Subject: FLASH: Vice President Gore Questions Current Key Escrow Policy!

From: [email-masked] (Stanton McCandlish)
Date: 10 Feb 1994 17:55:25 -0600

National Information Infrastructure Advisory Committee met today in Washington
at the Old Executive Office Building.  In comments made after a question and
answer period, Vice President Al Gore said that key escrow policy announced
last Friday (4 Feb 1994) had serious flaws and that he hope the issue of who
holds the keys and under what terms would be given more serious, careful
consideration.

Gore made it clear that some amount of control of cryptography technology was
necessary for national security.  However, the key escrow policies announced
by the Departments of Justice, Commerce & State, and the NSA, were "low level
decisions" that got out before thorough analysis.  In a conversation with
Mitchell Kapor, Esther Dyson, and Mike Nelson (of the White House Staff), Gore
said that he would prefer that the keys be held by some part of the Judiciary
branch, or perhaps even by trusted, private escrow agents.  He made it clear
that he believed that the escrow agents named in last Friday's announcement
(National Institute of Standards & Technology and the Treasure Department)
were no appropriate key holders.  Mike Nelson also indicated that there was
real interest in a software-based escrow system instead of the hardware-based
SKIPJACK standard

Those of us who heard Gore were quite surprised.  His remarks suggest that the
key escrow policies to date do not have full support of the White House.

Still, Gore was quite firm in asserting that some control of encryption
technology is essential to national security.  "Encryption and codebreaking
have determined the outcome of world wars.  He stated (incorrectly) that
most our industrialized allies place must stricter controls in encryption
that the US does.  In fact, almost all COCOM countries allow the export of
DES-based products, though some do not allow DES to be imported.

The whole question of encryption was raised when Mitchell Kapor told the
Vice President that over half of the Advisory Council members had serious
reservations about the current Clipper/Skipjack policies.  Gore and Kapor
agreed that the Advisory Council should be used to have a serious dialogue
about encryption policy.  Given Gore's departure from the current Clipper
proposals, there might actually be something to talk about.

==========
NOTE: This DOES NOT mean that Clipper is going away.  Part of stopping Clipper
is to lift export controls on encryption and enable US companies to start
producing products that enable all of us to protect our privacy with strong
encryption.

I urge you to write to Rep. Cantwell today at [email-masked]. In the Subject
header of your message, type "I support HR 3627." In the body of your message,
express your reasons for supporting the bill. EFF will deliver printouts of
all letters to Rep. Cantwell. With a strong showing of support from the Net
community, Rep. Cantwell can tell her colleagues on Capitol Hill that
encryption is not only an industry concern, but also a grassroots issue.
*Again: remember to put "I support HR 3627" in your Subject header.*

  [For more info on the Cantwell bill, see Stanton's contribution 
  in RISKS-15.47.  I have deleted a lengthy repetition here.  There is as 
  yet no response from Stanton on Jon Leech's question in RISKS-15.50 on 
  the address [email-masked].  It is presumably NOT Cantwell's.  PGN]

Daniel J. Weitzner, Senior Staff Counsel <[email-masked]>  202-347-5400 (v) 
Stanton McCandlish <[email-masked]>  Electronic Frontier Foundation
1001 G St, NW  Suite 950 East Washington, DC 20001      202-393-5509 (f)