Subject: Re: Denning's thoughts on the Clipper Chip

From: Fredrick B. Cohen <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 10 Feb 94 06:11:05 PST

>The standard (FIPS 185) is not a standard for the Internet or any other high
>speed computer network. ...

The language sounds to me like it covers ISDN which is rapidly becoming the
standard for non-local networking, all switched circuits, which will soon
include most cable systems, and standard commercial modems carry the vast
majority of all current computer communications.  What do you think the
superhighway is going to be made of?  We have AT+T trying for the twisted pair
as the standard, and the cable companies going for a cable version, and some
chasing optical, but it is all circuit switched at one point or another.

> ...  The standard will make it much
>harder for anyone to conduct illegal taps, including the government.

For someone who lived through Watergate and Irangate and all the other
gates, I am amazed that you can still take this position.  It only means
that the class of people who will be able to get the information will be
restricted to the richer and more powerful.  Anyone familiar with the
telephone system today knows that to tap a line requires only that the FBI
tell the telephone company the phone number.  The rest happens in a matter
of seconds.  With clipper, it will be the same way.

> ...  Keys are escrowed so that if someone uses this technology, they cannot
> use it against national interests.

How much do these escrow agents get paid, and how well are their families
protected?  How many guards watch them continuously? Who are we kidding?
US Nuclear codes were leaked to the Soviets at the height of the cold war.
Do you really think that we will protect these escrow agents any better?

>As near as I know, neither CPSR nor any other group has conducted any
>systematic poll ...

I know for a fact that most of the major telecommunications providers are
worried that Clipper will be made the standard.  The reason is that they need
better protection and they have to be able to do more things more flexibly
than Clipper allows.  They also don't want to have to pay the company who
makes clipper a fortune to use a technology they don't want to use.

>Hundreds of people is hardly overwhelming in a population of 250 million ...

Do you claim to believe that the great silent majority is in favor of Clipper?
Actually, hundreds of people who opposed it against only a few who supported
it would tend to indicate that 245 Million oppose it and 5 million are in
favor.  Not that this was a statistically valid sample.  After all, the people
who oppose it are probably more knowledgeable than the general public.

>... concluded it was very strong.  ...

In the light of 5,000 years of cryptographic history where experts claimed
that systems were very strong only to find them broken soon after, I find it
hard to trust the hand picked committee of 5 so-called experts who are given
money and time to pass judgement on a technology that is so weak that they are
afraid to expose it to the light of day.  If it is so strong, why not let the
rest of the world review it? The German experts said the same thing about
Enigma, and lots of US experts said the same thing about <name withheld> for
national security reasons.  The infoscape is littered with failed
cryptosystems and failed experts wo trusted them.

>...  I do not believe that our requirements for protecting private 
>information are greater than those for protecting classified information.  
>...  I am not aware of any recent evidence that the NSA is engaging in 
>illegal intercepts of Americans.

It is hard to believe that such a well known expert is that naive.  It is the
blind belief in government that allows it to get away with so much.  We need
more questioning, not less.  We need affirmative facts that show they are
not doing this before we will believe it.  Just because they haven't been
caught, doesn't mean they are innocent.

>The 5 of us who reviewed the algorithm unanimously agreed that it was very
>strong.  We will publish a final report when we complete or full evaluation.
>Nothing can be concluded from a statement questioning the technology by
>someone who has not seen it regardless of whether that person is an expert in
>security.

I disagree strongly with this assertion.  The mere fact that 5 experts agree
that a technology is strong gives me no confidence whatsoever.  If it is so
strong, what's the big secret? If it's so strong, why does it have to be
protected by a special hardware mechanism? If it is so strong, why not tell
all of us so we can start to develop similar systems of our own? How can you
claim it is so strong when you are afraid to even tell us how it works?
History has shown that secret systems such as these are not strong.  The
evidence I use to condemn is 5,000 years of history.  Your evidence is 5
people in a room saying it's strong.  Which should we give more weight to?

>...  I can tell you that it
>is a fact that new communications technologies, including encryption, have
>hampered criminal investigations.  ...

If technology hampers criminal investigations, why not eliminate cars except
for police.  Then we could catch a lot more criminals.  This is a stupid
argument.  Let's get better police and better tools for them to use, and not
try to weaken the very fabric of our information society instead.

>     Mr. Rotenberg said "We want the public to understand the full
>     implications of this plan.  Today it is only a few experts and
>     industry groups that understand the proposal. 
>
>I support this objective.  Unfortunately, it is not possible for most of us to
>be fully informed of the national security implications of uncontrolled
>encryption.  For very legitimate reasons, these cannot be fully discussed and
>debated in a public forum.  It is even difficult to talk about the full
>implications of encryption on law enforcement.

This is the argument of dictators, not democracies.  If it cannot be opened
to public scrutiny, it does not belong here.  The implications of controlled
encryption are the ones you are afraid of airing.  But I am not.  Controlled
encryption is just another way for those with power to tighten their grip.
What is so frightening to you about encryption that you can't even discuss
it? Is it that people will have privacy from their own government? Is it that
we will be able to assure integrity in communications?  Giving power to the
public is not something to be feared.  It is something to be sought out and
encouraged.

>This is why it is important
>that the President and Vice-President be fully informed on all the issues, and
>for the decisions to be made at that level.  ...
>In the absence of understanding the national security issues, I
>believe we need to exercise some caution in believing that we can understand
>the full implications of encryption on society.

Why is it that you think you understand more about the implications of
cryptography on national security than the rest of us? This elitist crap has
got to end.  It is bad for our country to have elitists who believe they know
more than the rest of us dictating how we will live our lives.  It is bad for
our country that the esteemed members of this forum do not have access to your
rational in order to openly discuss your points of view.  It is bad for our
country that professors at universities tell their students and the public not
to think about the issues, but to trust that the professors know best.  If you
want to serve the national interest, get the debate out in the open!

> ...

In one recent NRC study, the committee rightly pointed out that we need more
open research in this field.  Perhaps Professor Denning would like to follow
the recommendations of that report and open up to us.

	Fred Cohen - independent researcher