that it will provide an extremely high
level of security for the escrowed keys.

     The underlying technology was developed in secret by the NSA, an
     intelligence agency responsible for electronic eavesdropping, not
     privacy protection. Congressional investigations in the 1970s
     disclosed widespread NSA abuses, including the illegal
     interception of millions of cables sent by American citizens.

NSA is also responsible for the development of cryptographic codes to protect
the nation's most sensitive classified information.  They have an excellent
track record in conducting this mission.  I do not believe that our
requirements for protecting private information are greater than those for
protecting classified information.  I do not know the facts of the 1970s
incident that is referred to here, but it sounds like it occurred before
passage of the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.  This act requires
intelligence agencies to get a court order in order to intercept
communications of American citizens.  I am not aware of any recent evidence
that the NSA is engaging in illegal intercepts of Americans.

     Computer security experts question the integrity of the
     technology.  Clipper was developed in secret and its
     specifications are classified.

The 5 of us who reviewed the algorithm unanimously agreed that it was very
strong.  We will publish a final report when we complete or full evaluation.
Nothing can be concluded from a statement questioning the technology by
someone who has not seen it regardless of whether that person is an expert in
security.

     NSA overstepped its legal authority in developing the standard.  A
     1987 law explicitly limits the intelligence agency's power to set
     standards for the nation's communications network.

The 1987 Computer Security Act states that NIST "shall draw on the technical
advice and assistance (including work products) of the National Security
Agency."

     There is no evidence to support law enforcement's claims that new
     technologies are hampering criminal investigations. CPSR recently
     forced the release of FBI documents that show no such problems.

CPSR obtained some documents from a few FBI field offices.  Those offices
reported no problems.  CPSR did not get reports from all field offices and did
not get reports from local law enforcement agencies.  I can tell you that it
is a fact that new communications technologies, including encryption, have
hampered criminal investigations.  I personally commend law enforcement for
trying to get out in front of this problem.

     If the plan goes forward, commercial firms that hope to develop
     new products will face extensive government obstacles.
     Cryptographers who wish to develop new privacy enhancing
     technologies will be discouraged. 

The standard is voluntary -- even for the government.

     Mr. Rotenberg said "We want the public to understand the full
     implications of this plan.  Today it is only a few experts and
     industry groups that understand the proposal. 

I support this objective.  Unfortunately, it is not possible for most of us to
be fully informed of the national security implications of uncontrolled
encryption.  For very legitimate reasons, these cannot be fully discussed and
debated in a public forum.  It is even difficult to talk about the full
implications of encryption on law enforcement.  This is why it is important
that the President and Vice-President be fully informed on all the issues, and
for the decisions to be made at that level.  The Feb. 4 decision was made
following an inter-agency policy review, headed by the National Security
Council, that examined these issues using considerable input from industry,
CPSR, EFF, and individuals as well as from law enforcement and intelligence
agencies.  In the absence of understanding the national security issues, I
believe we need to exercise some caution in believing that we can understand
the full implications of encryption on society.

As part of the Feb. 4 announcement, the Administration announced the
establishment of an Interagency Working Group on Encryption and
Telecommunications, chaired by the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy and National Security Council, with representatives from
Commerce, Justice, State, Treasury, FBI, NSA, OMB, and the National Economic
Council.  The group is to work with industry and public interest groups to
develop new encryption technologies and to review and refine encryption
policy.  The NRC's Computer Science and Telecommunications Board will also be
conducting a study of encryption policy.

These comments may be distributed.

Dorothy Denning, Georgetown University

---

From: [email-masked] (George T. "14K F/D" Talbot)
Date: Wed, 9 Feb 94 22:16:51 EST

I would like to comment upon a few points raised by Dr. Denning:

>The decisions that have been made were not made lightly.

While I appreciate the sentiments expressed by Dr. Denning here, I'm
sure that those who oppose the Clipper initiative are also intelligent and
have also worked very hard to make their concerns known.  I have studied this
issue actively and I assure you that I did not sign the petition "lightly".

>speed computer network.

While the Clipper initiative only covers the phone system, the entire proposal
(Clipper and Capstone and the key escrow system) will touch the high-speed
networks and should be taken as a whole.

>...assuming
>communications in the first place...

There are two points to address here.  First, it is currently very difficult
to produce and export cryptographic software of any significant strength due
to export controls.  A private entity which has the resources to produce a
strong cryptographic solution will have to invest a great deal to produce such
software.  The current export controls would make it impossible for such an
entity to compete on the world market, thus limiting profit, possibly to the
point of non-profitability.  This makes superencryption pretty unlikely, and
this is one of the purposes of the current export controls on encryption.
Also at issue is whether the government will outlaw non-Clipper/Capstone/Key
Escrow encryption entirely.

Second, law enforcement needs to get a court order to intercept phone
communications.  I know of no such need to get a court order to intercept
communications on a high speed network w.r.t. Capstone.  The current
administration proposal does not require a court order to get the escrowed
keys themselves.

>following a sample letter that was sent out.

Currently the community which is informed on this issue is rather small.  It
is unclear whether that population of 250 million would support the initiative
if they were fully informed.  Assuming the people which responded to the
Commerce Department solicitation is representative of the public at large,
it is clear that this is not a popular initiative outside of government/
law enforcement/national security circles.

>level of security for the escrowed keys.

I'm sure that the committee which reviewed the algorithm made as accurate
an assessment of the algorithm they could in the limited time they were given.
What the NSA refuses to answer on this point is whether it, or the rest of the
national security community will use the escrow system.  If the [national
security] community does not sign up [for the key escrow system], then the
escrow system will be effectively compromised.

>...I am not aware of any recent evidence
>that the NSA is engaging in illegal intercepts of Americans...

