15 May 2004
United States Department of Defense News Release
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040515-0793.html
Media contact: +1 (703) 697-5131
Public contact: +1 (703) 428-0711
No. 458-04
IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 15, 2004
Statement from DoD Spokesperson Mr. Lawrence Di Rita
"Assertions apparently being made in the latest New Yorker
article
on Abu Ghraib and the abuse of Iraqi detainees are outlandish, conspiratorial,
and filled with error and anonymous conjecture. The abuse evidenced in the
videos and photos, and any similar abuse that may come to light in any of
the ongoing half dozen investigations into this matter, has no basis in any
sanctioned program, training manual, instruction, or order in the Department
of Defense. No responsible official of the Department of Defense approved
any program that could conceivably have been intended to result in such abuses
as witnessed in the recent photos and videos. To correct one of the many
errors in fact, Undersecretary Cambone has no responsibility, nor has he
had any responsibility in the past, for detainee or interrogation programs
in Afghanistan, Iraq, or anywhere else in the world. This story seems to
reflect the fevered insights of those with little, if any, connection to
the activities in the Department of Defense."
15 May 2004. One of the Eyeball
series.
Maps from Mapquest.com
Source of aerial photo:
http://seamless.usgs.gov
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040524fa_fact
The New Yorker, May 15, 2004
THE GRAY ZONE
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
How a secret Pentagon program came to Abu Ghraib.
[Excerpt]
The roots of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal lie not in the criminal inclinations
of a few Army reservists but in a decision, approved last year by Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, to expand a highly secret operation, which had
been focussed on the hunt for Al Qaeda, to the interrogation of prisoners
in Iraq. Rumsfeld’s decision embittered the American intelligence community,
damaged the effectiveness of élite combat units, and hurt America’s
prospects in the war on terror.
According to interviews with several past and present American intelligence
officials, the Pentagon’s operation, known inside the intelligence community
by several code words, including Copper Green, encouraged physical coercion
and sexual humiliation of Iraqi prisoners in an effort to generate more
intelligence about the growing insurgency in Iraq. A senior C.I.A. official,
in confirming the details of this account last week, said that the operation
stemmed from Rumsfeld’s long-standing desire to wrest control of
America’s clandestine and paramilitary operations from the C.I.A.
Rumsfeld, during appearances last week before Congress to testify about Abu
Ghraib, was precluded by law from explicitly mentioning highly secret matters
in an unclassified session. But he conveyed the message that he was telling
the public all that he knew about the story. He said, “Any suggestion
that there is not a full, deep awareness of what has happened, and the damage
it has done, I think, would be a misunderstanding.” The senior C.I.A.
official, asked about Rumsfeld’s testimony and that of Stephen Cambone,
his Under-Secretary for Intelligence, said, “Some people think you can
bullshit anyone.” ...
One Pentagon official who was deeply involved in the program was Stephen
Cambone, who was named Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence in March,
2003. The office was new; it was created as part of Rumsfeld’s
reorganization of the Pentagon. Cambone was unpopular among military and
civilian intelligence bureaucrats in the Pentagon, essentially because he
had little experience in running intelligence programs, though in 1998 he
had served as staff director for a committee, headed by Rumsfeld, that warned
of an emerging ballistic-missile threat to the United States. He was known
instead for his closeness to Rumsfeld. “Remember Henry II—‘Who
will rid me of this meddlesome priest?’” the senior C.I.A. official
said to me, with a laugh, last week. “Whatever Rumsfeld whimsically
says, Cambone will do ten times that much.”
Cambone was a strong advocate for war against Iraq. He shared Rumsfeld’s
disdain for the analysis and assessments proffered by the C.I.A., viewing
them as too cautious, and chafed, as did Rumsfeld, at the C.I.A.’s
inability, before the Iraq war, to state conclusively that Saddam Hussein
harbored weapons of mass destruction. Cambone’s military assistant,
Army Lieutenant General William G. (Jerry) Boykin, was also controversial.
Last fall, he generated unwanted headlines after it was reported that, in
a speech at an Oregon church, he equated the Muslim world with Satan.
Early in his tenure, Cambone provoked a bureaucratic battle within the Pentagon
by insisting that he be given control of all special-access programs that
were relevant to the war on terror. Those programs, which had been viewed
by many in the Pentagon as sacrosanct, were monitored by Kenneth deGraffenreid,
who had experience in counter-intelligence programs. Cambone got control,
and deGraffenreid subsequently left the Pentagon. Asked for comment on this
story, a Pentagon spokesman said, “I will not discuss any covert programs;
however, Dr. Cambone did not assume his position as the Under-Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence until March 7, 2003, and had no involvement in the
decision-making process regarding interrogation procedures in Iraq or anywhere
else.”
In mid-2003, the special-access program was regarded in the Pentagon as one
of the success stories of the war on terror. “It was an active
program,” the former intelligence official told me. “It’s
been the most important capability we have for dealing with an imminent threat.
If we discover where Osama bin Laden is, we can get him. And we can remove
an existing threat with a real capability to hit the United States—and
do so without visibility.” Some of its methods were troubling and could
not bear close scrutiny, however.
By then, the war in Iraq had begun. The sap was involved in some assignments
in Iraq, the former official said. C.I.A. and other American Special Forces
operatives secretly teamed up to hunt for Saddam Hussein and—without
success—for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. But they weren’t
able to stop the evolving insurgency.
the American and Coalition forces knew little about the insurgency: “Human
intelligence is poor or lacking . . . due to the dearth of competence and
expertise. . . . The intelligence effort is not coördinated since either
too many groups are involved in gathering intelligence or the final product
does not get to the troops in the field in a timely manner.” The success
of the war was at risk; something had to be done to change the dynamic. ...
The solution, endorsed by Rumsfeld and carried out by Stephen Cambone, was
to get tough with those Iraqis in the Army prison system who were suspected
of being insurgents. A key player was Major General Geoffrey Miller, the
commander of the detention and interrogation center at Guantánamo,
who had been summoned to Baghdad in late August to review prison interrogation
procedures. The internal Army report on the abuse charges, written by Major
General Antonio Taguba in February, revealed that Miller urged that the
commanders in Baghdad change policy and place military intelligence in charge
of the prison. The report quoted Miller as recommending that “detention
operations must act as an enabler for interrogation.”
Miller’s concept, as it emerged in recent Senate hearings, was to
“Gitmoize” the prison system in Iraq—to make it more focussed
on interrogation. He also briefed military commanders in Iraq on the
interrogation methods used in Cuba—methods that could, with special
approval, include sleep deprivation, exposure to extremes of cold and heat,
and placing prisoners in “stress positions” for agonizing lengths
of time. (The Bush Administration had unilaterally declared Al Qaeda and
other captured members of international terrorist networks to be illegal
combatants, and not eligible for the protection of the Geneva Conventions.)
Rumsfeld and Cambone went a step further, however: they expanded the scope
of the sap, bringing its unconventional methods to Abu Ghraib. The commandos
were to operate in Iraq as they had in Afghanistan. The male prisoners could
be treated roughly, and exposed to sexual humiliation.
“They weren’t getting anything substantive from the detainees in
Iraq,” the former intelligence official told me. “No names. Nothing
that they could hang their hat on. Cambone says, I’ve got to crack this
thing and I’m tired of working through the normal chain of command.
I’ve got this apparatus set up—the black special-access
program—and I’m going in hot. So he pulls the switch, and the
electricity begins flowing last summer. And it’s working. We’re
getting a picture of the insurgency in Iraq and the intelligence is flowing
into the white world. We’re getting good stuff. But we’ve got more
targets”—prisoners in Iraqi jails—“than people who can
handle them.”
Cambone then made another crucial decision, the former intelligence official
told me: not only would he bring the sap’s rules into the prisons; he
would bring some of the Army military-intelligence officers working inside
the Iraqi prisons under the sap’sauspices. “So here are fundamentally
good soldiers—military-intelligence guys—being told that no rules
apply,” the former official, who has extensive knowledge of the
special-access programs, added. “And, as far as they’re concerned,
this is a covert operation, and it’s to be kept within Defense Department
channels.”
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/50/2426.html
Sec. 2426. - Congressional oversight of special access programs
(a) Annual report on special access programs
(1) Not later than February 1 of each year, the Administrator shall submit
to the congressional defense committees a report on special access programs
of the Administration.
(2) Each such report shall set forth -
(A) the total amount requested for such programs in the President's budget
for the next fiscal year submitted under section 1105 of title 31; and
(B) for each such program in that budget, the following:
(i) A brief description of the program.
(ii) A brief discussion of the major milestones established for the program.
(iii) The actual cost of the program for each fiscal year during which the
program has been conducted before the fiscal year during which that budget
is submitted.
(iv) The estimated total cost of the program and the estimated cost of the
program for
(I) the current fiscal year,
(II) the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted, and
(III) each of the four succeeding fiscal years during which the program is
expected to be conducted.
(b) Annual report on new special access programs
(1) Not later than February 1 of each year, the Administrator shall submit
to the congressional defense committees a report that, with respect to each
new special access program, provides -
(A) notice of the designation of the program as a special access program;
and
(B) justification for such designation.