From what I understand, the Act was passed in response to the incident in the
1970s.  Just because one doesn't have evidence doesn't mean that abuses don't
exist, and one can't make basic policy decisions based upon that.  When
considering important policy like this, one has to actively consider the risks
of abuse.

>...

From what current reports show, NSA pushed the proposal through NIST, and it
was NSA, not NIST, which was the true author and sponsor of the initiative.
They were operating on a "gray area" where because they were the only source
for the standard considered, they effectively set the standard without
explicitly violating the law.

>...  I can tell you that it

Dr. Denning, would you, as a service to RISKS readers, disclose your evidence
of how encryption has hampered criminal investigations?  And how often?  And
what kind of investigations were hampered?

>...  In the absence of understanding the national security issues, I

I disagree and Dr. Denning contradicts herself.  If the decision is made at
those levels, the public will not be informed.  This policy is too important
to relegate to a back room.

George T. Talbot

---

From: [email-masked] (Geoff Kuenning)
Date: Thu, 10 Feb 94 13:48:28 -0800

In RISKS-15.48, Dorothy Denning combines some good points with some very
paternalistic and unsupportable claims.  I will primarily address the latter.

>... The Clipper initiative is the result of

In other words, despite the fact that many intelligent and well-informed
people *oppose* Clipper, "we know best, so stop complaining."  The fact that
the decision was made by well-intentioned people does not make it correct.

>speed computer network.  It is for the telephone system.

In the first place, many people access the Internet via various forms of
telephone lines.  If they are encrypted, it will be easier to tap them if they
use Clipper.  In the second place, the Administration has been quite up-front
about its desire to force key-escrow encryption into nearly every encryption
application.  So while Ms. Denning is technically correct in her narrow
reading of the document, CPSR is equally correct in raising an alarm about the
larger issue of high-speed networks.

>systematic poll ...

Ah, the old "silent majority" argument.  I thought that went out when Nixon
resigned.

The truth is that, among the tiny fraction of the public which has expressed
an opinion, there *has* been overwhelming public opposition.  Very few people
have written the Government to say, "my, what a wonderful idea!"

Organizations like TV networks have a multiplier rule they apply to letters,
where they figure that every letter received represents N people who felt the
same way, but didn't take the time to write.  To suggest that only one's
opposition took the time to write, and that everyone else is in agreement, is
at best disingenuous and at worst intellectually dishonest.

> The ACM is in the process of
>issues, not a public statement either for or against.

In other words, having attempted to discredit what little data we *do* have,
Ms. Denning is stating that there are no plans to conduct a scientific study
of public opinion.  Perhaps the ACM or the CPSR should fund Roper or Gallup to
investigate a few questions, approved by both Ms. Denning and a CPSR
representative as being unbiased?

> The International Association for Cryptologic Research has not to my
> knowledge made any official statement about Clipper.

I don't see what relevance this has to anything.  One organization of
cryptologists has remained silent.  So what?

> following a sample letter that was sent out.

The first part of this statement is patently false; the same argument
could be applied to any Harris poll.  The second part, about "form
letter" distortions in public issues, is relevant and important.  All
the more reason to do a more scientific survey.

> ...  I do not know the facts of the 1970s
> communications of American citizens.

The 1978 act was passed in response to the abuses of the early 70's.  It
should not have been necessary, since the NSA was prohibited from domestic
spying even before that, but the NSA figured that since the cables involved
were international communications, it was OK to eavesdrop on them.  This is a
rather classic case illustrating the way the NSA used the loosest possible
interpretation of restrictions, rather than actively trying to respect the
privacy of law-abiding citizens.

> I am not aware of any recent evidence

Once burned, twice cautious.  Ms. Denning, think of the egg you'll have on
your face if the NSA gets caught misbehaving a few years from now.
Personally, I don't see why I should trust any person or agency that is so
secretive.

> advice and assistance (including work products) of the National Security

The question is of who was in control.  There is a world of difference between
drawing on "advice and assistance," and stepping out of the picture to let
someone else do the job.  I believe that the latter is what CPSR is worried
about.

> hampered criminal investigations.

Without data or references, how are we to believe this?  CPSR carried out, at
great difficulty, some preliminary research.  There is no indication that they
selected that data, and I hope that Ms. Denning is not suggesting this.
Again, we have an attempt to invoke the "silent majority" argument to claim
that the sampled data is invalid.  Only this time Ms. Denning doesn't even
offer anything to back up her counterclaim.

In the first place, let's have some facts here.  What criminal
investigations have been hampered by new technologies?  How many?

In the second place, a pervasive thread in Ms. Denning's thinking seems to be
that there is no room for a tradeoff between law enforcement and freedom.  Let
me point out that crime would drop tremendously if the police were allowed to
search anyone's home at random, without warning, and to confiscate anything
they chose.  But I don't think I'd want to live in such a society.  Similarly,
I'm perfectly willing to let a few criminal investigations be "hampered" or
even fail, if it means I can use strong encryption without fear of
eavesdropping or prosecution.

> The standard is voluntary -- even for the government.

That's not what I remember.  I seem to recall that the original announcement
said that the standard would be applicable to all government agencies.  Is
there a citation to support the claim that it's voluntary within the
government?

As to outside the government, yes, it's voluntary.  For now.  But there are
already major pressures being applied to make sure that this "voluntary"
standard is the only practical choice.  For example, Clipper will be much
easier to export than RSA, Idea, or even the venerable Enigma.  Government
dollars are being used to make sure that the Clipper chip is available and
cheap, undercutting the possibility of fair free-market competition.  And
hints have been dropped that any future encryption made available to the
public will also require a key escrow scheme.

	Geoff Kuenning	[email-masked]	[email-masked]

A huge vote of thanks to all the police, fire, medical, water, power, and gas
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