(2) A report under paragraph (1) with respect to a program shall include
-
(A) the current estimate of the total program cost for the program; and
(B) an identification of existing programs or technologies that are similar
to the technology, or that have a mission similar to the mission, of the
program that is the subject of the notice.
(3) In this subsection, the term ''new special access program'' means a special
access program that has not previously been covered in a notice and justification
under this subsection.
(c) Reports on changes in classification of special access programs
(1) Whenever a change in the classification of a special access program of
the Administration is planned to be made or whenever classified information
concerning a special access program of the Administration is to be declassified
and made public, the Administrator shall submit to the congressional defense
committees a report containing a description of the proposed change, the
reasons for the proposed change, and notice of any public announcement planned
to be made with respect to the proposed change.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (3), any report referred to in paragraph
(1) shall be submitted not less than 14 days before the date on which the
proposed change or public announcement is to occur.
(3) If the Administrator determines that because of exceptional circumstances
the requirement of paragraph (2) cannot be met with respect to a proposed
change or public announcement concerning a special access program of the
Administration, the Administrator may submit the report required by paragraph
(1) regarding the proposed change or public announcement at any time before
the proposed change or public announcement is made and shall include in the
report an explanation of the exceptional circumstances.
(d) Notice of change in SAP designation criteria
Whenever there is a modification or termination of the policy and criteria
used for designating a program of the Administration as a special access
program, the Administrator shall promptly notify the congressional defense
committees of such modification or termination. Any such notification shall
contain the reasons for the modification or termination and, in the case
of a modification, the provisions of the policy as modified.
(e) Waiver authority
(1) The Administrator may waive any requirement under subsection (a), (b),
or (c) of this section that certain information be included in a report under
that subsection if the Administrator determines that inclusion of that
information in the report would adversely affect the national security. The
Administrator may waive the report-and-wait requirement in subsection (f)
of this section if the Administrator determines that compliance with such
requirement would adversely affect the national security. Any waiver under
this paragraph shall be made on a case-by-case basis.
(2) If the Administrator exercises the authority provided under paragraph
(1), the Administrator shall provide the information described in that subsection
with respect to the special access program concerned, and the justification
for the waiver, jointly to the chairman and ranking minority member of each
of the congressional defense committees.
(f) Report and wait for initiating new programs
A special access program may not be initiated until -
(1) the congressional defense committees are notified of the program; and
(2) a period of 30 days elapses after such notification is received
http://foia.state.gov/eo12958/part4.asp
[Excerpted from Executive Order 12958, Classified National Security Information]
Sec. 4.4. Special Access Programs.
(a) Establishment of special access programs. Unless otherwise authorized
by the President, only the Secretaries of State, Defense and Energy, and
the Director of Central Intelligence, or the principal deputy of each, may
create a special access program. For special access programs pertaining to
intelligence activities (including special activities, but not including
military operational, strategic and tactical programs), or intelligence sources
or methods, this function will be exercised by the Director of Central
Intelligence. These officials shall keep the number of these programs at
an absolute minimum, and shall establish them only upon a specific finding
that:
(1) the vulnerability of, or threat to, specific information is exceptional;
and
(2) the normal criteria for determining eligibility for access applicable
to information classified at the same level are not deemed sufficient to
protect the information from unauthorized disclosure; or
(3) the program is required by statute.
(b) Requirements and Limitations.
(1) Special access programs shall be limited to programs in which the number
of persons who will have access ordinarily will be reasonably small and
commensurate with the objective of providing enhanced protection for the
information involved.
(2) Each agency head shall establish and maintain a system of accounting
for special access programs consistent with directives issued pursuant to
this order.
(3) Special access programs shall be subject to the oversight program established
under section 5.6(c) of this order. In addition, the Director of the Information
Security Oversight Office shall be afforded access to these programs, in
accordance with the security requirements of each program, in order to perform
the functions assigned to the Information Security Oversight Office under
this order. An agency head may limit access to a special access program to
the Director and no more than one other employee of the Information Security
Oversight Office; or, for special access programs that are extraordinarily
sensitive and vulnerable, to the Director only.
(4) The agency head or principal deputy shall review annually each special
access program to determine whether it continues to meet the requirements
of this order.
(5) Upon request, an agency shall brief the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, or his or her designee, on any or all of the agency's
special access programs.
(c) Within 180 days after the effective date of this order, each agency head
or principal deputy shall review all existing special access programs under
the agency's jurisdiction. These officials shall terminate any special access
programs that do not clearly meet the provisions of this order. Each existing
special access program that an agency head or principal deputy validates
shall be treated as if it were established on the effective date of this
order.
(d) Nothing in this order shall supersede any requirement made by or under
10 U.S.C. 119.
SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION:
http://www.dod.mil/nii/other/5200_AP8.doc
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/s/04926.html
special access program
(DOD) A sensitive program, approved in writing by a head of agency with original
top secret classification authority, that imposes need-to-know and access
controls beyond those normally provided for access to confidential, secret,
or top secret information. The level of controls is based on the criticality
of the program and the assessed hostile intelligence threat. The program
may be an acquisition program, an intelligence program, or an operations
and support program. Also called SAP.
Special Access Program Oversight Committee:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/sapoc.html
https://dssacdsws.dss.mil/cat/sa100-01.htm
Special Access Program Overview SA100.01
Provides on-site training for organizations in the National Capital Region
working in support of Department of Defense Special Access Programs (SAPs).
This overview describes the SAP environment and discusses the interaction
among the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government in
establishing SAP policy. The roles and responsibilities of oversight and
support offices and agencies, and mandatory SAP requirements are reviewed.
Security enhancements such as special terminology, personnel security
investigative or adjudicative requirements, specialized non-disclosure
agreements, carve-outs, billet systems and other options are defined in
accordance with the Overprint to the National Industrial Security Operating
Manual Supplement 1.
Target Audience: Government and industry personnel assigned (or about to
be assigned) to an approved SAP - by invitation only. Attendees are selected
by the sponsoring organization.
https://dssacdsws.dss.mil/cat/sa101-01.htm
Special Access Program Orientation SA101.01
Introduces students to Department of Defense (DoD) Special Access Programs
(SAPs). The course describes the SAP environment and discusses the interaction
among the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government in
establishing SAP policy. The roles and responsibilities of oversight and
support offices and agencies, and mandatory SAP requirements are reviewed.
Lessons address security enhancements, annual reviews, inspections and audits.
This orientation is offered in residence or as a field extension course.
Target Audience: Newly assigned SAP security professionals and SAP non-security
professionals.
Prerequisites: Recommended successful completion of OPSEC Fundamentals (OPSE
1301), Basic Information Security (IF001.08), Basic Industrial Security for
User Agency Personnel (IS001.08), Essentials of Industrial Security Management
(IS002.08), Protecting Secret and Confidential Documents (IS003.08) and DoD
Personnel Security Adjudication (PS001.08) Independent Study courses.
SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM INDOCTRINATION AGREEMENT:
http://www.dior.whs.mil/forms/DD2836.PDF
http://www.defenselink.mil/photos/Mar2003/030311-D-9880W-177.html
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations & Environment Raymond
DuBois (left) administers the oath of office to Stephen Cambone (center)
as the new Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence during a ceremony
in the Pentagon office of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld (2nd from
left) on March 11, 2003, while Cambone's wife, Margaret, holds the Bible.
Rumsfeld created the position to emphasize the importance of intelligence
gathering and interpretation in the new security environment of the 21st
century. DoD photo by R. D. Ward. (Released)
http://www.defenselink.mil/bios/cambone_bio.html
Updated:
05 Dec 2003
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STEPHEN A. CAMBONE
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence |
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Stephen A. Cambone was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as the Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence on March 7th, 2003. Prior to March 7th, he was
the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of
Defense. Dr. Cambone held that position since July 1st, 2002. On July 19th,
2001, he was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy. He held that position until July 1st, 2002. Prior
to that, he served as The Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary
of Defense from January 2001 to July 2001.
Dr. Cambone was the Staff Director for the Commission to Assess United States
National Security Space Management and Organization from July 2000 to January
2001. He was the Director of Research at the Institute for National Strategic
Studies, National Defense University (INNS/NDU) from August 1998 to July
2000. Before that he was the Staff Director for the Commission to Assess
the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States from January 1998 to July
1998; a Senior Fellow in Political-Military Studies at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS) from 1993 to 1998; the Director for Strategic
Defense Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1990 to 1993;
the Deputy Director, Strategic Analysis, SRS Technologies (Washington Operations)
from 1986 to 1990; and a Staff Member in the Office of the Director, Los
Alamos National Laboratory from 1982 to 1986.
Dr. Cambone graduated from Catholic University in 1973 with a B.A. degree
in Political Science, from the Claremont Graduate School in 1977 with an
M.A. degree in Political Science, and from the Claremont Graduate School
in 1982 with a Ph.D. in Political Science. His numerous awards include the
Secretary of Defense Award for Outstanding Service in 1993 and the Employee
of the Year Award with SRS Technologies (Washington Operations) in 1988. |
Eyeballing
Stephen Cambone
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
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Stephen A. Cambone
1809 Barbee Street
Mc Lean, VA 22101-5213
703-848-0754
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